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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
After the 2007-2009 global financial crises, the elvation of President Xi Jinping to 
paramount power since 2012-2013 and his ´continuity through change´, cautious though 
resolute, step-by-step implementation of the 21st century ´China Dream Grand Strategy´, the 
world of today is somewhat ´broken up´ in terms of geopolitics. 
 For me, as a Sinologue, Bulgarian Senior diplomat with over thirty years experience, 
including in Beijing (1985-1990), the clear divide b tween the East and West that allegedly 
faded away after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, showed somewhat wake-up warning 
calls for reincarnation during the struggle between East Asia and the West during the 1997-98 
Asian Financial Crisis, reiterated by President Xi´s calls for a ´new historic starting point´, 
´struggle for the international system´, declaring China´s firm determination for a key role in 
all processes and developments in geo-economics and geopolitics, both regionally and 
globally. 
 No definite, plausible, and convincing answer has been given, yet, as to who is the real 
winner out of the end of the Cold War? We face globa  and regional, political, economic, debt 
burden financial, social, military and proliferation travails that persist. A wave of nationalism, 
protectionism, and de-globalization has arisen. The U.S. under President Trump is 
unpredictably retreating from global and regional vital challenges, and the structural alliance 
between the EU and the U.S. is being questioned, as Ch ncellor Merkel declares that ´Europe 
should take matters into its own hands´.  
 Emulating past great power rise´s economic and financial protectionism, China tells 
the world that its strategy is ´reform and opening´, but in real ground life it more resembles 
´reform and selected conditional opening´, under Beijing´s rules, appearing that the world 
´may be too late´. Appeasing President Trump, very r cently, China agreed to allow U.S. 
credit card giants, like Visa and MasterCard, access to its huge market – but now domestic 
Chinese financial service companies, like UnionPay, Alipay, so dominate the Chinese market 
that U.S´. and other foreign companies will be left to fight over the scraps. 
 The ´fragmentation´ of the world has brought major changes in the existing 
geopolitical patterns and has offered more choices and options to China´s continuous rise and 
global preeminence re-emergence. Beijing is gaining space and influence in global economy, 
governance, and development model promotion, making full use if its geo-economics 
advantages in expanding and remodeling the geopolitical global structure. 
 In the discipline of International Relations the global re-emergence of China is one of 
the most, if not the mostly sought, research topic, with vast body of published analytical 
literature in the last decade. However, what is still missing and understudied in both world´s 
policy debates and scholarly IR production, are the qu stions of existence/non-existence of 
current and structured Chinese Grand Strategy, and how will China operationally behave in 
implementing its 21st century two centenarian goals, based and guided by historical 
experience and lessons from past power transition patterns. Many researchers have made 
casual references to the emergence of past Great Powers, but fell short of thoroughly 
addressing structural Grand Strategy parallels betwe n China´s rise and similar cases in world 
history. Some even openly express legitimate doubts and pessimism about China´s key role to 
major processes and developments in geopolitics, both in the Asia-Pacific and globally 
 For my scholarly eclectic research inquiry into the domestic building blocks, driving 
forces and strategic goals of China´s rise and its international relations and foreign policy, I 
scholarly turned to comparative case-study with the relatively ´peaceful´ and successful U.S.´ 
post-WWII Grand Strategy. 20th century´s failed hegemonic rise attempts of Japan, Germany 
and USSR serve China´s Grand Strategy only as negativ  examples, and warning lessons of 
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what exactly not to do. China is trying to emulate nd Sinicize all successful U.S. strategies 
and policies that led to the later´s post mid-20th century final rise and global preeminance.  
Believing that the arc of history is on her side and actively working on that geo-
economically-first, geopolitically-second, all that currently China is strategically prioritizing, 
is, buying enough time and guaranteeing peaceful international environment at least until its 
second 2049 centenarian China Dream strategic goal of celebrating the 100th anniversary of 
then projected extremely powerful and influential People´s Republic. President Xi Jinping´s 
January 2017 Davos economic globalization leadership-apt speech clearly indicated China´s 
fears, that just like 100 years ago, the current wave of anti-globalization and its potential 
geopolitical backlash, could easily lead to the re-emergence of unpredictable geo-strategic 
hostile military rivalry and conflicts, de-globalization and global economic depression, seen 
as the main existential threats and risks facing China Dream Grand Strategy. 
While explicitly researching and elaborating on the potential 21st century unraveling of 
one of the global most important and consequential bil teral U.S. – China relationship, as the 
title of the research project dictates, being an European, though from the periphery, my 
signals and wake-up calls throughout the dissertation were implicitly raising the current tough 
and pending EU travails - its unity, solidarity and future European vision. 
In trying to give scholarly plausible and convincing answers to the thesis´ main 
question - ´What does China want? I also kind of put forward the not less important question 
of - ´What does Europe want?´ 
World history, not as a teacher, but rather as a warden, who punishes all those not 
learning from past lessons and mistakes, is abundant of cases where super and great powers 
do come to compromises and on terms, quite often at the expense of third parties. 
What bears more risks and threats to the EU - Russia, China, the ´Trump 
phenomenon´, or Brexit, that may exacerbate more divisions and geopolitical contradictions 
in Europe? 
What we have today is ´America First´, ´China First´, ´Russia First´, ´Brexit – Global 
Britain, independent actor, relying on its U.S.´ ´special relationship´, ´Golden Age´ 
relationship with China, and on conditional support from some of the EU member states.  
After recent, May 2017´s, President Trump business/money trip to the Middle East 
and Europe/NATO/EU/G-7/, continuing Russian assertiv ness, and the refusal of Chinese 
Premier Li Keqiang to sign the common EU-China declaration/statement on the bilateral 19th 
Leaders´ meeting in early June 2017 in Brussels, it i  more than obvious that Neo-Realpolitik 
is back home to roost. For me, it is more than obvius that the EU under pressure has to look 
after and safeguard its legitimate interests and international standing by masterly using its 
available soft-power, and hopefully forthcoming – hard power, to balance and stabilize 
international geopolitics. 
I would rather agree with Richard Haass that security, international relations and 
foreign policy Grand Strategy – begins at home. 
Lacking notable deliverables and practical future consolidation vision, the March 25, 
2017, 60th Treaty of Rome anniversary Declaration was short of openly admitting and 
promoting the option of a ´two speed Europe´. The simple concept of ´two speed´ speaks for 
itself, and implies threats and risks for the Union´s cohesion of democracy, rule of law, and 
welfare. 
What if the ´core´ minority member states group fails to agree on the future unifying, 
consolidating, and integrating the ´non-core´ majority group´s vision and Grand Strategy? 
How will the ´non-core´ member states who still objectively cannot or hesitate to join the 
´core´ group operationally behave amidst fading faith in common EU destiny and future? 
The crucial debates over EC´s March 2017 future EU´s Five scenarios White Paper 
and four reflection papers on globalization, defense and security, finance and economy, and 
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social dimensions of the EU should deliver a one voice vision and Grand Strategy by EU 
elections year of 2019, and streamline Institutions´ leaderships. 
By putting its economic and financial house in order first, the EU, not opposing, but 
independently and autonomously, should significantly enhance, streamline and integrate its 
security and defense standing assets through viable and optimally inclusive European Defense 
Union, beginning with Articles 42(6) and 46 of the TEU, assess a real, not wishfully 
imaginary world picture, and tell the rest what its s rategic interests are and what does Europe 
really wants for the 21st century. 
Quite some outstanding Belgian IR scholars have played a strong motivated role and 
encouraging influence for the apparition of this Ph.D. dissertation. 
I owe deep gratitude and am entirely thankful to my former Supervisor, Professor 
Emeritus Rik Coolsaet, both for his humanly philosophical and professionally wise and subtle 
advice, guidance, and scholarly freedom he rendered m  in the complex labyrinth of my 
ambitious endeavor and in conducting the research. 
I am also much indebted to my current Supervisor Prfessor Dries Lesage, who gave 
valuable practical support and guidance during the final important streamlining stage of my 
work. 
The works and publications of Professor Sven Biscop, served as example and 
inspiration. I truly value and admire his honest and professional stand of a totally committed 
Pro-European in this uncertain, volatile and ambivalent international geopolitical reality 
environment. 
Of course, finally, dedicating my scholarly endeavor to my family, I have to express 
my deep and loving gratitude and appreciation for Juliana and Stephan´s unconditional belief 
and trust in the scholarly and purely human added value that my work could contribute with. 
They stoically embraced the long days and nights, when I was missing from home and family 


























I N T R O D U C T I O N 
 
GENERAL HYPOTHESES OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
 Neither China nor the world were expecting or ready to meet the meteoric and 
spectacular rise of China and her overtaking Japan as the world second largest economy in 
2010. In only three decades China accomplished what took other countries dozens, even 
centuries. 
 In whatever direction we turn today - politics, global governance, economics, finance, 
energy, inter-state and inter-party interactions, we meet and face basic principles of Deng 
Xiaoping´s “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” theory, dialectically based upon China´s 
specifics and concrete historical conditions.. In most cases these ´characteristics´ are leading 
and guiding Chinese leaderships´ policies, regionally, even globally, based on pragmatic geo-
economics, rather than on hard power and ideology. Enshrined into the CCP´s Constitution at 
the 15th Party Congress in 1997, Deng´s Theory remains a cardinal guideline for action, 
allowing also for Beijing´s strategic and tactical political and economic flexible adjustments 
in progressive line with the officially proclaimed Chinese ´core national interests – security, 
sovereignty, economic development´ in 2011. 
IR discipline and scholarship make no exception. China as been a priority topic and 
theme for IR research and analysis, with the main questions – where is China going to, what 
does China want? Many scholars have tried routinely to compare China with the contender 
status of Germany, with its Bismarkian reassurance and Wilhelmine assertiveness, even with 
the USSR`s ideological revisionism. But, both of these hegemonic attempts have failed, 
fatally. China´s strategic and tactical behavior and policies show that she has no intentions of 
emulating a failed and compromised hegemonic strategic xperience, practice and patterns. 
Beijing´s consistent calls and drive for peaceful coexistence, win-win inclusive cooperation 
and dialogue also demonstrates determination to evade the history lessons it considers 
negative, harmful, and dangerous for its 21st century China Dream national rejuvenation and 
development. For Chinese leadership, the fate and future of 1.35 billion people is not a casino 
stake, especially after the ´century of humiliation´ that China suffered and will never forget. 
What makes China an unique strategist?  
Before its two failed belligerent hegemonic attempts, Kaiser´s and Hitler´s Germanies 
were integrated active parts of the existing Western international system, having mutual 
economic, trade, financial and investment interactions with its future adversaries. Shortly 
before WWII, Berlin even hosted the Olympic game in 1936. Germany-led distinct military 
alliances were established and fought during WWI and WWII. 
In systemic contrast to Germany, after WWI/WWII and during the hostile ideological 
and military blocks´ Cold War period, the Soviet Union was not incorporated into the Western 
dominant international system, having its own-led Warsaw Pact and Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance. Moscow took part at the Breton Woods negotiations in 1944, but never 
ratified the agreement. It was only after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and after long period 
of negotiations that the new Russian Federation becam  member of the Breton Woods´ liberal 
democratic systemic institutions of the IMF, WB, and GATT/WTO. 
China´s uniqueness and third path Deng Xioaping´s strategy lays in the premises that 
initially in its rise period after 1978/79 China conditionally accepted to be a non-systemic 
shaker, status-quo, ´Keep a low profile´ (KLP) ´responsible stakeholder´ within the dominant 
liberal democratic international system, and even struck a ´quasi-alliance´ with the U.S. in 
countering hegemonic USSR.  
Demonstrating systemic ´responsible stakeholdership´,after accumulating relatively 
impressive ´comprehensive national strength´, and especially after the global financial and 
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economic ´Great Recession´ in 2008-9, China began moving towards a more assertive 
´searching for acievements´ (SFA) strategy, by creating and supporting structures and 
platforms outside the existing liberal international system, such as: SCO; BRICS, 
OBOR/BRI; AIIB; NDB, etc. 
What we have today is an ambitious resurrecting China with a Grand Strategy that 
maneuvers and operates both within and outside the established dominant international 
system. In sharp contrast to Germany and USSR´s failed military based hegemonic attempts, 
and U.S´ initially successful one, China´s Grand Strategy third path, for the time being, does 
not include as its major building block, the scope of the creation of formal military-security 
alliances with third countries. 1982 enshrined in the CCP´s Constitution principles of ´no 
alliances, no hegemony, and no expansion´ allow China only for the creation and support of 
´strategic and/or cooperative´ partnerships with different states around the world. 
Deng Xiaoping´s adopted vision and legacy of the principle of ´one country-two 
systems´ also adds up to China´s uniqueness in its modern development path, characterised by 
a mixed planned and free market economy functioning together with a non-liberal political 
superstructure under the leadership of the CCP. 
Holistic comparison of the entire long periods of the U.S.´ and China´s rise is not the 
goal of my work. 
In my thesis, I claim, using eclectic empirical evidence, official documentation and 
comparative analysis, that China is gradually, selectiv ly and patiently emulating, with 
“Chinese characteristics”, the only successful experience of relatively ´´peaceful´´ global 
preeminence rise in history – that of the United States after WWII, taking into account the 
different historical periods of accomplishment. 
Strategic and tactical selective cases of emulations a d parallels with successful 
American experience and policies are abundant: 
- Chinese recent more assertive stands on the South China Sea and the East China Sea 
are not that much different from the distant 19th century U.S.´ Monroe Doctrine, when West 
European powers in the years were told that they are not welcome in the Western 
Hemisphere; 
- U.S. led Bretton Woods system of IMF and WB, now has its parallel in China led 
AIIB, BRICS´ NDB, as well as the option promoted byBeijing for the creation of SCO´s 
distinct Development Bank; 
- U.S´s role after 1945 as the world´s biggest creditor nation, engine for global 
economic growth and globalization, is currently, at the discretion of the Chinese leadership, 
strategically taken over by Beijing; 
- U.S.´ 1948 $ 14 billion Marshall Plan for the WWII post-war reconstruction of 
Western Europe and Japan is generally emulated by China´s 2013 OBOR/BRI for industrial, 
infrastructure, communications and energy development and connectivity of Asia, Africa and 
Europe in the tune of  hundreds of billions and even trillions U.S. dollars. 
- Post WWII American idustrial, technological, and educational supremacy is 
currently contested and emulated by overwhelming Chinese efforts and investment in these 
sectors. 
-  China´s 2011 officially declared ´core national interests´ quite resemble the red lines 
attached to the long existing stratagems of ´nationl security´ and ´national vital´ interests of 
the USA.  
-  China´s current Strategic Partnership of Coordinatio  with Russia, echoes U.S´ 
´quasi-alliance´ with China against USSR in the 1970s and 1980s. 
-   In April 2016, besides his other 3 top party, state, and military chairmanships - a 
direct military control over the PLA was assumed by Xi Jinping in his new, very U.S. like, 
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capacity of ´Commander-in-Chief, discarding the old Soviet-style structure, and emulating the 
U.S. model of joint command for faster execution of decisions. 
-  China´s March 2018 initial issuance of ´petro-yuan´ futures oil contracts is not that 
different from the established global system of the ´p tro-dollars´ contracts, marking China´s 
long term ambitious plans for increased circulation of the yuan (RMB) in the global economy. 
-  On the informational contest and emulating American practice, since 1998 the 
Informatiom Office of China´s State Council (Government) began publishing reports on the 
human rights´ situation in the U.S., emulating similar traditional annual reports on China by 
the State Department. March 2018 launched new Chinese informational platform – Voice of 
China´ (VOC), quite resembles the functions of the U.S. govrnment-funded – Voice of 
America (VOA), etc. 
  The title of the dissertation ´U.S. – China power transition in the 21st century´, in line 
with the general hypotheses, implies reference to the Power Transition Theory (PTT) and how 
China sees it. For Organski, and his main disciples and followers – Kugler, Tammen, Lemke, 
being structural rationalist, neither realist nor idealist, PTT has the most tightly integrated and 
internally consistent explanation for why, how, and when conflicts and war occur between the 
dominant great power and dissatisfied challengers in the system.1  
 Chinese leadership and IR scholars consider that PTT is a Western IR theory which 
analyzes Western hegemonic practices and war history. They consistently claim that one of 
the pillars of the Chinese Grand Strategy`s internatio l relations and foreign policy goals is 
the necessity of achieving and guaranteeing friendly, competitive, and peaceful development 
environment, thus promoting the peaceful identity of China. 
 Organski, in his original explication of power transition theory, however, was far more 
cautious regarding routine IR comparison made between a rising China with that of Germany 
over 100 years ago. Despite predicting the remarkable rise of China exactly 60 years ago in 
his 1958 book World Politics, Organski was circumspect in predicting a great power war 
involving China and the U.S. According to the PTT affili ted IR scholars, U.S. can maintain 
peace and stability by successfully managing the future transition with China, and later with 
India.2 
 In my work I hypothesize that by many measures the ris  of China in the U.S.-led 
international system has indeed triggered a U.S.-China power transition. In retrospect, this 
power transition started when China embarked on a more assertive SFA strategic and tactical 
behavior, especially after officially defining its ´core national interests in 2011, and President 
Xi´s 2012 concept of ´New Type of Major Countries Relationship´ between China and U.S. 
Many IR scholars, Chinese included, doubt whether China has a Grand Strategy which 
underpins and guides its march into the 21st century. I argue that China already has basically 
formulated its own third path Grand Strategy, well constructed from the point of view of 
current `means` and `ends`, with a dialectic unity of mandatory components and basic 
elements of  “security, economy and ideology”, and concrete mid and long-term strategic 
power transition goals till 2050. My discussions regarding China`s rise, its future options for 
influence and power in the 21st century through the focus of the equation China - U.S., and the 
new evolving international system, I consider as relevant and of importance mostly in the 
context of the goals of the Grand Strategy, and as a response to the question - ´What does 
China really want?´ 
As any Grand Strategy, “China Dream Grand Strategy” is mostly a hostage of the 
`means`. The success or failure of the global interdependent economy, the new Chinese 
economic model/project, and the global geopolitical developments, will determine how much 
                                                 
1 Ronald L. Tammen et al. ´Power Transitions : Strategies for the 21st Century´, 2000, New York: CQ Press, p. 6. 
2 Ibid, Chapter 7. 
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and how soon President Xi`s China Dream succeeds or fails, and how China will relate to the 
world in the 21st century, especially in its crucial interactions with the USA. 
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS/ CHALLENGES 
  
“Napoleon Bonaparte once said that China is “a sleeping lion and when China wakes 
up, the world will shake “3. In fact, the lion of China has awoken, but what the world sees 
now, is a peaceful, amiable, civilized lion”.4   
During his first official March 2014 visit in France, President Xi Jinping made a 
speech at UNESCO headquarters in Paris, decoding in a relative constructivist language, his 
China Dream strategy: “The Chinese people are striving to fulfill the Chinese Dream of the 
great renewal of the Chinese nation. The Chinese Dream is about the prosperity of the 
country, the rejuvenation of the nation and the happiness of the people. It reflects both the 
ideal and drive of the Chinese people today to seek constant progress. The China Dream will 
be realized through balanced development and mutual reinforcement of the material and 
cultural progress. Without the continuation and development of civilization or the promotion 
of prosperity and culture the China Dream will not c me true “, organically complementing 
his Paris realist metaphor of the “peaceful, benign Chinese lion”. 
At the turn of the 20th century, China was at best still on the average at the periphery 
of the global political economy and world liberal democracy driven international relations. 
Today, we have a transitional historic moment in which China, India, Russia, Brazil, 
Turkey, Indonesia and a list of secondary rising powers have a pretty impressive, though 
contradictory, developmental record, a “new historical starting point” as Chinese President Xi 
Jinping clearly and firmly reiterated in his opening address, keynote speech at the Business G-
20, and final press-conference of the 2016 China Hangzhou G-20 meeting (September 4-5). 
 G-20 September 2016 summit witnessed Xi`s skilful and unwavering promotion of the 
framework of Globalization 2.0 with `Chinese characteristics`. He declared that it will lead to 
the wellbeing of all mankind in the form of societies of common destiniy and interests on the 
basis of harmony, cooperation and fair distribution of public goods, displayed as the nucleus 
of the Chinese civilization`s values system. For Beijing, the instrumental role for achieving 
the recovery of the global economy from the crisis of the old industrial development model 
should be played by the G-20. The latter must be elevated from being a `talk shop` to medium 
and long-term active managerial actions group and multilateral innovation policies´ platform 
with allegedly strong China leadership role. 
 At the same time the U.S. and EU seemed to have fallen into a period of political and 
economic uncertainty and self doubt arguably of a sort we have not seen, unprecedented since 
the rise of the Western world. In the U.S. that is taking form of a conflicting domestic 
political polarization with weird and unorthodox partisan outcomes as the run of Sanders and 
Trump for the 2016 presidency, unknown to the USA since 1945. In the EU it is taking the 
forms of a re-nationalization of political and economic life, including immigration policies 
and building protection walls, or ideas for quitting the Shengen, a questioning of the future of 
the EU as a strategic project. Issues are raised whether the EU is coherent to aggregate and 
consolidate its model and role in managing and navigating the transition of this world to the 
next international system. Will the Brexit outcome lead to serious economic and geopolitical 
impact on the latter as a whole and especially from EU Global Strategy perspective? 
                                                 
3 Quote attributed to Napoleon by Alain Peyrefitte /1973/, Paris, Fayard, :”Quand la Chine s`eveillera … le monde tremblera. 
4 Xi Jinping – President of the PR of China speech to mark the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between PRC and France, Paris, 
March 28, 2014” , Xinhua News. 
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 We could not consider it as accidental that the U.S. seems to be almost politically 
polarized, that in Europe Madame Merkel was yelling at the leaders of Greece who were 
trying to bail out their failing and bankrupt economy. The Italians are wondering whether the 
EU is running out of steam, Germany is loosing its European vocation, and the UK is in 
search of its own future Commonwealth 2.0 model of development and global posture. 
Objectively, troubled Japan can be added to the mix. We are witnessing and looking at some 
deeper kinds of structural changes that are making political and socio-economic life in the 
liberal democracies of the world much more difficult than ever. 
Due to the all above, and especially to the Brexit shock, the June 2016 European 
Council did not meet the expectations for comprehensiv  and holistic debates and  
prioritization on the right EU Global Strategy, and the Union`s pragmatically idealistic role 
model “as the promoter of security, freedom and pros erity – as defender of equality – in 
Europe and the world”.5. 
Perhaps the new American administration will try to th roughly analyze the changing 
real world and adjust the U.S. Grand Strategy in line with President Trump inaugural address 
and first speech to the joint session of Congress on February 28, 2017, where his pledge to the 
´´renewal of the American spirit´´ quite resembled President Xi´s 2012 China Dream Grand 
Strategy and call for the ´´rejuvenation of the Chinese nation´´. 
The most pressing,  long term geopolitical question, confronting the world today are: 
“What is the next international system going to look like, how long  and in what direction its 
construct is going to take us, would it be peaceful or would it vindicate the realist discourse of 
war like hegemonic transition?” How will China and the USA behave strategically in the rest 
of the 21st century? 
Even though strategists, analysts, scholars and policy makers differ on exactly how 
long the material and ideological primacy of the West is going to last, almost everybody today 
has arrived at the same conventional wisdom which is that the processes of change have 
began. It may take another decade or two, but by sometime between 2025-2040 we shall live 
in a world in which, as Noble laureate in Economics Robert Fogel predicted in 20106, China 
will be the most powerful player economically, in which it may likely develop a military and 
geopolitical ambition to go with it. In 2010, Steven M. Walt also announced “the end of the 
world as we know it” in his May 13 post in Foreign Affairs concluding that “Even if this 
analysis is partly correct, then we are going to need some serious rethinking of grand strategy 
in both Europe and the United States. Hard choices will have to be made, and traditional 
world-view and familiar platitudes won`t help us very much”7.  
We are looking at and participating in a historical moment in which we are going to 
move away from a long period of Western dominance to one in which the West is only one of 
the multiple poles of power and ideology in the world. In history, when such kind of 
transitions took place, they were violent and dangerous. When power moved in the system, 
from one particular kind of power to another – there was a contest for the norms and the 
principles that order the international system and struggle, bloody struggle usually came along 
with it. 
The questions I want to research and give convincing, plausible answers in my thesis 
are therefore multifaceted:  
1. Similarities and differences in the leadership postures of the U.S (mid-20thc.) and 
China (21stc.). Is China selectively and pragmatically emulating some of the successful 
                                                 
5 See Sven Biscop, `Geopolitics with European Characte istics: An Essey on Pragmatic Idealism, Equality, and Strategy`, March 2016, 
Egmont Paper 82, Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, p. 26. 
6 Robert Fogel, “ $123000000000000 China`s Estimated Economy by the year 2040. Be Warned”, Foreign Policy, Vol. 7, January 2010. 
7 Steven Walt, “The End of the World as We Know it”, Foreign Affairs, May 13, 2010. 
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approaches and Grand Strategy of post-WWII U.S., and does Beijing have a Grand Strategy 
for a power transition in the 21st century? 
2. Will China eventually accept to be fully brought in line with the Western liberal 
international order, or shall we have – confrontation, defeat and possible integration? 
           3. Is it viable and realistic that for the first time in the history of Modernity, the West 
will loose the Grand contest and let live peacefully a Chinese model in the international 
system?  
4. Is China a status-quo, revisionist or third path strategist, targeting a totally new 
multi polar and no one`s international system?  
 
 
  CONTENT/STRUCTURAL OUTLINE  
 
The structure of the dissertation is divided into five building blocks. 
INTRODUCTION 
The work begins with the general hypotheses, my four research questions/challenges, 
followed by the structural logic of the research design, and the academic state of the art of the 
research questions. My eclectic analytical approach is represented by my discussion and 
concise drawing upon the main paradigms and IR theories with emphasis on how they explore 
and theorize on the topic of China`s rise. I also include the leading Chinese theoretical 
responses to the international China rise debate, and the Chinese Zhongyong dialectics of how 
IR scholars theorize on China`s rise and Grand Strategy. 
 PART I 
 I turn to selective comparative analysis of the systemic leadership posture processes of 
the USA and China, as one of my leading hypothesis claims that it is not Germany or the 
USSR, but the United States that China, applying its specific “Chinese characteristics”, is 
trying to pragmatically and flexibly emulate, especially the initial successful U.S. model 
towards global pre-eminence following WWII.  
 In the first chapter, I concisely discuss different periods of the successful emergence 
and rise of the United States on the world stage, with emphasys on post-WWII modes of 
world hegemony, definitely top priority research and study themes of Chinese strategists, as 
positive and negative experience. I also touch upon the limits of U.S. unipolarity, as 
evidenced in the first decade of the 21st century with signs of relative decline, leading to the 
2016 U.S. presidential debate in search for a new American Grand Strategy. 
 In the second chapter, I take a synthesized approach in exploring and discussing the 
main periods and major external and domestic defining events that led to the [re]emergence of 
China in the world, and set the stage for the evolution of its Grand Strategy for the 21st 
century. Here I concentrate on the premises showing that China`s rise strategy does not 
represent only a CCP`s copy right, but has a long history with green shots even during the 
period of the “century of humiliation”, before the fall of the Qing dynasty and the 1912 
Republic of China. Deng Xiaoping`s 1978 III Plenary marks only the beginning of the 
successful part of the China rise strategy, with two defined periods – the “keep a low profile” 
(KLP) from 1979 to the global financial and economic crisis of 2008-9, and the more 
confident and assertive “search for achievement” (SFA) period, from 2009 to the present. In 
the latter, China, under the almost unparalleled powerful leadership of President Xi Jinping, 
began demanding equality and parity in the relationship with the United States, by promoting 
Xi initiated “New Type of Major Countries Relationship” (NTMCR). 
P A R T II 
In the third chapter, the basic components or gradual b ilding blocks of “China 
Dream” Grand Strategy are under review. The discussion takes a thorough look at all security, 
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material and ideational elements that structure China Dream and shows the consequent and 
meticulous intentions and psychological approaches of President Xi to his collectivist project 
and experiment of capturing, energizing, and guiding the huge national potential, and 
especially the ambitions and dreams of the younger generation. The chapter concludes with 
the interconnectedness between Chinese nationalism nd the goals of the Grand Strategy. 
 In the fourth chapter I exhibit, based on the avail ble empirical data, the structure of 
the “China Dream” Grand Strategy. Then I discuss and try to put forward three sets of rational 
questions: What really does President Xi mean by China Dream and where is China believing 
to be headed at?; What can be projected of China`s c pabilities, political system, 
performances of the new economic growth model?; and What are the specific Chinese 
strategic intentions in the context of the Beijing`s current regional and global operational 
behavior? The chapter closes with plausible comparative trends and options for U.S. Grand 
Strategy response to “China Dream” in the context of he 2016 U.S. presidential election, 
which may open a new chapter in the universe of American politics. 
 PART III  
In chapter five I discuss the viability of China´s claims and surge for a new more just, 
democratic and inclusive system of international relations, and China´s from within and from 
outside the existing order third path approaches and strategy. China continues to selectively 
demonstrate its ´responsible stakeholder´s stands regarding the centrality of some of the 
existing systemic structures such as the UN, WTO, G-20, and in parallel seeks the 
establishment and enlargement of new international systemic structures and platforms where 
Beijing plays leading maker´s role - BRICS, SCO, BRI and AIIB. The recent Kazakhstan 
June 2017 inclusion in the SCO of India and Pakistan and President Xi´s call for a new SCO´s 
Development Bank, similar to the BRICS´ NDB, are notable examples of China Dream Grand 
Strategy´s efforts for major adjustments and transformations in the existing system of 
international relations. 
 Chapter six analyzes the current state of play of the international system and of the 
main actors, reiterates and reassesses the parallels and the differences between the leadership 
rise of the USA and China.. The analysis emphasizes China´s third pathway - ´geo-economics 
first´ strategy for regional and global pre-eminence, including by offering an alternative 
Chinese model of economic globalization development that may lead to ´Building the 
Community of Common Destiny of Mankind´ - the main motto of Xi´s January 2017 speech 
at the UNGA. 
 GENERAL ASSESSMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Finally, I draw general assessments and conclusions of the dissertation, based on the 
Beijing`s drive and declared option for economic globalization with ´Chinese characteristics´, 
the current state of play of the U.S.-China relationship, and the global geo-strategic outlook in 
the context of that relationship. I also turn to the results in the dissertation and formulate the 
basic answers to the four-folded research questions put forward in the Introduction, by reprise 
and summary of the arguments defined and developed throughout my work. 
 
STATE OF THE ART OF THE BASIC ACADEMIC RESEARCH  
 
The main questions and research topics in my thesis are about China`s rise Grand 
Strategy (status-quo, revisionist or third path geopolitical strategist) in the context of the 
geostrategic equation – China/U.S., and the new evolving international system. 
China seeks and works to reinstate its long past status as a great power. When 
discussing in the thesis as to how China relates to the existing international system and use the 
academic concepts of ´´status-quo´´ and ´´revisionit state´´, I eclectically draw on definitions 
given in Social Identity Theory (to be reviewed below). SIT postulates that states that seek to 
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improve their status have the options of pursuing: social mobility, social competition and/or 
social creativity. Social mobility [status-quo] emulates the values and norms of higher status 
group members so as the contender to be admitted to their club. The Chinese (Deng 
Xiaoping´s) general term is ´keep a low profile´ (KLP). Social competition [revisionism] aims 
at replacing or modifying the values and norms of the dominant group at the top of the status 
hierarchy by surpassing it in its domain of superiority. The Chinese Deng´s equivalent is -  
´search for acievements´(SFA). Social creativity seek  to attain pre-eminence in a different 
area from that of the other powers.  
Some SIT scholars consider social creativity to be th strategy that China has 
generally followed since the end of the Cold War …8, while I argue that China has 
pragmatically and flexibly used all three approaches in complementing its Zhongyong 
continuity through changes, third path geopolitical strategy after the 2008 Great Recession. 
The concept, “China`s rise” or “the rise of China”, s emerging great power, was first 
used and introduced by the distinguished Chinese realist IR scholar Yan Xuetong at Qinghua 
University. His controversial book - “International Environment of China`s Rise”9 was 
published in 1998, followed by his English language rticle entitled – “The Rise of China in 
Chinese Eyes “10 published in 2001. The concept was articulated and developed through the 
perspectives of China`s international relations andforeign policy strategies under the current 
and future Chinese leaderships. 
Then Party and State leader Jiang Zemin rejected the concept and the word “rise” was 
forbidden to appear in official documents, as having expansionist and revisionist 
connotations. 
Embedded in the logic of traditional realist Western IR theories, along with the take 
off of China as a rising power, came the perception of “China threat” prevalent in the West 
since the 1990s. The Bush Junior Administration was even advised to adopt a new 
containment strategy to counterbalance the “China Threat”11. 
China`s international relation and foreign policy strategists and elites were fully aware 
of the possible backlash that China`s growing economic and military power might cause.  
That`s the period when Deng Xiaoping left his `keep a low profile` (KLP) legacy to the 
future Chinese leadership as a strategy in the terms of his famous “28 character maxim”. 
The maxim, “ on the Pentagon`s annual reports to Congress on the military power of 
the PR of China since 2002, goes as follows: observe the situation calmly, hold the positions 
securely, cope with matters cool-heartedly, hide the capabilities and bide the time, practice 
solid defense, never assume international leadership, but strive to make measured moves”.12 
After 2002, with the arrival of the new 4th generation Hu-Wen leadership, prof. Yan 
Xuetong`s concept of “China`s rise” was revived, and redefined. The task was taken by 
President Hu´s advisor – Zheng Bijian. He elaborated and disseminated the idea of the 
concept under the title of “China`s peaceful rise “. Later, to avoid any hegemonic revisionist 
allusions, the name was modified to “China`s peaceful development “,. China`s peaceful rise 
was defined as an equivalent to the continuation of China`s modernization and reform, so 
there was no reason for China to change.13 The key pillars of China`s domestic and external 
policies were conceptualized in 3 dialectic “peaces”: international peace; internal harmony 
and reconciliation across the Taiwan Straits. 
                                                 
8 Deborah Welch Larson, `Will China be a New Type of Great Power? `, p. 324. 
9 Yan Xuetong, “International Environment of China`s Ri e “, Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 1998. 
10 Yan Xuetong, The Rise of China in Chinese Eyes, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 10. no. 26, 2001, pp. 33-44. 
11 Robert D. Kaplan, “How We Would Fight China”, The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 295, no. 5, June 2005, pp. 49-64. 
12 David Lai, “ The United States and China Power Transition”, Strategic Studies Institute Book, Dec. 2011, p. 60. 
13 Zheng Bijian, “The 16th Party Congress of CPC and China`s new path of Peaceful Rise”, in Collection of Zheng Bijian`s Essays, 
    Vol. 3, / Shanghai People`s Press / p. 1122.          
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The promotion of the “peaceful rise” theory in the U.S. reached a culmination when 
Zheng`s article on the theme was published in the most influential foreign policy journal in 
America – Foreign Affairs.14 
Zheng tried hard to drive his points home: Americans need a new conceptual 
framework to look at China`s rise as a world power and have to be convinced that China will 
take a brand new route of peaceful rise that is totally different case from those of Germany 
and Japan or the former Soviet Union. 
 Deputy Secretary of State Robert B. Zoellick delivered the U.S. response on the 
concept in his now-famous speech to the New York-based National Committee on U.S.-China 
Relations on September 21, 2005. Zoellick welcomed China’s forthcoming initiative. He 
commended China for its impressive economic development, accrediting it to the U.S. policy 
of integration that started with President Nixon’s hi toric visit to China in 1972 and continued 
by successive U.S. Presidents. He quoted Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as saying that 
“the United States welcomes a confident, peaceful, and prosperous China, one that appreciates 
that its growth and development depends on constructive onnections with the rest of the 
world.” At the same time, he urged China to become a responsible stakeholder in this 
system. 
Zoellick also emphasized that China’s quest for peaceful development had internal and 
external requirements.  
For him, although the Chinese leaders’ priority was understandably domestic 
economic development, they must also take measures to modernize China’s political system, 
without which China could not have a sustainable peaceful condition for its ambitious 
mission. Externaly, China must work with the United States and other leading nations to 
create and maintain an environment for all to develop peacefully. This cooperation would 
require that China share common interests, and more importantly, fundamental values with 
the United States, and the other leading nations.15  
Beijing`s strategists analyzed the U.S. requirements wi h much precaution. On the one 
hand, they assessed that it was a tactical and reluctant acceptance of China’s growing power 
and international posture. On the other, the Chinese noted that the “responsible stakeholder” 
concept had many undisclosed agendas and ulterior goals against China. Notably, it was a 
U.S. hegemonic design to integrate China into the U.S. led system The United States would 
press China to follow the rules set by the United States and the West. The latter would be the 
arbitre for China’s behaviour. Second, the agenda of responsibilities would be far beyond 
China’s potentials. Third, it was an exercise to get China to share the U.S. hegemonic 
burdens, many of which were against China’s foreign policy, `moral principles` and national 
interests. Fourth, it was an intelligent way to blame China for those China-threat problems 
such as, then rising costs for energy and other national resources, environmental degradation, 
climate change, and many others, and to urge China to bear more responsibility for the global 
problems. 
Chinese analysts, nevertheless, also noted the asset side of the U.S. maneuver — it was 
one that sought cooperation rather than confrontation. However, they all called for the 
Chinese leaders to stand firm on China’s long-held independent foreign policy, take on 
responsibilities according to China’s ability, moral principles, and national interests, even if 
they were in conflict with those of the United States and the West. China would be 
responsible to the world, they argued, but not justto the United States and the West alone. 
                                                 
14 Zheng Bijian, China`s “Peaceful Rise” to Great-Power Status, Foreign Affairs,  September/October, 2005. 
15 Robert B. Zoellick, “Wither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” Remarks  to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, 
September 21, 2005, New York  City. Not unexpectedly the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy included Zoellick’s  promotion of China as 
a “responsible stakeholder” and since then it stands firm on the  negotiation agenda of Washington DC.
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They also pointed out that although the ´responsible stake-holder´ formulation suggested that 
the United States welcomed China into the “club,” China would still be treated differently; it 
would be an insider in name but an outsider in factor a long time to come. China would be 
better served to continue its “ keep a low profile “ focus on its development, IRs and foreign 
policy16.  
The dissertation is about China`s third path emergence as a great power within the still 
unknown development of U.S.- China relations´ strategic equation in the twenty first century. 
The present case of China`s rise is a unique precedent in international relations and 
world history. No other world great power has ever had the chance or the potential to try to 
climb again the ladder to world preeminence twice. The reemergence of China as a great 
economic, political and military power and its follow ups at the end of the 20th and in the 
beginning of the 21st century is certainly one of the most notable IRs and historical topics of 
interest and scholarly research. The world is watching China`s rise with different sentiments 
and reactions ranging from expectation and admiration to awe and suspicion. 
It is very important to research and present a viewpoint and projections whether China 
will inevitably challenge the existing international system and the dominant global power 
violently, and force a global confrontation leading to potential classical power transition, or 
the present and future Chinese leaderships will seek and follow a different Zhongyong 
continuity through changes path into a new kind of international system. 
This is a crucial topic not just for IR scholars, strategists and policy makers, but also 
for the general public who care about the future of mankind – will it have the noble humane 
mission of “Star Trek” or the fatal lethal destiny of “Battlestar Galactica” . This makes it even 
more demanding to research international politics and history so that ways can be found to 
guide and manage U.S. – China 21st century crucial relationship towards a peaceful 
coexistence in the future. 
Very little is actually researched and known to serve as a guideline and precedent, 
about whether and how a global power transition can be attained peacefully, especially in 
today´s world of great power´s tensions and confrontations, economic and financial 
volatilities, global risks and challenges to mankind. 
Indeed, have we really reached the “end of history” with the current politico-
economic, social and international system? 
The Transatlantic Western power transfer after 1945 and the Soviet Block demise at 
the end of the Cold War, and their significance foruture global and regional power 
transitions, for example, are, too, unconvincingly under-researched. 
The neo-liberal democratic peace proposition positing that war is very unlikely 
between two democracies does not hold water in the present case and processes of power 
transition as we have a non-democratic dyad with a potential regional and global power shift, 
from the U.S. to China, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Chinese IR scholars, analysts, strategists and policymakers have been hard at work 
over the last decade driven by the theoretical and practical challenge of great power relations, 
specifically on power transitions. They keep a very close and sharp eye on Western concept 
development within IR theory.17 The “Thucydides Trap” is a hot topic of discussions i  high 
level Chinese circles in the last decade , including the debates and clashes over the concepts 
                                                 
16
  See Ni Feng, “From Responsible Stakeholder to Constructive Cooperator: President Hu Jintao`s visit to the United States and U.S.-China 
Relations”, Contemporary World, No. 6, 2006.; Yuan Peng, “On U.S. Attitude towards China: From China Threat to China as a 
Responsible Stakeholder”, East China Morning Post, December 22, 2005; Lin Limin, “A Careful Analysis of the Call China as  Responsible 
Stakeholder”, People`s Forum, No.6, 2007; Lin Fengchun, “ Fortune or Misfortune? An analysis of China as a Responsible Stake-holder”, 
International Issues, No. 4, 2006; Wang Yiwei, “The United States Wants to Reduce its Hegemonic Burden”, Huanqiu Times, June 7, 2006; 
Ma Zhengang, “China`s Responsibility and China as aResponsible Stakeholder”, International Issues Studies, April 2007, etc. 
 
17 Lyle J.Goldstein, “Test of Wills: Can China Overtake America in Asia Peacefully?”,  The National Interest, May 19, 2015. 
 20 
of “keeping a low profile” (KLP)  and “striving for achievements” (SFA), championed by 
two of the leading Chinese IR scholars Qin Yaqing ad Yan Xuetong. President Xi Jinping`s 
2012 concept of “New Type of Major Country Relationship” is the basis upon which Chinese 
scholars try to construct a new feasible paradigm of peaceful power transition, reflecting 
deeply and anxiously on the fact that similar cases ar  extremely rare in history.18 
Surveying the course of America`s rise to global preeminence Chinese scholars 
carefully point out that while the U.S. and GB avoided direct conflict in this period, the 
USA`s rise was hardly peaceful.19 
At present, U.S.- China rivalry continues to appear across geopolitical, geoeconomic, 
financial and even cultural spheres and is now unfolding in all corners of the planet. China 
seeks to pursue its China Dream Grand Strategy. Although formally sticking to its structural 
South China Sea claims, Beijing still appears to be deliberately avoiding a sort of “direct 
collision” by focusing China`s potential in all possible different directions, prioritizing on 
UN, G-20, BRICS, SCO, and its recent strategic initiatives – OBOR, AIIB.  
In both Washington and Beijing there is a strategic distrust, mutual fear, uncertainty 
and loathing that drive and lubricate zero-sum mentalities and serve as stimulus for hostile 
and increasingly dangerous policies and actions, such as the recent North Korean 
divergencies, and trade tariffs´ reciprocal sanctios, that may lead to unpredictable crisis 
consequences. 
A major academic debate has resurfaced since 2010-11 in Washington regarding how 
to respond to China`s rapid growth in comprehensive power. Perhaps the most eloquent and 
logically argueing for a more forceful U.S. approach in countering/containing China, is Aaron 
Friedberg in his book Contest for Supremacy , due to the clarity of his arguments and the 
specificity of his recommendations. He openly posits: “The `natural antagonism` between a 
rising power and an established hegemon has not been, and cannot easily be extinguished. 
Nor can the `massive` ideological differences betwen America and China be put aside.”20 
A balancing note into the Obama administration`s China policy was provided by 
Jeffrey Bader`s analysis – Obama and China`s rise. The book makes no references to the 
Pivot/Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region or to the Air-Sea Battle strategy. The special 
assistant to Obama for national security affairs at the NSC (2009-11) seems to call, above all, 
for the “balance” in Washington`s China policy, warning against falling “into the classical 
security dilemma” with Beijing, yet excluding any possibility of “excessive accommodations 
to China”. 
Henry Kissinger`s On China, too, offers a compelling vision of a cooperative future 
built on his deep understanding of Chinese strategic culture. He does not offer up specific 
policy recommendations, suggesting only that U.S. and Chinese leaders must develop a 
“tradition of consultations and mutual respect.”21 
Michael Swaine`s book, America`s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the 21st 
Century is another crucial step in the research and analysis of U.S.-China relations. Swaine 
points out the important possibility that “to maintain an effective strategy overall, U.S. 
interests … might also need to change as China`s capabilities increase”. Examining a range of 
possible strategies that Washington could pursue in cooperation with China, he concludes that 
a broad consensus supports a balance between hedging and engagement. He seems in a 
position of distancing from the current policy paradigm, calling for “alternatives to the present 
emphasis on predominance in the Western Pacific”, arguing that assertive “U.S. maritime 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Aaron L. Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for/Mastery in Asia, New York: W.W.Norton, 2012, pp. 
141-42. 
21 Henry Kissinger, On China / New York: Penguin Press, 2011 , pp. 529-530.  
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predominance in the Western Pacific is probably unsustainable over the long term, … [ and ] 
attempts to sustain this predominance … are likely to prove … destabilizing.”22 
Another new and extremely indicative research is “Strategic Reassurance and 
Resolve: U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century, by James Steinberg and Michael 
O`Hanlon. The authors note that in various obvious scenarios “the risks of serious U.S.-China 
war could be far greater than many now appreciate”. Offering a large number of concrete 
proposals to mitigate U.S.-China tensions, they express the hope that “Washington can craft 
its own policies in ways that will call forth reciprocal, positive Chinese actions”, advocating a 
“various cycles of cooperative restraint”.23 They admit that advocating cooperative 
approaches is frequently not popular, and, moreover, th y assert that “there are powerful 
forces in the United States … that will tend to favor U.S. policies that could accentuate 
…[the] rivalry between the U.S. and China. The same is true in key allied capitals, perhaps 
most notably in Tokyo”.24 
Obama administration´s 2011 Pivot/Rebalancing to Asia had in fact largely endorsed 
the program advocated by those American forces seeking to balance against China`s rise and 
growth in comprehensive power. President Trump´s continuing surge and attempt to resurrect 
the Quad alliance (U.S.-Japan-Australia-India) is as essed in Beijing as an open and hostile 
approach, follow up of the Pivot/Rebalancing in contai ing China. 
Cold War related ideological rivalries are now long i  history, but the risks of a U.S.-
China military accidents and conflict have increased ubstantially in the past 7-10 years. They 
now include scenarios ranging from the South China Se , to East China Sea, Taiwan, back to 
the Korean Peninsula, even into the Indian Ocean, and much further. In comparing the present 
era of geopolitical rivalry with the early Cold War, however, one fundamental difference is 
most and more than obvious. In 1950 the U.S. was at the Olympus of its comprehensive 
power (over 50% of the world GDP), and China had been utterly weakened by decades of 
wars and internal civil turmoil. Today the U.S. has to deal with a China that is unrecognizably 
strengthened, strategically innovative, and national stically motivated. 
Strategists and scholars who research U.S.-China relations on both sides of the Pacific, 
and elsewhere, are almost at consensus that a potential 21st  century catastrophic conflict is far 
from inevitable. 
In my dissertation I try to help bridge the gap between academic and policy 
community. I wish for a modest role in the process and make a humble attempt to be different 
from others in the field by explicitly focusing on the organic complex state nature, the 
similarities and differences in the rise and behavior of the two great powers. I also try to 
analyze the existence or lack of common denominators f r compromises on the peaceful 
power transition and paths for their future coexistence, and to give an added value to the 
genuine debate regarding the nonviolent policy solutions to the most vexing problems in the 
U.S.-China bilateral relations.  
Since the peak of the global financial (2008-09) and continuing economic crisis , and 
especially after 2010, when China overtook Japan as the world`s second largest economy, 
some renowned members of the IR academia both in the West and in China, took some first 
steps and slowly deviated from the predominant U.S. mainstream confrontational debate 
regarding China`s rise. Though lonely, and much limited, there was a more sober and 
                                                 
22 Michael D. Swaine, America`s Challenge: Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century /Washington DC: Cornegie Endowment 
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inclusive narrative regarding the future of the inter ational system, and the existential for the 
21st century key issue – the need of stable peace. 
The main schools in the field of international relations – realism, liberalism and 
constructivism, all have something to add up to explaining the outbreak of peace. At the same 
time, each paradigm has its own shortcomings and gaps. Research on stable peace, like many 
other fundamental issues explored by scholars of international politics, has suffered from 
intellectual barriers that accompany theoretical divides. Insufficient attention has been paid to 
approaches that cut across paradigmatic divides. Indeed, theoretical/analytical eclecticism is 
precisely what is needed to open up new horizons in the study of stable peace, so much 
deficient for the case of proper management and guiance of the U.S.-China relationship in 
the 21st century. 
Otherwise, the other potential option might be – research and “theory production” 
regarding a kind of a mutant version of Cold war 2.0 between the U.S. and China? 
In my thesis I draw on the recent seminal writings on the subject by: Lyle J.Goldstein, 
Meeting China Halfway: How to Defuse the Emerging U.S.-China Rivalry (2015); Michael 
Pillsbury, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China`s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the 
Global Superpower (2015); Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the 
Choices of a Rising Power (2015); Henry Kissinger, On China (2011); Charles Kupchan, 
How Enemies Become Friends: The Source of Stable Peace (2011) and also on the interesting 
and nonorthodox ideas and concepts of Barry Buzan – “A world without superpowers, de-
centered globalism”; Kevin Rudd and Hugh White – “The China Choice: Why We Should 
Share Power” and the latter`s suggestion for the creation of a Concert of Asia; Charles 
Kupchan – “No One`s World: The West, the Rising Rest and the Coming Global Turn”, 
including the works of leading Chinese IR scholars like Wang Jisi; Yan Xuetong; Qin 
Yaqing; Ye Zicheng, Lin Mingfu, and many others. 
 
 
ON PRACTICAL METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL APPROACH 
 
In pursuing and researching this potential power transition equation, I am not 
gathering new and unknown empirical evidence. Numerous interviews with Chinese 
diplomats and IR scholars and 6 years work in Beijing aside, my thesis is based on new 
analysis and review of existing IR literature, and very recent defining international relations 
and foreign policy interactions and events. Through analysis, abstraction, reconcretization and 
synthesis new knowledge can surface. Without following the production of new historical 
evidence about U.S. mid-20th century ascendance, nor the discovering of untapped int ntions 
of contemporary ´Chinese characterictics´, however, it is my humble intention to make an 
original added value contribution to knowledge by developing this unique historical 
comparison/transition from specific theoretical approach, by bringing a challenging light on 
contemporary Chinese Grand Strategy. 
I have little problem for combining material and social theory. My research is one of 
basic theoretical pluralism. I am not devoted to any o e approach as containing “the supreme 
truth”, and I am friendly to any perspective that seems to offer disciplined, systemic and 
objective added value into how the international system works. I believe one would be 
encouraged for examining the interplay of different approaches in a scholarly thoughtful 
manner. 
´´For a theory to be a paradigm, it needs to have a moral dimension. Paradigms are 
very useful, but analytical eclecticism is at this stage a superior way of doing theory… It lacks 
some of the advantages of paradigmatic science, but at least it doesn`t shun interesting 
questions and topics”, argues Peter Katzenstein in his Theory Talk # 15 in August 2008. 
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Notable problem in applying IR theories to an analysis of China`s “peaceful rise” and 
Grand Strategy in the 21st century is that none of them is sufficient enough for providing a 
comprehensive and systemic perspective. As dominant theories of IR, classical (human 
nature) realism – Morgenthau25 and structural realism - Waltz26, Mearsheimer27 , provide 
detailed explanation of why China began enhancing its comprehensive economic and military 
capabilities. They also clarify why President Xi was so consistent and insistent in promoting 
to president Obama his concept of “New Type of Major C untries Relationship”(NTMCR) 
with the USA, since 2012. Realist theories, however, do not elucidate: why China has been, 
and still is, so firm in officially upholding the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and 
Deng Xiaoping`s legacy of “no expansion”, “no hegemony” and “non alignment” principles 
in its international relations and foreign policy. 
The reason my research employs analytical eclecticism is because it reconfirms that 
existing theories of orthodox international politics [ classical/neo-realism; classical/neo-
liberalism] and supplementary existing alternative approaches (ex. Constructivism) are 
incomplete in themselves. At the same time they are mutually supplemental within an eclectic 
research method attempting to prove the applicability of analytical eclecticism. Due to 
“broadening of the theoretical spectrum”, research on China`s “peaceful rise” strategies and 
policies have differed from scholar to scholar / realist, liberalist or constructivist /. Research 
also tends to have “sidestepped meta-theoretical debates”, thus making it viable to take a more 
eclectic turn, by incorporating elements drawn from two different styles of analysis –  
rendering of synthetic accounts, and historically informed narratives and comparisons. 
In fact, the necessity of analytical eclecticism can be found in IR theories and 
approaches. First, the significance of an eclectic approach can be identified in the analysis of 
E.H.Carr, one of the founders of classical realism in international politics. Although his main 
work, The Twenty Years` Crisis, 1919-1939, is regarded as one of the major texts in classical 
realism, previous “simplistic reading of Carr has began to be reevaluated as a number of 
scholars have pointed to areas of common concern of both `idealists` and `realists`28 . Indeed 
Carr`s “motives in writing the book were both realist and utopian”29. Moreover, Carr`s other 
well known work, The Conditions of Peace, includes the tenets of idealism, in other words, 
the conditions for utopia30. Further more, whereas Carr`s main argument focuses on a 
criticism of the extremely idealistic nature of IR theory developed after WWI, he also points 
out the limitations of realism 31. Carr likewise asserted the importance of balanced analysis 
with both realist and utopian perspective. Political science must be based on recognition of the 
interdependence of theory and practice which can be attained only through a combination of 
utopia and reality32. 
Significantly, Carr reached the conclusion that any sound political thought must be 
based on elements of both utopia and reality33. His insistence on the need for a combined 
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method of analysis in the study of political scienc and IR provides strong support for the 
methodological validity of analytical eclecticism. 
. In addition to classical and structural realism, liberalism, the English School and 
constructivism also underline the efficacy of eclectic approaches. First, neo-liberalism 
acknowledges some neo-realist conditions, such as the significance of national interest as a 
state goal, and the existence of anarchy in the global system34, and at the same time neo-
liberals are positive that sustainable international cooperation is possible even under 
anarchy35. In this regard, neo-liberalism is theoretically eclectic in comparison to the realist 
schools. Second, the English School also demonstrate  the possibility for analytical 
eclecticism. Hedley Bull`s analysis shows that although anarchy is the nature of the 
international system as neo-realists argue, internaio l order exists in an anarchical society36. 
Bull divided traditional political philosophy into three types: the Hobbesian (realist tradition), 
the Kantian (universalist tradition) and the Groatian (internationalist tradition)37. He posited 
that it is important to balance the perspectives of realism and liberalism with an emphasis on 
the priority of internationalism in influencing the international relations. Third, 
constructivism, a “liberal-realist theoretical approach”38, also indicates the utility of eclectic 
analysis. On the one hand constructivism accepts the conditions suggested by realism and 
neo-realism, such as the significance of states as key actors in the international politics, and 
the self-center of states in pursuit of their national interest39. On the other hand constructivism 
theoretically stems from idealism and liberalism40 and underscores the significance of the 
“institutional transformation of identities and interests”41. Indeed, the culture of anti-
militarism as an analytical framework42 is composed of both classical liberalist and 
constructivist perspectives.43 Constructivism, therefore, employs an eclectic approach in an 
attempt to “bridge the gap between neo-liberal and neo-realist theories44. In this sense, the 
constructivist approach is even more eclectic than e realist and liberalist perspectives.  
As examined above, each theory of, and approach to in ernational politics 
demonstrates the methodological applicability of analytical eclecticism, hence it can be 
applied to a comprehensive analysis of China`s “peaceful rise”, Grand Strategy and politics in 
the 21st century.  
Classical realism supports the argument of China´s great power status from a domestic 
perspective. On the other hand, structural realism supports China`s emergence, as well as its 
new evolving security identity by stressing the signif cance of the balance of power.45 It also 
argues that an international structure of anarchy46 and the presence of the U.S. as a hegemonic 
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state47 determine the behavior of other states in the system. From a structural realist 
perspective it is possible to argue that China`s security policies have been shaped by the 
present international structure. The anarchic self-h lp system and the Cold War structure 
forced Beijing to approach Washington economically nd on the other hand to expand and 
grow in military power. As structural realism supports the hegemonic stability theory, U.S. 
hegemony made it possible for China to focus on its economic development guided by Deng 
Xiaoping`s strategy since 1978. 
As an additional perspective to my eclectic approach I also draw on the English 
School and on social identity theory (SIT), from social psychology – ideational allies of 
constructivism. The latter argues that in the system of international relations states seek to 
maintain a positive and rather distinctive role and identity48. China is struggling to restore its 
ancient status as a great power, but in parallel, aso to safeguard and preserve its civilizational 
culture and norms, keeping at a distance the Western liberal values and standards. 
For the sake of an optimal and more holistic eclectic approach, in my thesis I also 
follow on the works of the one of the most eminent Chinese IR scholars and theorist Qin 
Yaqing. In contrast to the conflicting Hegelian dialectics, he challenges the prevailing 
Western approaches and narratives regarding the China phenomenon by using the 
complementary Chinese dialectics of Zhongyong49. He argues that it represents the Chinese 
way of thinking, a Chinese worldview through which to understand the world and the 
universe. For him, Zhongyong represents Chinese princi al behavioral norm code, and a 
guiding theoretical framework for the accurate discussions on China` international Grand 
Strategy, both in China and in the West. 
 
 
BASIC THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTION AND THEORIZING CHINA `RISE 
 
Although it is difficult to definitely assess and predict exactly China`s future 
development identity and Grand Strategy (realism + liberalism + constructivism + 
Zhongyong), and the response of the West, especially of the U.S., into the rest of the 21st  
century, it is theoretically feasible to construct, identify and analyze viable trends and 
scenarios in terms of analytical eclecticism.   
“According to the Global Language Monitor which tracks the top 50000 media source 
throughout the world, “China`s rise “ has been the most read-about news story of the 21st  
century …”50       
While China’s rise is arguably the biggest development in international relations since 
the end of the Cold War, the rather oversimplified t rms of the debate—which ultimately 
boils down to whether China’s emergency represents a threat or an opportunity for Western 
powers and for the international institutional order they created—are counterproductive for 
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advancing our understanding of China’s role and its implications for the West. To go beyond 
a simple realist versus liberal versus constructivist debate on whether China poses a threat or 
not, my thesis brings into conversation eclectic types of explanations for China’s behavior on 
the international stage. Besides drawing on the dominant western theories of international 
relations—neo-realism, neo-liberalism, and constructivism—to understand China’s historical 
behavior and to analyze the trends of its future behavior toward the U.S.,  EU, and others as 
its international influence continues to grow, I also use lenses through which Chinese scholars 
view China’s rise, among them the notion of the “peaceful rise”. Historically and 
philosophically informed views of China’s contemporary behavior are also being addressed, 
and despite the different types of arguments they have a great deal to say to each other. By 
drawing on a varied set of theories, and testing them using evidence ranging from historical 
case studies to quantitative analysis , I hope to move beyond the usual (and rather non 
constructive) debate between so-called “panda fans” d “dragon terminators.” 
 
 
 Relations between international structure and states:  
 
 China represents indigenous example of complex amalgam of state capitalism and 
´´socialism with Chinese characteristics´´. President Xi´s state-collectivist driven Grand 
Strategy has redefined Deng Xiaoping´s slogan - ´tobe rich is glorious´ into ´ China Dream 
state/nation to be rich is glorious´. 
 Analyzing eclectically how different IR paradigms address the variable: states-
international structure, and especially how they reflect in their theorizing of the China 
phenomenon, initially I draw on Jing Men´s approach on the three main IR schools51, then 
enlarge the China theorizing by including the rest of the schools that make part of my 
eclectical study. 
 
 Realist approach 
 
 Kenneth Waltz defines structures “according to the principle by which a system is 
ordered “.52 He defines the structure in three tiers, the firstbeing – the ordering principle. The 
ordering principle gives “information how the parts of a realm are related to each other”.53 In 
the international politics, the ordering principle is anarchy, and as the fundamental assumption  
about international politics, anarchy indicates that ere is an absence of a central government 
in the system. “Structural anarchy “, or the absence of central authority to settle disputes, is 
the defining characteristic of the system that shapes the motives, decisions and actions of 
sovereign states. They must be self-reliant and self-help. States in anarchy are preoccupied 
with power and security, and will suffer if they fail to protect their vital interests. 
 The second is the character of the units in the system. The anarchical nature of the 
international system homogenizes states`external behavior regardless of their domestic 
political nature and distribution of power. Anarchy compels that “the states that are the units 
of the international political system are not formally differentiated by the functions they 
perform … So long as anarchy endures, states remain like units”.54  
 The third image is the distribution of capabilities. In defining international political 
structure, the distribution of capabilities is the most important since “the structure of the 
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system changes as result of changes in the distribution of capabilities across the system`s 
units”.55 As there is no functional differentiation of units n an anarchic system, the units are 
primarily distinguished by their varied capabilities”.56 Structure is defined by the distribution 
of capabilities across units. 
 Confined by the anarchical nature of the system, state  lack in trust in their 
interactions and relationships. The nature of international politics is “a recurring struggle for 
wealth and power among independent actors in a state of anarchy “.57 Security dilemma 
becomes the inadvertent derivative when states try to strengthen their power position in the 
system. The more states arm to increase their strength, the more reciprocal vicious cycle of 
arming by other states emerges for the sake of security. “Nowhere is uncertainty greater than 
in international politics. Anarchy places a premium on foresight. If one cannot know what is 
coming, developing a greater resource base for future use takes precedence over present 
prosperity “.58 
The anarchic feature fosters conflicts and competitions in the interactions of states, and 
shapes the positional nature of states. Internationl i stitutions do not posses many 
capabilities to affect and manage the prospects for co peration among states, and especially 
between great powers. They are unable to mitigate anarchy`s constraining effect on interstate 
cooperation.59States have to be self-reliant in the system, otherwis  one has to reap what one 
has sown: “ A self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do 
so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to danger, will 
suffer.”60 
Waltz diminishes the role of practice and politics in shaping the character of anarchy. 
Although he admits that the structure affects state` behavior through two processes: 
competition and socialization, he considers that social factors are not important in 
international politics, and that socialization only matters in the way to condition the behavior 
of states.61 Relying heavily on the constraining material forces of the international structure in 
shaping states` behavior, Waltz altogether downplays the role of socialization. 
Waltz treats the identities and interests of states as exogenously given and solely 
focuses on the study of behavior of states. Reducing the process of interaction to dynamics of 
behavior interaction among exogenously constituted s ates, Waltz`s theory offers a behavioral 
conception of process, Thus, only behavioral adaptation is possible, the change of identities 
and interests is not.  All the attributes of states which do not concern material capabilities such 
as traditions, habits, objectives, desires, and forms of government except their capabilities can 
be abstracted and should not be included in the definition of structure.62 
Besides neo-liberalism and constructivism`s continuing paradigmatic charges and 
critiques of neo-realism, in general realism in IR, and especially Waltz`s theory of 
international politics, has never been challenged so eloquently as by Robert W. Cox.63 For 
him, politics can never be separated from economics, theory is always linked to practice, and  
material relations and ideas are inextricably inter winded to co-produce world orders. Cox 
claims that `theory is always for someone and for some purpose` and that Waltz`s theory is a 
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problem-solving theory, an ahistorical work, and unco vincing mode of historical 
understanding.64 
There are a number of theories and resulting policy prescriptions that derive from a 
realist tradition and they do not speak with one voice, especially when theorizing on the 
central for the IR issue of China`s strategic posture in the 21st century. 
 Realist approaches that derive from a classical foundation theorize and suggest 
policies65 that are fundamentally different from structural/neo-realism, and more so from the 
offensive realism favored and promoted by John Mearsheimer.66 
 Classical realism is not at all sanguine and is also larmed, like Mearsheimer, about 
the implications of China`s status. A classical realist perspective inherently observes the 
emergence of new great powers in the system with enormous apprehension (China as a 
natural great power – its desire for power, military modernization and upgrades), because it 
expects the ambitions of rising states to expand along with their capabilities, and also because 
of the anxiety that this expectation provokes in their neighbors and potential adversaries.67 As 
Gilpin has argued “the most important factor for understanding world politics is not the static 
distribution of power, but dynamics of power relations over time”68. A central problem in 
international relations is addressing these changes to the balance of power, which historically 
has commonly been resolved by war. 
 Classical realists argue that alarm in and of itself, offers very little positive analytical 
space and added value. As a general rule, with some exc ptions, classical realists, however 
inherently wary and skeptical, seek to accommodate rising powers. “This accommodation is 
rooted in three core tenets of classical realism. First, and always, is the acknowledgement of 
the reality of power, which is part of seeing the world as it is, not as we would like it to be. 
Second is an unwillingness to automatically privilege the perspective of those that would 
defend the status-quo. Third is the belief that politics matter, and that therefore the future is 
largely unwritten. It is on this last point that classical realists break most sharply with their 
structuralist cousins. The classical view holds that while they must irretrievably be alert to the 
conditions of anarchy and sensitive to the balance of power, nevertheless states – especially 
great powers – enjoy considerable discretion with rega ds to the strategic choices that they 
can and will make. Thus, these choices are shaped by the context in which they are made, that 
is – by both domestic and international politics”.69 
 In his critique of Mearsheimer`s offensive realism approach towards China`s great 
power posture, Kirshner makes the theoretical case that the U.S. should return in its policy 
versus Beijing to the traditions of classical realism. He acknowledges that the power 
emergence of China must be seen as a potentially dangerous destabilization of the 
international system. Yet, he argues that in the influe tial structural realist approach to great 
power politics and the rise of China, Mearsheimer`s offensive realism - is wrong and 
dangerous, both in the abstract, and as it applies to contemporary China. 
 “It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking outside of states. 
The implications of systemic forces are inherently and irretrievably indeterminate”.70 “It is 
impossible to understand and anticipate the behavior of states by looking only at structural 
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variables and constraints. To explain world politics, it is necessary to appeal to a host of other 
factors, including domestic politics, history, ideology and perceptions of legitimacy”.71 
 Classical realists tend to envision states, in the abstract, as essentially rational, 
purposeful, and motivated, but they do not see state  s hyper-rationalist automatons. Rather 
classical realists also understand that states` behavior is shaped by the lessons of history -  
right or wrong, ideas – accurate or not, ideology – good or bad, and that states make choices 
influenced by fear, vulnerability, and hubris, usually in the context of considerable 
uncertainty.  
 In contrast to neo-realists who claim that “survival” is the goal of states, classical 
realists, like E.H.Carr, see politics as the clash of interests, with outcomes determined by 
power, and with many wars fought not for specific ends, but rather to establish military 
primacy.72 
 For Gilpin, it is axiomatic that, `as the power of a state increases, it seeks to extend … 
its political influence`73, and realists usually say that there is nothing wrong with that, since 
they are generally reluctant to label the behavior of states in international relations as “good” 
or “bad”. 
 Activist powers, like China in particular, are poten ial sources of instability ( assertive 
interests, increasing capabilities and expectations of more great power to come ), and classical 
realists expect them to seek not just security, but also status, prestige, and even deference 
from others. “All of this applies to contemporary international politics – to the rise of China 
and the responses of other states to that rise … and it is not a pretty picture”. 74 
 That classical realists are alarmed by the consequences of the rise of China, and 
anticipate increased international political, economic and military frictions as result, they 
certainly do not mean that `war is inevitable`, and it oes not lead to the prescription of 
superficially obvious policy recommendations. That - ´interdependence´ - will not prevent 
war, for example – a common realist proposition, does not mean that interdependence is a 
“bad thing, which should be avoided. Rather, it is a condition with political consequences, and 
choices which require political assessments and considerations.  
 Mearsheimer`s ´offensive realism´ structural theory states plainly that “China cannot 
rise peacefully”. According to him,  Beijing will become aggressive and determined to 
achieve regional hegemony in Asia, the way the USA behaved since its creation in 1783 for  
domination and hegemony in the western hemisphere bas d on the Monroe doctrine of 1823. 
He draws his conclusions from his five “bedrock assumptions”75, which build his theory: 1. 
Anarchical international system. 2.  Offensive capabilities of the states. 3. States` uncertain 
intentions. 4. Survival goal of states and 5. States ct as rational actors. Accepting the first 
three assumptions, some classical realist find the fourth and especially the fifth, as overly 
restrictive. Mearsheimer argues that as China will seek to dominate Asia, the current U.S. 
policy of engaging China is “misguided” and “doomed to failure” urging the U.S. to reverse 
course and do what it can to contain and slow the rise of China.76 
 For classical realists, Mearsheimer is “wrong – analytically wrong in the logic of his 
predictions and dangerously wrong in his prescriptions”.77 They consider that the fatal flaw in 
Mearsheimer`s argument, is in his failure to distinguish between being a hegemon and 
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bidding for hegemony. Bidding for hegemony, as history shows, is one of the few and rare 
paths to destruction for a great power, which otherwise according to his theory should fight 
for survival and be a rational actor (fourth and fifth bedrock assumptions). “Most great 
powers are extremely likely to survive; most great powers that bid for hegemony do not”.78 
Two attributes of the U.S. case that predetermined an  contributed to its sole exceptional 
success were: weak adversaries and even weaker neighbors, which is not the case with 
contemporary China. 
 “While classical realism must be wary and pessimist c regarding the consequences of 
China`s future intentions, its perspective nevertheless leads to the conclusion that engaging 
rather than confronting China is the wisest strategy. The only context that matters to realist 
analysis, is - the optimal strategy compared to the likely consequences of other options …, as 
for classical realists, the future is unwritten, and so acknowledging power and wise policies 
matter.”79 
 “The first lesson the students of international politics must learn and never forget “, 
Morgenthau, classical realist, lectured, “is that the complexities of international affairs make 
simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impossible”.80 
 
 Liberal approach 
 
 Neo-liberalism accepts the core assumptions of neo-realism including the 
impedimental role of anarchy in the realization of cooperation. It agrees to neo-realist 
arguments that states behave according to the perceptions of their self-interests. Relative 
capabilities remain important, and states have to rely on themselves to sustain gains from 
cooperation. Contrary to neo-realists who concentrate on conflicts, rivalry and competition, 
the neo-liberal approach emphasizes the capacities and potentials of rules and of international 
institutions in promoting cooperation and in changing conceptions of self-interest. 
 For neo-liberalism, anarchy does not necessarily mean lack of cooperation. Here 
institutions and authority rather than force and power are accentuated as particular functions 
of government. As defined by Keohane, institutions are persistent and connected set of rules 
(formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape 
expectations “.81 A lack of common government in world politics does not deny the existence 
of a fragmented international society. Both carefully structured and loose organizations may 
be present. While anarchy remains as a constant, “the degree to which interactions are 
structured, and the means by which they are structured, vary. It has often been noted that 
military-security issues display more of the characteristics associated with anarchy, than do 
political-economic ones”.82 
 Neo-liberalism relies heavily on the assumption of institutions: “states actions depend 
to a considerable degree on prevailing institutional arrangements”.83 Institutions are seen as 
enabling the states to reach mutually beneficial, cooperative outcomes. While neo-realists 
regard international relations as the relations betwe n the international structure and nation- 
states, neo-liberalists interpret it as the relations between international institutions and nation-
states. Neo-realists view the institutions as a random variable, while neo-liberalists consider it 
as an independent variable in the interactions among states. 
                                                 
78  Ibid., p. 61. 
79  Ibid., p.65. 
80  Ibid., p. 69. 
81 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Theory, 1989, Westview Press, p.3.  
82 Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategy and Institutions”, in David A. Baldwin (ed,) 
Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debat , p. 85.  
83 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Theory, p. 2.  
 31 
 Institutions put forward behavioral principles that re mutually recognized and 
accepted by the members of the system. Their legitimate status demands the member states to 
consider the institutional restrictions in their behavior. Whether a state is responsible or not 
can be identified through its attitude towards the int rnational institutions. When discussing 
the roles of institutions, neo-liberalism holds that: “This necessity for institutions does not 
mean that they are always valuable, much less that they operate without respect to power and 
interests, constitute a panacea for violent conflict, or always reduce the likelihood of war. 
Claiming too much for the international institutions would indeed be a `false promise `. But in 
a world politics constrained by state power and divergent interests, and unlikely to experience 
effective hierarchical governance, international institutions operating on the basis of 
reciprocity will be components of any lasting peace “.84 
 Although institutions, once created, are regarded as effective in bringing peace to the 
world, the neo-liberals admit that the institutions are created in response to state interests, and 
that their character is structured by the prevailing distribution of capabilities among states. 
 In order to counter the overwhelming influence of anarchy in the international politics, 
institutions are chosen as a sort of international authority. They provide the basis for 
determining what is just or unjust action and event in the context of international relations. 
International society is not merely a cluster of actors whose actions affect one another. It is 
similar to any other society in that there are expectations regarding to certain types of action 
and standards against which such action can be measured and judged.85 In neo-liberal 
narrative, states seek to alter the anarchical context through building institutions that embody 
particular principles, norms, rules or procedures for the conduct of international relations. 
 The Kantian triad of democracy, trade and internatio l institutions analytically linked 
to outcomes of peace and prosperity has been and remains the general foundation of liberal IR 
theory.  
 Although there is no single and correct way to understand and explain the world any 
more than there is a singular and correct way to be in the world, the liberal world order – i.e. 
the post-Cold War world in which we currently live is, in short, a world informed by the 
dominant theoretical faith in the Kantian triangle.86 
 What is more striking about contemporary IR liberal theory, in fact, is its remarkable 
sameness from the pre-to post- Cold War period and that it has become the dominant 
perspective of the discipline. There is an ample evidence that liberal theory surpassed realism 
some time ago and now occupies the “best in show” position, as the most and neatly suiting 
the liberal world`s concerns of knowing and being.87  
 As the liberal world order lived through some significant transformations and events 
in the last 10-15 years, there has been some theoretical developments in liberal IR theorizing. 
As Burchill points out, “the post-Cold War optimism of many liberals has been tempered by a 
series of unexpected events which, at the very least, suggest that the path to modernity 
remains a rocky one”.88 
In co-authored publication by leading liberal theoreticians - Jeff D, Colgan and 
Robert O. Keohane, ´The Liberal Order is Rigged: Fix it now or Watch it Wither´, in  
May/June 2017 Issue of Foreign Affairs, both co-authors make even more stern and warninig  
                                                 
84 Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory”, International Security, Vol. 20, No 1, 1995, p. 50.     
85 Mark J. Hoffman, “Normative Approaches”, in I ternational Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory, 1985, London: Pinter Publisher, 
p. 33.  
86 Jennifer Sterling-Folker, All Hail to the Chief: Liberal IR Theory in the New World Order, International Studies Perspective, 2015, 
Vol.16, Isuue 1, pp. 40-49.  
87 Ibid. 
88 Scott Burchill, Liberalism. In Theories of IRs, 4th edition, edited by Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak and Jack 
Donnelly, 2009, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 32 
political, economic and social psychology analysis, and assessments concerning the current 
state of the liberal democratic international order. 
 Like other analytical perspectives, liberal IR theorizing has had to grapple with the 
analytical implications posed by processes and events such as 9/11, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, 
the Arab Spring, the crisis in the Middle East, Syria and Iran, the conflict Ukraine/Russia, 
now Brexit and president Trump, and most of all – 21st century China. 
 So far, the China debate among IR theorists has pitted optimistic liberals against 
pessimistic realists, more so with those of the offnsive realism. 
 The liberals theorize, that because the current international order is defined by 
economic, political and institutional openness, it can accommodate China`s rise peacefully. 
The U.S. and the other leading liberal powers, thisargument runs, can and will make clear 
that China is welcome to join the existing order and prosper with it For them, China is likely 
to do so rather than launch a costly and dangerous str ggle to overturn the system and 
establish an order more to its own liking.89 
  Complex interdependence, put forth by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye,90 argues 
that states and their fortunes are inextricably tied ogether by increasing, various, and complex 
transnational connections and interdependencies. These connections, furthermore, have 
resulted in the creation of numerous stakeholders (including multi-national companies, non-
governmental organizations, and the public at large) which have become important 
international actors.  
 Institutionalism, advanced by Robert Koehane91, Stephen Krasner92 and others, asserts 
that the United States created a post-war internatio l order, open and inclusive to other great 
powers. Such system provided the ability to manage tensions while at the same time promoted 
and strengthened the growing interdependencies, influencing the stability, wealth, and 
prosperity of the great powers.  
 Democratic Peace Theory, the third aspect of the Lib ral Institutionalist paradigm, 
contends that the U.S. promotion of capitalism and democracy has produced a liberal order in 
which its main architects and supporters share similar ideological, governance, economic and 
social views, which inhibit the propensity to use military force to adjudicate differences. 
While non-Western, non-liberal states, including China, populate and contribute to the 
international order, the shared liberal rules and norms underpin, and explain the institutional 
framework’s durability in stabilizing great power relations. The Western-based liberal order, 
in short, provides goods and areas of reciprocal influe ce for great powers, while being hard 
to overthrow due to the presence of nuclear weapons and interdependencies that stifle power 
transitions, and mitigate zero-sum conflicts. 
 One of the leading, and most active in the analysis of China`s rise, liberal theorist, 
John  Ikenberry,93 argues that, while power transition theorists correctly highlight the historic 
anxieties during such transitional periods, China’s ascendance will not inevitably lead to war 
and conflict. Beijing faces an international system fundamentally different from those of 
previous rising powers. China may one day overtake he U.S. in terms of economic and even 
military power, but it is less likely that China will be able to surpass the entirety of the liberal 
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world order. Simply put, the aggregate power of the W st will obstruct and deter Beijing’s 
ability to overthrow the system, if they intend on doing so. China, also, is heavily integrated 
into the world’s trade, finance, social, political, nd military fields to a degree unparalleled by 
other rising powers and, thus, system overthrow will be extremely detrimental to their wealth, 
prosperity, and overall stability. Beijing may oppose varying aspects of the current 
institutionalist order, specifically its continuing under-representation in the World Bank and 
IMF, but they nevertheless engage significantly in the existing institutional framework. 
 There are a number of recent trends, however, which challenge liberal theorizing and 
confidence that China’s rise can be accommodated and its leaders socialized into the existing 
Western liberal order. China’s dissatisfaction with t e current architecture has been 
channelled towards creating entirely new institutions. Multi-billion dollar initiatives, 
including the One-Belt, One-Road, maritime and land strategies, the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, BRICS´ NDB and its Africa and Latin America engagements, place China 
in central decision-making position to the exclusion of the West. Similar tactics on the part of 
the U.S. to eschew Chinese participation, such as vi  the Trans-Pacific Partnership, are 
resulting in parallel institutions that compromise the more international and inclusive 
organizations of the liberal order. China`s strengthening  pragmatic relations with Russia, 
while usually, and yet, incorrectly categorized as  strategic alliance, demonstrates a 
congruence of geopolitical desires on the part of Beijing and Moscow to carve out local 
sphere of influence and marginalize U.S. global power and influence within the G-20. The 
resultant regionalization of institutions  (SCO, BRICS, EEU) under the sway of various 
emerging powers (China in East Asia, Russia in their n ar abroad, India in South Asia, Brazil 
in Latin America and South Africa on the African continent ) threatens to not necessarily 
overthrow the current liberal order, but rather paralyze its functionality and ability to generate 
collective action in addressing international issues. 
 Another important challenge to the world liberal order is the weakness of democratic 
growth in the world. Contrary to liberal optimistic assessments in the early 1990s, the Chinese 
Communist Party, while undergoing massive changes in it  membership and structure, shows 
no sign of moving towards political liberalization. Throughout the developing world, as well, 
there is a resurgence of authoritarian rule, masked un er democratic structures meant to 
promote international legitimacy and régime maintenance. With Russia and China, as the two 
greatest strategic challenges to the US, furthermore, there is a concern that a ‘League of 
Spoilers’ opposed to the liberal West is getting stronger. Even other emerging, democratic 
states such as India, Brazil and South Africa are not reliable partners for the West, as evident 
in their UN voting records. As power shifts in the world, it does so from the West, a largely 
coherent body of states with similar governance models, economic and social institutions, and 
congruent world outlook and ideology, to a new group of rising powers which show no 
affiliation for one another or the West, but rather an inclination to work with the latter on a 
case-by-case basis to achieve short-term interests.     
  As a whole, liberal theorists agree that China, as an outsider state from the Western 
bloc, will continue the agenda of shaping and moulding the international order towards its 
advantage. But, publicly, they still claim that there is no clear indication Beijing is serious 
about a hegemonic challenge to the order as China is far more integrated and interdependent 
within the existing system than any other emerging power in history. Combined with the 
virtual inability to use military force to construct an alternative geopolitical order under its 
dominance, the future of Sino-American relations, while not completely benevolent and co-
operative, will for the most part be peaceful and stable as the forces of institutionalism and 
interdependence have rooted them within the existing order. China will work towards system 
change but not overthrow, as Beijing increasingly becomes entangled within the existing 
order – one it simply cannot afford to oppose or overthrow anytime soon. 
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Social constructive approach 
For the understanding of the international structure, Wendt holds two distinctive 
points: first, the international structure is social, not strictly material and second, not only the 
structure shapes the behavior of states, but also their identities and interests.94The relations 
between the structure and the states are not just as casual as Waltz suggests that the anarchic 
structure predicts the self-help and power politics of states. The structure also plays a 
constitutive role in forming the identities and interests of states. Socialization is indispensable 
in generating possible actions of states. The effects of the casual and constitutive relationships 
are different from each other but not mutually exclusive. Holding a distinctive understanding 
of the nature of the international structure, Wendt works to re-conceptualize what the 
international structure is made of. He argues that rather than strictly materially oriented, the 
structure is socially constructed. Practices determine the character of anarchy.95 The effects of 
anarchy and material structure depend on what states want.96 Rather than the distribution of 
capabilities, the beliefs and expectations states have about each other form the nature of 
international politics. According to Wendt, the configuration of preferences drives outcomes. 
Different preferences will generate different logics of anarchy. The system is not causally 
competitive due to the anarchic structure as Waltz suggests. “Self-help and power politics do 
not follow either logically or causally from anarchy.”97Anarchy may drive states for 
competitive power politics, but it may as well bring states to the construction of collective 
security. “Self-help and competitive power politics may be produced causally by process of 
interaction between states in which anarchy plays only a permissive role.”98 Self-help and 
power politics are merely institutions instead of essential features of anarchy. They are the 
result of process, not structure. Which kind of anarchy will be dominant in the system 
depends on which particular identities and interests of states will emerge.                                
  It is in the process in which the identities and i terests of states are formed. “The 
process of signaling, interpreting, and responding completes a `social act` and begins the 
process of creating intersubjective meanings.”99Although the first social act may be 
unreliable, it nevertheless creates tentative expectations on both sides in the interaction about 
each other`s future intentions and actions. Following the accumulation of knowledge on the 
possible behavior of each other in the constant interac ions between them, relative stable 
concepts of self and other are generated. Through this reciprocal interaction, the states 
involved form their identities and interests. According to Wendt, without offering the 
structure of identities and interests in the system, Waltz`s definition of the international 
structure foretells neither the content nor the dynamics of anarchy. It is also problematic for 
Waltz to predict a state`s behavior. There is no doubt that the distribution of capabilities 
affects states` calculations. But how such influence grows is determined by the intersubjective 
understanding and expectations of states, by the knowledge they posses which is used to 
interpret self and other in the interactions between states.100 
 The international structure is socially constructed. Social structure leads to different 
actions of states “by constituting states with certain identities and interests, and material 
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capabilities with certain meanings.101 It can influence states through constituting identities and 
interests, helping states find common solutions to pr blems, defining expectations for 
behavior, constituting threats or collective security. 102 Structure only has meaning for state 
action when taking into consideration of the understandings and expectations that constitute 
states`s identities and interests. In order to examine the action of states, it is necessary to 
consult the intersubjectively constituted structure of identities and interests in the system. 
 Constructivists` theorizing of China`s rise in general comes to the conclusions that 
China is currently undergoing an identity and national interests` shift towards Sino-centrism, 
i.e. – a self-centering tendency to turn debate attention to the internally generated, specifically 
Chinese world associated with China`s civilizational p st and cultural heritage. “China is not 
just another nation-state in the family of nations; China is a civilization pretending to be a 
state”.103  
 Apart from the political/ideological divide between China and the Western liberal 
order, there is the cultural dimension to China`s non-Western identity. Constructivists claim 
that China`s identity-related distinctiveness to a very large extent rests on civilizational,  
moral-philosophical and ethnic elements that may all be regarded as part of China`s historical 
and cultural heritage. The fact that China represents a non-Western rising power in a political 
as well as cultural sense is probably the most important cause for concern.104 After the Cold 
War, there was a wide-spread belief in the West that Chinese economic growth would be 
accompanied by political reforms and that China would eventually embrace liberal 
democracy.105 
 Currently, China is already being viewed by some countries as an alternative societal 
model, which is better able to combine political stability with economic growth while 
retaining its cultural distinctiveness.106 As such the Chinese model could well become an ideal
to be emulated by other developing countries. “One Belt, One Road” strategy represents a 
striking departure in Chinese policy. For the first time China is seeking to export its 
development model to other countries107… and it is different from that in the West, its 
purpose is to develop industrial capacity and consumer demand in countries outside of China. 
Rather than extracting raw materials, China is seeking to shift its heavy industry to less 
developed countries, making them richer and encouraging demand for Chinese products.” 
 Like realists and liberals, constructivists agree, that with the rise of a non-Western 
great power it becomes all the more crucial to investigate and research the foundations of 
Beijing`s main international relations and foreign policy priorities, long-term interests, as well 
as to how China will position itself internationally in the coming decades of the 21st century. 
 However they claim that a constructivist focus on identity structures yields important 
insights, many of which are neglected in the current theoretical debate between realists and 
liberals regarding the complex phenomenon of China`s great power status. The latter two, 
both disregard the specific character of states, relying instead mostly on systemic incentives 
what is basically a top-down generated story of power and state interests. 
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 Constructivists, in contrast, seek to endogenize – i. . to explore from within, an inside-
out research, the interest formation of states by relating interests to socially constructed 
variables on either the systemic or domestic levels, so as to focus on Chinese self-
understanding in order to arrive at the overall inter ational relations and foreign policy 
interests of China.108 
 Constructivists are usually branded optimists with respect to international 
cooperation.109 Yet, there is no intrinsic optimism to constructivist arguments, and believing 
that China represents just another rising great power – as quite a number of liberal and realist  
(with the exception of the offensive school) theorists seem to do – is thus to underestimate the 
potential challenge to Western style international politics that China poses.110 
 Instead constructivism adheres to a number of choices of theoretical premises, three of 
which are relevant to the case of China`s rise. First, constructivists study the socially 
constructed, rather than materially conditioned, nature of international relations, and they 
emphasize how social meaning is structured within specific identities, norms, beliefs and 
cultures.111 Secondly, collective identities encompass fundamental, ideational logics such as 
beliefs about legitimate membership or the role of the community, and these logics generate 
the motivational disposition – or simply put, interests – of its respective communities.112 And 
thirdly, state identities may be quite stable in the sense of being deeply structured, but 
competing identity narratives with alternative ideational logics always exist.113 
 In line with these constructivists` theoretical premises, Chinese identity may be 
viewed as an evolving formation of structural elements, or Sino-centric identity markers114 
with specific ideational logics – some of which are combined into a more or less coherent, 
hegemonic narrative of China in recent years. For constructivists, the ideational logic within 
the hegemonic narrative functions as a “navigation c mpass” guiding Chinese policy-makers 
in their international relations and foreign policy making.115 
 In spite of its pronounced optimistic nature, constructivism does not entirely exclude 
the option that China with its distinct non-Western societal template may potentially elaborate 
a more sophisticated Sino-centric foreign policy. If actively implemented, such policy may 
push Beijing into continuous conflict with different aspects of the current international liberal 
order, as well as with the U.S., feeding revision and offering a responsive new strategic focus 




 The English school and the constructivist tradition are in a way fundamentally 
different and at the same time have some substantial overlaps.117 They are fundamentally 
different in the sense that they come from different places. Constructivism is and holds an 
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epistemological position and it comes out of philosophy of knowledge. English School is a 
rather practical, pragmatic tradition that comes out f political theory, history, and 
international law, so its roots are completely different. But both of them are talking about 
society, in some sense – international society, and in that way they are the same thing. Any   
society has by definition to be socially constructed, so from that point of view, the English 
School is constructivist, but there is much more in its approach than just constructivism, as its 
engagement with history gives the better way to ask questions about what international 
society looks like, how it is structured, where it`s going, how it evolves, etc.118 
 The English School`s greatest contribution to IRs is perhaps its invention and 
persistent conceptualization of international society. This concept is unique in two ways. First, 
it differs from the mere power calculation that has long dominated American IR theory; and 
second, its invention and development are based upon European history and experience.119 
 Besides the concerns and the question posed by realists and liberals - `Can China rise 
peacefully´, the English School, with its key concept of international society, has similar 
concerns. Still, it theorizes from different angle, sharing the affinity of the constructivist 
tradition, and concentrates more about identity, i.e. China`s identity vis-à-vis the English 
School definition of international society.120 This is a crucial question as China`s identity in 
relation to international society constitutes the century-puzzle of the Chinese since the first 
Opium War in 1840, and highlights the English School approach to the phenomenon of 
modern China. It is based on the fundamentally important issue of the institutions of the 
international society, especially the so-called primary institutions121, which define 
international society and the conduct of its members as regards to `what is` and `what is not` 
legitimate and appropriate behavior.122 
 According to these strict criteria, the peaceful rise of emerging power, which does not 
disturb the order of international society, presupposes China`s acceptance of the primary 
institutions of the international society. If not impossible, it will be extremely difficult, as 
China has to accept international society`s changing primary international institutions, in 
particular those of democracy, human rights and enviro mental friendliness.123 “To put it 
bluntly, can a Communist government ever support the market ideationally, or must its 
support necessarily be not more than calculated?”124 
 The English School accepts that China has been succe sful in rising peacefully and 
accommodating itself into the international society in the first three decades since 1979 to the 
present. But, at the same time, as the primary institutions of international society are evolving, 
changing from Westphalian ones of sovereignty, non-i terference, balance of power, etc. to 
post-Westphalian ones of human rights, democracy and green peace. As China remains a 
Westphalian non-democracy, it should naturally have much more difficulty in rising 
peacefully and further integrating into the international society in the next thirty years. China 
is thus defined as a reformist revisionist, who “accepts some of the institutions of international 
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society … But it resists, and wants to reform others, and possibly wants to change its 
status”125 
 
Social Identity Theory / SIT/ 
 
 In his November 29, 2014 speech at the Foreign Affairs Work Conference (FAWC), 
the first to be held since 2006, Chinese President Xi Jinping guided the attending Chinese top 
ranking foreign policymakers and officials to work for a `distinctive diplomatic approach 
befitting China`s role as a major country`. He strongly emphasized the need for Beijing to 
display diplomacy with a salient Chinese feature and  Chinese vision.126 
 China is sensitive to how the world looks at it. `Saving face` is a national 
psychological priority and the current Beijing leadrship is actively preoccupied with 
restoring the country`s long past status of a pre-emin nt world power.127  
 In spite of the impressive Chinese economic slow dn in the recent couple of years, 
from around 10% to 6-7% annual growth in 2015/2016 ( `new normal` as officially declared), 
China is still expanding its power and economic influence, in contrast to the anemic economic 
growth in the rest of the world`s major economies. Strangely enough, Beijing is not even 
publicly exploiting, and its leaders are shunning the official announcement of IMF at the end 
of 2014, that China`s economy has overtaken that of he United States, measured in 
purchasing power parity (PPP).128 One of the possible explanations for this behavior on part 
of the Chinese leadership, officials, even mass-media, is the continuing identity role of 
“keeping a low profile” (KLP) that China selectively adhers to, denying anxiousness, fear, 
and uncertainty about its future plans and intentions in its neighbors, the rest of the world, and 
especially in the U.S. 
 Constructivists argue that China`s identity is influenced by interactions with others 
and that China is increasingly being socialized, through its participation in the international 
system and institutions, into accepting international norms129. Yet, in a way they undervalue 
the role of China`s identity in shaping its future international relations and foreign policy, and 
especially the availability of alternative identities from which China`s leadership may 
choose.130 
 How, then, will China`s eventual and expected realization of great power status affect 
its international relations, foreign policy and world international system? Consistent with SIT, 
China wants and works to return its long past statu s a great power, and at the same time to 
preserve its ‘Chinese characteristics` in almost all spheres of socio-political, economic and 
cultural being. As discussed, SIT postulates that state  that seek to improve their status have 
the options of pursuing: social mobility, social competition and/or social creativity 
My analysis claims, that China`s future international relations and policies will largely 
depend on how it defines its identity relative to that of the U.S. and other major powers, and 
how the latter respond to China`s self-definition of fully attained great power status. Beijing 
will seek a pragmatic, and case by case, mix of the thr e strategic option offered by SIT, as 
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the most productive and feasible third strategic path for the achievement of China`s 
rise/Dream, peaceful development and integration into the evolving new international system.  
Social psychology and SIT can also be very useful and instrumental for research and 
assessments on the western public opinion behavior, response and inquiry into the causes and 
the conditions that lead to the current tendencies of power transition from the West to the 
East. 
 
A Theory of Stable Peace 
 
The Atlantic Charter that Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill crafted in August 
1941, only two months after Hitler`s invasion of the Soviet Union, envisaged a new global 
order based on self-determination, free trade, disarmament, and marked the beginning of the 
final stage of the power transition process, and moment at which the U.S. indisputably 
assumed the leading role of the Western world and the expansion of the liberal order. 
By the end of the 20th century, it had become most approving to argue that history was 
coming to an end131, and that the unipolar moment has arrived.132Then came the still 
continuing 2008-2009 financial and economic crisis, the failure of the December 2009 
Copenhagen Summit, at which the rising powers called th  shots, and “there were no chairs 
for Obama and Clinton”, and the America`s European p rtners were not even in the game. 
Amazed at this turn of events, the Washington Times pronounced, “The American Century is 
over”.133 
There are many signs that the 21st century marks not only the ultimate triumph of the
West, but the emergence of a global landscape that is headed towards a turning point rather 
than an end point. “The West is loosing not only its material primacy as new powers rise, but 
also its ideological dominance… Even rising powers that are democratic, such as India, 
Brazil, are hardly stalwart supporters of the Western camp. They regularly break with the U.S. 
and Europe on geopolitics, trade, the environment and other issues …Interests matter more 
than values.134 
Charles Kupchan, the initiator of the initial stage in building a body of theory on 
Stable Peace, posits: “The twenty-first century will not be America`s, China`s, Asia`s, or 
anyone else`s; it will belong to no one. The emergent international system will be populated 
by numerous power centers as well as multiple versions of modernity.135 For the first time in 
history, an independent world will be without a center of gravity or global guardian. A global 
order, if it emerges, will be an amalgam of diverse political cultures and competing 
conceptions of domestic and international order. Failure to foresee this global turn and adjust 
the West`s Grand Strategy accordingly would be an error of grave consequence. This 
potential misstep is already in the making …Most strategists are, however misconstruing the 
nature of the fundamental change posed by the global diffusion of power. The prevailing 
wisdom holds that the Western powers should capitalize on the twilight hours of their primacy 
to corral countries into the liberal international order that they have constructed … the West 
should `sink the roots of this order as deeply as po sible` thereby ensuring that `the 
international system the United States leads can remain the dominant order of the twenty-first 
century`136 … `the power shift … is good for America, if approached properly. The world is 
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going America`s way. Countries are becoming more open, market friendly, and 
democratic`137 
“To cast the grand strategic challenge of the era in such terms may be reassuring to 
Americans and their democratic allies, but it is wishful thinking. The Chinese ship of state 
will not dock in the Western harbor, obediently taking the berth assigned to it. Rather than 
embracing the rules of the current international system, rising powers will as a matter of 
course seek to adjust the prevailing order in ways that advantage their own values and 
interests. They have been doing so since the beginnin  of time and the coming era will be no 
different. The task at hand is not guiding rising powers into the Western harbor. Rather it is 
establishing a new order whose fundamental terms will have to be negotiated by Western 
powers and newcomers alike. The West will have to give as much as it gets as it seeks to 
fashion a new international order that includes the rest.”138 
To theorize and to lay the initial stage in building a body of theory about Stable Peace, 
including the rise of China, is for Kupchan, “to adv nce understanding of one of the most 
enduring puzzles in the study of global politics of h w to explain change in the character of 
the international system.  
All main schools in the field of international relations – realism, liberalism and 
constructivism – have positive contributions regarding the state of peace. Still, like many 
other cardinal questions explored by IR scholars, the issue of Stable Peace has fallen victim to 
continuing theoretical debates and disputes, and little creative efforts were addressed to 
options that may reconcile the schools`opposing stand  and views. Hopefully, theoretical 
eclecticism may bridge the divides and set free a new onconfrontational and innovative 
approach to the imperative of peace in the 21st century.139 
Acknowledging the strengths and weaknesses of these intellectual traditions Kupchan 
makes an attempt of developing a theory of Stable Peace that shares affinity with all of them. 
Although Stable Peace keeps with the tradition of the so-called English School`s 
international society, it privileges no single theoretical approach. The analysis is explicitly 
eclectic and synthetic in nature, seeking to follow insights from multiple paradigms, rather 
than prioritize any single one of them. As the process under research is a dynamic one – “how 
interstate relations move along a continuum from endemic competition, to halting 
cooperation, to lasting friendship – theoretical eclecticism is a necessity, at different stages in 
the onset of Stable Peace, quite different politica and social processes are at work.”140 
Kupchan, in his theoretical endeavor, examines twenty different cases of Stable Peace, 
ranging from the thirteenth century to the present and spanning the globe. His research reveals 
that Stable Peace breaks out through a four-phase process, which may take years, if not 
decades. The process is elucidated, using rapprochement between the United States and 
United Kingdom (1895-1906) as a major illustrative case study. 
As to the causes of peace, the examination of the twenty instances of Stable Peace 
yields important theoretical findings regarding to when, not just how peace breaks out: 
Engagement is not appeasement – and rapprochement erges as a product of engagement, 
not coercion. Rivals find their way to lasting peac when they resort to diplomacy to settle 
their differences, not when one side coerces the otr into submission. The exercise of 
strategic restraint is in many respects the key that puts rivals on the path to peace. Second, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, democracy is not a necessary condition for Stable Peace 
and regime type is a poor predictor of the potential for enemies to become friends. Third, too, 
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in contrast to convention wisdom, diplomacy, not economic interdependence, is the currency 
of peace and growing economic ties and exchange can lo k in rapprochement, but only after a 
political settlement is being negotiated and formally ccepted. Fourth, although diplomacy is 
the currency of peace, domestic politics weight heavily in the outcome of efforts to advance 
rapprochement, and as a whole consolidating Stable Peace requires good politics, not just 
good diplomacy.141 
Theorizing on China`s rise and assessing it through the lens of Stable Peace Kupchan 
argues that:  
- “ China and the U.S. today find themselves in Act1 of the obvious 3-4 Acts play that 
is going to unfold in their future relationship. The play falls into the category of historic 
hegemonic transition in which we have one global hegemon that is going to be challenged by 
the rise of a country that by the middle of the 2020 will be top economic power. Over time 
China will have the military capability to challenge the U.S. for hegemony, at least in its own 
neighborhood, not unlikely the way the U.S. challeng d Great Britain in its own hemisphere 
at the end of the XIX century.  
 - At the present point, the key is to avoid mutual provocations, to find modes for 
building U.S.- China mutual trust, deepening the dialogue, so that when China is at the stage 
that it can check and challenge, U.S, and China are not adverse geopolitical rivals. If 
foundations for that trust are not provided, then by 2025 there can emerge a kind of tensions 
over naval supremacy in East and South China Seas, the first island chain – Taiwan, South 
Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, that could be the main locus of geopolitical uncertainty and 
rivalry over the next several decades. 
- In Washington there are many different opinions o China and anyone who makes a 
sort of firm, definitive judgments about the rise of the present day China is wrong, as any 
definitive judgment would be premature. Anyone who claims that China will inevitably 
emerge as an aggressor is obviously premature, becaus  `we do not know`. Anyone who 
claims that China will follow a peaceful path to greater power is also wrong, because we `do 
not know`. China is simply at that interim stage of identity formation. One thing that could be 
said with certain amount of conviction is that China and the U.S. need to avoid things that 
would push them down to an unintended consequence of rivalry, as there is the key lesson of 
WWI. They need to be very careful not to get involved in a kind of tit for tat struggle, in 
which neither wants conflict but end up sliding that slippery slope. 
- The key is – accommodation and reciprocal restraint. The U.S. has to put its cards on 
the table and make clear to China what its “red lines” are, but at the same time confirm that it 
does not mean ill to China and is not attempting to block China`s  rise. That it in fact believes 
that China`s rise can be good for the world as long as Beijing plays by a certain set of rules. 
The key is to nurture new rules based order rather t an just let a more anarchical order to 
prevail. China needs to play the same game and lay own its cards on the table, make clear 
that it expects to have more influence to commensurate with its greater power, but also to do 
things to convince others that it does not have predatory military intents. That kind of mutual 
transparency and accommodation is key to avoiding that unintended slide towards U.S.- 
China geopolitical competition. 
- The world is headed towards the times when there will be multiple models and 
multiple powers with different views of how to organize life domestically and internationally 
– all out there, competing in the marketplace of ideas, and for the first time in history – 
integrated and globalized world without a leading center of gravity. The Western world will 
continue to be just there – the Western world, and there will be Washington consensus, 
Brussels consensus, Beijing consensus, Delhi consensu , Brazilia consensus, Jakarta 
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consensus, and there will be no dominant model in a way that there has been for the last 200 
years. 
- There will be many and different major players, and the only alternative is that the 
UN takes the lead and asks all of them to put the cards on the table and have a decisive 
discussion about the founding rules for the world that is going to come next. A totally new 
world in a way, it has to be. It does not mean thatimportant parts of the Western world will 
not survive, will be part of the next world, they will. But the West will have to give as much 
as it gets, as it seeks to fashion that new consensu . The effort must be made, whether 
successful, remains to be seen. 
There is not too much time left, as by 2030 China will be the largest economy of the 
world. By 2050, of the top leading powers, only one will be from the West, the USA, all the 
others in the  top 5, from today`s developing world. 
We better have that conversation and discussion sooer rather than later, as the world 
is changing in a very quick pace”142 
 
Is there IR Theory with ´Chinese Characteristics´?  
 
 International relations research in China has challengingly increased over the past 35 
years within broader efforts to emancipate from Anglo-Saxon IR discipline narrative, and in 
search for localizing international relations theory. 
Since the post-WWII development of IR as a discipline mainly elevated by scholars in 
American institutions based on Hoffmann´s IR -´´An American Social Science´´, there was no 
explicit need of label for any so-called ´American school of IR´ or ´IR with American 
characteristics´. U.S. IR´s somewhat distinct and common positivism-oriented methods, 
rationalist approaches, and research styles still allowed for a variety of theories, especially 
across and within Realism and Liberalism, to coexist within ´American social science´.143 
Early development of IR in UK reflected imperial problems UK faced in foreign relations, 
leading to the formation of the ´English School´ with the common ontological disposition and 
criticism of the kind of scientific methods advanced by positivists.144 As the latter two 
concepts are at the center of the current Chinese IR discourse, professor Ren Xiao´s claim, 
´´The work of the English School was of interest in heir own right, and as an alternative to 
the American IR theory … If there could be an English school, why not a Chinese school?´´145 
sounds not political/scholarly surprising. 
Following Cox´s ´Theory is always for someone and for some purpose´, Chinese IR 
theory, when, and if it becomes reality, will hence be out there for someone and for some 
purpose. Due to China´s rise, relative decline of the West and objective changes in the real 
world, scholars question whether or not IR theory with Chinese characteristics is a political 
project for China´s political purposes.146 In China, as with all countries, IR theory is never 
purely scientifically academic, and bears the prominent purpose of basic policies. As China´s 
explicitely announced intentions in President Xi´s January 2017 Davos speech, to move to the 
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center of world politics and globalization, the question of China´s international purpose and 
behavior becomes more important than ever, and the shape and foundations of Chinese IR 
theories will therefore provide guiding clues to the direction of Chinese Grand Strategy. 
History matters much in IR theories. Wight provides an analytical equation: Politics: 
International Politics = Political Theory: Historical Interpretation.147 As mainstream IR theory 
has been shaped by modern narrative of European history, abundant historical, civilizational 
and cultural resources could also serve as the basis for developing non-Western IR theory.148 
The Chinese evolution is no exception, as most scholarly efforts and energy to create their 
own IR theory start from historical experience and ´background knowledge´, bearing the 
burden of external and domestic debates and criticism regarding ´Historical Interpretation´. 
Various labels have been used to describe Chinese theoretical research to create a 
distinct IRT: ´IR theory with Chinese characteristic ´, ´Chinese localization (or nativization) 
of IR theory´, ´China´s exploration of international political theory´, ´the Chinese view of 
international relations or international politics´, ´ Chinese School´, etc.149 There is no 
consensus, yet, about whether a Chinese School(s) distinctiveness lies in its methods, topics, 
questions, core concepts, theoretical construct, or app oach. It was Huan Xiang, foreign policy 
adviser to Zhou Enlai, who originally openly proposed at the first Chinese ´Theory of IR´ 
conference in Shanghai in 1987 the elaboration of IR theory with Chinese characteristics, 
directly linked to Deng Xiaoping´s ´socialism with Chinese characteristics´.150 
Until recently, there were three clear converging views of a Chinese School(s) of IR or 
IR theory with Chinese characteristics. First, a strong consensus among scholars that a 
Chinese School(s) consists of a theoretical construct(s) of global politics that uses uniquely 
Chinese building blocks, such as Chinese history, tradition, political thought, culture, 
literature, problems, or puzzles. It was assessed that the hope for Chinese IR theoretical study 
lies in rediscovering Chinese thought. 
Second, scholars agreed that future prospects for a Chinese School(s) have been 
heavily influenced, and will be affected by the real world adjustments in global politics, 
especially with the rise of China. 
Third, agreement that the development of a Chinese School(s) parallels the increasing 
influence of mainstream IR and that there is a rolea Chinese School(s) should play in relation 
to the IR discipline.151 
Donald Trump´s unexpected 2016 presidential victory caught the world offguard, 
including the mainstream IR community, even in China. If the gradual and successful 
implementation of his declared ´principled realism´ paradigmatic shifts in U.S.´ Grand 
Strategy towards Restraint and economic nationalism at the expense of globalization and 
liberal democratic world order ever takes place in the years to come, Chinese IR house will be 
forced to search for an adequate theoretical adjustment, and response to the above second and 
third understanding of a Chinese School(s) or IR theory with Chinese characteristics. 
Potentially new reality will provide Chinese scholars with new theoretical questions and 
uncertainties under a new global environment that relates to rising China, ambitious initially 
to significantly transform and complement, rather than to replace, the global order as defined 
by the United States and Western Europe since the end of WWII. 
Currently, Chinese scholars accept that there are at least three IR schools so far whose 
projects and theoretical constructs are copy rights distinct: 
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 Zhao Tingyang leads the first school. As professor philosopher, he gained 
acknowledgments for his 2005 book, The Tianxia System. Tianxia, or ´all under heavenly sky´ 
also refers to a tributary or suzerain system, known as an ordering principle of traditional East 
Asian international relations before the arrival of Western nation-state system.152 Besides 
intellectual curiosity and ambition as primary drivers of his Tianxia theory, other distinctive 
motivations are – to ´rethink China´ and develop Chinese indigenous views and theories of 
international relations and world politics, to prepare China intellectually for a greater, more 
constructive role in world affairs, as theoretical and practical alternative to the existing 
modern state system. 
 Qinghua professor Yan Xuetong represents the second school. As ´moral´ realist he 
believes that Chinese IR scholars must look to their native traditional culture and thoughts.153 
Yan claims that all IR theories are universal, have no national specifities, thus IR theory with 
Chinese characteristics is not achievable, and opposes labels, such as ´Chinese School´ or ´IR 
with Chinese characteristics´.154 He works on elaborating a universal theory based on Middle 
Kingdom´s classical historical experience, culture, and philosophy. Assertive, leading Chinese 
realist, he is known as the initiator of   KLP vs SFA debate, proposing that Beijing drops 
Deng Xiaoping´s ´non-alliance´ legacy. While promoting his binary IR theory of ´Moral 
Realism´ he still admits that even if China becomes a super power, by 2050 USA will still be 
there as the main peer competitor of the People´s Rpublic. 
Third school is led by constructivist/realist with Chinese characteristics professor Qin 
Yaqing, member of the Central Committee (CC) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and 
President of China Foreign Affairs University. Strongly advocating for the notion of ´Chinese 
school´ in Chinese IR scholarship Qin critically engages with professor Yan on several 
important academic and policy issues. In contrast to Yan, he claims that IR theory differs 
from natural science, and that the former entails cu tural meaning, context, and understanding. 
He argues that although Yan brings traditional Chinese thinkers and historical experience 
back into IR theory, his strong belief in rationality – a core Western assumption in IR theory, 
blocks his attempts in the creation of a genuinely Chinese IR theory. On his part, by 
introducing ´relationality´, a concept deeply rooted in Chinese tradition and culture, Qin 
adopts an interactive approach that links Western IR theories with Chinese cultural 
thinking,155 an idea in progress in his recent book – Relationality and Process: Cultural 
Construction in Chinese International Relations Theory.156  
Chinese characteristics´ constructivist approach of Qin Yaqing tries to blend Western 
ideas, approaches, concepts, and theorizing with a modern, contemporary reinterpretation of 
traditional classical Chinese narrative. He aims to render China an external peaceful and 
benign identity by introducing the Chinese supplementary co-evolutionary ´continuity through 
change´ dialectics of Zhongyong, to be discussed below.  
The introduction of Zhongyong dialectics in a major subtle way tries to neutralize 
professor Yan´s sometimes hawkish realist stands vis-à- is the U.S., to balance the KLP v/s 
SFA debate, and at the same time to reconcile and give objective external and domestic 
explanatory Chinese dialectics´ force to the contradictory ´socialism with Chinese 
characteristics´ political superstructure and China´s declared status of market economy.     
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Chinese theoretical responses to the international China rise debate 
 
Chinese IR scholars acknowledge that China`s rise is a major event in the international 
relations of the 21st century, and that the rise of any new power inevitably leads to challenges 
and adjustments in the existing international system. However, they argue, that unlike 
Western powers, which have a history of hostile rival y and conflict when power shifts, China 
has practiced a peaceful and cooperative internatiol strategy since it started its reforms and 
opening up more than three decades ago, a tendency and a process that China will stick to 
continuously in the future.157 
At the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, in 2014, Chinese 
president Xi Jinping laid down the guidelines for Chinese major-country diplomacy with 
Chinese characteristics, emphasizing also on mutually beneficial international cooperation in 
the 21st century. Due to the continuing “China threat” and “China assertiveness” international 
debate, and abiding to top Chinese leadership´s guidelines, Chinese IR scholars enhanced 
their research and attention to the ´three traps´ related to the rise and fall of world powers. 
They draw on historical empirical evidence and experience of other great powers and by 
referring to leading theories of international relations, such as: Paul Kennedy`s research that 
prophesized the collapse of the USSR and the decline of the U.S.158, the Thucydides and 
Olson traps.159 
Chinese IR scholars warn that for escaping `Paul Kennedy trap` and avoid strategic 
mistakes, China should focus on its specific strategic goals, not to expand and not to ignore 
reality when undertaking more international obligations. In spite of its status as the world`s 
second largest economy, China is still a developing country, and its strategies should be 
formulated in line with actual strength and reality, and there should be a balance and 
dialectical unity between economic development and national security. 
For them, in avoiding the `Thucydides trap` China should pay special attention to the 
strategic competition with the U.S. as it still poses severe structural problem. U.S. is still 
doubtful about the concept of `mutual respect`, rega ds China`s rise as a challenge to its core 
goal of world dominance, and shows no respect for the Chinese political system and order. 
Western powers should abandon their views of binary opposition between China and the U.S., 
and instead seek ways to reform the existing interna io al system, and accept the modes of 
China`s peaceful development. 
As more and more Chinese goods, capital and talent re exported overseas, and as 
China is becoming more open and internationalized with outward expanding interests and 
influence, there is a higher risk of negative effects and blowback of the `Olson trap` for the 
country`s international relations and diplomacy. Large interest groups will objectively take 
shape in the nation`s rapid development path, pursuing maximized share of total wealth and a 
`free ride`on the overall efforts of others, while n glecting the common and general interests 
of the nation as a whole. As China has the headache of overlapping management and vicious 
competition among the national regions, departments a d enterprises, fragmentation, lack of 
coordination and mutual constraint have become prominent problems for China`s foreign 
strategy. Scholars assess positively the establishment of the National Security Council, and its 
goals to overcome the problem of excessive diplomatic roles, and lack of coordination. By 
getting rid of the `dilemma of collective action` Chinese diplomacy can come into full play, 
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help create, and maintain the necessary period of strategic opportunities for the Chinese 
national development in the 21st century”.160 
Chinese IR theoreticians claim that great power diplomacy with Chinese 
characteristics has rich connotations, includin persistent pursuit of the Chinese path to 
development and strengthening of social institutions, cultural traditions and core values. It is 
also characterizes by an insistence on the democratization of international relations, 
opposition to all forms of hegemony and power politics, perseverance in constructing a new 
type of international relations, and following the right approach to principles and interests. 
IR scholars also present China`s engagement with the international system as a 
strategic Chinese choice and initiative of its own, a d not that China`s been “taught”, as 
attributed in some of the Western mainstream IR theories. For them, China`s participation in 
the international system is not a passive process, and China will not sacrifice its core national 
interests just for the opportunity of joining the international institutions.161 
The hegemonic stability theory and the neo-liberal institutionalists posit that a 
hegemonic power is crucial in establishing the international order, for it provides the 
necessary international rules and public goods for g vernance. Qin Yaqing argues that 
Chinese wisdom can contribute to the evolution of the international order and the international 
system in at least three ways: First, by promoting a pluralistic mode of global governance in 
the current more pluralistic world. Second, by bringing forth, promoting and putting into 
practice the idea of partnership, replacing the predominance of the distribution of power and 
self-interest in the Realpolitik and rational choice theories. For him, partnership is based on 
trust and respect, reflecting the idea of relational governance. The latter, by complementing 
the rule-based governance may and can lead to a model that respects rules, values human 
relations, and beliefs in morality, and finally to a fiduciary society. Third, existing 
international institutions were established by the W stern nations for the governance of their 
relations during a certain period of past history. China`s participation in the international 
system will promote its legitimacy and will lead to genuine evolution of the international 
order. In an increasingly globalized world, participatory practices that include all the states, 
are necessary conditions for the legitimacy of globa  governance and the effective way of 
overcoming the sense of alienation among the majority f international society.162 
China`s international Grand Strategy has become top pri rity topic in the last several 
years, resulting in broad `China threat` and `assertive China` discourse. IR analyses and 
theorizing have broadly focused on China`s current strategic policies assessing China- Japan- 
and other neighbors relations, the territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, the 
Chinese New Silk Road initiative, the creation of the Beijing based Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), and the key issues of China-U.S. strategic competition.  
This omnipresent trend is partly due to China`s substantially expanded capabilities as 
the world`s second largest economy, and also to the anxieties and uncertainties about China`s 
international behavior as status-quo or revisionist great power in the international system and 
society. The discourse intensified since the new Chinese top leadership assumed power at the 
18th Party congress in November 2012, considered by many foreign and domestic scholars 
and strategists as a turning point and major strategic shift from Deng Xiaoping`s legacy of – 
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taoguangyanghui – keeping a low profile / KLP / to fenfayouwei – striving for achievements   
/ SFA /.163 
Some Chinese domestic IR theorizing efforts tried to explain this alleged strategic shift 
in China`s international strategy by the reemergence of a Chinese “moral realism”, through 
the lens of the power transition theory, and the argument that the existing hegemon and the 
rising contender will clash – as objective law and therefore inevitable.164 Some good part of 
Western strategists and analists, too, tried to exploit the categories “revisionism” and 
“assertiveness” in explaining why China had become difficult for the world to deal with in the 
recent years. They claim that “Beijing exhibits increasingly tough and truculent behavior 
towards many of its neighbours in Asis, as well as to the United States, and the European 
Union”165, and even that the “old days of power politics” are back.166 
Summing up, the hidden agenda in the discourse in Ch a and in the West was about 
whether or not Beijing is shifting away from the KLP to the SFA approach in its international 
relations and foreign policy, a tendency allegedly observed in the new initiatives and more 
assertive stands of the 5th generation Chinese leadership after 2012-2013,167 and especially in 
the context of the president Xi promoted concept of a “New Type of Major Countries 
Relationship” between China and the USA in the 21st century. 
 
Zhongyong dialectics in IR theorizing of China`s rise  
 
One of the main pillars of the Chinese Grand Strategy`s international relations and 
foreign policy goals is the necessity of achieving and guaranteeing friendly and peaceful 
development environment and promoting the peaceful identity of China, guided by the “no 
hegemony”, “no expansion” and “no alliance” legacy principles of Deng Xiaoping. To 
counter and diffuse the damage and anxiety concerning the peaceful identity of China as 
result of the “assertive”, “threat”, “revisionism” and especially the latest KLP v/s SFA 
narrative and debate in the U.S., the West and in As a as a whole, the Chinese IR scholarship 
had to put first its own house in order.  
Most of leading Chinese IR scholars do assess and agree that China has not undergone 
a fundamental change in its international strategy.168 Some, notably Yan Xuetong, 
approvingly argue and claim that after 2012-2013 China as effectively abandoned KLP and 
adopted the SFA approach and strategy, as best serving the rise of China. In his publication in 
2014169, Yan explicitly criticizes the KLP, and implicitly the Chinese leadership, for its 
emphasis on three foreign policy tenets: no internatio l leadership, no alliances, and first 
priority relationship with the U.S. According to Yan, KLP serves predominantly economic 
goals while SFA has defining political connotations. A suming a fundamental change in terms 
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of strategic goals in Beijing´s foreign policy – from development to power-oriented one,  he 
questions whether China`s international strategy serve  the national political, economic and 
social development, or strives for global hegemonic competition.170 
Yan Xuetong`s arguments and claims are substantially and theoretically debated, 
contested and challenged by prof. Qin Yaqing .171 
The main leading argument of Qin, in critiqueing and countering Yan`s arguments and 
claims, is that the latter treats, in a typical structural realist tradition and Hegelian/Western 
conflictual dialectics, both KLP and SFA “as dichotomous opposites that have fundamentally 
different goals, tenets, general layouts, working approaches, and methods”. He elaborates and 
argues that the Chinese do not structure things in such a dialectical construction and that this 
either-or dichotomous approach to the two strategies, adopting either KLP or SFA, could lead 
to a serious international misjudgement of China`s current foreign policy and international 
behavior on the global stage, and points out that: “The Chinese do not think and act that 
way”.172 
Qin goes much deeper and further, mostly for the outside audience – Western and 
other policy-makers and strategists. He explains and clarifies China`s self-understanding and 
generative approaches not only regarding the subject of the concrete debate and cotraversy – 
KLP v/s SFA, but in general – how Beijing sees the ov rall Grand Strategy of China for the 
21st century. 
Qin begins by theoreticaly introducing the concepts of “background knowledge” and 
the Chinese Zhongyong complementary dialectics, in co trast to the conflictual Western 
Hegelian dialectics. Drawing on Adler, Barnett, Pouliot, he argues that background 
knowledge, term coined by Searle and similar to Bourdie `s concept of Habitus, matters more 
than representational knowledge in social action, and has been in the focus of the practical IR 
approaches in recent years.173 The Zhongyong (seeking the middle course) dialectic, or 
complementary dialectic, constitutes a core component of the Chinese background 
knowledge, as the essence of several thousand years of practice in Chinese society. According 
to Qin, Zhongyong is the most useful international and otherwise behavior guiding principle, 
a virtuous social norm, best illustrating the Chinese way of thinking. It also reflects the 
Chinese worldview through which they understand the self, the other, the universe and 
especially the relationships among them,174 implying the processes of “continuity through 
change”. 
To drive his point home, Qin makes a comparison betwe n the Chinese Zhongyong 
dialectic, and the Hegelian dialectic, which he argues, constitutes a core component that 
guides the thoughts and actions of a Western mind. For him, the Hegelian dialectic is one that 
implies a strong either-or logic and includes several defining assumptions175: dichotomy, 
which structures any mutually exclusive, discrete and independent pair of poles or thesis, 
interacting with each other. The thesis and antithes s are thus reified into the either-or logic, 
fundamentally denying reconciliation and co-evolution. The thesis cannot become the 
antithesis, and vice versa. The synthsis is born, if, and only if one overwhelms or destroys the 
other. Thus, dichotomy, exclusivity and conflict constitute the three interralated defining 
features of the Hegelian dialectic, a dichotomous structure that has obtained almost universal 
applicability for the last couple of centuries. Knowledge production itself follows a similar 
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path. Realism in IR, is a theory constructed with such background knowledge deeply 
embedded in it. In turn, it appears as representative knowledge and “objective law”,176 to 
provide a rational justification and lawfulness foran irreconcilable power struggle between 
two great powers for global hegemony.177 
Qin claims that the Chinese tend to think and act differently from other nations and 
cultures because they cherish and hold a different worldview, as reflected in the Chinese 
Zhongyong dialectics. The latter, similar to the Western dialectic also sees progress and 
evolution as a result of the interaction between two opposites, but structures them in a non-
dichotomous way, in correlativity, which is perhaps the most distinctive feature of this 
interaction, in which the two opposites are two correlated parts of an organic whole.  
Zhongyong sees no thesis and antithesis locked in confrontation till one replaces the 
other, but co-thesis that interacts, complements and gives life to one another, leading to a 
synthesis that combines and includes both thesis, and which at the same time is different from 
them, i.e. the interaction between the two is a process of mutually complementing, a process 
of becoming, a “continuity through change”. 
 
Zhongyong theorizing on Grand Strategy 
 
After theorizing and differentiating the Western from the Chinese dialectics, Qin turns 
to the practical implications of Zhongyong in Beijing`s international relations and foreign 
policy: “In term of strategies … Zhongyong does not imply that one should never be 
assertive, should always keep a low profile, and should never strive for achievements. It does 
mean that one should know where and when to be assertive, to keep a low profile /KLP/, and 
when and how to strive for achievements /SFA/. Zhongy g is thus about due measures and 
degree …, and it is the most difficult principle of the Chinese dialectics. Exactly what is due 
measure and degree is in itself not easy to determin  in specific situations. Thus, in reality, 
flexibility and selectivity are characteristic aspects of how one should attain due measure and 
degree”.178 
The crucial question for China`s international strategy is where and when to stick to 
`keeping a low profile` and where and when to be more `proactive towards achievements`.  
This is when the real test comes, the test of wisdom, vision, and determination.  The question 
of `Either KLP or SFA` is a false, irrelevant question, not the one that Chinese use in the 
practice of international relations. Elements of KLP and SFA, are and will be both present in 
China`s international and strategic behavior. 
Drawing on Zhonyong continuity through change dialectics and theorizing on China`s 
rise, Qin outlines the current Chinese Grand Strategy and its international relations organic 
component, using official State and Party program documents, as well as guidelines by the top 
Chinese leadership:179 
The three main pillars and core national interest underlining China`s Grand Strategy 
are: continuation of China`s state and political system and political stability, the leadership of 
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the Communist Party, the socialist system and the road with Chinese characteristics. The 
second is sovereignty and security, territorial integration, and unification of the country, and 
the third is sustainable economic and social development of China. 
Within the overall comprehensive Grand Strategy there are two specific strategic 
goals: to double China`s GDP and per capita income by 2020, compared to 2010 and the 
second – to build China into a modern socialist country of prosperity, democracy, civility and 
harmony by 2050.  
Peaceful external environment for economic development is China`s leading strategic 
goal, and instrument for the realization of the comprehensive strategy of domestic 
development – national rejuvenation, and for the two specific strategies targeted to 2020 and 
2050. 
China`s international strategy is both for sustainable support and helping the 
realization of the comprehensive and specific strategic goals. Major countries will be the key, 
neighbouring countries as the priority, developing countries as the foundation, and 
multilateral global and regional organizations, as the platform for China`s international 
relations and foreign policy. Non-alliance will continue to be main feature of China`s foreign 
policy, in search of implementing a balance of relationships. 
As domestic issues and developments continue to repres nt the top priority of China`s 
comprehensive Grand Strategy there is not external reversion in the efforts and the attention 
of the Chiese leadership for global hegemony. “Continuity through change” is what 
characterizes China`s international strategy in terms of the ultimate strategic goals, the overall 
comprehensive strategic design, and the main strategic policies.180 
 
Considerations from all levels 
 
With the exception of the Chinese politico-pholosophical Zhongyong dialectic 
approach, and the Stable Peace theory eclecticism, all other schools analyzed above, start their 
argumentation and theorizing, based on the internatio l structure. Although Waltz prioritizes 
the systemic influence on national policy, he admits that since causes operate at different 
levels and interact with one another, explanations operating at either level alone are bound to 
be misleading.181 He also observes that “systems populated by units of different sorts in some 
ways perform differently, even though they share the same organizing principle. More needs 
to be said about the status and role of units in neorealist theory.”182 Despite his major focus on 
international relations, the works of Waltz offer a bridge to ways of exploring foreign policy 
behavior. “State identity formation” and the explanation of state identities and interests fall 
into “the domain of theories of foreign policy”,183 and “foreign policy behavior can be 
explained only by a conjunction of external and inter al conditions”. 184 In agreement with 
such remarks, Keohane points out that more research has to be undertaken at the level of the 
state since “the current theories do not take us very far in understanding the behavior of the 
United States and the European powers at the end of the Cold War.”185 
Wendt accentuates on the importance of ideas in interna ional relations. The 
motivations, expectations, and the shared knowledge between states are crucial in the analysis 
of state actions. Not examining how the attributes of tates are formed by domestic factors, 
Wendt stays at the system level to explore the definition of structure and the structural 
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influence on the transformation of state identities and interests, however admitting that rather 
than being determined by the international system, international behavior is often determined 
primarily by domestic politics.186 
Can the above Western leading IR theories – China`s rise theorizing, and the ancient 
Chinese politico-philosophical ideas, and traditional Chinese moral norms give an analytical 
framework, and adequate - full spectrum responses to the questions I research in my 
dissertation? My simple answer is – maybe not, maybe to a certain positive added value effect 
– yes, if I pragmatically employ and capture the richer and more textured insights that a 
critical reading and analytical eclecticism can rend r to my work. 
Western theories have to guard against the tradition and inclination to make Western 
achievements and experience the benchmark to understanding the predominantly non-Western 
world`s political and ideational systems. It represent  an incommensurability problem Hedley 
Bull wisely warned of, and raised more than 40 years go, which is yet to be solved.187 
Bringing Chinese classical ideas into the discussion on China`s logic of modern international 
behavior takes the burden of transmuting ancient ideas to contemporary ontological and 
epistemological discourse.188 A simple attempt to combine Western theory and Chinese 
thought is also challenging, having to deal with the problem of “translatability of political and 
moral visions across civilizational and cultural barriers and divides”, which is difficult to 
overcome if not completely insurmountable.189 
Western IR theories and their conclusions reffering to the dissertation topic are quite 
controversial. Offensive realists continue to asses China as a revisionist power which is or 
will try inevitably to reconstruct the existing international order by challenging the American 
hegemony. The neo-liberal institutionalists argue, and hope that China is and will remain a 
status-quo power, contended with the economic interes s achieved through the international 
cooperation within the existing institutional architecture. In between there are undecided and 
cautioned IR scholars with a relatively open approach to the issues of China`s rise and 
intentions. Constructivists highlighten the social interaction between China and the 
multilateral international institutions. For them, it is a process in which China`s international 
identity, intentions, and expectations are socially constructed and evolving, but with the 
tendency of becoming too Sino-centric. English School worries whether China`s self-defined 
identity will accept and comply with the new primary institutions and norms of the 
international society. SIT recommends that it is in China`s interest to be “socially creative”- 
status-quo, as it has been in the last 30 years. Stable Peace theory proponent claims that 
“nobody knows what China will be in the 21st century, as it is too premature”, and will depend 
predominantly on creative and consensual diplomatic approaches. Finally, IR scholars, who 
under the influence of classical realism argue that t ere is possibility and flexibility for China 
to choose to be either a responsible great power or a challenger to the existing hegemon, due 
to the contingent feature of power politics. 
 We have a wide range of Western IR assessments and responses to the main issues 
and questions of my research: from “yes” to “no” to “yes and no”, including “we do not 
know, it is too premature to say”. 
Even China assertive and pro-SFA “moral realist” Yan Xuetong, who actually initiated 
the 2014 domestic and international debate on KLP v/s SFA´s Chinese international strategy, 
had to cede and admit in 2015, that “if China fulfils its second centennial goal of building 
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prosperous and strong democratic civilized harmonious socialist modern country in 2049”, the 
U.S. will not necessarily lose its superpower status.190 
On the Chinese leading IR scholarship side, we have the basic luring tenet that the 
classical Chinese Zhongyong dialectic (basically – keep the middle course not extremes, and 
continuity through change) should be used as the right theoretical framework for a discussion 
on the China`s international strategy. Zhongyong dialectic is defined as the key to how the 
Chinese think and act, and the worldview through which they understand the self, the other, 
the universe, the relationship among them and how to behave internationally and otherwise. In 
the processes there might be changes (even assertiven ss) when safeguarding the national 
interest, but the continuity of the basic principles of “peaceful development”, “no alliance, no 
expansion and no hegemony” will guide China for the rejuvenation of the Chinese people and 
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P А R Т I 
 
 SELECTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RISE OF THE USA AND CHINA  
 
 When China`s overall and per capita economic output equalizes or eventually 
surpasses America`s sometimes in the future, it will be the first time since the 18th century 
that the world`s largest economy will belong to a nonwestern, not English speaking and not a 
liberal democratic state. Yet, in the asymmetrical world that is emerging, the US will remain 
for a long time the dominant military force. Economic and military powers are separating. 
Can these changes in the distribution of power occur peacefully? Current reading of   Grand 
Strategies of both the U.S. and China shows that it will be very difficult, but possible! 
 Rivalry between great powers, between the hegemon and the second in economic 
power in the system, with potential for changes of place at the top of the hierarchy is an old, 
commonly well researched and theorized topic in international relations. In contrast to this 
predominantly offensive realist conflicting posture, more than a decade ago China officially 
announced its adherence to a more liberal-constructivist idea and pragmatic policy of peaceful 
rise/development.191  
 The mainstream historical record and structural causes IR discourse supports the 
story of inevitable tension and conflict between, o ne side, challenging rising powers 
seeking to change the status architecture and hierarchy, and on the rival side, consuming the 
status quo established ones, seeking to defend the syst m and its rules. The usual suspects and 
primary examples in this kind of IR theorizing are given as: France rose to preeminence by 
challenging Spain and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, th  British Empire ascended by fighting 
the Netherlands and Napoleonic France, and tried to keep the global throne by crashing two 
challenges from Kaiser and Nazi Germany. Russia/USSR charged her own path of emergence 
in many wars with Sweden, Poland, the Ottoman Empire, Austro-Hungarian Empire and 
Napoleonic France, and fought its way to superpower status by taking and occupying Berlin 
in 1945. Indeed, most of these aspiring powers inevitably had to fight wars as main 
components of their Grand Strategies for global rise. The two world wars of the 20th century 
(the second 30 years Great War / 1914-1945 /192 and the Cold War), obviously support this IR 
and history narrative. 
 In 1990, at the turn of the Soviet demise, John Mearsheimer wrote, “The world is 
about to conduct a vast test of the theories of war and peace put forward by social scientists, 
who never dreamed that their ideas would be tested by the world-historic events announced 
almost daily in newspaper headlines”.193 His prediction proved accurate. 
 China`s rise and its implications for the Western dominated international society 
became hot topic in the post-Cold War period, opening the gate for immense number of 
academic books, studies, research articles. Althoug not a pioneer on the topic, and not the 
first using the cliché “China rise” William H. Overholt`s work194 in 1993 was the first 
research to predict China`s economic and geopolitical success that prompted discussions and 
debates which turned this concept-puzzle into a top gl bal policy project in IR scholarship. By 
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mid 1990s Chinese IR scholars and other political sience and philosophy authors also began 
research and writing on China`s rise. At the close f the 1990s leading Western scholars 
doubted that China would rise to a great power statu , and some still doubt it.195 As a whole 
by the middle of the first decade of the 2000s the ris  of China as a great power has become 
nearly a conventional wisdom among most scholars, policy-makers and strategists in the 
West. 
  Mainstream IR, historical record and conventional wisdom live with the notion that 
the U.S. is arguably the only case of ´´peaceful rise´´ to world preeminence? Now, that we 
have another claimant for similar attempt, with Grand Strategy incorporating the concept of 
“Peaceful rise/development” to achieve the China Dream, with the exception of few scholars 
– Buzan and Cox196, Kupchan197, Feng Yongping, Womack, Mearsheimer, Wolf and some 
others, the comparison case study of the both “Peaceful Rises and Dreams” is quite 
understudied and muted. 
 Some scholars point to the so called Anglo-American peaceful hegemonic power 
transition as an example of peaceful rise to be emulated by contemporary U.S. and China.198 
Others make the comparison arguing the existence of similarities and differences in the rise of 
both countries, and that the rise of China currently looks rather “cold” than “the mixed, but at 
the end warmer” definite rise of the U.S. in the mid-20th century, sharing lessons and advice 
to China for the present and for the future.199 What is missing from the research are the 
consequential questions and explanatory responses to is ues and facts regarding the processes 
in the final rise of both the U.S. and China, such as: objective motives and origins of their 
respective rise Grand Strategies and the paradigms that guide and drives them, periodicity, 
ups and downs, as these processes were not linear ad consistent all the time. Reevaluation 
and redefinition of the term – “peaceful”, if we accept and agree with the mainstream IR and 
history record, that 1945 was the benchmark when th peaceful power transition from Britain 
to the U.S took place.  
 What was so peaceful in 1945 after tens of million dead, what about Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, does the fact that the U.S. and Britain were not directly in war make the transition 
peaceful in a six years period of WW? Could we by analogy and by default then argue that the 
Soviet Union also “rose peacefully” in 1945, being an ally to the U.S. and Britain? What role 
and impact the socially constructed driver of the concept of “exceptionalism” had  and still 
has in the Grand Strategies of  U.S. and China, andshould we not rename John 
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 CHAPTER 1: POST-WWII LEADERSHIP RISE AND STATE OF THE U.S. 
  
 The aim of this dissertation is not to thoroughly follow, compare, and analyze the 
long historical periods of rise, respectively that of U.S. and China. 
 In the two chapters that follow I will make an attempt for basic descriptive inference 
regarding the comparative case and current state of the mid-20th century final leadership rise 
of U.S. and first decade of 21st century SFA assertiveness of China in support of my argument 
that to a very large extent Beijing tries to pragmatically and selectively emulate Washington`s 
post-WWII successful march to world preeminence. Confined within the Zhongyong 
dialectics China struggles to evade all extremes and strategic blunders, such as unilateralism, 
domestic divisions, politico-military overreach and social engineering, deindustrialization, 
national debt and financial travails, causing U.S. its relative decline in the beginning of the 
21st century.  
 
  Setting the stage for the final U.S. leadership rise in mid-20th century 
    Realism and/or Idealism 
 
 Narratives of America often begin with the westward expansion of the New England 
colonies, the depredations against natives Americans, d the wars against Mexico annexing 
Texas, New Mexico, and California, to the United States. Securing the continental land mass 
was the necessary condition for turning the raising American power outwards. Yet, George 
Washington`s warning about not following the Europeans in getting entangled in alliances, 
John Quincy Adam`s legacy for not looking for external dragons to slay, and the early history 
United States portraying itself as disdainful of the power politics that characterized Europe 
did not prevail long as a policy. As America came to grow as a world power, overtaking more 
notably economically the British Empire at the turn of the 19th century, USA also began to 
acquire foreign lands beyond its continent through imperial expansion in both the Caribbean 
and the Pacific, and turned over time a pseudo-empire nation state.  
 Next to the Monroe doctrine, the `City upon the hill`, `the first new nation`, 
`promised land`, `special providence`, `indispensable nation that stands taller and sees 
further`, `the U.S must and will continue to lead in the 21st century`:200 these are some of the 
highly domestically valued concepts and notions of how the USA sees its place in the world. 
The main massage, like in the China case, is difference: by geography; virtues of providence, 
history, ideology and power, the USA and China are not like all other nations. 
     The reference to the notion of an American empire in my thesis is objectively 
helpful for several reasons. The empire analogy has generated impressive new scholarship 
indicating that historians and political scientists ee it as a credible description of the United 
States201. Most importantly, it is theoretically more viable than other IR narratives and 
hypothesis concerning the origins, motivations and paradigms that elaborate on the basis of 
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the American international relations and foreign policy202 – realism or idealism?  Still, empire 
analogy faces a number of issues. The notion of `empir ` - is strikingly in contrast (allusion 
with Rome, Britain or France) with the America`s sen  of `Self `. “Most Americans believe 
that the United States, by its history and very nature, cannot be imperial, let alone 
imperialist”,203 notes Peter Katzenstein as he tries to advance further his argumentation about 
the `American imperium ` in Europe and Asia.204 
 The nature and contrasts between the diametrically opposed constructs of `City upon a 
Hill` and empire/imperium are too stark for the latter to be psychologically accepted by most 
Americans, which explains why U.S. leaders and officials almost never use the ` E ` word in 
public discourse. Historians and political scientists who see utility and reason in the analogy 
had also seen fit and `politically correct` to address the `E` word by adding adjectives in front 
or after as in `inadvertent empire`, `empire by invitation`, `empire lite`205 or by using 
euphemisms like `proactive and reactive global gatekeeper`206, etc. These qualifications try to 
enhance the acceptability and benign model of the American empire, in total moral and 
material contrast to previous empires, which China now echoes with its claims for a 
Confucian pacifism, ´peaceful development´, ´contributor to world peace´, deeply and 
traditionally rooted in its international relations and foreign policy. 
           The British Empire is commonly regarded as the hegemonic power for most of the 
1800s and, as such, represents a workable ( albeit conditional by some scholars ) analogue for 
the present United States.207 
Mainstream theory and narrative says that by the end of the 19th century, the 
weakening British empire faced a power transition on several fronts: the ascent of the United 
States in the Western Hemisphere, the rise of Japan s a Pacific naval power, the German 
Kaiser`s decision to draw on mounting economic and industrial might to build a world-class 
fleet of battleships208 , and the complex conflicting realities alongside th ailing great powers 
of the era: France, Russia, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire209 . London responded 
to each of these challengers in a different way.  
 In the Western Hemisphere, U.S. and Britain were long-term bitter enemies.  
American colonies revolted against British rule in 1775 and the two again went to war in 
1812. Amid the U.S. Civil War, Britain came close to openly intervene on behalf of the 
Confederacy, yet London preferred a weak and divided America to one whose rise might 
come at the expense of British hegemony. After the Union`s victory and for decades 
thereafter, the United States and the British Empire remained cautious and watchful 
antagonists and competitors. Britain`s naval superiority in the Western Atlantic and its 
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imperial presence in North and South America stood in the way of the United States` growing 
interest in extending its sway throughout the Western Hemisphere.210  
 In the 1800s Britain led and shaped not only the European, but also the global 
geopolitical rivalries and games. London assumed th role of a balancer in the concert of 
Europe and kept its closest rivals masterfully in check and won a decisive position in the 
outcomes of the most important multilateral conferences of the age.211 
 The British Empire came to rule 10000000 square miles of territory and over 400 
million people.212While it would be overstatement to characterize Victor an Britain as fully 
omnipotent in world politics during the long 19th century, London was definitely much more 
the primus inter pares when standing against the other great powers of the age. Pax 
Britannica was firmly based upon robust and multifaceted military and material 
foundations.213 
 Emulating the real world then, the practices and policies of the British Empire, the 
logic of the alleged Lord Palmerston`s legacy that “nations have no permanent friends or 
allies, they only have permanent interests”, was echo d almost century later by Henry 
Kissinger`s “America has no permanent friend or enemies, only interests”214, The great 
turning point of America`s foreign policy came in the early 1890s, during the second 
president Grover Cleveland Administration (1885-89 & 1893-97). It was then that the U.S. 
turned sharply and pragmatically from a foreign policy of relative peace and non-intervention 
to a hard and proactive program of political and economic expansion abroad. At the heart of 
the new policy were the America`s leading industrie and finance eager to use the country`s 
growing economic strength to subsidize and force-feed (Open Door) export markets and 
investment outlets that they would finance, as well as to guarantee Third World government 
bonds. The major focus of this expansion in the 1890s was Latin America, and the principle 
enemy to be dislodged was Great Britain, which has dominated foreign investments in that 
region. 
 Richard Olney, Secretary of State from 1895 to 1897 set the tone. After leaving the 
State Department, he summarized the policy he had pursued, “the old isolationism heralded in 
George Washington`s farewell address is over,” …” the time has now arrived when it belongs 
to us to accept the commanding position … among the Power of the earth … and the present 
crying need of our commercial interests …is more markets and larger markets” for American 
products, especially in Latin America.215 
 London`s Rapprochement (1895-1906) and the appeasement of Washington, that 
began with the Treaty of Washington of 1871, and much more pronounced  since 1896, was 
an explicit result of British overstretch, fiscal and domestic difficulties and a pragmatic self-
interested effort to use strategic restraint to dampen geopolitical rivalry with the United 
States.  
 More often common goals, common culture and language, dded to the positive shifts 
in massive public discourse in both countries, that elped transform the identities of 
opposition and rivalry into the identities of inclusiveness and friendship, were the engines and 
factors that consolidated the rapprochement processes.  
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 In terms of economic power (GDP) the U.S. objectively surpassed the British Empire 
during the 1870-80 and never lost the lead thereafter. Britain not only provided over 6 million 
emigrants to the U.S. between 1800 and 1914, but also was by far the largest investor in the 
American economy, with well over half of the FDI into the U.S.216 
 “Contrary to realist expectations, it [British Empire] very quickly came to accept 
America`s rise as being both inevitable following the Union`s victory in the Civil War, and 
potentially beneficial as Britain`s rivalry with Germany began to assume an increasingly 
serious form in the late 19th century. Britain became, in effect, a major collaborator in the rise 
of the United States – though this fact of course do s not feature much in United States self-
understanding of its rise.217 
 U.S. slowly challenged a declining and divided Europe for leadership of the world. 
Financial dominance had moved from the City of Lond to New York, as the U.S. became 
the world`s largest creditor. When researching thisperiod IR scholars and historians, rather 
shun the fact of the unexpected and quickly shoved cr ation of the Fed in 1913, less than a 
year before the outburst of the Great War in 1914. “The Fed itself “enabled the banking 
system to inflate money and credit, finance loans to the Allies, and float massive deficits once 
the U.S. entered the war”.218  
“The U.S. was also much powerful in other ways. The Great War had boosted 
American industry and speeded up the conversion of the U.S. economic strength into 
diplomatic and military power. By the end of the war, the U.S. was the world`s largest 
manufacturer and had the largest stock of gold to back its dollar. Its navy rivaled the British, 
up until then the world`s biggest.219 American exceptionalism – that sense of being both 
different and better than the rest of the world – has also been reinforced echoing President 
Wilson`s – “America is an idea, America is an ideal, America is a vision”.220 
In 1901, the influential British publisher and journalist William T. Stead published a 
best-selling book – The Americanisation of the World221 with a logo, quoting 1835 British 
Radical and Liberal politician Richard Cobden remark: “We fervently believe that our only 
chance of national prosperity lies in the timely remodeling of our system, so as to put it nearly 
as possible upon equality with the improved management of the Americans”. The book 
attracted a good deal of attention at the time, frequently cited, especially in the last couple 
plus decades when the concept of “Americanization” came to be more widely debated in the 
social and historical sciences.222 Some forty years later, in 1941, the owner, and influe tial 
publisher of Life – aspirant for the post of Secretary of State – Henry Luce, wrote an article in 
the magazine titled “The American Century”. This publication has also generated plenty of 
public and scholarly discussion and debates.223 The debate on these two concepts has been 
heating up in the current century as the question of their relevance is being raised by IR 
scholars, and by the diversified political and public discourse in Europe regarding the secrecy 
                                                 
216 Ibid., p. 116, fn. 14 and 15. 
217 Ïbid., p. 116. 
218 Murray N. Rothbard, `Wall Street, Banks and American Foreign Policy`, p. 5. 
219 In 1921-1922, Britain formally acceded to naval parity with the United States. See Peter Harris, `The Imminent US Strategic Adjustment 
to China`, p. 236, fn. 58. 
220 Margaret Macmillan, WWI – The War that Changed Everything, The Wall Street Journal, June 20, 2014. 
221 William T. Stead, T̀he Americanisation of the World: The Trend of the Twentieth Centurỳ, 1901, New York: Horace Markley. 
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and ambiguity of the now frozen Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
between the U.S. and the EU. Some claim that the agreement will mostly benefit 
Washington`s strategy, leading to the deindustrialization of Europe. Scholars even question if 
the “Americanization of the world” and the “American century” ever existed, or lasted merely 
a “half-century”, while others, highlighting the interaction between America and Europe 
speak for a mutually beneficial and equitable “Transatlantic Century” pointing out that the 
American century in Europe is over.224 
It would not be until the early 1940s225 when the British Empire and the United States 
finally fashioned the non-linear and unbalanced “special relationship” of today. The 
rapprochement between 1895 and 1906 laid the foundatio  for the allegedly mutually 
beneficial strategic partnership – and made possible the initial phase of the first “peaceful” 
power transition in history in 1945. The second andfi al phase took place during the Suez 
crisis in 1956. Facing massive negative internationl reaction and Soviet missile threats, the 
Americans peremptory, no objections accepted, firmly to d the British government to stop 
their military action, jointly staged with France and Israel against Nasser`s Egypt, claiming to 
crash the pound sterling, and imposing an oil embargo.226 The age of old-fashioned British 
Empire and European colonialism was, in the eyes of the Washington administration and elite, 
definitely over, and the end of the Suez crisis unambiguously demonstrated the final 
ascendance of the U.S. in the power transition longprocess as the hegemon of the West. 
John Mearsheimer argues that beginning with the Founding Fathers and the Monroe 
Doctrine in 1823, the U.S. behaves in the world as realism dictates, but uses rhetoric and 
justifies its policies in terms of liberal idealistic ideologies. In spite of this structural 
argumentation, the analysis of the final period of the rise of the U.S. should not be entirely in 
terms of “warm” and “cold” or “realism” versus “idealism”, but rather through the pragmatic 
lens of a workable and complex mixture, or a winning so long model of “congagement”227 – 
in which the U.S. uses instrumentally both engagement and containment approaches in its 
interactions with the rest of the world, very much the British Empire way, as “America has no 
permanent friends or enemies, only interests”. 
 
  
American post-WWII Grand Strategy and mode of world leadership 
 
The end of the Cold War, and the demise of the Soviet Camp, made possible the final, 
this time, indeed peaceful, rise of the U.S. in the early 1990s to the top sole superpower status 
in the international system. The unipolar period roughly lasted for 20 years, till the 2008 
global financial and economic crisis, challenged due to U.S. decline, the rise of China, Russia, 
and the Rest. 
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 The roughly one hundred years rise period of the U.S., until the assumption of the 
hegemonic preeminence in the international system in the early 1990s, was a very complex, 
non-linear, and almost always actively challenging the system, process. Several phases can be 
chronologically identified. From 1898 till 1956 – a great power becoming hegemon and 
leader of the Western world. From 1955 (the creation of the Warsaw Pact) to 1991 – end of 
the Cold War, and the balance of power bi-polar period [accepting the USSR as a peer, on the 
basis of nuclear parity during the 1960s, the 70s and sometime in the 80s, caused by the threat 
of mutually assured destruction (MAD)]. From 1991 till 2008 – the final peaceful rise, 
Fukuyama`s “end of history” and Krauthammer`s “unipolar moment”, the period of the 
uncontested U.S. global dominance. And finally the period from 2008 till the present day, 
with which some IR scholars and historians make a very simplistic and structural analogy 
with the pre-Great War (1914-1918) period, as well as between Kaiser Germany and today 
China.228 Scholarly very cautious with general and simple analogies that provide simple 
explanations and solutions, it may be accepted that in some ways the world of today is like the 
world of 1914, but at the same time there are cardin l differences, much more important than 
the similarities. 
Some of the main research topics in my thesis regarding the international system in the 
21st century are the ways of unfolding of the power transition from the West to the East and 
more precisely the U.S. – China relationship. By using the method of basic comparison of 
their respective ascendence to great power status, I al o eclectically draw upon, and exploit 
analogical reasoning regarding one of the main instruments of power for ages – Grand 
Strategy.Within the model of U.S. post-WWII final rise Grand Strategy come the pillars of 
comprehensive national power, showing that USA and China have more in common than is 
generally recognized.  
            The analogies analyzed and considered a not for the sake of simple isolated 
comparison between the United States and China. They are organically interwoven, explicitly 
affecting and having much to say to my thesis arguments regarding the behavior and future 
interactions between Washington and Beijing, which may strongly disbalance the rest of the 
world in case of conflicting scenarios. One must not forget the Chinese national psychological 
shock, and the existential crisis of the “century of humiliation” which followed the collapse of 
the Chinese world order by the mid-19th century: Chinese Empire`s sense of its glorious 
hegemonic posture in the world shrank from - `tianx` (literally – all under the heavenly sky) 
to `guojia`(an ordinary state ), and the ` Chinese world` turned into ` China in the world`.229 
On the other hand we have the American Grand Strategy in the 20th and 21st centuries that 
turned the state republic into a `tianxia`, or “Pax Americana”, which currently is also under 
sort of ´psychological shoch´ due to domestic divide, foreign pressure and challenges.  
            Since Deng Xiaoping´s era of reforms and opening up, all Chinese leaderships with no 
exceptions, have continuously and meticulously worked and added value to the final rise of 
China Dream, for the restoration of the greatness and glory of the `tianxia`, with ´new era 
Chinese characteristic´. The crucial question stillremains – shall we have two competing and 
rival models of `tianxia` or healthy and constructive competition and peaceful co-existence 
between the two great countries?  
In geographical, demographic and economic perspective both U.S. and China are one 
of the biggest factors in the international system. In terms of land area, they are almost of the 
same proportions, U.S. - around 9.85 million, and China – around 9.6 square kilometers, 
ranking the 3rd and the 4th in the world. During the period of its great power rise the U.S. was 
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also definitely a big country. At the beginning of the 20th century it had the third largest 
territory after the Russian Empire and China, or the fourth, if considering the British Empire 
as a single entity. In terms of population the U.S. has around 4.5% of the world`s, which 
places it after China and India.  
           Why have parallels between China and the U.S.`s approach to the international system 
been so long invisible and muted?  
           The“Inadvertent Empire”, “Empire by Invitation”, “Empire Lite”, “Global Gatekeeper” 
and the “Patron-Client” concepts contain the seeds for a possible framework for the U.S. as a 
hub or epicenter of dominant liberal democracy parallel to dominant Confucian-ideational 
system of Ming and Qing China in most parts of Asia.  
 Post-WWII United States´ Grand Strategy had instituted the most successful 
international Bretton Woods system the world has ever seen. As hub or epicenter of the most 
extensive network of formal and informal alliances ever built, the U.S offered its allies and 
partners – military protection as well as economic/financial/trade access to its markets. 
Through an equally impressive array of international i stitutions – IMF, WB, GATT/WTO, 
many of which it helped created, even the UN, United States transmits and imposes its values 
and its preferred rules of the game on the internatio l system. The ensuing economic and 
politico-military `orders` are construed as `public goods` provided by a benign American 
hegemony. In return for all its exertions, the response America seeks is straightforward: first, 
that it is recognized as the power or hegemon, and second, that others emulate its 
political/economic forms and ideas. With both tributes at hand, the United States finds 
equanimity: it and the world are safe, at least from the United States` point of view.230 The 
insights that America wants its likeminded to acknowledge its dominant position and emulate 
its political system (in the same way that China expected its tributaries to adopt its cultural-
ideational forms) are the distinct attributions of the Grand Strategy idea. In practice it is not 
easy to separate these two expectations: U.S. claims to hegemony are based in part on its 
overwhelming material power and in part on its identity as a liberal democracy.231 
 The norm of sovereign equality was supposedly woven into the conduct of 
international relations and enshrined in the United Nations Charter after the end of the Great 
War in 1945. Yet, whatever the United Nations Charter says, few would presume to deal with 
the U.S. as an equal. To be sure, the United States, s John Ikenberry has also argued, may 
mitigate that inequality by exercising `strategic rest aint`, creating, and locking itself in 
international  institutions aimed at providing `public goods` such as security and economic 
order. In doing so, it may facilitate the `buy in` of its tributaries to the American-led 
hegemony.232  
 From all five veto power permanent members (PM) of the UN Security Council, the 
U.S. sits at the apex by the virtue of its political-ideological, economic and military 
superiority and strength, not to mention its enormous advantages and benefits from the status 
of the dollar as world reserve currency. The United States spends more on its military than all 
the other major powers combined [to the tune of $ 700 billion for 2018],  has the highest share 
of world GDP, and its research and technological prowess are peerless.233  
 In his publication, Imperial by Design, John Mearsheimer discusses the options for 
optimal U.S. Grand Strategy, and argues that the model of `Offshore Balancing` is the best for 
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the United States to follow, as it would allow the U.S. to keep its hegemonic posture in the 
Western Hemisphere, to balance and to contain the app arance of `peer competitors` in other 
strategically important for the U.S. national security parts of the world.234    
 What kind of power is the United States? Some of the empire epithets and 
euphemisms that I have recorded and mentioned above, such as: `inadvertent`; `by invitation`; 
`lite`; `global gatekeeper`, that some historians are fond of, do not resonate as well with 
American policymakers, mainstream IR scholars, and foreign elites. `Hyperpower` - coined 
by former French foreign minister in a moment of fit – also imply a psychologically unsound 
and over the top approach to power. Most consonant with American self-understanding and 
dominant frames originating in U.S IR scholarship are descriptions, devoid of normative 
content, that portray the USA as great power (since the early 20th century), superpower and 
Western hegemon (1945 – 1990), or the unipolar superpower (since 1991).235 
 William Wohlworth`s three dimensional graphs of how the United States outclassed 
all others in the past and everyone today along all the relevant power indicators, went far in 
establishing his depiction of the United States as the unipolar superpower.  
 “Hegemony and unipolarity, however, are not the favored descriptions of America for 
policymaker in the United States and its allies andpartners. Hegemony smacks of domination 
while unipolarity sounds too social scientific and soulless. Their preferred discourse is one of 
U.S. leadership,”236 now modified into the winning 2016 election Presidnt Trump´s 
´principled realism´ strategy of ´America first´.  
 
 Limits of unipolarity 
 
 The unexpected and unpredicted, well in advance, by intelligence, diplomats and IR 
scholars´ collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 - 1991, produced the greatest change in world 
power politics since the end of the Great War in 1945. A `tectonic geo-strategic shift`, for 
which the bipolar superpower international structure, governments and IR theorists were not 
prepared and ready for swift accommodation and adjustments. The United States emerged as 
the sole surviving superpower and some strategists and commentators were quick to announce 
that `the end of history` and a new `unipolar moment` of unprecedented U.S. power had 
arrived.  
 In 1992 Pentagon drafted a new Grand Strategy (Defens  Planning Guidance) or the 
Wolfowitz Doctrine, co-authored with then Secretary of Defense and future Vice-President 
Dick Cheney. The draft said that containment was an old idea, a relic of the Cold War and 
advocated that America should maintain military superiority beyond challenge and use it to 
preempt provocations from rogue states with weapons of mass destruction, and if necessary, 
the U.S. be prepared to act alone. President Bush Senior ordered Cheney to rewrite and 
softened it, as he was not previously consulted and briefed on the draft. After all, it was only 
one year after the fall of the Soviet Union and the successful coalition in the Gulf War in 1991 
carried out with U.N. support and closer cooperation among all great powers. Although the 
U.S. came out of the Cold War as the unilateral superpower, the President knew there were 
going to be new realities – of what might be called “architecture” of international politics and 
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national security. President Bush was also highly sensitive to his relationships with other 
world leaders who would not have been very pleased with the new American “preemptive and 
unilateral “ Grand Strategy and with the perspective o be named potential U.S. rivals. 
 In 2002, after the war in Yugoslavia, Wolfowitz came to be vindicated as major parts 
of his views laid down in the 1992 draft were included in the U.S National Security Strategy, 
approved by President Bush Junior in September 2002, marking dramatic and sweeping 
reformulations of U.S. foreign policy that went even beyond his two terms in office.237 
 The rise and the sudden demise of the “Wolfowitz doctrine” as an official strategy for 
preserving primacy and unipolarity lent credence to the IR scholarship and widespread belief 
and critique that unipolarity is dangerous and unstable.238 For neo-realists, unipolarity is the 
least stable of all structures as any great concentration of power threatens other states and 
causes them to take action and restore the balance.239 Other scholars argued that a large 
concentration of power promotes peace, but doubted that U.S. global preeminence can last 
long.240 
 Although they disagreed vigorously on virtually every other aspect of post – Cold War 
politics, in the 1990s scholars of IR increasingly shared this conventional wisdom about 
unipolarity.   
 In his seminal 1999 publication,241 Wohlforth makes an attempt for a theoretical 
neoclassical realism paradigmatic case in defense of `The Stability of a Unipolar World`. He 
claimed and advanced three main propositions that according to him undermine the emerging 
then conventional wisdom that the distribution of pwer is unstable and conflict prone:242 (1) 
The system is unambiguously unipolar. The United States is the first leading state in modern 
international history with decisive preponderance in all the underlying components of power: 
economic, military, technological and geopolitical, nd to describe this unprecedented 
quantitative and qualitative concentration of power as an evanescent “moment” is profoundly 
wrong; (2) The current  (1999) unipolarity is prone to peace.- no important source of conflict, 
no hegemonic rivalry, no security competition among other great powers and tendency to 
bandwagon with the U.S.; (3) The unipolarity is notonly peaceful but durable. If Washington 
plays its cards right, it may last as long as bipolarity. His main message and appeal was: as 
unipolarity is prone to peace and the probability that it will last several more decades at least, 
America should focus on it right intellectually and materially, the chief threat being U.S.`s 
failure to do enough”.243 
 In 1999, William Wohlforth challenged the consensus and the prevailing throughout 
the 1990s argument that unipolarity is not durable, y including also the notion of `unipolar 
peacefulness` in which believers in the transient nature of unipolarity expressed little or no 
interest. Indeed, durability and peace have often ben discussed in the context of systemic 
“stability” in the past. In 1964, Kenneth Waltz defined a system`s stability “in terms of its 
durability, as well as peacefulness of adjustment within it”.244 Later, however, he revised his 
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view on stability, redefining it exclusively in terms of durability and dropped the requirement 
for peace,245 admitting the mistake he made by conflating peace and stability.246 
 His benevolent theorizing and views of unipolarity, Wohlforth developed further with 
his coauthor Stephen Brooks.247 The question of unipolar durability remained the subject of 
spirited debate during the first decade of the 2000s and their work emerged as one of the most 
influential perspectives about current international relations, echoing the “end of history”, 
“the unipolar moment”, and the universalization of Western liberal democracy. 
 Many analysts, such as Robert Kagan, continued to argue that “American 
predominance is unlikely to fade any time soon”.248 Others, however, believe that it is in 
serious decline.249 Adm. Michael Mullen, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
repeatedly warned that the greatest threat to the United States`s national security is the U.S. 
national debt. Richard Haass bluntly puts it, “Foreign Policy Begins at Home” and argues that 
the biggest threat to the United States comes not from abroad but from within.250  
 Potential peer competitors, especially China, are on the comprehensive rise251, while 
Russia is demonstrating military power. U.S. travails in Afghanistan, Iraq, and as a whole in 
the Middle East, added to the unchecked North Korean nuclear (allegedly hydrogen bomb) 
program and the continuing China assertiveness in East and South China Seas seem to 
confirm Paul Kennedy`s argument on the inevitability of imperial overstretch.252 Some see the 
continuing financial and economic crisis that began in the United States in 2008 as the death 
knell of U.S. predomonance253 and Robert Pape argues that “the unipolar world is indeed 
coming to an end”.254 
 The first two decades of the unipolar era have been anything but peaceful.255 U.S. 
forces have been deployed in four new interstate wars: Kuwait/Iraq in 1991; 
Kosovo/Yugoslavia in 1999; Afghanistan from 2001 to the present, and Iraq 2003-2010,256 
with some presumable military presence even at present day. In all, the United States has been 
at war for thirteen of the 25 years of unipolarity, which makes up around 10% of U.S. history, 
account for more than 25 % of the nation`s total time at war.257 In spite of the empirical data, 
the theoretical consensus still upholds that unipolarity encourages peace, and the debate on 
whether, when, and how unipolarity will end has all but monopolized U.S. and foreign IR 
scholarship. 
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 Western liberal democracy had won decisive victory ver fascism and communism, 
and should be seen as the “final form of human governm nt”.258 One consequence of this 
“ideological evolution” was that large-scale conflicts between great powers was “passing 
from the scene”. As the only remaining superpower on the planet, and based on the durability 
and peacefulness of the unipolar world, American leaders were urged not to be reticent about 
using that power, but “to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world 
order and being prepared to enforce them”.259 
 In 2011, analyzing the U.S. Grand Strategy that has followed these basic prescriptions 
for the past twenty years after the Cold War, John Mearsheimer concludes that the results 
were disastrous,260 arguing that the root cause of America`s troubles lies in the adoption of a 
flawed Grand Strategy, starting from President BillClinton on, of global dominance or global 
hegemomy, which was doomed to fail261. 
  
 In search of a new U.S. Grand Strategy 
 
 Mearsheimer and Monteiro´s 2011 challenges and critiques of unipolarity, and world 
dominance tractions of the U.S. Grand Strategy were not unique and unprecedented. In 1943, 
Walter Lippmann expressed similar concerns and considerations offering a classical 
formulation on the issue of Grand Strategy: `In foreign relations, … as in all other relations, a 
policy has been formed only when commitments and power have been brought into balance 
… The nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within 
its means and its means equal to its purposes`.262 “Although Lippmann was mindful of the 
economic costs of global engagement, his primary concern was the political `solvency` of 
U.S. foreign policy. The spectacle of this great nation which does not know its own mind is as 
humiliating as it is dangerous”.263 
 Lippmann`s anxiety and fears proved to be unfounded. It was the coupling of U.S. 
power and international partnership, rather than unilateral actions and initiatives that gave the 
U.S. Grand Strategy such a distinctive character in the decades following 1945. Working 
together, Democrats and Republicans fashioned a bipartisan consensus behind a new type of 
U.S. engagement in world affairs, and to coalesce around a common strategy. Abroad, the 
United States used its superior military power to check potential challenges to stability and an 
open international economy, turning to multilateral institutions to reassure allies and partners. 
In the U.S., the political environment was ripe for the emergence of a “centrist” coalition. The 
formation of a North-South alliance, the easing of class tensions due to economic growth and 
rising incomes, the onset of political pragmatism and ideological moderation – these were the 
conditions that led Democrats and Republicans alike to forge what Arthur Schlesinger labeled 
the “vital center”.264 Thus began the era of liberal internationalism. 
 In the aftermath period of 9/11 and the Iraqi invasion in 2003, Lippmann`s concerns 
and fears surfaced again. In 2007 publication, Kupchan and Trubowitz declared that the 
polarization of the United States has dealt a severe blow and the era of liberal internationalism 
is over, the bipartisan compact between power and partnership has been effectively 
dismantled. They warned that “if left unattended, the political foundations of U.S. statecraft 
will continue to disintegrate, exposing the country to the dangers of an erratic and incoherent 
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foreign policy. To find a new equilibrium between the nation`s commitments abroad and its 
polarized politics at home, the United States will need a Grand Strategy that is as selective 
and judicious as it is purposeful”.265 
 Indeed, in the 2000 presidential election campaign, foreign policy and strategy was far 
from a major focus of either party – and of little interest to the public. In the previous decade 
America seemed to have embarked on a new era of self-absorption and even complacency 
after a half century of global conflict and tensions – victors in the Cold War and the 
campaigns in Kuwait and Yugoslavia, champions of free trade, exemplars of prosperity and 
marketeers par excellence.  
 One of the allegedly first, early 2000s neo-realism scholarly attempts to address these 
issues, was Robert J. Art`s 2003 book – “A Grand Strategy for America”266, sort of 
complementary and corrective theoretical version of President Bush Junior 2002 official 
National Security Strategy (NSS).  
 He postulates and ranks six overarching national iterests for the United States: the 
first vital, the second and third as highly important, and the last three as important: Prevent an 
attack on the American homeland. Prevent great-power Eurasian wars and, if possible, the 
intense security competition that make them more lik ly. Preserve access to a reasonably 
priced and secured supply of oil. Preserve an open int rnational economic order. Foster the 
spread of democracy and respect for human rights abroad, and prevent genocide or mass 
murder in civil wars. Protect the global environment, especially from the adverse affects of 
global warming and severe climate change. All six, encompassing both realpolitik and liberal 
internationalist goals, are consistent with the tradi ional American style and practice of 
foreign policy and strategy, which has always fused the realist and liberal strands of 
statecraft.267 
 In his theoretical work Art evaluates 8 Grand Strategies that the United States might 
choose, selects and makes the case for the one he considers and favors as the Grand Strategy 
that would best protect America`s six national interests – Selective Engagement. For Art, the 
United States should keep a peacetime military presence in the Persian Gulf, Europe, and East 
Asia, maintaining its key alliances and forward-based forces in those regions, and preserve a 
healthy military capability to reinforce troops abroad when necessary. Selective engagement 
is characterized as the optimal Grand Strategy best protecting America`s national interests, 
steering a middle course between not doing enough and aspiring too much, neither an 
isolationist, unilateralist path at one extreme nor a world-policeman role at the other. In sum, 
if properly conceived and executed, Selective engagement Grand Strategy is politically 
feasible and materially affordable.268 
 In his 2009,269 second book on the topic, Art continues promoting his preferred 
American Grand Strategy of Selective Engagement, yet, unlike the neorealist approach in his 
2003 work, in this one he evolves into being a more neoclassical realist with an emphasis on 
the importance of aspects other than solely the structu e of the international system, such as 
legitimacy, domestic politics, and economics. 
 His realism-strong American-centrism, however, is not as determinist as some other`s   
who viewed the inevitability of a rising China warring with a declining America. Instead, Art 
saw opportunities for the U.S. and China to make real choices in diplomacy, institutions, 
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nuclear forces and military modernization that could lead to better and more peaceful 
outcomes.270 
 Since 1987, the United States had adopted 17 official National Security Strategies 
(NSS)271, including the last one of the Trump administration, published in December 2017. 
All of them address and evaluate the current state of U.S.-China relationship. 
 National Security Strategy, like the Defense Planning Guidance and Defense Strategy 
of the USA do not entirely fall and cover the notion f a Grand Strategy. Still, NSS is the 
result of bureaucratic process that obliges multiple executive departments of the government, 
often rivals for resource and influence, to come toge her and produce a single report regarding 
the national security and interests of the U.S, including to address the China rise issue. 
  NSS was initially intended to be an annually revis d document, submitted to Congress 
as an attachment to the budget authorization and appropriation process, communicating a 
rationale to Congress for resource request and major elements of presidential priorities. Over 
the past 30 years, since Reagan`s first NSS in 1987, the balance between these purposes has 
lifted. More and more its pragmatic intent is to address audiences beyond the U.S. 
government and Congress: the domestic public for support, allies, partners, and adversaries 
alike. The George H.W. Bush administration was the first to miss the annual mandate of the 
NSS, showing its shift of importance, and since the election of George W. Bush in 2000 it has 
become practice for only a single NSS document per term. NSS has real value, with two 
caveats. First, given the political risk of being unequivocal, the NSS only communicates an 
implicit hierarchy of priorities. Second, any particular NSS only captures one administration`s 
worldview and self-image at the moment of unveiling, and can quickly become dated. 
 All U.S. NSSs can be separated in two distinct periods: the NSSs prior to the 
financial-economic crisis of 2008, and the NSSs after the crisis, i.e. the 2010 and 2015 NSS of 
the Obama administrations, and President Trump´s 2017 NSS. The first ones, prior to the 
crisis, while outward oriented, and addressing major gl bal issues like terrorism, nuclear 
proliferation, free trade and liberal globalization, were not explicitly concerned with the rise 
of China, despite that the “China threat theory” was already out in the world by the beginning 
and mid-2000s. After the crisis, though, 2010, 2015, and 2017 NSS are much more inward 
oriented, still, seriously addressing and prioritizing the complex implications of the rise of 
China. In principle, all National Security Strategis are constructed around the idea of the 
national interests of the U.S. The core concept of the `American way of life` has been invoked 
by all administrations since that of George H.W. Bush.272 The idea, that the United States 
occupies a position of `leadership` is also a consistent feature, having a status somewhere 
between assumed established fact and normative assertion.273 
  Every administration has faced difficulty in identifying a hierarchy among interests 
that is explicit, systematic and sustainable. The closest any NSS comes is the Clinton 
administration`s 1998 report, which offers a hierarchy with three categories: `vital interests`; 
`important national interests` and `humanitarian and other interests`, though, the distinctions 
between the first two are not easy to sustain, while the last one leaves wide range for 
interpretations. 
 The Reagan administration`s 1987 report was a straigh forward outline of Cold War 
thinking, that laid out a classical conception of the Soviet threat and a robust variant of the 
orthodox strategic response of containment.1987 and1990 NSS included extensive 
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discussions of nuclear weapons in the context of maintaining the deterrence strategy against 
the USSR.274  
 The Clinton administration was the first to use therm `globalization` in its NSS, and 
also made its assessments on the changing global economic environment – with free trade, 
technological innovations and intensified global interconnectedness as its driving forces – a 
priority component in its re-conceptualization of U.S. security and leadership in the post-Cold 
War period.275 Clinton created the National Economic Council and included the Secretary of 
the Treasury as a non-statutory member of the Nation l Security Council. Moves such as 
these demonstrated the Clinton administration`s goals for a strategy of `geo-economics`, to 
the extent that some termed this `the Clinton Doctrine`.276 
 Due to 9/11, the `axis of evil`, Afghanistan and Iraq wars, George W. Bush 2002 and 
2006 (more low-profile) NSS were notable for their focus on the threat of terrorism and 
weapons of mass destruction, the willingness to engage in preemptive use of force even with 
limited international support, and aggressive rhetoric -`right and wrong` on the exclusive 
legitimacy of liberal democracy social engineering as a basis for political order. 
 The National Security Strategies of the 1990s and 2000s underwent a gradual general 
non-confrontational, but mixed evolution and approach when addressing the issue of China`s 
rise. The Clinton era ended with the highly difficult, yet significant passage in Congress of the 
bill establishing permanent normal trading relations with China, and with support for 
Beijing`s ultimate membership of the WTO in 2001 – both justified by the argument that this 
would maximize the chances of integrating China peacefully into the American-led 
international liberal order. 
 In the George W. Bush`s cover letter and in the text of the 2002 NSS there were both 
hopeful and cautious, even softly warning paragraphs w en addressing and assessing the 
China issue: “The U.S. has led the way in completing he accession of China and a democratic 
Taiwan to the WTO”; “… Russia is in a hopeful transition, a partner in the war on terror … 
and  Chinese leaders are discovering that economic freedom is the only source of national 
wealth”; “China should adhere to the rights of assembly, talk and beliefs of its people, … and 
to its nonproliferation commitments …”; “…U.S. is attentive to the internal transition in 
Russia and China … and to possible renewal of old patterns of great power competition…”;277 
The main message was: “We welcome the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and prosperous 
China. The democratic development of China is crucial to that future …, (but still has) 
communist legacy… In pursuing advanced military capabilities that can threaten its neighbors 
in the Asia-Pacific region, China is following an outdated path that, in the end, will hamper its 
own pursuit of national greatness”, and “The U.S. will ork to narrow differences where they 
exist, but not allow them to preclude cooperation where we agree”.278 
 The 2006 NSS, compared to the 2002, was a more low-key affair mainly due to the 
travails in Iraq and Afghanistan and the mixed allies` perception of the Bush unilateralism. 
Still the report reassessed the 2002 NSS claim that the U.S. has the right to use preemptive 
forces in dealing with perceived threats.  
 Like in 2002, there are mixed messages of hopes and co cerns with some nuanced 
differences: the requirement China to be a `responsible takeholder`, the missing 2002 NSS 
adjective of `strong` when welcoming China, and in a way acknowledging its economic 
success .., and the direct statement that the U.S. may hedge against China .   
                                                 
274 1987, pp. 21-24; 1990, pp. 22-25. 
275 1994, pp. 14-18; 1998, pp. 1, 2, 7. 
276 Michael Walker, The New Yorker, 7 October 1996, p. 6. 
277 2002, pp. 18, 26, cover letter. 
278 2002, pp. 27-28. 
 69 
  As evident in president Obama`s 2010 and 2015 NSS, U. . approach and strategy of 
`balance and hedge` was the main driver in a search and need for a productive relationship 
with China, together with the imperative of meeting America`s security commitments to its 
Asian regional allies and partners. 
 Following its assessment that the most important strategic centers of power and 
influence in the 21st century world would lie in Asia, Obama administration announced its 
intention to pursue a strategic Pivot/Rebalancing of energies and resources towards the region.  
 As expected, the 2015 NSS picked up and evolved from where the 2010 report left off, 
retaining the core of Obama administration`s more inward, seeking bipartisan consensus, 
cautious, restrained approach to the wielding of American power, and its aspirations to 
facilitate the integration of rising powers into the international liberal order, with one major 
exception – Russia – `openly accused of being aggressiv  and revisionist`.279 
 One of the main concerns of the NSS 2015 was to emphasize and demonstrate, that the 
achievements, and the management of world affairs by the Obama administration will still 
sustain the USA as the undisputed global leader afthis presidency.  
 China`s approach in the 2015 NSS echoes the one frm NSS 2010, but this time new 
elements of competition, cyber-security, and  U.S. position of strength were inserted.
 Rising tensions between China and its neighbors since 2010, at the same time as the 
country`s economic and financial pro-activity and military modernization proceeded apace, 
made it more important than ever that the United States find the right combination of words 
and actions to persuade China to embrace its previous r le of status-quo power. In seeking a 
middle way that does not antagonize China, or streng hen the latter`s quasi-alliance 
relationship with Russia, 2015 NSS emphasized the importance of upholding the normative 
framework of the liberal international order, a point the NSS made in reference to the 
unacceptable and punishable `Russian aggression in Europe`, equally applicable to any 
similar destabilizing strategic challenges, and actions by China in Asia-Pacific. 
 Trump`s December 2017 “America First” NSS, urgently drafted over the course of the 
year, depicts China and Russia as “revisionist” powers, “rivals”, and for all practical purposes 
strategic competitors, only short of defining them as enemies to the U.S., in a way admitting 
that geopolitics, if not Cold War 2.0, among major p wers is back on stage. 
 The NSS of the United States do not stand as lone signposts. They should be 
interpreted in context,  next to U.S.` National Defense Strategy and Nuclear Posture Review 
as major part of a Grand Strategy, and good predictor of an administration`s efforts to present 
a coherent, and functioning rationale for its 4 or 8 years approach to the external world. To 
regard it as an all encompassing key that can reveal th  forces and logic uniting every Grand 
Strategy policies is to expect far more than a NSS can deliver. 
 As discussed, based on his offensive realism`s tradition and paradigm, Mearsheimer 
argues that since president Clinton on, the United States has adopted and pursued a Grand 
Strategy of `global dominance, or what might alternatively be called `global hegemony`.280 
According to his analysis, global dominance has two broad objectives: maintaining American 
primacy and spreading democracy across the globe, making the world over in America`s 
image, with an important difference and disagreement among `global dominators` in the U.S. 
establishment, about how best to achieve their strategy`s goals. On one side, he argues, are the 
neoconservatives of the George W. Bush era, who believed that the United States could rely 
heavily on the armed forces to dominate and transform the world unilaterally, and president 
Clinton`s `liberal imperialists`, on the other, who believed that running the world required the 
                                                 
279 2015,  p. 1 of Obama`s Cover Letter to the NSS, pp. 10, 19, 25. 
280 John J. Mearsheimer, `Imperial by Design`, p. 18. 
 70 
U.S. to work closely with allies and international institutions,281 or as Richard Haass has 
labeled the U.S. during the Clinton era - “the reluctant sheriff”.282 
 More recent, balanced and comprehensive critique, challenge, and alternative scenario 
to American Grand Strategy is presented and offered for constructive debate in the 2014 work 
of the political science professor and director of the Security Studies Program at the MIT, 
Barry Posen.283 His basic argument is that the United States has grown incapable of 
moderating its ambitions in international politics, pursuing since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union a Grand Strategy of `Liberal Hegemony` which he considers unnecessary, 
counterproductive, costly, wasteful, and claims that it is time for a change of Grand 
Strategy.284  
 Defining Grand Strategy as – “a nation-state`s theory about how to produce security 
for itself”, Posen offers a platform for debate on his alternative – Grand Strategy of Restraint, 
which he considers, is responsive to the deep problems encountering the present policies of 
Liberal Hegemony.285 Grand Strategy makes its argument for the foreign policy and military 
share, yet Posen admits that complex domestic political and economic prosperity processes 




 Successful U.S. final rise to world preeminence after WWII was marred by the 
unilateral Bush Junior period after 2001, and the relative decline inflicted by the 2008-9 Great 
Recession. 
 At present, none of the above analyzed two cardinal ebates – on unipolar durability, 
and Grand Strategy – has reached a consensus in the United States. The clash between the two 
main philosophies – Liberal Hegemony and Restraint is still on display. The question of 
whether unipolarity is still durable continues to be the object of much spirited debate, as 
witnessed during the 2016 presidential elections campaign. Many insist and argue that 
“American predominance is unlikely to fade any time soon”, and that the United States will 
continue to be the world`s default power and indeed “an uberpower”. Others, however, 
believe that U.S. power preponderance is in serious decline, and question how the pursuit of 
Liberal Hegemony can be sustained without paying significant national price to maintain that 
too costly unipolar world posture. 
 American political scientists, IR scholars and strategists from all paradigmatic and 
political specters call for a new U.S. Grand Strategy, as it takes no great leap of imagination 
to realize the obvious: the world shows clear signs of chaotic deviations and increasing 
disorder. Failure to formulate such a strategy willon y further fuel talk and commentary of 
American decline, disorientation and lost of the “primus inter pares” status. 
 Evidently, many states make crucial policy choices without an overriding and coherent 
Grand Strategy. This is, without doubt, an immensely dangerous human regression, given the 
multiple sources of disorder, sometimes even chaos, nd the consequential threats to world 
peace and stability. Per se, recent events: civil bloodshed war in Syria, unstable situation in 
the Middle East as a whole and in the Gulf, Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan in 
particular, shaky Iran nuclear deal, North Korea`s uncertainty, despite plans for Trump-Kim 
meeting, still remain geopolitical scary headlines. Economic, financial and refugee`s travail of  
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post-Brexit EU, U.S.´economy stuck in neutral, below trends, despite 8-9 years talks of 
recovery, signs of potential U.S.-China trade war, Russia and China seemingly  gaining power 
and influence, based on their muscle policies in Syria, Ukraine and the South China Sea, all of 
which continue to disbalance the system of internatio l relations. The list can go on and on. 
 A reevaluation of the need of adequate and responsible Grand Strategy is in order. As 
these shifts and threats to the international system continue to cascade upon each other, there 
are many questions that societies and their policymakers can no longer avoid. How nation-
states formulate Grand Strategies for properly managing a world that shows signs of 
increasing fracture, disorder, and diffusion of power? What principles should govern foreign 
policy? What choices should societies make? How do orld leaders create viable world order 
out of the emerging disorder? 
 Answering these questions is the key challenge for present leaders and policymakers if 
they want to ensure world peace, freedom and security. 
 From the prospects of the 2016 presidential results in he United States, can President 
Donald Trump and the new American leadership provide the right answers and policies to 
these questions? The analysis of the presidential campaign and the striking insurgencies and 
division in both the Republican and the Democratic parties, clearly show that the American 
people, especially the elderly, middle class and the young generation, are tired of war, socio-
economic and financial domestic hard times. 
 President Trump´s controversial and sometimes changing and unpredictable stands, 
his ´America first´ and ´renewal of the American spirit´ declared strategies are too young to 
give any convincing outcomes and assessments, though they show his affiliation to a new 
´Principled Realism´ based American Grand Strategy of conditional Restraint and relative 
offshore balancing, without giving up U.S. leadership status. 
 Perhaps the forthcoming practical domestic and external policies based on the U.S. 
2017 National Security Strategy will hopefully give some more clear, and characterizing his 

























CHAPTER 2: THE RISE OF CHINA 
 
 In the previous chapter, attempting theory synthesis and analytical eclecticism, I tried 
to blend predominantly a realist and constructivist perspectives in analyzing and explaining 
the successful final rise of U.S. after WWII, its current domestic Grand Strategy debates, and 
challenged preeminent unipolar power. By reconciling realist and constructivist traditions I 
was searching to apply higher explanatory power for understanding the multidimensional 
domestic and external reality confronting U.S. supremacy287 in the last 25 years.  
 Both material and ideational factors are necessary fo  understanding continuing 
predominant position of the United States in the world. It is not the only superpower, but as 
well as most dominant in both the ideational dimensio  (discourse power and attraction, 
ideology), and in the material dimension (economy, finance, technology, military) which 
together glue into `thick hegemony`288. U.S. world hegemony, then, rests on material power, 
but was complementary and organically created and maintained via the constructs, promotion 
and imposture of ideas and norms. 
 In this chapter and in the rest of my dissertation I i tend to be faithful to my initial 
approach in trying to understand and explain the comparative case of the assertive emergence 
of China, notably after 2010-2012, and to answer th main research questions in the title of 
my work. 
 
 Genesis and evolution of China`s rise strategy 
 
 Ancient Chinese Empire was economically one of the most developed civilizations in 
world history and formed a world system in itself. The 18th century was regarded as the 
apogee of development in Qing (Manchu) dynasty. In the 19th century, the traditions-rooted 
Chinese society was infected from both internal andexternal problems. Dynastic struggles 
and decline were accompanied by peasant unrest and revolts causing government reshuffles 
and falls. In the outside world, “dynamics of economic, technological, and ideological 
revolutions generated in Europe”289 The enduring empire was disseminated in its encounter 
with the more advanced and developed Western imperial states. 
 First Opium War (1840-1842) initiated the `hundred years of humiliation` in Chinese 
history. The Second Opium War (1860-1861) further ravaged the empire. The former imperial 
glory fell victim to military inferiority. Series of unequal treaties were imposed. By the 
summer of 1862, all French, British, Russian and American diplomatic envoys arrived in 
Beijing to acquire their residences and to demand their concession spoils. The spheres of 
influence - actually colonies in everything but name, reduced China to the status of a semi-
colony. Its independence and sovereignty had become a fiction.290  
 In the process of Western penetration in China, the number of ports open to the great 
powers grew rapidly from five in the first imposed unequal treaty in 1841 to one hundred and 
fifteen in 1943. British Empire started the pattern, but “other nations joined Britain at 
different stages. All major powers of the West were involved in the final treaty settlement that 
ended the conflict in 1860-1861”.291 The wars not only inflicted humiliation and suffering on 
the Chinese people, but also disintegrated the two thousand years` empire, and forced the 
Chinese to deeply reconsider the relations between Chi a and the world. 
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 Although the Chinese empire had existed for several thousands years, formally till the 
beginning of the 20th century, the Chinese had never regarded themselves as a Westphalian 
type of a “nation-state”. The differences between China and the outside world were for them 
differences between the civilized Chinese, the tribu aries and the barbarians, between a 
superior unified by the Chinese emperor – the Son of Heaven, central world, and the rest. 
Culturally and Confucian - philosophically bound, till the 20th century China, was not a nation 
state.292 When in 1839 the British urged the imperial court to settle the conflict between the 
“two nations”, the Chinese officials could not understand that one of nations implied was no 
more or less, but China.293 
  The genesis of the rise of the United States can be traced and found in its search and 
acquisition of power, wealth, expansion and leadership. The genesis of the Chinese rise 
strategy can be defined and explained by its struggle for existential survival, territorial 
reunification, independence, and by attempts to regain at least equality, dignity, respect and 
power, as their forced “entry into the emerging universal international society was a historical 
experience and was conditioned on the approval of the European powers as original members 
of that society”.294 It was humiliating and painful process for China to change, and adapt its 
institutions and statecraft in line with the Western imposed political patterns and practices. 
The Chinese were “forced to accept Western concepts as nation, sovereignty, race, 
citizenship, and identity”.295 
 In traditional Chinese political and philosophical thought, and culture as a whole, 
nationalism did not exist. It was cosmopolitanism, rather than nationalism, that forged the 
driving developmental force of the Chinese empire, as nationalism implies priority of 
ethnicity and the state, while cosmopolitanism embraces the power of culture and 
philosophical thought. “The traditional Chinese self-image has generally been defined as 
“culturalism”, based on the historical heritage and acceptance of shared values, not as 
nationalism, based on the modern concept of the nation-s ate”.296 The birth and spread of 
Chinese nationalism came as a result and reaction to the inflow of massive foreign ideas and 
the military incursion of foreign powers. The crisis and the falling of the empire gave birth to 
the national self-consciousness, as “challenges from the foreign `other` played off and forced 
an increasingly radical rethinking of the Chinese `us`”.297  
 `Fuqiang` (literally – wealthy and strong) – this Chinese idea goes back thousands of 
years and represents a holistic imperial tradition in parallel with Confucianism. Every country 
wants to be wealthy and strong. What makes China different? The Chinese case is unique, 
because historically speaking the Middle kingdom fell rom such towering height of 
supremacy during the Qing dynasty, as it became aware of its inability to defend itself against 
the great powers, and ultimately against the Japanese who were the most predatory of them 
all. This feeling of weakness, helplessness and of humiliation was very deep and crushing, 
and it was out of that whole tragic experience, that e fabric was woven of China as the 
aggrieved party, it was this kind of fierce determinat on to someday, somehow make it up and 
claw China`s way back to the ladder of success to a p int where it could neither be pushed 
around, bullied and exploited. In this process to get up and rise China tried many different 
guises, ways of government, philosophies, economic odels and systems in the hope of 
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finding the key to the restoration of this idea of `fuqiang`, and most importantly – to regain 
respect.298 
 The genesis of processes and strategies in search of the resurrection of China during 
the last one hundred years, results of which can be observed only in the last couple of 
decades, can be traced and placed chronologically in three distinct historical periods: the 
Republic of China period from January 1, 1912 to the proclamation of the People`s Republic 
of China on October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong era from 1949 to 1976, and from 1978 to present 
days, the pragmatic ´Chinese characteristics´ period of Deng Xiaoping`s reforms and opening 
up of the country. 
 The first two periods were marked by series of failures and self-inflicted, arguably 
with foreign footprints, setbacks – civil war (1927-1949) and `cultural revolution` (1966-
1976), though they played their historic role of dismantling the pillars of the archaic imperial 
system and Confucianism, and laid down the basis of modern China. All three periods have 
their own specific form of nationalism as a social and development driving force, while in the 
third and last, not surprisingly there is an ardent r evaluation and rehabilitation of the Chinese 
classical thought and culture, including - the importance and role of Confucius.299 
 On January 1, 1912, the nationalist forces led by Song Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) 
overturned the Qing dynasty and declared the Republic of China. Imperial China came to an 
end due to foreign interventions and pressure and with the rising hope and sense that Chinese 
nationalism will turn the tide of imperial decline and decay. 
 Both first and second attempted China rise periods dramatically downgraded the role 
and influence of Confucianism, denouncing it as conservative ideological fetters to national 
modernization progress and development. At the beginning of the 20th century, Western 
educated Chinese intellectuals and scholars hoped of regaining the empire`s past greatness via 
the elimination of Confucianism, and turned the national survival of China into an antithesis 
of its values and institutions.300  
 The establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, however, did not change 
China`s overall deteriorating situation. The Western powers kept their privileges and 
concessions. National independence and sovereignty n international affairs were not fully 
granted to the newly founded republic. While succeeding in eliminating the dominant position 
of Confucianism in Chinese society, the May 4th Movement in 1919, intended as an attempt of 
liberal capitalist revolution, could not attain its goals to rise and revitalize China by the 
advanced developmental model of the West.301 The sense of humiliation and wounded 
national pride mounted even higher in 1919 when the C inese government bent down to the 
great power`s “proposal” allowing Japan to take over Jiaodong Peninsula (Shandong 
Province) recently held by Germany. Calling for “striving for national pride externally and 
ridding the national traitors internally”302 the Chinese poured massively into the nationalist 
movements. 
 The Republican period (1912-1949) of Song Zhongshan ( Sun Yat-sen ), then of the 
Confucian - Methodist303 Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) and his Christian wife Soong Mei-
                                                 
298 See Orville Schell and John Delury, Wealth and Power: China`s Long March to the Twenty-first Century, 2013, New York: Random 
House. 
299 The brand of Confucius is even exploited for the increasing Chinese soft power overseas. On November 21, 2004, the first government 
sponsored Confucius Institute abroad opened door in Seoul, South Korea. As of 2015, there are around 500 similar Institutes in six continents 
with over 100 million attendees learning Chinese and spects of Chinese culture and classical philosophy. The target set is, by 2020 the 
number of Confucius Institutes abroad to nearly double. 
300 Zhang Yongjin, “System, Empire and State in Chinese Int rnational Relations”, p. 62. 
301 Li Yaoxian, “Ruxue yu xiandaihua de chongtu yu xietao” (Clashes and Coordination between Confucianism and Modernization) in 
Ruxue yu xiandaihua (Confucianism and Modernixation), pp. 327-328. 
302 One of the main popular slogans of the May 4th Movement. 
303 Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China, 2009, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, p. 2. 
 75 
ling, ended in total catastrophe, in feudalism, warlords, disunity, a country that was broken by 
the Japanese occupation and the civil war ( 1927-1949 ), between the Chinese Nationalist 
Party (Goumindang) and the Chinese Communist Party - CCP (Gongchandang), founded in 
1921. In a series of ups and downs, finally the Communists took the upper hand in the 
struggle against the Nationalist and chased Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan, as they managed to 
gain support of the masses of poor peasants, and mobilized a guerilla war on the Japanese 
occupiers. Mao, after capturing and restoring Beijing as the capital of the country, declaring 
the People`s Republic (PRC) on October 1, 1949 from the Qing imperial headquarters – 
Zhong Nan Hai, proclaimed, “Our country will never again be an insulted nation. We have 
stood up!”304 
 Both the United States and China experienced traumatic and destructive civil wars in 
advance of their constructive periods of rise. China`civil war ended three decades before its 
policy and search of peaceful rise began to bear some initial fruits, commencing in 1978.
 The establishment of the PRC in 1949 finalized the initial transition of China to a 
modern independent sovereign state, restoring the overall territorial integrity (with the 
exception of Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao and disputed Tibet). Safeguarding equality among 
states as a basic principle in international relations, Beijing had to wait though for full official 
recognition and diplomatic relations with the U.S. and most Western countries another few 
decades till the 1970s.  
 The relative self-sufficiency of the Chinese economy enabled the new Chinese 
leadership to reverse the process of semi-colonization nd put the People`s Republic back on 
track of joining the world economy as a developing country. To stimulate development and 
bridge the gap with the industrialized world the PRC introduced a model of USSR-style 
economic planning. In the beginning the remnants of the `national capital` represented by 
petty and middle owners and producers was left at pe ce to continue in business, but soon this 
Chinese mutant of the Soviet 1920s N.E.P. (New Economic Policy) was replaced by a more 
collectivist approach and Maoist economic voluntarism during the `Great Leap Forward` 
campaign.The `Leap` represented an economic and social campaign and experiment led by 
Mao from 1958 to 1961 aiming to rapidly transform the country from an agrarian economy 
into a socialist society through accelerated industrialization and collectivization, but tragically 
ended up and caused the Great Chinese Famine, resulting in tens of millions of deaths.305 In 
subsequent party conferences in 1960 and 1962, the negative effects of the campaign were 
analyzed, and Mao criticized. Moderate leaders likeLiu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping (both 
purged later) rose to power while Mao was relatively marginalized within the party, leading 
him to initiate the Cultural Revolution in1966.306 The `Revolution` was a socio-political 
movement that took place from 1966 till the death of Mao in 1976 and the purge of his wife`s 
clique - `The Gang of Four` that took power for a short period after 1976. The Revolution 
marked the return of Mao to a position of supreme power after the Great Leap Forward. The 
chaotic period was a definite set back for China`s revival, paralyzed China politically and 
significantly drew back the country`s economic and social development.  
 After Mao`s death and the arrest of the `Gang of Four`, the reformers faction led by 
Deng Xiaoping gradually began to dismantle the Maoist powerbase and policies associated 
with the Cultural Revolution. In 1981, the CCP declared the period as “responsible for the 
most severe setback and the heaviest losses suffered by the Party, the country, and the people 
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since the founding of the People`s Republic”.307Deng Xiaoping, though, managed to 
safeguard the undisputed symbolic role and importance of Mao Zedong legacy for the PRC.  
 From the initial period of the founding of the PRC, Washington spared no efforts and 
full fledged resources to contain, block, and strangle the rise and development of the new 
communist country. The United States “quarantined RChina308, confrontation with the U.S. 
certainly “ill served China`s long-term interests, and the ingredients for this confrontation 
were all too evident in the fall of 1949”.309 
 Three year (June 25, 1950 - July 27, 1953) Korean w r had negative impact on 
China`s international relations. U.S. managed to esabli h a series of pacts and treaties310 with 
China`s direct and regional neighbors with the aim of containment, and internationally – 
China`s application to replace Nationalist Taiwan in the UN was rendered void. The only 
positive moment, besides the massive military aid from the USSR during the war, was the 
psychological and nationalistic pride – a precedent si ce 1840, that China can challenge and 
fight the Western greatest power. 
 The four fundamental pillars of U.S. policy towards China: non-recognition; total 
support for Taiwan; opposition to Beijing`s seat at the UN, and trade embargo, underwent 
insignificant changes into the rest of the 50s and the 60s, in spite of the Chinese attempts in 
1954 and 1955 to mend the relationship. Premier and foreign minister Zhou Enlai invited the 
American government to direct talks with the PRC implying that Washington accepts the 
legitimacy of the regime in Beijing. The ambassadorial level talks began on September 10, 
1955 in Geneva, and with virtually no substantial results, were the only direct official bilateral 
contact, prior to the secret Beijing visit of Henry Kissinger in July 1971, followed by 
president Nixon`s trip and summit talks with Mao in February 1972. 
 1970s cautious shift in U.S. policy towards China resulted due to the increasing split 
and hostility, including military border clashes, between China and the USSR in the 1960s. 
Although Beijing accused Moscow of ideological revisionism and opportunism, hegemonic 
aspirations and military threats311, the real motives of the `divorce` were rather pragm tic and 
practical312. The Soviets did not have the potential and the resources to contribute for the 
further Chinese development, as well as for Beijing`s international UN recognition, and for 
the unification with Taiwan.  Playing independent balancing role in U.S.-USSR strategic 
rivalry, China aspired for realization of its sovereignty atributes. Nixon´s overture and kind of 
rapprochement with China also had its pragmatic and strategic goals – a way of gradual face 
saving exit from the Vietnam war, tapping the huge potential of the economic, financial and 
trade Chinese market313, and most importantly – adding a new strong partner i  the world-
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wide efforts for the USSR containment – “The most important strategic chance which has 
occurred to the benefit of the United States since the end of the Second World War was not 
any major technological change or weapons development but rather the shift of China from 
being an ally to becoming an adversary of the Soviet Union ”.314 
 These Grand Strategy policy epochal shifts had an immediate impact on China`s entry 
in the UN. While the United States could no longer postpone the Chinese UN membership, 
Washington tried to maneuver and proposed that Beijing gain the seat on the UN Security 
Council, and Taiwan retain only a General Assembly membership. Beijing categorically 
rejected the “Two China” scheme.. 
 Second genesis stage of China`s rise strategy ended up with mixed and ambiguous 
results. On the domestic political and socio-economic front the outcomes were mostly failures 
and setbacks, analogues, as Orville Schell rightly points315, to the Joseph Schumpeter`s 1942 
dilemma of `creative destruction`. Mao`s dilemma about the Chinese socialism during that 
period can be found in his – “Bu Po, Bu Li” dictum - (literally, if you do not destroy, you do 
not create). 
 
 Deng Xiaoping period 
  
 To understand a country as complicated and contradic ory as China, one must delve 
into China`s complex national conditions, history, national policies, and seek to identify both 
the core elements affecting periodic changes, and the key forces influencing its long-term 
development and rise strategies. The history of China until 1978 is conventional proof that no 
success is greater than the formulation of a functio ing Grand Strategy, while no failure is 
greater than the formulation and implementation of a wrong one.  
 Since 1978, the principle of `seeking truth from facts` is theoretically the unique 
pragmatic policy-making philosophy of the CCP, enshrined in its constitution as well as in the 
national constitution of the PRC. This leading principle combined with the other pragmatic 
and practical principles and maxims of Deng Xiaoping: “reform and opening up, one country, 
two systems, keep a low profile/search for achievements, represent the logic and the practice 
of China`s domestic and external policies in the pursuit of its rise strategy and self-interest 
after the Mao Zedong era. 
 The pragmatic reformer forces that took power with the return to the stage of Deng 
Xiaoping in 1977 were well aware that China was in no position to succeed in its rise strategy 
on its own, on `class struggle, permanent revolutions and international economic isolation`.   
The new era began with the historical five day heated III Plenary  of the 11th CC of the 
CCP from 18 to 22 December 1978. 
 Deng Xiaoping became the paramount leader replacing the Maoist Hua Guofeng who 
remained nominal Chairman of the CCP until 1981. Party leaders and officials who were 
purged in the past like Chen Yun, Bo Yibo, Yang Shangkun and Hu Yaobang were 
rehabilitated and given high party positions, in support for the new course of nationwide 
economic revival. By not immediately removing Hua Guofeng and holding the Plenary at a 
hotel, not in the Great Hall of the People, Deng wanted to calm down the domestic and 
external anxieties, and to reassure that this is not a new purge or a coup, but a normal power 
transition, and the beginning of a new period in the history of the country. 
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 The new course of reform and opening up was debated nd laid down as the party 
innovative cardinal line. With this shift and experiment of building socialism with Chinese 
characteristics, China took the road to the third attempt of rise strategy for breaking out of her 
backwardness, rejecting the Soviet and Maoist models, and turning instead to a `hard 
variation` of the Western liberal economic model, while keeping the arbitrary role of the 
Party, State and the Five Year plans. 
 Quite ironically, in 1979, using the pretext phrase that brought the most painful of 
humiliations suffered by China in the 19th century, Deng Xiaoping proclaimed his `Open 
Door` policy inaugurating the Special Economic Zones in Shenzhen and Xiamen. Still, it was 
not the `free market` but the Chinese state that decided to `marketize` the Chinese economy, 
to proceed with the `Four Modernizations`, and as awhole to reintegrate China into the world 
economy, by selectively imitating the Asian model of development and the envious by the 
Chinese, miracle and economic success of the ` FourAsian Tigers`.316 Deng believed that 
export-oriented industrialization (China as the world manufacturer) and imports of foreign 
technology and capital could and should work for the rise of China.317 
 With Soviet Union collapse still far ahead and hardly imaginable at that time, Deng 
Xiaoping made his pragmatic calculus and was convinced that, unlike in the 19th  century, 
opening up and `westernizing` the Chinese economy would not lead to foreign dictate and 
domination over China. The country was under full control by the Party and government, with 
large, strong standing army with nuclear deterrence capacity, and internationally secured by 
the permanent seat in the UN Security Council. Direct threats to Chinese sovereignty deemed 
improbable, as the West was courting the huge Chinese market and encouraging Beijing`s 
balancing hedge against Moscow. All strategic calculus and circumstances appeared favorable 
and tempting for the successful reintegration of China in the international system and world 
economy on pragmatically negotiated terms. 
 
 [Re] emergence in the international system in the 20th century 
 
 For the ideological and domestic politics shift and adjustment to succeed, there was an 
urgent and pragmatic necessity for an adequate, and corresponding change in international 
relations and foreign policy strategy. In 1978 China was still regarded as isolated outsider of 
the international system and architecture. Deng Xiaoping`s Zhongyong dialectic model put 
top priority imperative and regarded China`s economic strength as the main propelling force 
of the new China`s rise strategy. Seeking relaxation of the external environment Deng 
transcended Mao`s revolutionary model in international affairs, guided China`s openness to 
the outside world, and searched for a beneficial to China international economic cooperation. 
 Although the process of the Chinese initial acceptance and admission in the 
international system began in the late Mao period with the ascendance of China in the UN in 
1971, and Beijing`s official diplomatic recognition by some Western capitals318, the real and 
essential breakthroughs took place with the beginning of the Deng Xiaoping era in late 1970s 
and early 1980s.  
 Rapprochement with U.S. in 1971-1972 was still conditional and hedging. Despite 
the neutral and non-confrontational tone of the Shang i Nixon-Zhou Communique of 
February 28, 1972, basic contradictions continued to exist, including the crucial one on the 
Taiwan issue. 1973 opened Liaison Offices in both Beijing and Washington, were trying to 
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improve the political dialogue, but real détente was far of sight.UN membership card also did 
not perform in any significant new and positive change for China. Rapprochement with 
Washington stimulated China`s posture of opposing the two hegemonic superpowers, and by 
mid-1970s the Maoist leadership formulated a new approach to the structure of the 
international system.  
 In Mao Zedong`s strategy, the rapprochement with Washington was only “a means to 
escape China`s acute security predicament”319 and Beijing`s U.S. policies were in search of 
pragmatic balance of “quasi alliance and anti-hegemonism”.Official normalization and full 
diplomatic relations between China and the United States took place on January 1, 1979, with 
the Joint Communiques, published on December 16, 1978. There were many political, 
economic and geopolitical factors, and events that made Nixon`s 1972 promise come to life.  
 By late 1970s Deng Xiaoping was already taking thehelm of the Chinese top 
leadership, and his pragmatic and flexible policies of “reform and opening up” were seen 
initially by Washington as promising and switching from the `revolutionary` oriented Mao 
overall strategy to a more balanced, inward and statu -quo, economically subordinated state 
policy. 
 In the second half of the 1970s, China`s warmongeri  Taiwan rhetoric changed 
gears, and the option of war like scenario for the unification with the mainland was 
temporarily taken off the table. Beijing`s signaled to keep the status-quo for the next ten 
years,320 luring to and engaging the U.S. on the fully normalization path. December 1978 
Communique recognized Beijing as the sole legal capital of China. Washington revoked its 
diplomatic and official level relations with Taipei, still, maintained its commercial, 
technological, cultural and other `unofficial` contacts. In April 1979, only three months after 
the establishment of diplomatic relations, U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act 
(TRA). For the next three years U.S. military procurements to Taipei rose to over $ 800 
millions, from $ 300 million in 1981, explicitly demonstrating how the superpower rules of 
the play work. Reagan`s first presidential term also disillusioned China`s initial attempts to 
play a significant role in the strategic equation: U.S. – USSR, rendering Beijing only a 
secondary counterweight role to the Soviets in the USA global Grand Strategy.321  
 Relative improvement of Sino-Japanese relations, establishment of the bilateral 
diplomatic relations in 1972, Joint Statement´s rejection of any kind of hegemonism in the 
Asia-Pacific, and the signing of the Sino-Japanese treaty of peace and friendship in October 
1978 by Deng Xiaoping, also contributed to the U.S. – China normalization process. 
 The 1970s were marred by global Sino-Soviet hostilities and antagonism. For Beijing, 
in contrast to Vietnam war´s decline of U.S.´ hegemony, USSR was fresh offensive 
imperialist, ambitious militaristic and great-nation chauvinistic power, effectively deceiving 
other countries by exploiting its first socialist state status.322 Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese 
antagonism, Hanoi`s increasing military cooperation with Moscow - the signing of the USSR 
- Vietnam Treaty of friendship and cooperation in November 1978, and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979, drew China – U.S. strategic priorities even closer, and contributed 
significantly to the rapprochement processes, providing both capitals with additional leverage 
in their confrontation with Moscow.323 
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 By the end of 1970s, more than 100 countries, the majority developing, established 
diplomatic official ties with China, some on ideological grounds, but most on economic 
mercantile hopes of penetrating the increasing Chinese market, and for financial assistance 
and aid. U.S. also regarded China as a huge potential market, and the economic considerations 
forged large portion of the rapprochement initiatives. For Beijing, normalization of its 
relations with U.S. meant expansion of trade, investm nt from the rich West, and acquirement 
of so much needed modern technologies, and industrial equipments for the goals of Deng`s 
new strategy of China`s rise through development and economic growth. 
 In the 1980s, the external component of Deng`s China rise strategy shifted its priorities 
from security-sovereignty - to main contributor for domestic modernization and economic 
growth drive under the banner of “world peace and socio-economic development”. 
 
 External strategy adjustments 
 
 Beijing´ssearch for an independent and autonomous rle of respected power in global 
affairs, the quasi-alliance with the U.S. and the West, and the symbolic position of 
spokesperson for the Third World in the UN, did notfully met the expected outcomes for 
China´s rise strategy. Many developing countries even turned away from Beijing, suspicious 
of the latter`s true goals in the rapprochement with Washington and the West as a whole.324 
The next shift and strategy adjustments, around mid-1980s, included – turning to the 
diametrically opposed to power politics 1954 Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence 
(FPPC)325, emphasis on the UN and other international organizations via multilateral foreign 
policy, and in search for a noncommittal balance in the relations with the two superpowers.326 
 The increasingly pragmatic nature of China`s rise strategy made the FPPC a very 
useful and rewarding instrument for Beijing`s relative disengagement from the overloaded 
with expectations informal China-U.S.´quasi-alliance´, and for distancing from the U.S.-
USSR open rivalry. The point was made very clear during President Reagan`s trip to China in 
1984, when Beijing`s engagement in a strategic partnership against the Soviet Union was 
declined. “Reagan`s trip to Beijing marked a turning point, for now it was the Chinese who 
were playing the America card”.327 
 By weaponizing its external relations with the FPPC Beijing was aiming not only a 
rebalance towards the superpowers, but also a reinvigoration of its relations with the Third 
World, including with one of its leaders – India. then a staunch Soviet ally, where these 
principles were always at home, starting with their incorporation in the Statement of the Ten 
Principles, issued in April 1955 at the historic Asian-African Conference in Bandung, 
Indonesia.  
 The very initial reconnaissance stage of the rapprochement with Moscow began in 
1982 at bilateral consultations on deputy-ministerial level. In 1983, China`s foreign minister 
Huang Hua represented Beijing at the funeral of the Soviet leader Brezhnev, and also met and 
held talks with his Russian counterpart for the first time in more than couple of decades. The 
normalization process gradually continued, and after Gorbachev took over the reins of power 
in Moscow in 1985, was finalized, after three decades of hostility and rivalry, during his visit 
to China in 1989. 
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 China´s pragmatic peaceful coexistence external str tegy from the early 1980s served 
well its strategic priority for successful domestic e onomic modernization and development. 
By rebalancing the relations with the two superpowers mostly at its terms328, Beijing 
reminded and demonstrated openly for the first time its firm decision of becoming an 
independent strong player in the international system, to be reckoned with.  
 China`s international, relatively balanced and beneficial posture did not last long. The 
collapse of the Soviet Bloc in 1989-1991, the implosion of its 45 years old  political and 
socio-economic system, and the end of the Cold War, left the victorious U.S. and liberal 
democratic West as the dominant forces in the system of the global international relations – 
politically, economically, financially and militarily. 
 Externally, China remained mainly on its own, with crippled and decreasing 
bargaining and hedging options, even more so, after th  Tian An Men Square militarily 
suppressed student`s demonstrations in the beginnin of June 1989. Western-imposed 
sanctions and isolation followed, still Deng Xiaoping and Chinese leadership did not cave in, 
dismissing parallels of potential Chinese repetition of the Soviet ongoing collapse. 
 Domestically, China was not in the same situation as the USSR. She survived and 
managed to come out of the Cold War much stronger and mobilized. Deng Xiaoping`s initial 
rise strategy, taught China to concentrate on its economic modernization and development in 
search of `Fuqiang`. China was now more capable of con ronting the West with its own 
equally effective `weapons`, having already growing and expanding market, Western major 
corporations not wanting to loose, competing and succeeding in foreign finance and 
investments, and playing an increasing role in the new wave of `globalization`. 
 In the aftermath of the Tian An Men political crisis, the cardinal domestic socio-
political threat appeared to be the issue of `natiol stability` and the challenges to the leading 
role of the CCP. Gorbacev`s `Glasnost and Perestroika` were put to blame for the domestic 
and the student`s pro-democracy unrest, but there walso claims from the hardliners in the 
Chinese leadership that the reforms and the opening up have gone much too far, suggesting 
rebalancing of  domestic and foreign policy.329 
 At the urgently summoned Fourth Extraordinary Plenary Session of the 13th CC of the 
CCP, Deng faced serious opposition. He still managed to convince the leadership of the 
imperative importance to keep the reforms and opening up going, as the only way to 
legitimize the role of the CCP, by achieving economic growth and development that brings 
increasing living standard, and thus social stability. “China would continue its reform and 
open door policy, and would never go back to the old closed-door path”, said the final 
Communique of the Plenary Session, released on June 24, 1989, almost three weeks after the 
peak of the domestic political crisis.330 
 The initial shock, mixed feelings and assessments concerning the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union and the scaling down of the new bankrupt Russian Federation, to only a 
“lopsided” great power331, forced Beijing to undertake a thorough and multifaceted study, 
research and analysis of the roots and causes that led to this catastrophic for Moscow fatal 
outcome, drawing the respective lessons and conclusions for internal Party and State official 
use.332 
 The sober reality was that Beijing no longer could play an independent balancing role 
in the new type of unequal and unbalanced relationship between Washington and Moscow. 
U.S. highly superior military, technological, and new sophisticated methods of warfare 
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demonstration during the 1990-1991 Gulf War, only confirmed this reality, and the newly 
emerging U.S. dominated unipolarity after the Cold War. 
 China was left with no other option than to embark on a very cautious, moderate, not 
openly conflicting survivalist and low-profile posture, as its comprehensive power was still 
not a match to that of Washington, and in the good realist tradition, Beijing gave credence to 
John Mearsheimer`s assessment and prediction that “the United States does not tolerate peer 
competitors”. It was the time when Deng Xioaping laid down his guidance in the maxim that 
China should “keep a low profile”(KLP).  “China must set up a profile of engaging in reform 
and opening up. … We cannot take the lead against American hegemonic behavior. …We 
have to guarantee that our reform and opening up should be continued. …Without reform, 
there is no hope for China”.333 
 In 1992-1993, the first significant positive result  of the 1978 initiated China rise 
policies of economic reforms came to fruition. The economic boom and lofty opportunities 
relatively soon put an end of China`s isolation in the wake of the 1989 turmoil, as nobody 
wanted to miss out the lucrative deals offered by the new Chinese bonanza. China began 
emerging as a global trading power. In 1993 the IMF declared it the third largest world 
economy on PPP basis, a major recipient of FDI, with increasing trade surplus with the 
U.S.334 
 Convinced that Deng`s strategic policies helped weather the 1989 crisis, and 
confirming them as the most appropriate in the new emerging global order, the 14th Party 
Congress in 1992 supported the course of further enhancing China`s efforts and policies in 
guaranteeing “peaceful international environment and stable economic growth”, as guiding 
priority principles in China`s international relations and foreign policy. 
 The time-frame from 1989 to present days, can be defined in two distinctive external 
policy periods of cautious up-grading, some times as ertive – on the brink of provocative, 
some times, when necessary, even stepping back policies, consistent with the Zhongyong 
dialectics of ‘keeping the balanced middle course via continuity through change”. 
 
 KLP tactical/strategic phase 
 
 The KLP period, from 1989 to approximately 2008-2009, marked roughly twenty 
years of intensive efforts, and demonstration that China is accepting, and integrating into the 
international system as a status-quo country, worthy of being accorded and recognized on 
merits by the system itself, as a “big country power”.335 
 This twenty years period marked the reigns of the 3rd and 4th generations of Chinese 
leadership, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao eras. In the history annals of the Chinese Communist 
Party both of them are remembered with their domestic oriented socio-economic and 
ideological contributions, with no strategic international relations or foreign policy concepts, 
ideas or initiatives in the context of big countries power relationships, that could have upset 
U.S. global posture and influence. Jiang`s `Three Rpresents` concept and Hu`s `Scientific 
Development` concept, aiming at building harmonious socialist society, prosperous and free 
of social conflicts, were enshrined into the Party`s Charter. At the 2002 National Party 
Congress, leaving the top leadership post, Jiang outlined the next 20 years as “the strategic 
opportunity” for China to concentrate on its domestic tasks. 
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 The period rewarded their adherence to Deng´s KLP legacy, of patient, meticulous 
accumulation of economic, financial, and military capabilities for the restoration of China`s 
geopolitical centrality in Asia. As the Soviet syndrome was constantly ringing the bell, both 
Jiang and Hu realized that it would be illusory and counter productive, to assume that the U.S. 
would any time soon make equal space for China in the Asia-Pacific, or to pro-actively  
contest its still strong dominant hold on the unipolar international system. In 1991 and 1992 
Jiang Zemin made some shy attempts to feel the American ´pulse´ with proposls for general 
guidelines in Sino-American relations, “to increase mutual trust, reduce troubles, strengthen 
cooperation, and avoid confrontation”.336 This was the time of the peak of Cold War victory 
triumph, so Jiang`s conciliatory lamentations were barely adequately taken in Washington. Hu 
Jintao did not even make a similar try, as his tenur  began with the first unilateralist George 
W. Bush administration in the wake of 9/11.  
 A multipolar world order, in which China was to beone of the poles, was out of sight 
and not to be expected any time soon.337 Beijing displayed a tacit grudging acceptance that
American hegemony was there to stay for some time, and changed guard to balancing and 
erosion of U.S. positions and influence where possible. In parallel, Beijing sought working 
and cooperating with America in areas of self-interest. China`s economy was still in its initial 
ascendance period, depending heavily on investments a d transfer of advanced Western 
technologies, and most importantly on the American o sumer market, the major destination 
of Chinese products. A kind of a strong interdependence of a Siamese type was into the 
making – the American market in exchange for the Chinese purchase of U.S. Treasury bonds 
and U/S. dollars denominated assets. 
 The domestic and international political, economic, financial and security record of 
China, and its participation in the globalization process, during this long twenty years period, 
is full of events and interactions on bilateral, multilateral regional and international level.338 
Most of them had rather mixed tactical/strategic status-quo connotations, with potentials for 
strategic added value for its future final rise period, and Grand Strategy that began to take 
shape at the end of first decade of the 2000s. 
  
 SFA strategic phase 
 
 The second, more SFA, current, post-Cold War stage of China`s rise strategy began 
with the outbreak of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Within few months the entire global economy came 
crashing down, with almost no exceptions as all were in the same globalized village. The 
world came close to a total global economic meltdown in January 2009, forcing the leaders of 
the G-20, at their London April 2, 2009 meeting, to mount a major coordinated global 
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experiment to bring the world economy back from thebrink, by pooling all possible and 
available resources for a global stimulus injection of U.S. $ 1.1 trillion.  
 Series of additional individual national quantitative easing (QE) followed suit in the 
trillions with hope of recovery, though at present time world economy remains stagnant, 
volatile and recession prone,339.  
 In the first decade of the 2000s China pragmatically continued its strategy based on the 
Peaceful Development platform, under the “congagement” and economic interdependence 
construction in the relations with the U.S. At the end of the Bush Jr. low-profile second 
presidential term, Beijing made some firm and assertive moves in the existing maritime 
disputes with its neighbors in the East and South China Seas, exploiting the critical 
international conjuncture of the initial financial crisis.  
 China was holding large amounts in the bankrupt Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac shares. 
Due to domestic pressure and government considerations, n early October 2008 reports that 
China would buy up to U.S. $ 200 billion worth of Treasury bonds to help Washington 
combat the deepening crisis were denied. U.S. Treasu y Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr., and 
other senior American officials were in almost daily contacts with their Chinese counterparts, 
For U.S. it was most pertinent whether China will continue to finance American debt.340 
President Bush also interfered,341 and Secretary Paulson praised China`s cooperation in 
taming the global financial turmoil, as in early October 2008, China also joined other G-7 
central banks in a rare coordinated interest rate cu s, and Chinese Premier Wen went further 
by expressing China`s willingness to cooperate withthe U.S. to address the crisis.342 
 The practical and “responsible stakeholder” approach and goal of China -  helping the 
U.S. and `saving` the global financial system, with the hope that the crisis might bring a 
substantial change in the relations with Washington wards recognition of its equal 
interdependence and power status, did not come to fruition. By late November 2008, 
Washington began with its first QE of $ 600 billion, later peaked by June 2010 to $ 2.1 
trillion, followed by QE – 2, with another trench of $ 600 billion in November 2010 and 
lastly, QE – 3, of 40 billion up to $ 85 billion per month in September 2012.   
 Newly elected President Obama opened the first session of the new U.S. – China 
Strategic and Economic Dialogue on July 27, 2009, in Washington D.C., as a kind of a booby 
prize for China`s efforts in containing the financial crisis, by cosmetically upgrading the 
previous U.S. – China Strategic Economic Dialogue, which ended with its 5th session in 
December 2008. 
 The new strategic elements in his opening remarks were not too hard to be defined: the 
U.S. - China relationship will shape the 21st century, but the relationship is as important as 
any bilateral relationship in the world … and the new president does not intend to contain or 
fear Beijing`s ambitions, and believes in future strong, prosperous and successful China…The 
presidential message also did not miss the `human rights` and `democracy promotion` issues, 
not by trying to impose them, but simply because “this is what Americans are”. China`s 
`assertiveness` was not mentioned or commented upon. This was also the first and last time 
when in speeches or remarks regarding future China, Ob ma used the adjective “strong”. 
 Soon in 2010 and 2011, U.S.´ Pivot/Rebalancing new Asian-Pacific strategy was 
shaped, and officially announced. It was assessed by Beijing as an outward attempt to encircle 
and contain China, by intensifying U.S. dominance and military presence in Asia-Pacific, 
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stirring up disputes, causing trouble, taking sides and making provocative remarks on the East 
and South China Sea issues and contradictions. 
 The Chinese kind response did not come long. “China-U.S. most important 
relationship in the 21st century” turned into “very important …”, and Xi`s decision to take his 
first official trip as new president to Russia seemd designed to send a reinforcing message. 
 One of the most important indicators of Beijing`s new stage of “continuity through 
change” rise strategy, after the 2008 global crisis, was the final formulation and officially 
adopted concept of the “core national interests” of China in “China`s Peaceful Development” 
White Paper of the State Council in 2011. It included: stability of the state, the political 
system, and the path with Chinese characteristics, under the leadership of the CCP, 
sovereignty, security, territorial integrity and the unification of the country, and sustainable 
development of China`s economic and social life. Thus security, sovereignty and development 
were officially declared as the undisputable “core national interests”,343echoing and quite 
similar with the U.S. frequently used rhetoric of “national security interests” and “national 
vital interests”.  
 In parallel with the newly taking shape “core national interests”, and based on its 
enhanced ameliorating role in the global crisis, in 2008-2010 China`s international and 
domestic behavior has become more pro-active, determin d and assertive. It became 
imperative the international community understand China`s strategic approach, and forecast 
how it might react when Beijing safeguards its “core national interests”. 
 In 2011, one of the most prominent Chinese IR scholars, theorist, and close advisor to 
the Chinese leadership, Wang Jisi, published seminal article in Foreign Affairs, titled, 
“China`s search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Find Its Way”.344In the article, 
U.S. and Western strategists and policymakers are implicitly informed that Beijing is in the 
process of formulating and delivering new Chinese Grand Strategy, which must give the right 
answers to at least three questions: What are the nation`s “core interests”? What external 
forces threaten them? And what can the national leadership do to safeguard them? Wang 
clarifies that the “core national interests” are alre dy there, and it will now depend how China 
will define the organizing principles of the new strategy. 
 In October 2012, shortly before the Party Congress, the same strategist published in 
the Party run “Global Times” another policy op-ed piece, titled “March West”345. Giving 
broad reading of the expected new Chinese grand strategy, the logic of Wang Jisi was rather 
simple and reflected the complex regional environmet. As U.S. pivots/rebalances to Asia-
Pacific, the relationship between Beijing and Washington has become increasingly 
contradictory and “zero-sum”. In China`s view, the pivot was due to U.S.` profound concern 
and anxiety about China`s rise in the region.  Keeping its regional activism, and evading open 
conflict, China´s best strategic choice would be to disbalance U.S. by marching to the West. 
 The western vector in Chinese strategic thought was formulated much earlier, with the 
first major breakthrough in 2001 – the official establishment of the SCO. Attempting to codify 
Eurasian multilateralism, and cooperating heavily on security matters by conducting vast 
military games and military exercises, under the umbrella of anti-terrorism, radical 
extremism, separatism and organized crime, China hosted SCO raised much concern in U.S., 
and China`s western neighbors.  
 The vast regional outlook to China`s `West` might not offer the same immediate level 
of economic sophistication and advantages as its `hedging East`, but it does offer massive 
strategic prizes that will grow increasingly importan  in the 21st century. 
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 U.S.-China strategic competition 
 
 China`s regional/global taking form Grand Strategy has introduced significant and 
subtle changes marking growing China – U.S. strategic rift. 
 Along with 2013 Kazakhstan announced New Silk Road Economic Belt strategic 
initiative, assessed by Fukuyama as the first ever Chinese attempt to export and demonstrate 
the superiority of its developmental model, came president Xi Jinping`s blunt official offer in 
2013 for the establishment of a “New Type of Major Countries Relationship” (NTMCR) 
between China and the U.S. 
 The broad analysis of the NTMCR concept allows for a certain parallel with the 
August 14, 1941 agreed upon Atlantic Charter between th  United States and still existing 
British Empire, negotiated by Roosevelt and Churchill. The Americans laid down their 
conditions for support, and vision for the post-World War global order, very much to the 
reluctance of London. From the 8 principal points of the Atlantic Charter 3 of them had put 
the British in a difficult and uneasy position: No. 3, the principle of self-determination; No. 4, 
removing or lowering trade barriers and No. 7, freedom of seas. The Americans were insistent 
that the Charter was to acknowledge that the War was fought to ensure self-determination.346 
The British were forced to agree to these aims, but in September 1941 speech, Churchill 
stated that the Charter was only meant to apply to states under German occupation, and 
“certainly not to the people who formed part of theBritish Empire”.347 
 The message that Xi was conveying to Washington with his NTMCR proposal, ever 
since 2012, during his official trip in the U.S. as then Chinese Vice President, was quite clear: 
China wants equal relationship status, no hegemony, no confrontation. Washington`s response 
to the proposal was muted and vague, with no official reference or even mentioning. 
Consistently, Xi repeated his initiative at the informal summit with Obama at Annenberg 
Estate in June 2013, during Obama`s state visit to China in November 2014348, and his 
reciprocal state visit in U.S. in September 2015. 
 Deployment of U.S. Marines to Darwin, Australia, beginning from 2011, a location 
that can be viewed as a crossroad between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, indicated that the 
U.S. is adopting a new two-ocean strategic framework, replacing the Atlantic-Pacific with the 
Indo-Pacific priority emphasis. If Japan was the most capable and reliable ally in the Pacific 
to counterbalance China, India should become the `natural ally` to curb China`s ambition and 
influence349 in the Indian Ocean, balancing also the One Belt One Road project. U.S. strategic 
guidance document released in January 2012 defined “th  arc extending from the Western 
Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia” and specifically 
highlighted that “the United States is also investing in a long-term strategic partnership with 
India to support its ability to serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in 
the broader Indian Ocean region”, echoing former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton`s 
encouragement of India to not only “Look East”, but also to “Go East”. In June 2012, U.S. 
then Defense Secretary Leon Panetta specified, “America is at a turning point. After a decade 
of war, we are developing a new defense strategy…In particular we will expand our military 
partnerships and our presence in the arc extending from Western Pacific and East Asia into 
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the Indian Ocean region and South Asia. Defense cooperation with India is a linchpin in this 
strategy”.350 
 As a countering move, for China`s new Premier Li Keqiang, the choice of India for his 
first foreign trip in May 2013 meant to send out a strong reminding signal that China was 
willing to enhance its relations with India when it is interested in marching West. Li made it 
clear to Indian leaders that “we are not a threat to each other (even partners in the BRICS), 
nor do we seek to contain each other”. He pledged to open China`s markets to Indian products 
for addressing the bilateral trade imbalance. Li also sought to reassure India over the border 
issue and called on both sides to use their wisdom to find “a fair and mutually acceptable 
solution”.  
 Daniel R. Russel, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, 
has underlined on many occasions that “the Asia-Pacific rebalance is here to stay”, though 
there was enough evidence that the Obama administration is restrained and lacks the 
necessary instruments and resources to fully and succe sfully implement the strategy.351 The 
“come home” policy alternative and growing contradictions in U.S., even during and after the 
2016 presidential elections, puts the new Administration and Congress on the defense. 
Department of State senior officials complained that because of budget cuts, the financial aid 
for Asia-Pacific allied and partner countries between 2012 and 2013 declined by 19% 
compared to 2009-2010. The U.S. federal defense budget decreased by $ 37 billion in 2013 
and was projected to be cut by 20% over the next decade compared to 2012 figure. In early 
March 2014, Katrina McFarland, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
admitted that “Right now, the Pivot is being looked at again, because candidly it cannot 
happen”.352 February 2017 President Trump´s declared intentions f r U.S. 54 billion dollars 
(almost 10%) increase of the Pentagon budget were candidly met by Premier Li Keqiang´s 
announcement of 7% 2017 boost of Chinese military spending at the NPC annual session. 
 President Xi and Chinese leadership do not convincingly accept the speculation of  
eminent U.S. political, economic and military decline, in spite of one of the leading slogans in 
the 2016 presidential campaign, “Make America Great Again”. On many occasions Xi even 
has stated that “The Pacific Ocean is vast enough for both China and the USA”. On U.S. 
military preponderance, the Chinese president being pragmatic strategist, recognizes the 
reality, and has no interest and intentions in triggering a war-like scenarios or an armed 
conflict - catastrophic scenario that would fundamentally undermine the slowing Chinese 
economy. Yet, he does not see this as a serious obstacle to a “continuity through change” 
mixed KLP and SFA Chinese Grand Strategy. Chinese comprehensive power and military 
capabilities are gradually enhancing over time, so a  to temper and balance American 
unilateralism and Asia-Pacific strategy, rather than to directly challenge them. 
 China is now a bigger trading partner with every country in Asia than U.S. New 
geopolitical scene emerges and what the world sees now is the rise of what Evan Feigenbaum 
has described as “New Asia … New Game: Two Asia – an economic Asia that may be 
increasingly dominated by China; and a security Asia – that still remains dominated by the 
U.S.353 
 In Beijing`s eyes, U.S. is deeply opposed to China`s rise. A document circulated 
among CCP leadership and political elite in 2014 summing up the consensus view. “American 
strategy towards China, it said, has five objectives: to isolate the country, contain it, diminish 
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it; divide it and sabotage its political leadership”.354 According to the former Australian Prime 
Minister, the conviction of the CCP leaders and Chinese elite is that the U.S. has not, and 
never will, accept the political legitimacy of the r gime in Beijing because it is not a liberal 
democracy. The assessments in the document also reflect the Chinese view that U.S. will 
never willingly share or cede its status as the preeminent power in Asia, and the world. For 
America, the relationship paradigm with rising China is no longer business as usual. Instead, 
the U.S. sees a marching rival that`s growing in strength and competing for political, 
economic, diplomatic and security space in Asia andglobally. On this view, Beijing`s long 
term strategy is aimed at pushing the U.S. out of Asia altogether and establishing a Chinese 
supremacy. 
  2014-2015 period in spite of the two reciprocal st te visits by Obama and Xi, marked 
the most serious downturn in the bilateral relationship for decades. When the media and 
influential think-tanks make headlines about China`s construction of a so-called “Great Sand 
Wall” in the South China Sea, senators, congressmen, IR scholars and presidential candidates 
took the lead in pressuring the executive branch to be more tough on China. 
 The stands, official discourses and strategic documents of both U.S. and China in that 
period showed a distinctive non reconcilable paradigm of the most important bilateral 
relationship for the 21st century. President Obama`s February 2015 National Security Strategy 
was in a stark contrasts and departures from his first NSS in May 2010, which advocated 
increased engagement and cooperation with China and Russia.355  
 In remarks in April and May 2015 in Hawaii, on occasion of the U.S. Pacific 
Command (PACOM) command change, and at a symposium hosting military officials from 
22 Asia-Pacific countries, the new U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter issued the most 
forceful warning yet, demanding “an immediate and lasting halt to the land reclamation” by 
China in the disputed Spratley/Nansha island: “There should be no mistake, the U.S. will fly, 
sail, and operate wherever international law allows as we do all around the world … the U.S. 
intends to remain the principle security power in the Asia-Pacific for decades to come”.356 
 CFR report in early 2015 advised that the U.S. Grand Strategy towards China be 
revised because America`s efforts to integrate China into the liberal international order have 
not only failed but also generated new threats to U.S. primacy in Asia. A new Grand Strategy 
should center on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its 
ascendancy and the 54 pages document prioritizes a policy, in which the U.S. takes even 
harder line towards China in almost every area of the bilateral relationship.357 
 Even compromise, bargaining, and trade off options were suggested. In February 2015 
Foreign Affairs article358, former National Security Adviser (2005-2009) to George W. Bush, 
Stephen Hadley and Carnegie Qinghua Center Director Paul Haenle, suggested that U.S. and 
China should make a compromise: China removes its references to the “core national 
interests” and in return the U.S. accepts the “New Type of Major Countries` Relations” Xi 
proposal, in order to build a more constructive andpositive relationship. 
 For President Xi Jinping, China has no time to spare and wait for the crystallization of 
the real intentions of other major countries, and must seize the limited strategic opportunities 
to advance and implement its strategic agenda for the 21st century. He considers that China`s 
domestic policy priorities are organically bound up with Beijing`s international relations and 
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foreign policy strategy. In Xi`s worldview, an increasingly powerful and wealthy China has to 
play a much more decisive role regionally and globally. 
 Underpinning the strategic importance of the OBOR project, in October 2013, Xi 
presided over an unprecedented high level Conferenc o  China`s Relations with Neighboring 
Countries (CCRNC) in the context of China`s periphery foreign policy and diplomacy. All 
CCP Politburo members as well as senior foreign policy, economic and military officials, 
even a good number of CEOs of state-owned enterpriss attended the event. The main 
message and guidance that Xi laid down was – new pro-active diplomatic principles in 
dealing with the neighboring countries, based on wi- in, honesty, tolerance and patience. 
 At the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) 
in Shanghai, in May 2014, in the presence of Russian President Putin, Xi Jinping called for a 
new Asian-Pacific security infrastructure that will transcend old conflicting Cold War 
approaches and thinking, offering an alternative to the U.S. led system in the region - Asian 
security by and for the Asian countries themselves.  
 In November 2014, at the Party Work Conference on F reign Affairs (FAWC), the 
first in 8 years, Xi stated clearly that China is now engaged in a “struggle for the international 
system”, emphasizing that the Chinese leadership will not bow down to foreign pressures in 
defending China`s “core national interests”. “Regarding the long term trends of world politics, 
Chinese leaders have made five assessments: trend towards a multipolar world, trend of 
globalization;, trend of Peace and Development, trend of reform of the international system, 
and trend of growing prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region”.359 Indeed, it was the first time, 
that a paramount Chinese leader urged and instructed for more pro-active SFA global foreign 
policy that helps maximize China`s economic and security core interests, and will lead in the 
long run to reforming the global international system, by implementing a “new major country 
diplomacy with Chinese characteristics”, especially with the USA. 
 At the background of this “ tipping point “ environment, on May 16 and 17, 2015, 
State Secretary Kerry made his 5th official visit to China, ahead of the forthcoming summer 
7th bilateral Strategic and Economic Dialogue, and President Xi Jinping`s state visit to the 
USA in September 2015. The visit was of great importance at this critical moment. It showed 
that both countries would like to manage differences before crisis occurs. As for the 
construction – land reclamation work in the South China Sea, Beijing made no compromise, 
and even urged the U.S. not to take sides, and to avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation. 
 Roughly 10 days after Secretary Kerry`s visit, on May 26, state Xinhua news agency 
announced the publication of the first military White Paper, issued by the State Council`s 
(Government) Information Office entitled “ Chinese Military Strategy “.360 The document 
stresses the principles of defense, self-defense and post-emptive strike, and that China will 
counter attack if attacked – with focus on “winning informational local war”, and 
international cooperation in “areas crucially relatd o overseas interests “. 
 The strategy defines 4 “crucial security domains “: ocean, outer space, cyber space, 
and nuclear forces, confirming that: “Chinese Navy will defend offshore and open seas 
waters, cyber security as priority, opposes arming of space while securing its space assets”. 
 May 25, 2015, state and party run Global Times editorial bluntly warned: “If the US 
bottom line is that China has to halt its activities, then a US-China war is inevitable in the 
South China Sea. China will have no choice but to engage in response to US provocations. 
Beijing waters are its own.” 
 On June 29, 2015, the formal launch of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) took place in Beijing. Some analysts perceived the event as the beginning of the 
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Chinese century, as the former U.S. Treasury Secretary Larry Summers has commented 
earlier in April: “U.S. lost its role as the underwriter of the global economic system”.361 57 
countries, in spite of U.S. objections and persuasions, joined the new bank as founding 
members out of which: 4 of the 5 Permanent Members of the UNSC; 18 of the 34 OECD 
member states; all of the ASEAN; 5 of the 6 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and 6 out of 
the 8 South Asian countries. China-India-Russia-Germany were the four biggest contributors 
in the Bank with initial capitalization of $ 50 billion, raised to $ 100 billion later. Australia, 
which Secretary of State John Kerry personally pleaded to stay out, became the first to sign 
the Articles of Agreement as the fifth contributor with $ 700 million. By enlisting all major 
EU economies, and especially the closest U.S. ally,the UK, strategists and commentators 
claimed that Beijing has dealt a blow to the United States` dominant status in the world and 
has increased China`s heft in the international arena. 
 Less than a week before, the two-day 7th U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue 
(SED) took place in Washington DC (June 23-24, 2015). The Dialogue environment and 
background was complex and tense, with increased U.S. tone of criticizing Beijing`s island 
construction in the Nansha/Spratly reefs, monitoring and surveillance operations. U.S. 
academia, think-tanks and even officials were pushing the executive repeatedly to resume 
tougher policies towards China, with voices for American support to regime change in 
Beijing,362 casting shade over the meeting. Reacting and displaying dissatisfaction with the 
current state of the play, the level of the Chinese del gation was relatively lowered, headed by 
Liu Yandong (f), vice-premier, in charge with health, education and sports. At the opening of 
the session she read a letter from President Xi, expressing his stand that a ‘new model of 
major-country relations” is the priority of China`s foreign policy, refuting speculations that 
China is adjusting its diplomatic strategy to weaken the importance of Sino-American 
relations at the expense of a Sino-Russian alliance against the U.S. In response, Vice-
President Joe Biden remarked, that the U.S. not only does not fear, but wants to see China 
rise, and that besides the United States and China, the world also depends on the success of 
that important bilateral relationship. Biden also admitted that “there will be intense 
competition between the two countries”, as “that is the nature of international relations, and 
the U.S. welcomes fair and healthy competition”.363  
 Long awaited President Xi first state visit to USA in September 2015, proclaimed as 
success story by both parties, was actually busines as usual, consequent attempt to manage 
disputes, and address disagreements in a constructive top level manner. China tried to reassure 
the U.S. that Beijing would not be a revisionist challenger, and clarified its support to the 
existing UN based international system, rather not using the notion of “world order”. 
Regarding China`s concerns, Xi requested U.S. to stay away from the issues relating to 
China`s sovereignty and territorial integrity, to avoid miscalculations and to save the bilateral 
relationship from potential damage. 
 In November 2015, the IMF decided to include Chinese national currency, the yuan 
(RMB) in its Special Drawing Rights (SDR) basket, issue discussed during Xi´s U.S. visit, 
which was hailed as a milestone in China`s efforts to make the RMB a major global reserve 
currency, reflecting China`s economic strength and outward strategy. 
 Two early 2016 events again showed that the stand-off has been heating up on both 
sides. 
  In the wake of the DPRK`s fourth nuclear test andthe satellite-disguised long-range 
missile launch, ROK government took measures to beef up its military defense, also 
requesting the deployment of U.S. Terminal High-Attitude Area Defense (THAAD) system 
                                                 
361 See https://www.fortune.com/2015/04/06/larry-summers-u-s-has-lost-its-role-as-underwriter-of-the-global-economic-system  
362 Joseph A. Bosco, http://www.thediplomat.com/2015/06/americas-asia-policy-the-new-reality/  
363 Chen Jimin, “The Strategic and Economic Dialogue Shows the Maturity of China-U.S. Relations, ChinaUs Focus, June 30, 2015. 
 91 
for national protection. Beijing strongly objected to this option and warned the U.S. of 
possible counter-measures, as the THAAD system would seriously destabilize, and endanger 
the strategic equilibrium in the region.  
 After news in February 2016 that China has deployed an advanced surface-to-air 
battery in the Paracel islands, on February 24, 2016, U.S. Pacific Command Head Adm. Harry 
Harris told Congress that China is militarizing the South China Sea. China reacted by 
declaring that deployment of limited and necessary defense facilities on its own territory is 
granted by international law, and accused Washington of provoking needless conflict, and 
turning $ 7.4 trillion Asia-Pacific annual maritime trade into a second Middle East.  
 U.S.-China strategic rift, and elements of new Chinese Grand Strategy were best and 
openly explained, and summed up in the speech of the C airwoman of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee and spokesperson of the Chinese Parliament (NPC) Fu Ying, at the February 2016 
Munich Security Conference, titled: “Putting the Orde (s) Shift in Perspective”.364  
 Making a blunt distinction between the U.S.-led world order and the UN international 
order, she stated that China belongs to and supports the latter, UN based system including the 
international institutions and norms. Chinese leaders s ldom talk about the “world order”, but 
for the need to “reform and improve the international system to keep up with the times”, using 
the term “international order”.365 With globalization going deep and international poitics 
fragmenting this “world order” is being overstretched in providing new and effective 
solutions to contemporary challenges, as promotion of western values have shown, with chaos 
occurring and even spilling over. The 2008 global financial crisis has betrayed flaws in the 
international governance and the newly born G-20 had to take on the reform of global 
governance system. China has also deep concern over the long-held rejection and pressure by 
the U.S. and other Western countries on China`s political system. 
 Representing the New Silk Road Initiative (OBOR) and the AIIB as new international 
mechanisms and public goods that China is offering, where the existing international order 
falls short, she pointed out that they are non-exclusive and guided by UN principles. 
 Commenting on the bleak strategic outlook of the Munich Security Report 2016, and 
the implied increasing difficulties in managing the differences between China and the U.S, the 
option of  President Xi`s proposed “New Model of Major-Countries Relationship” was given 
as China`s positive contribution and a way out of the Thucydides Trap. 
 Trying to sound rather conciliatory with the U.S., the Foreign Affairs Committee 
Chairwoman, still, warned: “China`s commitment to peaceful development remains on 
course. We don`t want to be distracted, and still less do we wish to see the external 
environment that enables China`s peaceful rise revers d. The Chinese are a calm and patient 
people. But, if threatened or confronting tougher situations, China now has more leverages 
and means at disposal …”.366 
   
 Ideology, Nationalism, China Dream 
 
 As result of the new economic model, which can be both correctly labeled as 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics” and/or “capit lism with Chinese characteristics”, in 
the last 25-30 years China gradually emerged as the new world economic miracle with an 
average annual growth of 9.4%.  The model practically mobilized people with the middle 
class incentives, and lifted hundreds of millions out f poverty, in the context of the `Fuqiang` 
(wealthy and strong) aspirations of the country. Even the 1989 Tiananmen suppression events 
                                                 





and political crisis were not able to deviate or radic lly change the processes and policies of 
the rise strategy, despite the serious accumulation of economic and social problems, unrest 
and population discontent. 
 Not that during the early stage of Deng`s era, and the new economic model there was 
lack of nationalism and patriotic popular pride forthe take off, and the first symptoms of 
`Fuqiang`367. Still, it was the demise of the Soviet bloc and the growing anxieties and 
uncertainties of Chinese leadership to whether only delivery of economic growth, 
international prestige and improvement of living standards for substantial portion of the 
population, can sustain and guarantee its legitimacy and still existing popular support. This 
became more vitally pressing, especially after the rather controversial 16th Party congress 
decision in November 2002, allowing representatives from the private sector and the 
entrepreneurial cast to join the CCP, and some claims that the latter may become a majority 
among the national and local party leaderships.368 The 3rd  generation party leadership in the 
1990s and early 2000s, headed by Jiang Zemin, had, indeed, gone too far in accommodating 
and prioritizing Deng`s economic model and the markets by boosting the capital attractive 
coastal regions and widening inequality to unprecednted levels.369 The gaps between rich and 
poor, and between (coastal) cities and the rural areas, had grown dramatically and the party`s 
primary existential goal of political and social stability was at serious risk due to labor unrest 
and peasant revolts. 
 Given the importance of national unity and stability for the economic domestic and 
external standing of the regime, the 4th generation leadership under Hu Jintao and Wen 
Jiaobao (2002-2012) made a balanced change of course. Attention and resources were 
redistributed from the rich and more developed coastal areas to the underdeveloped interior 
and western regions. Ideologically and socially, Hu`s intentions were to go back to `socialist 
values`, `putting people first`, poverty reduction, redressing imbalances, and fostering a more 
equal distribution of income and resource balance between the regions.370 
 With the natural passing of the older generations and the emergence of younger, much 
more ambitious and exigent ones, the past glorious communist revolutionary legitimacy of 
foreign oppression and domination resistance, and the creation of the PRC was hard to sustain 
and uphold. Income and other social inequalities were mounting and the party acceeded to 
massive proletariatization of China`s workforce by creation of exploitative flexible labor 
market regime, imposition of user fees, and the privatization of assets formerly held in 
common. All of that led to the raise and continuing questions about the social-political nature 
of the system, and threats to the domestic stability, adding to the external pressures already at 
display with the widely spreading first round of “China threat theory”.371campaign, and the 
necessity of Beijing`s response with the “China`s peaceful rise” concept. 
 In contrast to the more loosened and relative ideological `free ride` of the 2nd and 3rd 
generation leaders, respectively during the Deng and Jiang eras, Hu and Wen were forced to 
pay much more attention to social development and social justice, using the ideological allies 
of nationalism and patriotic pride. Their appeals to the glorious Chinese nation history, 
recallings of past humiliation, and destructions caused by foreign powers, allowed for some to 
argue that nationalism had become the only ideology that allowed the Chinese regime to 
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prolong its life expectancy.372 In the present China case, there is a rather mixed and complex 
continuous phenomenon of top down nationalism created nd sponsored by the state, and also 
a bottom up significant component of Chinese nationl sm in the form of relatively popular 
mass initiatives, as proven by the many nationalist mass demonstrations (predominantly anti-
Japanese and anti-Western), the explosion of authentic nationalist forums on the web, and vast 
amount of nationalistic movies and best-sellers like – China Can Say No.  
 The nationalistic Party and State adagio was overtak n by the current, 5th generation, 
Chinese top leadership, and personally by President Xi Jinping. In late 2014, speaking at the 
FAWC, Xi spelled out the guidelines of China` new foreign policy vision, as subordinate and 
underpinning “China`s crucial stage of achieving the great renewal of the Chinese people and 
the `China Dream`…”.373 The term China Dream was first used by Xi during a high profile 
visit to the National Museum of the PRC, in Beijing, on November 29, 2012, where he took 
all the newly elected Political Bureau Standing Committee (the top Party echelon) members to 
attend a `national revival` exhibition. Since then, the Chinese Dream brand and logo has 
officially been linked with the concept of – “the great revival of the Chinese nation”. 
Deliberately departing from jargon-heavy ideology of the past, Xi is constantly using – 
“Chinese Dream” to psychologically appeal to the Chinese people, implying the symbol and 
the parallel with the past success of the “American Dream”, and to emphasize his own 
determination, ambition and vision for the great power status of China on the global stage, 
China that can project and protect its “core national i terests”. 
 
 Economic performances and uncertainties 
 
 The economic aspect of the current third attempt of Deng initiated China rise strategy 
is also complex, contradictory and apt to uncertainties and potential setbacks. As emphasized, 
the thesis hypothesis is based on the leading assumption that China continues its economic 
development and growth, and does not suffer a Soviet – style sudden – death syndrome and 
spins out of control, which would create an even worse and devastating scenario, hard for the 
world to deal with. “Realizing the China Dream, according to Xi Jinping, requires a second 
phase of transformative economic reform. He sees no contradiction in prosecuting deeper 
market reforms to achieve his national objectives, even if implementing new restrictions on 
individual political freedom.374 In fact he sees this as the essence of the “China model” in 
contrast to the liberal democratic capitalism of the West which he describes as totally unsuited 
to China”.375 
 In the last two decades, China`s economy has emerged as a major player in the world 
economy. China`s high GDP376 growth has changed the distribution of economic activities 
across the world. In 2014 China`s value of GDP represented 16.70% of world`s economy, and 
17.9% in 2015. In 2010 it has passed Japan to become the second largest global economy. 
IMF, WB, and some economic analysts, project, it isonly a matter of time before it passes the 
                                                 
372 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, `The Many Facets of Chinese Nationalism`, 2005, China Perspectives, 59, p. 26. 
373 Chen Xiangyang, `A Diplomatic Manifesto to Secure th Chinese Dream`, China-U,S Focus, December 31, 2014. 
374 The U.S., German, Canadian and Japanese ambassadors to China signed a letter dated January 27, 2016, voicing unease about the 
counterterrorism law, the draft cyber security law nd a draft law on management of foreign non-governm ntal organizations. The cyber 
security and counterterrorism laws codify sweeping powers for the government to combat perceived threats, from widespread censorship to 
heightened control over certain technologies, so even non-violent dissidents could fall over the definitio  of terrorism. Separate letter with 
similar concerns was also sent by the EU chief of mission in Beijing. 
375 Kevin Rudd, `How to Break the Mutually Assured Misperception Between the U.S. and China, China-U.S Focus Digest, February 5, 
2015, p. 3. 
376 Starting from $ 46. 68 billion in 1962, China`s GDP reached world second in 2015 to - $ 11, 384.8 trillion, and only for 9 years from 
2006 to 2015 increased by more than three fold, from $ 2, 729.78 to 11, 384.8 trillion – Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO), 
October 2015, last updated November 10, 2015. 
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United States.377 China`s exports have lowered consumer prices across the globe, and its 
imports have major impact on global commodity prices. Becoming also a major hub of intra 
industry trade, China is turning into the major engine of the world economy growth. 
 Chinese leadership takes pride, and does not miss opportunities to underline the 
constructive behavior and adequate Chinese financial and economic measures during the 
Asian crisis of 1997-1998, and the world financial, turned economic crisis in 2008-2009, that 
“helped Asia and the world escape total meltdown”. 
 Overall global negative outlook did effect China`s performances and the economy of 
the country began slowing down in the last three years. Reaching 25 year low of only 6.9% 
GDP growth in 2015, 6.7% in 2016, and 6.9% in 2017, the economy continues struggling to 
shift from its manufacturing roots and to rebalance towards consumption, services, 
innovation, and ´green´. 
 As economic deceleration in China continues to reverberate across global markets, 
foreign governments, businesses, IR scholars and economists are wondering about China`s 
future growth and what it will mean for the world and the international system.  
 “There`s is no doubt China has been going through a bit of bumpy road as it 
transitions from a `capex` (capital expenditure) to an `opex`(operating expenditure ) economy. 
That said, although it is going to be bumpy, it does f el to me that China`s going to weather 
this … over the long-term”378  
 This general, cautious and parsimoniously optimistic assessment echoes the 
Government Annual Work Report379 for 2015 of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang at 2016 NPC 
annual session. At a time when China`s economic momentum is sagging, Premier Li 
announced the government`s growth target of between 6.5% and 7% 380 and acknowledged 
that “downward pressure on the economy is growing”, as in 2015 China “encountered many 
difficulties and challenges in its development”.Pointing out why these achievements did not 
come easily, the report marks the extremely complicated and challenging international 
environment in 2015: lowest global growth in 6 years, slow down of world trade with 
plummeting commodity prices, increasing volatility of financial markets, with direct impacts 
on the Chinese economy, as export and import targets w re not reached. 
 Reiterating that no difficulties will stop China from moving forward, Premier Li 
pledged that the targets of the 13th Five Year Plan (FYP), 2016-2020, will be reached: average 
7.8% and minimum 6.5% annual growth, so as to double by 2020 the 2010 per capita income, 
and reach a 2020 GDP of 90 trillion yuan, over 50 million new urban jobs, and a total work 
force of 900 million people, of whom over 100 million with higher education, and 
professionally trained. 
  Elaborating further on the political aspects of the government activities in 
2016, emphasizing the leadership of the CCP over the army, and the concept that the Chinese 
people are one family, Li concluded: “ so as, to make  good start to the decisive stage of 
finishing building a moderately prosperous society in all respects, and make new 
contributions to turning China into a modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, 
democratic, culturally advanced, and harmonious, and to achieve the Chinese Dream of the 
rejuvenation of the Chinese people”.381 
                                                 
377 Ibid., According to the IMF, based on GDP purchasing power parity (PPP) valuation, in 2014 and 2015 China was the largest economy 
with respectively $ 18, 088.1 and $ 19, 510 trillion compared to the USA - $ 17, 348,1 and $ 17, 968,2 trillion. 
378 Statement by Goldman Sachs President and Chief Operation Officer Gary Cohn, www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/pages/china-in-
transition.html  
379 Ùsually, the official Chinese version is published with some delay, so I am using the 39 pages version published in the Wall Street 
Journal on March 5, 2016, see www.blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2016/03/05/china-npc-2016-the-reports/  
380 Much lower growth rate than before, which now in official party and government rhetoric is usually refe red to as “the new normal”. 
381 All the data, discussion,  my comments and quotations are based on the published report in the WSJ. 
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 In essence, the current stage of the China rise strategy is an explicit example of the 
strategic shift and adjustment that Deng Xiaoping made from the extremes of the Maoist 
domestic and external policies to the classical Zhongy ng dialectics of following the middle 
course of “continuity through change”. His theory of the “primary stage” was adopted at the 
12th Party Congress in 1982, including the initial theorizing concept of “constructing 
socialism with Chinese characteristics”. It also meant justifying introduction of private 
ownership in the socialist economy, indicating that China should search its own model of 
modernization, as imitating other country`s experience would not succeed. The theory was 
gradually updated and at the Sixth Plenary Session in 1986 Deng stated: “Our implementation 
of reform and open policy need to take in the useful lements from the capitalist system as a 
supplement to the development of our social productivity”. 382 The theory of the “primary 
stage” was thoroughly developed at the 13th Congress in 1987383, attempting to “answer the 
fundamental question of how to build a modern socialist country in China, the biggest 
developing nation in the world. This was the problem to which Mao, the leading founder of 
the People`s Republic, failed to find the right answer”.384 
 As finally emphasized in Li Keqiang`s 2016 annual report, China of today is in its 
“decisive stage of finishing building a moderate prosperous socialist society” by 2020. 
  
 [Re] emergence of China on the world stage in the 21st century 
 High Church of Realpolitik 
 In the continuing post-Cold War and new Millennium defense of Realism and war on 
Liberal idealism, in October 2004, in his E.H.Carr Memorial lecture at the University of 
Wales, Aberystwyth,385 titled “E.H. Carr vs. Idealism: The Battle Rages On”, John 
Mearsheimer made firmly and convincingly his positin that “states continue to worry a great 
deal about the balance of power, which drives and shapes much of what they do, and in short, 
power politics are alive and well in the world around us”.386 For Mearsheimer, Realism will 
disappear into the night only if there is a revoluti nary change in the structure of the 
international system, and that, he believes, is not likely to happen any time soon, if ever. 
 Professor Mearsheimer is notably one of the most frequently invited and visiting 
China U.S. IR scholar, where in his words – “he is feeling very much at home in the `China 
realist world`. He admits, he is met with understanding in academic debates, and in his 
meetings and discourses with Chinese counterparts and officials”, even when he argues and 
promotes his offensive realist theory that “China cannot rise peacefully” to Chinese students` 
audiences,387 and foreign public. 
 “China cannot rise and reemerge peacefully” theory, as discussed above, has many 
opponents and counterarguments. There are also relatively more optimistic voices about the 
future relationship between China and the United state . Especially forceful claim among 
Chinese academia and top officials is that the country can reemerge peacefully because it has 
a deeply rooted Confucian culture and peaceful politica  traditions. Sino-centric theory, 
Confucianism, Yan Xuetong argues, not only promote moral virtue and harmony but also 
excludes aggression towards neighboring countries, with emphasis on self-defense, except for 
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`just wars`. China has historically acted in accordance with the Confucian legacy, in sharp 
contrast to the European great powers`, Japan`s, or the United States`s offensive wars based 
on the dictates of realism. China, he claims, has behaved much more benignly towards other 
states: eschewing aggression, and pursuing “humane authority” instead of “hegemonic 
authority”.388 This perspective is much appreciated as an alternative to the principle IR 
theories, which are defied as U.S and Eurocentric and thus oblivious to China`s exceptional 
cultural and political tradition. “The rise of China will make the world more civilized … The 
Chinese Confucian concept of `benevolent governance` … rather than hegemonic governance 
…will influence international norms and make international society more civilized”.389 Other 
scholars, supporters of the `peaceful rise` narrative, claim, ”Chinese culture advocates moral 
strength instead of military power, worships kingly rule instead of hegemonic rule, and 
emphasize persuasion by virtue”.390 They argue, too, that China has a genuine desire for peace 
in her rise period and may achieve it using the sources of soft power in the context of six 
pillars: cultural attractiveness, political values, development model, international institutions, 
international image and economic temptation, via the c annels of formal, economic and 
cultural diplomacies.391 
 In his 2014 updated final chapter “Can China Rise Peacefully?” of “The Tragedy of 
Great Power Politics” Mearsheimer emphasizes that Confucian rhetoric can be used to justify 
aggressive as well as defensive behavior, and like L b ralism in the U.S., Confucianism 
makes it easy for Chinese leaders to speak like idealists and act like realists. 
  In the roots of the Chinese strategy for rise and reemergence, we can trace the 
classical Zhongyong dialectics of continuity through change and search for the middle course. 
Instead of leaning only to the traditional leading source of Chinese thought and insights, 
Confucianism,  China´s rise architects have also drawn on its rival Legalist school in an 
attempt to maximize their combined added value. Where Confucianism propounds 
“benevolence, ritual propriety, social hierarchy and harmony” as the only legitimate and 
effective basis for good government, Legalism streses the need “to enrich the state and 
strengthen its military power. The concept and term of `Fuqiang` (Wealth and Strength) is 
actually an abbreviation of “fu[guo] – rich country, and qiang[bing] – strong army”, 
representing the Realpolitiker`s understanding for p licy success or failure. Further, the 
Chinese leaderships since Deng Xiaoping believed that in order to reassert China` rise and 
reemergence in a world dominated by wealth and power relations, China must strengthen 
itself in all possible ways and embrace Realpolitik, meaning also in part, learning from 
`enemies` and appropriating their winning ways, or `killer apps`. They have also understood 
for decades that, during this period of learning and building up forces, China must defer to the 
stronger players, not inciting too much suspicion and evading fatal for the rise strategy 
deterrence and containment. For them, any success of `Fuqiang`, naturally leads to 
geopolitical reemergence, and furnishes the resources for a robust military facilitated global 
influence.  
 When in the 1990s first positive results of the reform and opening up began to appear, 
U.S. policies towards China were premised on the idea that increasing Chinese wealth and 
international stature would lead naturally to domestic political liberalization. In the late 1990s, 
Premier Zhu Rongji was the first visit of every Western foreign policy maker. He was the face 
of `new China` - a boisterous, confident, English-speaking technocrat who understood free-
market language and was beyond reproach as a reformr. Larry Summers even viewed him as 
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China`s answer to Fed chairman Paul Volcker who pushed harsh monetary policies to defeat 
U.S. inflation, while Zhu tossed more than 40 million people out of work to trim back the 
political and ideological influence of state-owned nterprises. Many scholars and analysts 
now wonder how Zhu let many Western interlocutors deceive themselves into thinking he was 
a true free-marketer, when in fact he had no intention of abandoning `socialism with Chinese 
characteristics`. 
 Since the new Millennium, Premier Zhu saw China`s 2001 entry into World Trade 
Organization (WTO) as a kind of a Trojan horse. Joining meant opening the economy and 
financial industry to foreign investment and to a certain extent, to international conventions of 
trade, intellectual property and environmental management. Likewise, Zhu did not view the 
internalization of China`s currency as a tool of financial hegemony but as a means for China 
to begin forcing changes in the existing Western-led world system, which is what we observe 
up to present days, culminating with the acceptance of the Chinese currency, the yuan (RMB) 
in the IMF – SDR basket as a world reserve currency at the end of 2015, with effect – starting 
from October 1, 2016, and March 2018 initial Chinese issuance of RMB oil futures contracts. 
 In 2003 Premier Wen Jiaobao and President Hu Jintao, feared modernization and 
liberalization would threaten the existing and relatively well functioning model of economic 
growth, unleash social unrest, and most importantly undermine the political system and the 
leading role of the CCP. Central structures and state-owned enterprises gradually reasserted 
their dominance over the Chinese economy and domestic politics. 
 Inequality and social unrest were seen as something at had been rising, and the best 
that can be said about them is that in their final three years in power, the country stabilized 
inequality though it did not reign in. 
 In the wake of the “China Threat Theory” world diffusion and Beijing`s counter 
“China`s Peaceful Rise/Development” campaign in 2003-2 05, both Hu and Wen tried to 
optimize Confucius legacy in China`s external relations. In 2003 Premier Wen told Harvard 
audience, “Peace loving has been a time-honored quality of the Chinese nation”, and one year 
later, at the Boao Forum President Hu declared, “China since ancient times has had a fine 
tradition of sincerity, benevolence, kindness and trust towards its neighbors”, clearly implying 
that China, unlike other great powers in history, has acted like a model citizen on the world 
stage, as friendly and cooperative atmosphere of the successful Beijing Olympics in 2008 
demonstrated. 
 In the long term it may well be viewed that the Hu and Wen ten years formal top state 
and government leadership was a success. It made China a truly wealthy and significant 
country, and managed to build up domestic national esteem and importance. The CCP 
political elite remained unified, President Hu was able to create consensus over this period 
and to maintain the Party`s privileged leading role in society. Economic growth was 
indisputable and visible. In 2012, China`s economy was four times larger than it was in 2002, 
up on almost every major indicator, becoming an economic superpower, whatever its 
geopolitical status, and some of the realpolitik miscalculations that were made. 
 Perhaps the single achievement that President Hu really expanded personal political 
capital on was the dramatic, in spite of the anti-sece sion law, improvement in the relations 
with Taiwan on the re-election of the Nationalist Party in 2008. The symbolic importance of 
signing of a major quasi-free trade deal in the form f the Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement in 2009 was immense, contributing much more t  the relative normalization of the 
strangled relationship than previous top Chinese leaders. 
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 Hu-Wen pragmatically elevated the `Peaceful Rise/Development` concept to the core 
of the `New Thinking` about international relations and foreign policy under the 4th 
Generation Leadership.392  
 2008 – 2010 was the period when China finally realiz d that the U.S. is not ready, and 
probably will never accept parity with Beijing as an equal in the bilateral relationship, letting 
it have more say and its own sphere of influence in East Asia and world recognition. As 
former U.S. Treasury Secretary Paulson comments in his book393, “We would be naïve to 
assume that the Chinese political system will become just like ours or that Beijing will accept 
all aspects of the current global system, which for well over a half-century has been one in 
which America has played the leading role. But we should equally guard against demonizing 
China`s leaders as intent on world domination. We should rather, think of them, as pragmatic 
men striving to keep their own organization on top domestically, to return their country to 
pre-eminence regionally and to gain a seat at the tabl  globally”. 
 In the immediate aftermath of the 2008 global financi l crisis, President Bush, and 
later Obama, talked the urgent liquidity problems over the phone with Chinese President Hu. 
They personally sent their Treasury Secretaries Paulson and Geithner, respectively in 2008 
and 2009, to Beijing, to get personal high level Chinese assurances that Beijing will continue 
the purchasing of U.S. Treasury bonds and securities. Chinese leadership was thrilled and 
enthusiastic, believing that interdependence really works in its favor, and that the moment of 
recognition of China`s equal status in the bilateral relationship has arrived.394 Then came the 
U.S. QEs, the Pivot/Rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific, and China`s response by shifting from its 
skillful geopolitical maneuvering, pragmatic KLP/SFA mix, to more assertive policies and 
concrete Realpolitik actions. As the State and Party power transition year of 2012 was 
approaching, it was becoming more and more evident that the next Chinese paramount leader 
will be Xi Jinping. In 2008 he was promoted to the post of Vice President and in 2010 – as a 
Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. His elevation to these power positions 
clearly showed that he personally has participated, and has been very active and directly 
engaged in the 2011-2012 molding of the new selectiv , flexible and calculative, “continuity 
through changes”, more assertive/SFA Chinese interna io al relations and foreign policy 
strategy, especially towards some of its regional neighbors and in the bilateral China – U.S. 
relationship. 
 
 The `strategic distrust ` roots of Chinese selective Realpolitik 
 
 At U.S. Vice President Biden`s invitation, Vice President Xi Jinping visited the United 
States in February 2012. The invitation was extended not only to feel the pulse of the 
incoming at the end of the year top Chinese leader , but also symbolically coincided with the 
40th anniversary of U.S. Nixon opening to China in 1972. Top U.S. officials gave Xi a 
respectful and warm welcome, and he met with President Barack Obama, Vice President Joe 
Biden, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Defense, Treasury and Agricultural Secretaries, 
members of Congress, military and business leaders, even with some local leaders.395 
 The U.S. Democratic administration demonstrated it attaches significant importance to 
Sino-U.S. relations and indicated that it is in a se rch of a bilateral “cooperation paradigm”.  
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 Xi, stepping on 2011 China defined and announced “ore national interests”, invoked 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity principles implying the correlation between the 
existence of stable Sino-U.S. “cooperation paradigm” with difficulties for other countries to 
push their artificial pretense and cases or take reckless actions in disputed areas, and vice-
versa.396 For Xi, China could and should do many things, such as further “binding” Sino-U.S. 
economic and trade relations, continuing to strengthen strategic mutual trust, seeking  solution 
to “trust deficit” issues, actively promoting public diplomacy and increasing bilateral cultural 
exchanges, and others.397 
 Indeed, the question of mutual distrust of long-term intentions, or “strategic distrust”, 
was continuing to be a central priority concern and impediment in U.S.-China relations in 
2012, even more so in present days. Vice President Xi openly focused on this reality in giving 
the issue first place in his review of key problems in China-U.S. relations during his major 
policy address in Washington DC on February 15, 2012. It was during this trip to the United 
States that he first tried to probe, and to implant the seeds of his concept for a “New model of 
major countries relations” between China and the U.S., and ever since misses no opportunity 
to raise it again and again when meeting Obama or other U.S. senior officials. 
 In 2012, both Beijing and Washington were seeking to build a constructive partnership 
for the long run. U.S-China relations were, more ovr mature. The two sides understood well 
each others` position on all major issues and dealt with each other extensively. The highest 
level leaders met relatively frequently, and there were more than 60 regular government-to-
government dialogues between ministries and agencies in the two governments each year. 
 Since the 1970s and 1980s quasi-rapprochement, the PRC leadership has consistently 
demonstrated desire to “increase trust, reduce entanglements, develop cooperation, and refrain 
from confrontation” in U.S.-China relations, as a prerequisite for the country`s success in 
reform and opening up. In Beijing`s view, it is U.S. policies, attitude, and misperceptions that 
cause the growth of existing “strategic distrust”, which is deeply rooted in history. Four 
Chinese assessments based on recent structural changes in the international system contribute 
to this distrust: perceptions in Beijing that since 2008 the PRC has risen to a first-class world 
power, relative decline of U.S., despite its ongoin great strength, continuing challenge to 
Western domination by emerging powers like Russia, India, Brazil and South Africa. China`s 
development model of a strong political leadership, effectively managing social and economic 
problems, for Beijing, provides an alternative to Western liberal democracy and market 
economies for other developing countries. Based on these factors, Beijing firmly believes that 
the U.S. ultimate goal is to maintain its global hegemony, to constrain or even upset China`s 
rise.398 American democracy promotion agenda is understood by China as designed to 
sabotage the CCP`s leadership, to divide and weaken Chi a, and has been met by building 
increasingly powerful and sophisticated political and technological devices to safeguard 
domestic stability. 
 For Beijing, continuing arms sales to Taiwan despite vastly improved cross-Strait 
relations, and close-in U.S. surveillance activities off China`s coasts – contribute to PRC`s 
deepening distrust of Washington`s strategic intentions in the national security arena. U.S. 
rebalancing towards Asia and strengthening of its alliance and partnership structures further 
contributes to this assessment of security threat. China also views the U.S. as taking 
advantage of the dollar as a world reserve currency and by adopting various protectionist 
measures, and ´trade wars´ seeks to disadvantage the PRC economically and financially.399 
                                                 
396 Philip Stephens, “The Danger in Xi`s Rebuff to Obama”, Financial Times, March 2, 2012 
397 Ibid., see also, Geoff Dyer, “A Less Pacific Ocean”, Financial Times, February 13, 2012. 
398 See Wang Jisi, in `Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust`, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series, Number 4, March 
2012, Brookings Institution Press, pp. vi – viii. 
399 Ibid., pp. vii-viii 
 100 
 In 2012, strategic distrust of China was not the tn dominant view of national 
decision makers in the U.S. government, who believed it is feasible and desirable to develop 
basically constructive long-term relationship with a rising China. At the same time, U.S. 
decision makers also saw China`s future as very undetermined, and there were related worries 
and debates about the most effective approach for promoting desired Chinese behavior. The 
following underlying concerns of American leaders help understanding the U.S. “strategic 
distrust”: Various U.S. and other sources indicated that the Chinese side thinks in terms of a 
long-term zero-sum game, which requires that America prepare to defend its interests against 
potential Chinese efforts to undermine them as China grows stronger. It was considered that 
PLA (People`s Liberation Army of PRC) aspirations for dominance in the near seas 
potentially challenge American freedom of access and ction in international waters where 
such freedom is deemed vital to meet American commit ents to friends and allies, to 
maintain U.S. credibility. The Pentagon saw the PLA apparently prioritizing development of 
weapon systems particularly targeted at American platforms and worried about lack of 
transparency in China`s military plans and doctrines. The scope and persistence of China-
based cyber attacks against U.S. government, military, and private sector targets has alarmed 
American officials in charge of cyber efforts and raised very serious concerns about Chinese 
norms and intentions. U.S. intelligence officials ao saw increased evidence of zero-sum 
thinking in Beijing regarding the U.S. and increased Chinese espionage efforts in the United 
States.400 
 Economically, the United States worried that China`s mercantilist policies will harm 
the chances of American economic recovery after the 2008 crisis. China`s one-party 
governing system continued to induce distrust in various ways: less stable and more prone to 
blaming others for its domestic discontent, and less transparent, which makes it more difficult 
to judge China`s sincerity and intentions. Violations of civil rights made it more difficult for 
the U.S. to take actions targeted at building greater mutual trust. 
 U.S. no longer regarded China as a developing country, so it should stick to global 
rules, take some responsibility for international public goods that major powers should 
assume, and Washington worries when Beijing declines to do so. Given the U.S. assessment 
that Asia is the most important region in the world for future American interests, American 
leaders were especially sensitive to Chinese actions in 2009-2012 that suggested the PRC may 
be assuming a more hegemonic approach to that vital region.401 
 Back in 2012, Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, both very influential and closely 
related to U.S. and Chinese leaderships, respectively,402 made common conclusions in their 
analysis, that there are three fundamental sources of growing strategic distrust between the 
United States and China: “different political traditions, value systems and cultures, 
insufficient comprehension of each others` policymaking processes and relations between 
government and other entities, and a perception of arrowing gap in power between the 
United States and China”.403 For both strategists, U.S. and Chinese leaderships should very 
carefully consider how to manage bilateral relations so as to maximize cooperation and 
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minimize the tensions and conflict, despite each side`  deep distrust of the long-term 
intentions of the other.404 
 Fast forward 2016, the open mutual U.S.- China strtegic distrust of the long-term 
intentions of the other, since 2012, not only did not erode but became even more deeply 
rooted.  
 In November 2012 President Obama was reelected for an ther, and last, four-year 
term. Also in November 2012, 18th Party Congress marked a key power transition with the 
election of Xi Jinping. In March 2013 Xi assumed also the top position of President of the 
PRC. Well in advance, Obama`s China strategists began organizing the informal `shirt-
sleeves` Obama-Xi summit at Sunnyland, California for June 2013, aimed to review the state 
of the bilateral relations, engulfed within the `strategic distrust`, and assess President Xi`s 
plans and vision for their future perspectives.  
 The June summit, with total seven hours Obama-Xi discussions, once again proved 
that the U.S. relations are defined by multi-vector strategic competition. The U.S. steadfastly 
step-sided and declined China`s consistent push for a “new type/model of major countries 
relations” signifying Beijing`s quest for equality and parity. It came clear that besides the 
strategic mistrust issue, the biggest problem additionally burdening the Sino-U.S. relations 
will be – power sharing. More importantly, on all security issues that actually concern Cnina`s 
`core national interests` and reflect Beijing`s selective realpolitik, such as the China-Japan 
dispute, South China Sea disputes and Taiwan weapon sales, the U.S. made no changes in its 
positions. 
 The state of the bilateral play did not change substantially following the reciprocal 
state visits Obama and Xi exchanged, respectively, in 2014 and 2015. 
 “Americans will need to stop asking questions about who is number one, and to 
entertain narratives about dominance, and start asking questions about how various tools of 
power can be combined into smart strategies for power with rather than merely over other 
nations”.405 Along with this equally valid for both Washington a d Beijing vision, in 2011, 
Joseph Nye defined the hubris in the rising power and the fear in the status-quo power as a big 
but not existential problem of the 21st century, compared to other much more important and 
expected survival issues and global vital challenges. 
 For China, still, the primary goal of the U.S. in world affairs is to preserve its status as 
the sole superpower as long as possible, with strategic design and efforts to weaken any actual 
or potential peer competitor. China`s surging power is considered as the greatest challenge to 
U.S. hegemony and the most likely realpolitik adversary. In Chinese interpretations, in spite 
of – or because of – Washington`s inability to shape nd manage China by wielding its own 
power, the Obama administration was taking advantage of China`s territorial disputes with 
Japan, the Philippines and some other neighbors by trengthening military and security ties 
with them in coalition effort to encircle China. U.S. `Pivot to Asia-Pacific`, and now ´Indo-
Pacific – Quad´ strategies had further confirmed these plans and intentions.  
 Serious, additional Chinese concern was the Trans-Pacific-Partnership (TTP) – “a 
cornerstone of the Obama administration`s economic, investment and financial policies in the 
Asia-Pacific” and “an U.S.-led ambitious, comprehensive and high-standard agreement” to be 
ratified by 12 countries, with vague and not strong interest in China`s participation. Following 
initial January 2017 Trump withdrawal from TPP, currently there are options for U.S.return to 
the agreement - ´at Washington´s terms´. 
 Together with the Transatlantic Trade and Investmen  Partnership (TTIP) and the 
Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) initiated by the U.S., both seen in Beijing as 
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Washington`s attempts and strategic maneuvering to hamper China`s economic development 
and international presence, and for maintaining USA´s economic supremacy. 
 The most challenging and sensitive U.S. threat that the Chinese leadership is aware of 
and countering, are the alleged `liberal-democratization` moves and schemes of political and 
ideological penetration into the Chinese society, to subvert the government and weaken the 
leading role of the Communist Party. For most of Chinese strategists and the public at large 
the so called Chinese “assertive” and aggressive” recent behavior is rather too “timid” and 
“submissive”, if compared to U.S. policies versus China. Both China and the United States 
are entering into their own respective `Realpolitik̀  moments, seeing each other as being both 
assertive and defensive in a selective strategic, calculative manner. For Beijing, the only 
reasonable and politically win-win way out of escaping the “warfare trap” is the construction 
and faithful implementation of the “New Model of Major-Countries Relations” proposed by 
Xi. It is in China`s best interest to see a vibrant U.S. economy stimulated by technological 
innovations, and a benign, careful use of U.S. power in the international system. In turn, an 
orderly yet changing China, under a strong, reform-minded leadership, will make greater 
contributions to the international order in favor of the United States.406  
 American strategists and analysts consider that Washington and Beijing are moving 
into a period in which in almost every sector – cyber, business attitudes and activities, and 
primarily military, they are going to rub up against each other more and more as China goes 
out and confronts the United States. The real problem is that the two countries have not 
established, yet, set of rules of the road or crisis mechanisms to regulate inadvertence or threat 
miscalculations. At present, in contrast to the past, U.S. has to use a very different set of 
strategies in trying to shape the world view and the actions of the fastest rising power in  
world history. It will be very difficult for the U.S. to keep right track of a relationship that has 
intense areas of competition, but also areas of some verlapping shared interests, that might 
be described as cooperation. The U.S. does not have much history as a nation at these mixed 
relationships, but rather black and white, friend-foe experience, like the one with the USSR.407 
 The complexities of a relation like the one U.S. is going to have with China will 
require characteristics not very often used when describing USA foreign policy, like: deftness, 
subtlety, nuance, sophistication, and much more preparation and capabilities, for decades and 
decades. 
 During President Xi September 2015 state visit in he U.S. both sides compromised 
and achieved some positive results: cyber security agreement, though only on cyber economic 
espionage, and not on mutual non-targeting of critical kinetic infrastructure, Chinese 
acknowledgement of the benefits of the Bretton Woods system, and not short-circuiting it 
with the AIIB, U.S. not blocking China`s greater voice in the IMF, voting quotas changes and 
inclusion of the RMB in the SDR basket – which, with some U.S. caveats, took place a couple 
of months later.  
 Not a single word regarding the topic of maritime security was mentioned in the White 
House-released Fact Sheet about the visit, meaning that Xi has not compromised on the 
Chinese “core national interests” in the South China Sea. He also did not give ground on 
human rights abuses, the foreign NGO law, and other concerning the domestic stability and 
national security issues. Regarding the U.S.-led TTP, some analysis showed that China will 
try to transcend it and move straight to a more encompassing Free Trade Area of the Asia-
Pacific, making it thus not a major topic in the discussions. 
 Washington feels most uncomfortable with the broad specter of the U.S – China 
interdependence, and as bitter as it goes, the two countries have to learn to live together and 
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find areas of constructive cooperation, including, difficult as it is, a Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (BIT). In case of success of the Chinese next phase of economic growth, in spite of the 
current slow down, and in case of a healthy U.S. – China relationship, American goods and 
services` participation, and U.S. business role in the surging Chinese middle-class market 
should be non-negotiable.408 
 Against the background of contradictory, ambiguous, sporadically conflicting and 
China assertive international environment, beginning with 2010-2011, the formation and 
crystallization of the Chinese new Grand Strategy gradually, and based on the `continuity 
through changes` dialectics, took its current shape and practical implementation. 
 
          Chinese elite and the 18th Party Congress, Leadership Transition,  
        13th Five Year Plan and the 19th Party Congress 
 
 China`s “assertiveness debate”, or the top leadership and elite discussions over how 
pro-actively China should project its increasing power and influence on the global, but more 
so, on its regional stage, to defend what it officially coined in 2010 and 2011 as its “core 
national interests”(CNI), took place intermittently, but more vigorously in the aftermath of the 
global financial crisis. Then-President Hu Jintao consensually tried to stove the debates with 
the officially and unanimously accepted Party/Government line of “Peaceful 
Rise/Development”(PR/D), reminding the proactive hardliners that the CCP is faithful to 
Deng Xiaoping`s legacy and strategic guidance for a KLP foreign policy. The peaks of the 
Chinese assertiveness during 2009 and into 2010, for which Beijing claimed of being 
provoked by foreign hostile forces, were tactical probes and “legitimate counteractions”. 
Beijing sought to feel the pulse and readiness for push backs from its regional neighbors and 
U.S. after its cooperative and `responsible stakehold r``s behavior in overcoming the 
immediate meltdown of the 2008 crisis. The “assertiv ness mode” would also serve as an 
international geopolitical barometer for the forthcoming new Party leadership, and also as a 
showcase of Chinese potential realpolitik reactions to the announced U.S. strategic 
pivot/rebalancing to Asia-Pacific, along with the rhetoric of “mutual strategic distrust”. 
 Since Deng launched the KLP reform-and-opening strategy in 1978-79, Beijing`s 
paramount strategy priority has been concentrated on rapid peaceful economic development 
and domestic modernization, to which external political and economic ties, including with its 
regional neighbors, were totally subordinated. Foreign policy was de-revolutionized.409 
 The urgent focus on domestic development, its direct and indirect external support by 
attracting foreign direct investments (FDI), trade and favorable external environment, brought 
the initial positive growth outcomes. That led to more proactive economic diplomacy and 
Beijing´s financial solidarity behavior during the Asian financial crisis in 1997-98. The 
pattern was used again after the Great Recession of 2008, to demonstrate benevolence and 
goodwill to its neighbors, and to check as much as po sible the ongoing diffusion of the 
“China Threat Theory”. The latter was politically complemented by two white papers released 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2005 and 2011 on “China`s Peaceful Development”,410 a 
pillar concept that was to play a major role in the future shaping of Beijing`s Grand Strategy. 
 U.S. sparked 2008 financial crisis and Europe`s sovereign debt crisis to a certain 
extent discredited their status as role models. The unraveling of the Great Recession exposed 
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their imbalances and vulnerabilities, as it did the same for China, where the initial shock was 
followed by a rude awakening.411  
 Both domestic and external factors were pressing hard for strategic adjustments and 
changes as Beijing was preparing for the 2012 Party Congress and top leadership and elite 
transition. There was deep conviction for the necessity of power consolidation and unity in the 
face of growing complex challenges confronting the PRC. 
  
 State of the Chinese Elite 
 
 “Any political regime, in the first place, represents the result of the actions of the elite. 
The mechanism of interaction between different elite groups, of the communication with the 
citizenry of the country, defines the character of the political system and her stability. The 
differences in the elite`s interaction mechanism, the level of their internal homogeneity and 
structure is defined by two main parameters.  
 First, the level of the structure integration, which shows how deep the regional elite 
groups are inscribed in the central elite´s relationships structures, and also how stable is the 
system of vertical intercommunication within the elite. 
 The second parameter represents the degree of consolidation of the elite, which 
reflects the level up to which members of the elite ar  ready to support a common set of 
values and goals, and if they are apt to follow a defined code of conduct.”412 
 Based on these characteristics we can distinguish three main types of elite: 
 First type: Fragmented elite, i.e. – ones that have not reached a compromise 
regarding the common set of values and the code of conduct. What is essential for this type 
are the frequent conflicts, permanent fights for redistribution of power-resources and as a 
consequence – the political regime supported by this type of elite is rather fluid, having a low 
level of efficiency. 
 Second type: elite, united on the platform of an ideology. This type is marked by 
high level of centralization and tight integration, based on a single set of values, which define 
the dominant ideology. Not all members of the elite should share these values, but are obliged 
to declaratively uphold them. Usually, in this case the main power prerogatives are 
concentrated into a narrow group of the political elite members. 
 Third type: Agreed/Coordinated elite. They function in accordance with a single 
code of conduct, formulated on the basis of the system of values, to which all elite group 
agree to adhere to. The value basis of their activities s not openly declared, as is the case with 
the ideologically united elite, yet there are undeclared rules for coexistence in the political 
system of the country, limits and principles, whose violations are not encouraged. 
 The existence of consensus does not mean that there ar  no contradictions and 
conflicts among the different elite groups, or intergroup`s disagreements, but all of these 
processes flow within the established system. 
 The elite themselves are interested in the support of such balanced self regulated 
system and seek to exclude the elements that are destroying the settled order. 
 Based on historical experience there are several basic ways for the unification of 
national elite. First, the integration of elite groups having contradictory goals and values, may 
be the result of war, external or civil, or revolutions that necessitates the unification of all 
forces for the recovery and the stability of the country. Unifying ideas and ideals of national 
proportions is the second factor, which stimulates he compromise platform for the 
cooperation between rival elite groups for reaching the common goals. Favorable economic 
conditions in the country also creates environment for the gradual overlapping of the elite 
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groups, observed in the absence of strong external impulses and by inter elite special 
arrangements.413 
 According to this classification, we can identify the Chinese elite as predominantly – 
ideological elite, with still marginal component of agreed/coordinated elite in the face of the 
newly emerging business cast. On the other hand, in the American case, all three types of elite 
are being actively represented. In spite of the domestic fights and partisan struggle414, they are 
pragmatically united under the banner of global political, economic, financial and military 
preeminence, and mostly – by the promotion of liberal democracy. Some current deviations in 
the light of President Trump´s ´America first´ offshore balancing and ´economic nationalism´ 
announced strategic policies, are drawing ire, internal and external accusations that he is 
taking the global liberal order on the ground. 
 Besides being highly centralized, horizontally and vertically integrated, the current 
Chinese elite is also ambitious, strongly unified and motivated for reaching the goals of the 
nation`s Rejuvenation, the decades long accumulated political legacy and the Chinese Dream 
Grand Strategy project, with an open nationalistic zeal of never forgetting the lessons of the 
“century of humiliation”, often expressed in the lead rship parlance that “China will never, 
ever bend on its knees again”. 
 The advantages of the American elite are its long term hereditary history, rich 
domestic and offshore successful politico-economic and financial practices and experience, as 
well as its amassed wealth and unparallel military power. 
 The common place and conventional assessment of China observers, pundits and 
especially foreign IR scholars is the assumption that ere are 4-5 major elite factional groups 
in Chinese politics: the Shanghai Group; the Princel gs; the Qinghua Clique; the Chinese 
Communist Youth League / CCYL / Group, the New Left, e c., that are quite mutually 
exclusive.415 
 In 1977-78, when Deng Xiaoping took over the helm of Chinese politics with the 
reform and opening up strategy, a gradual process of treamlining, cohesion and even 
overlaps among factional elite groups took place with various degree of amplitude. 
 The theoretical models of explanation of elite politics in China as: “the winner-
takes-all”,416 “bandwagon” and “balance of power”417(anarchical structure) - have tremendous 
explanatory power for the political dynamics of China`s elite politics of the pre Deng eras. 
 The new theoretical model – “ Power Balancing “418, introduced by Bo Zhiyue, 
explicitly assuming that the Chinese political struc ure is hierarchically organized, is offering 
much better arguments as alternative perspective on Chi ese elite politics in the 21st century. 
It has taken into account a fundamental structural change of the 1990s – the political 
institutionalization in China. As a result of the political institutionalization, the authority of 
position has been restored, the formal substructure has become more dominant, institutional 
loyalty has mostly superseded personal loyalty, andfunctional differentiation has become 
substantial.419   
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 The passing of the highest political office from one political leader to another could 
be consensual and politically meaningful due to the authority of the position, the prioritization  
of the institutional loyalty with the positive outcome of the political game with multiple 
winners, instead of – “ the winner-takes-all “ old and detrimental zero-sum practice. Finally, a 
power balance among political elite actors could be achieved because of the functional 
differentiation, the existence of common domestic and external challenges, as well as shared 
national strategy.420 
 The key principle that was rooted at the foundation of the new political architecture, 
masterminded by Deng Xiaoping, allowed initially for the existence of informal agreement 
between the dominant political actor – the ruling elite, and the rest of the elite factions for the 
separation of power (institutionalization) and the functioning of the system for resource 
distribution. The political actors had two choices: ither become part of the existing system 
formulated by the power elite, or be thrown out [ the demise of Premier Zhao Ziyang after 
Tian Anmen events in 1989 and the expulsion from the CCP and trial of Bo Xilai ( a serious 
candidate for a Politburo Standing Committee post ) in 2012 , and most recently in June 2015,  
life sentence of the ex-security boss and Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou 
Yongkang ], under the pressure of the existing system. 
 There are three major formal institutions in China: central institutions; provincial 
organs and the military. They all have their role pr scribed and defined in the Constitution of 
the PRC, last version promulgated in 1982, with further revisions in 1983, 1993 and 2004. 
 In the Preamble, the leading role of the Chinese Communist Party is explicitly 
imposed and China is defined as a Unitary Multinational State undergoing socialist 
modernization. In article 1 of the Constitution one can read that the PRC is a socialist state 
and that the socialist system is the basic system of the country and that the sabotage of the 
system is prohibited. Constitutionally fixed and guarded, the 89 million members of the CCP 
represent the leading political force, therefore thvast majority of the ruling elite is within 
this political structure – as center piece of China politics, domestically and externally. 
 
 18th Party Congress – 2012 
 
 Party Congress work reports usually perform three main concrete tasks: to identify  
the major achievements (and to a lesser extent the omissions and failures) of party work since 
the previous congress, to identify the challenges and strategic opportunities in mid-term 
range, and  describe the basic principles and priority goals that will guide the CCP until its 
next convention. Emphasis is usually concentrated on general strategic trends, concepts and 
themes in party work, covering all major policy spheres: party building; social and economic 
development, defense and foreign relations. Domestic i sues and policies take center stage.  
Foreign policy and defense sections are briefly conceptualized, with no content and approach 
references, barely mentioning foreign countries, depiction of the international environment 
facing the CCP and China, general foreign policy goals of the leadership, and the basic 
features of China`s current and future foreign policy strategy. 
 The 18th Party Congress opened on November 8, 2012, attended by 2270 party 
member delegates, and additional 50 delegates representing the business. Hu`s, 12-part, work 
report had a strong undercurrent of Marxist and Mao ideology, twice mentioned Deng`s 
concept of the `Four Cardinal Principles`, Mao`s `let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred 
thoughts contend`, spoke of continuing to adopt Marxism to China`s conditions and for 
strengthening “core socialist values”. The report mentioned reform 86 times and tasked for 
doubling the per capita GDP by 2021 from 2010 levels. It also said:”economic entities under 
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all forms of ownership have equal access to factors of production in accordance with law,”  
“and are protected as equals”, but the emphasis was noticeably on “common prosperity” and 
economic policies that benefit peasants and rural areas. Emphasizing gradual reform the 
report cautioned that “in economic structural reform how to strike a balance between the role 
of the government and that of the market …” must be examined. Taking note of social 
tensions, an entire portion discussed `social management`, the euphemism for domestic 
political stability. 
 In Hu`s view, developing nations are primarily focused on economic development, 
and contribute to the process of economic globalization. Their growing power and influence 
in the international system promotes the emergence of multiple power centers, which restrain 
negative forces, such as hegemonism and power politics, the latter often involving aggressive 
or expansionist behavior,421 with clear allusion that Western powers – the U.S. in particular as 
a major driver in military alliances – are the foremost practitioners of hegemonism and power 
politics. 
 In the work report, the phrase “neo-interventionism” was listed for the first time 
alongside hegemonism and power politics, implying the Western military intervention in 
Libya and the 2012 Syrian crisis, as the statement – “China opposes any foreign attempt to 
subvert legitimate government of any other countries” s unprecedented in past reports. Also 
allegedly associated with the West, for the first time, the effects of the financial crisis are 
referred as a separate force, along with the increasingly disruptive forces associated with 
“food, energy, resource and cyber security”, that contribute to what the report described as a 
“volatile global environment and fierce competition in overall national strength”.422 
 Market-oriented economic development, through peaceful and productive relations 
with all nations, is cited as the primary objective of China`s foreign (as well as domestic) 
policies, much the same as in previous reports. Echoing the last one of 2007, the reference to 
a “win-win strategy of opening up” is again emphasized in line with Beijing`s efforts to 
counter the ‘hostile allusions” of the so-called “China Threat Theory”, that its growing power 
is at the expense of other nations and will lead to a “zero-sum” challenge to the U.S. and other 
major powers.423 
 Besides the traditional “… to safeguard China`s sovereignty, security and territorial 
integrity and ensure its peaceful development”, for the first time the report also asserts the 
need to construct a “… strong national defense and powerful armed forces that are 
commensurate with China`s international standing and meets the needs of its security and 
development interests …”, an official recognition for “continuity through change”, regarding 
pro-active expansive level of military power and codependence with China`s international 
standing, that was not displayed in previous party document or statements. 
 The report did not discuss or clarify such important nd pressing issues as: the 
maritime sovereignty disputes with China`s regional eighbors in the East and South China 
Seas, pro-active involvement in new fields that imply foreign and defense strategy elements, 
such as space and cyberspace, and the concept of “New Type of Major-Countries Relations” 
that Xi as a Vice President initially raised during his February 2012 visit to the USA.  
 The first two, China seemingly regards as entirely its “core national interests” and 
sovereignty rights, that need no discussion or explanation (only mentioned as being attached 
great importance to maritime rights and interests, space and cyber security), while the third, as 
explicitly a bilateral China-U.S. question, yet to be formulated and raised at appropriate 
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moment by the new leadership. The report only stated “… strive to establish a new type of 
relations of long-term stability and sound growth with other major countries”. The inclusion 
of this statement in the report points to its significance in China`s foreign policy strategy and 
a kind of a preamble for the massive campaign for its promotion to the United States, initiated 
by Xi Jinping since 2013. 
 The 18th Party Congress has outlined and sent out three clear and organic messages: 
“continuity through changes”, re-assertion of the Party`s traditional and inclusive orthodox 
values of development and political stability, and retention of focus on domestic issues 
including gradual economic reforms leading to “common prosperity” and what is now seen as 
a “new normal” model of development. 
 Most importantly, the Congress oversaw, more smoothly and institutionalized than 
predicted, the hand over of power to a pair of new leaders who had not been directly selected 
by “Long March” Party elders, and a set of Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) and 
Politburo (PB) members, who have entirely different academic and social backgrounds than 
their predecessors and all of whom grew and joined th  CCP during the deconstructive and 
tumultuous Cultural Revolution years.424 
  
           Leadership transition (2012-2013)  
 
 In November 2012, the 18th Party Congress witnessed the Party power transitio of 4th 
to  5th generation of Chinese top leadership, and concluded with the State power transition at 
the NPC session in March 2013, with the election of the new General Secretary of the CC of 
the CCP Xi Jinping as President, and the number two in the new Party hierarchy – Li 
Keqiang, as the Premier of the PRC. 
 In spite of the routinely for such Chinese Party fora extensive overseas and domestic 
rumors and speculations about severe inter-factional fights and bargaining for the future key 
Party and State positions, in the pre-18th Party Congress period, all major cadre issues were 
well coordinated, settled and decided long time in advance. The ascendance of Xi was very 
much a consensual decision, and he was preparing for the paramount post for quite a long 
period of time. Party Secretary of Shanghai in 2007, member of the PBSC, Vice President 
since 2008, and Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) since 2010, were 
all clear indicators for his eminent top leadership elevation. The only and last recent attempt 
to break this ascendancy process took place at the 16th Party Congress in 2002, when Hu 
Jintao took over only the Party and State leadership, and the system had to rectify the problem 
by “forcing Jiang Zemin to write his letter of resignation from the Chairmanship of the 
Central Military Commission on September 1, 2004”425, almost two years after the 2002 
power transition Party Congress. 
 The political institutionalization as a leading principle of power transition from the 
older to the younger generation of Chinese leadership was demonstrated by the active 
participation of Xi Jinping in the initial drafting of Hu Jintao`s work report at the Congress 
and by the fact of openly non contradictory and peaceful transition of power from Hu to Xi in 
2012 and 2013 in all 3 top positions ( Party, State and Military), when Xi Jinping assumed the 
posts of General Secretary of the CC of the CCP, Chairman of the Central Military 
Commissions, and President of the PRC. 
 Xi Jinping`s first speech, after assuming the post f Party General Secretary on 
November 15, 2012, to a “collective study session” f the new Politburo was highly 
ideological. Emphasizing the necessity to “uphold and develop socialism with Chinese 
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characteristics as the focus priority …” and “make sure the 18th CCP national congress 
guidelines become a powerful ideological weapon” he asserted that “the theoretical 
development and novice of socialism with Chinese characteristics is to genuinely uphold 
Marxism. Xi reiterated that the CCP will be the sole ruling party in China for a long period of 
time, as CCP`s main task is to “make the Chinese people wealthy, build a strong and 
prosperous country and rejuvenate the great Chinese ation”, enlisting ‘combating corruption` 
and `preventing degeneration` as party priorities of equal importance.426 
 On November 16, speaking at the enlarged meeting of the Central Military 
Commission, Xi discussed and set the guidelines for “ideological and political awareness as 
the top priority in army building and Party leadership” instructing the military brass to 
`always put the country`s sovereignty and security first, comprehensively improve the 
military`s deterrent power and capacity of real combat to protect China`s sovereignty, security 
and development priorities in the current information-based age`.427 
 What is the current political, ideological, professional and personnel power-base for Xi 
Jinping`s ambitious new strategic development plan for China`s rise in the next decade? The 
strength of the Party`s new 18th Central Committee (CC) registered a marginal increase from 
371 (permanent and alternate members) to 376. The average age, however dropped to 56.1, 
with 166 of the 205 full members born in the 1950s. The female representatives were reduced 
to 33, with 39 ethnic minority members, which is roughly the usual case. Tibetan members of 
the CC were reduced from 2 to 1, but their alternative members rose to an all time high of 4. 
             Chinese 2012 political elite leadership was concentrated in the Party top brass. The 
Politburo Standing Committee had 7 members (9 in 2007), out of which only 2 – Xi himself 
and his tandem Premier – Li Keqiang were to remain at the next Congress in 2017. The 
Politburo had 25 members; the Secretariat of the Central Committee – 7 members and the 
Central Committee – 205 members. Almost 70% of the old PBSC, PB and CC members were 
replaced in 2012, due to age of retirement, a limit ntroduced by Deng Xioaping. Majority of 
the 18th Congress CC members, who had practically elected/selected Xi Jinping in 2012 were 
to be around and active at the next Congress in 2017, presupposing a ruling elite stability, 
unity and integrity for the next 5 years, at least till – 2022, with options for Xi and Li to 
search, make choices and prepare their future succesors. 
             Average age of 2012 members of PB was 61 years, with unprecedented educational 
background and practical personal experience at high level party and government positions: 
19 – university degrees; 5 – degree from the party Central School and 1 – degree from 
Military Academy. 6 members of the PB were economists; 2 – IRs scholars and practitioners, 
2 – MA in Literature; 1 in Political Science; 1 – in History and as a whole 13 of them hold 
postgraduate degrees. The PB was strongly civilian, with only 2 ex-officio military men. 
             The composition of the PB was better balanced and proportionally represented: 14 
members from the coastal and richer provinces, where they have previously worked; 11 from 
the central, poorer provinces, yet the far western 1-2 provinces were not represented on that 
highest level.428 
             President Xi Jinping`s unparallel leadrship style draws him quite apart from the 
modern Chinese orthodoxy and norm. Both in personality nd policy he represents, by 
Chinese standards, 34% continuity and 66% change. For the last four years he successfully 
managed, supported overwhelmingly by the Chinese elit , to become the most powerful 
Chinese leader since Deng Xiaoping, and seemingly so since Mao Zedong, a sort of second 
                                                 
426 Jayadeva Ranade, `China`s 18th Party Congress: Trends and Analysis. 
427 Ibid., p. 3. 
428 My personal research and analysis based on multiple Chinese and foreign publications, media, lectures and debates in think-tank and 
academia events. 
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Deng Xiaoping moment. Even sticking to the principle of collective leadership he is infinitely 
more primus than he is primus inter pares. 
             Three pillars define how Xi Jinping`s leadership differs from that of his recent 
predecessors: his personal background and integrity; political and managerial mastery and 
authority; deep, almost messianic sense of national mission and multifaceted approaches of 
urgency. 
              Xi, as a person, feels quite comfortable in his skin as a national paramount leader, 
including with the exercise of the respective power entrusted to him by his multiple top 
positions. Due to his family upbringing and history, he knows - ups and downs (Cultural 
Revolution), most of the revolutionary leading veterans personally, and the military high 
command while serving as a personal secretary to the minister of defense Geng Biao in the 
early 1980s. He is a professional and consummate politician who understands the dynamics of 
Chinese politics from within. 
 Before 2012, besides his Party and State posts, Xi was leader of only 3 Leading 
Groups (LG)429: President of the Central Party School and leader of the LG for Party building; 
leader of the LG for Study of the Scientific Development and leader of the Coordination 
Group for Hong Kong and Macau. 
 After taking over the three top Party, State and Military posts in 2012-2013, in 2013 
he was elected Chairman of the new National Security Commission, and also took over, as 
leader, the control and oversight of the most important national LGs as: Foreign Affairs 
(2013); Taiwan Affairs (2013); Comprehensively deepning of the reforms (2013); Finance 
and Economic Affairs (2013); Defense and Military Reform (2014); Internet Security and 
Informatics (2014), thus accumulating and concentrati g unprecedented power, authority and 
leverage in all strategic sectors of political, military, security and socio-economic life in 
China. 
 Xi is absorbed nationalist-realist deeply proficient in Chinese and world history and 
international relations, surging for the best of his country. He sees himself as savior of the 
CCP, leaning on ideology, classical Chinese thought and traditions, fighting against 
corruption, and prevening the party from explosion, degeneration and lost of power. At the 
same time during his overseas official trips he exploits the mantle of idealist-constructivist in 
promoting win-win international institutional inclusive cooperation, and calls for international 
community/society of common destiny for mankind.  
 The Chinese Academy for Social Sciences (CASC), Xi Jinping`s favorite political 
and social science institution and think-tank, has hundreds of qualified scholars and 
researchers whose main tasks are studying, researching, omparing and drawing lessons and 
conclusions from historical political theory and esp cially – practice, of the cases of power 
transition periods, with top priority on the British Empire, Pax Americana and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union”.430 The aims of these huge efforts and resources being to provide the 
Chinese leadership with the optimum accurate and objective assessments, analysis and 
expertise on the real causes, prerequisites and leadership/elite mistakes or false judgments that 
lead to the fall of the British Empire and USA ascent, the German disasters in World Wars 
and specially the collapse of the USSR. 
 In February 2015, Xi introduced his personal theoretic-practical contribution to the 
construct of China`s Grand Strategy, by unveiling his “Four-Pronged Comprehensive 
Strategy”, concentrated mainly in solving the domestic Party and socio-economic near and 
                                                 
429 Central Leading Groups ( LG ) - also translated as “Leading Small Groups” – an ad-hoc supra ministerial coordinating and consulting 
bodies ( two types – Party and Government ), formed to build consensus on issues that are across Party, Government and Military systems  
(Chapter IX of the Constitution of the CCP ).     
430 From my interviews and discussions with Chinese diplomats and IR scholars. 
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midterm tasks and challenges: to build a moderately prosperous society, deepen reform; 
govern the nation according to law and strictly govern the Party. 
 According to sinologists and China leading experts, regular meeting´s agenda of the 
Chinese Politburo has three main organically interdependent items for debate and discussion: 
1. Political stability, guarantees and measures that the CCP is safe and in place; 2. Search for 
economic growth, and jobs for the people, especially for the young generation, and 3. 
Safeguarding of energy security.431 
 
 13th Five-Year Plan – FYP (2016 – 2020) 
 
 China observers and analysts agree that the CCP was able to rule successfully after 
the reform and opening up in 1978, and to maintain relatively high public confidence and 
participation, thanks to its capacity to deliver on its major economic promises, to its highly 
organized structure and meticulously planned preparations ahead of key party and government 
events.  
 China`s FYPs are blueprints containing the country`s social, economic and political 
goals. They encompass and interwine with existing policies, regional development plans, and 
strategy initiatives. FYPs signal Chinese party andgovernment`s visions for future reforms 
and communicate to the rest of the hierarchical burea cratic structures, to business, citizenry, 
and to outside world. It is a living document that t kes hurdles to be born and goes through 
constant review and revisions over the five years of duration, as things are far from set in 
stone.  
 Traditionally there are two main sets of comments a d analysis regarding the FYPs. 
External by strategists, China experts, and busines who usually claim that while providing 
some policy continuity, FYP does not provide clarity on the operating environment for 
foreign and multinational corporations in China, representing top line summary of targets, a 
wish list that packages existing policies and goals providing no guarantees. 
 The Chinese official rhetoric, responses and claims usually follow the line that 
China has no other options than reform and opening up, and in spite of risks for its political 
system and stability will continue with more bold reforms and opening up.  Blaming the Great 
Recession and volatile, risky international economic, trade and financial environment, on 
whose healthy and steady growth China has claimed to rely on, is another way of hiding 
Beijing`s domestic fears and cautiousness while proceeding with the reforms. In President 
Xi`s words, “to make good use of both the invisible and the visible hand of the market”. Not 
surprisingly, the previous – 12th FYP (2011-2015) was focused on the agenda of “inclusive 
growth” – ensuring that more benefits of the economic growth are spread to greater portion   
Chinese population. 
 The 13th FYP is the first under President Xi`s leadership, and articulates building 
blocks of his “continuity through changes” China Dream Grand Strategy until mid-21st 
century It contains five main principles (innovation, openness, green, coordination, and 
inclusiveness) formulated and set up first at the 5th CCP Plenum in October 2015432, translated 
into state-government language at the NPC March 2016 Sessions, underpinning the policies 
for China`s future development.  
 The analysis of FYP shows that in addition to market privatization, China plans to 
employ a variety of strategies aimed at transforming it from big into powerful industrial 
country, meaning new sources of growth combined with domestic protectionism, emulating 
                                                 
431 Kevin Rudd, lecture “Imagining China in 2023: China`s Domestic and Foreign Posture under Xi Jinping”, Lee Kuan Yew School of 
Public Policy, Singapore, March 18, 2014. 
432 See full text of the Proposal, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/special/fifthplenary/ , and at http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2015-
11/03/c_1117027676.htm  
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the U.S. protectionism during its advanced period of rise, especially the period of the 1930s 
when it became less open to inward FDI and a “battery of legislation was passed to ensure 
that the U.S. retained control over an increasingly American economy”.433 These strategies 
are not entirely new – they are continuation of China`s previous industrial policies, including 
Strategic Emerging Industries (SEIs), Megaprojects and myriad of policies that called for 
truly indigenous innovation. 
 As pointed out, the first component of China`s vocabulary of reform is ensuring the 
economy stays on track, as the old model of growth is out of steam, and the “new normal” 
paradigm of development is making a shift from exports and investment-driven to services 
and consumption-driven growth. This means finding new drivers of growth by promoting 
innovation and entrepreneurship, while simultaneously creating conditions and external 
environment conductive to producing Chinese national multifaceted champions. The 13th FYP 
envisages a “medium to high” growth, with President Xi stating that the annual GDP growth 
rate should be no less than 6.5% over the next five years – for the nation-wide successful 
celebration of the first Grand Strategy goal – meeting the centenarian anniversary of the CCP 
in 2021, as a “moderately prosperous society”. 
 In interview during his first official state visit to the U.S. in September 2015, Xi 
described the China Dream as a dream for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, the 
greatest Chinese hope of modern time, and not an illusion. For him, “the China Dream is 
fundamentally about making life better for the Chinese people and should be approached from 
two angles: history and reality”.434 In historical aspect he referred to the “century of 
humiliation”, but fell short of mentioning the long period of the supremacy of the Chinese 
Empire till the 18th century. 
 The text of the 13th FYP opens and closes with the firm ambition of creating a 
“moderate prosperous society” by 2020, an obvious “stepping stone” in “passing the river” on 
the way to achieving China Dream “national revival” nd the second strategic goal of 
successful celebration of the centenary anniversary of the creation of the CCP-led PRC in 
2049. 
  
 19th Party Congress the of the CCP – 2017  
 
 October 2017 19th Congress of the CCP underwent the active and usual pattern of 
political and socio-economic national preparations. On March 5, 2017, addressing the annual 
session of the NPC, Premier Li Keqiang announced that Chinese growth target this year has 
been cut to around 6.5%, down from 6.5 to 7% last year, metaphorically describing the 
world´s second largest economy as ´a butterfly struggling to emerge from a chrysalis´, and 
admitting that this transformation was filled with promise but also great pain. Along the 
telling 7% planned 2017 increase of the military budget, in a veiled reference to President 
Trump´s stands on North Korea, East and South China Seas, and complaints about China´s 
exchange rate and trade policies, Premier Li warned of a far more complicated and risky 
global picture in the year ahead with Beijing facing threats of outside pressures and growing 
economic and financial protectionism.435 
 In 2012, China`s Internet blogosphere before and after the 18th Party Congress 
seemed to be quite controversial. Before, there were markedly stringent voices demanding 
democracy and change, guessing whether the CCP would drop its Maoist legacy. The moment 
the new leadership was announced, microblogs appeared filled with balanced satisfaction and 
                                                 
433 Barry Buzan and Michael Cox, `China and the U.S`, p. 122. 
434 Interview with Chinese President Xi Jinping, full transcript, The Wall Street Journal, September 22, 2015, 
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435 See ´China cuts growth target to 6.5% this year – Premier Li Keqiang´, BBC news, March 05, 2017, 
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expectations of the new line-up, thankful that Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang have been elected to 
lead the nation. Hu Jintao`s decision to retire completely from all top positions was labeled 
respectful and civilized, echoing Xi`s personal comment, “Chairman Hu`s important decision 
fully embodies his profound thinking of the overall development of the Party, country and 
military. The decision also embodies his exemplary conduct and nobility of character”.436 
 One of the key factors explaining the CCP`s continuing ability to govern lies in its 
stronghold of national institutions. It is not a loosely organized party that works towards 
obtaining people`s political preferences and votes at election time. The elaborate body of 
party institutions governs recruitment, indoctrinaton, performance evaluation and profiling, 
promotion, cadre transfer, leadership selection, deliberation, decision making, discipline and 
other important organizational aspects of strongly centralized party life. There are party 
structures in every workplace, organizing members to study the party`s ideological and 
development policy strategies, a process that unifies and consolidates the 89 million members 
political force, well aware of what its destiny will be in case of China`s systemic, economic 
failure, and a Soviet Union type of implosion. 
 As discussed, Party Congress represents one of themost important CCP institutions, 
charged with three main responsibilities: to furthe unify the party in terms of policies and 
strategic direction, to rejuvenate and strengthen t top structures of power, and to formalize 
the line of top leadership transitions and succession. What the domestic general public,   
outside world see at CCP congress is only tip of a gig ntic iceberg of enormous permanent 
political, ideological and organizational activity. Political Congress work reports seem 
repeatingly and boring, which is exactly the point – a consensus on policy, ideology and 
power hierarchy has already been achieved prior to the event.437 
 Prevailing view among China`s ruling elite is that reform and further opening up is 
the only way forward for the realization of the China Dream Grand Strategy. In spite of the 
deteriorating external and domestic environment, boh politico-militarily and economical 
frictions with the U.S., global volatility and China`s much slower “new normal” model of 
economic development, 18th CCP Congress and 13th FYP, cautiously but firmly had put 
reform back on the agenda. What Xi and Li now face r  the key cardinal challenges – 
successful implementation of the “moderately prosperous society” first leg of the Grand 
Strategy in 2021, and who from the younger Chinese l adership can be entrusted to take the 
succession baton of paramount leadership at allegedly d fining times in the 2020s? 
 2017 19th Party Congress, organizationally well prepared in advance,438made  
review, evaluations of the period since 18th Congress, and necessary policy adjustments based 
on results of the initial implementations of March 2016 adopted  13th FYP, with emphasis on 
political, social stability, financial security and economic growth. 
 With five vacancies in the PBSC, there were ample opportunities for Xi and to a 
certain extent – for Li, to seek and make their choi es for their viable and trustworthy 
successors to whom they were to hand top power at the 20th Party Congress in 2022. Still, the 
wetting process did not occur, and no clear top successors were selected. 
  2012 Politburo saw 15 new 2017 members out of total 25. All plain members of the 
18th Politburo born prior to 1950 retired without exception. Only three members meeting age 
requirement returned to 19th Politburo for a second term. Taking into account new Standing 
Committee members who were all promoted from the Politburo level,  top echelon changes in 
2017 represented a 60% turnover of membership between the 18th and 19th Politburo, mostly 
with Xi`s confidents and allies.  
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 History and tradition in Chinese leadership records for the last 25 plus years tell that 
no General Secretary, President or Premier has ever been elected without serving at least one 
5 year term as member of the almighty PBSC. On the Politburo Standing Committee, Xi 
Jinping and Li Keqiang renewed their terms, while fve new members joined. From the five 
new members of the PBSC no one qualifies due to age to r main for new term in 2022 at the 




 2012 18th Congress, 2016 13th FYP, and 2017 19th Party Congress represent Zhong 
yong ´continuity through changes´ dialectics, and co-evolution final synthesis of the long rise 
period in PRChina´s history. The period marks the success story of Deng Xiaoping´s post 
1978 KLP tactics and strategy of reform and opening up, and demonstrates more clearly the 
domestic and external pillars of President Xi Jinping´s Grand Strategy till mid-21st century. 
 March 2018 NPC´s no objections and no abstantees vot  allowing for Xi´s unlimited 
post-2023 terms as head of state demonstrates the ideological and strategic unity of Chinese 
elite. 
 19th Congress ratified changes to its Charter by approving the incorporation of Xi 
Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era into the Party 
constitution. Xi thus became the first modern leader since Deng Xiaoping to append his name 
into party politico – ideological theory, and was defined by many Western IR scholars and 
strategists – “the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao”. 
 Congress also advanced the coordinated development of Xi`s “Four 
Comprehensives”, which refers to four-pronged Grand Strategy that aims to comprehensively 
accomplish deepening of reform, advance rule of law, strengthen Party self-governance and 
prosperous Chinese society – a big vision that will determine China`s two centenary 
(2021/2049) goals,  called by President Xi –  China Dream. 
 Following Congress resolution, Xi`s `Belt and Road Initiative` project was also 
incorporated into the CCP Constitution. This is clear indication that inspite of domestic 
pressure and potential foreign obstructions, China is firmly decided to continue with the 
implementation of this vast economic endeavor in the 21st century. 
 By 2022 President Xi and Premier Li will be 69 and 67, respectively, not that old 
age for Chinese standards and revolutionary veteran practices. 
 For years, with few exceptions, and not set in stone, CCP has institutionalized a 
check on the power of its leaders by calling on them to retire if they have reached age 68 
when a new Party and State leadership takes the reins. NPC March 2018 annual session 
revoked PRC Constitution´s clause limiting Chinese Pr sidents to only 2 five years term in 
office, thus allowing for President Xi to remain on the post after 2023. No law or Party 
Constitution´s clause may prevent him from retaining also the more powerful posts of 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Secretary General of CCP.  
 Most probably, Xi´s protracted paramount power positions in China will be defined 
as imperative case of national security urgency and vital necessity presumably under the 
pretext of successful implementation of China Dream Grand Strategy, and strongman 
handling of upcoming strategic mistrust controversial economic power transition processes 
from the U.S. to China in the late 2020s and beyond. 
 The enormous power and prestige President Xi Jinping has accumulated for such a 
short period of time, emulating second Deng Xiaoping moment, may also lead to a Deng type 
option – Xi, formally stepping down from official power in 2027-2028, but still yielding 
decisive influence, and playing guiding role from behind for the next 6th generation younger 
Chinese leadership. 
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 At the end of the first two chapters´ selectively structured U.S.-China rise 
comparison, initial generalized conclusions can help the next steps of my work´s research 
design. 
 Having two weak neighbors, Canada and Mexico, and two vast oceans, to the East 
and to the West, that separate it far from other centers of power, the U.S. represents unique 
case as the most secured nation in the world, even in the age of nuclear weapons. 
 On the other hand, as the most populous country in the world and third largest in 
area, China has a good number of 14 neighbors sharing its 22,000 km land borders, out of 
which – 4 nuclear players, and economically powerful Japan. 
 U.S.´ rise to global preeminence after WWII, inspite of the confrontational Cold 
War, was rather linear and progressive, based on the premises of its 19th century policies for 
´wealth and power´, and the post-war bipartisan Grand Strategy. 
 In contrast, China´s rise was marred by continuous struggles with foreign powers on 
its soil, by domestic crisis – civil war, ups and downs in development and the drawbacks of 
the Cultural Revolution. It took China almost 35 years of gradual comprehensive great power 
build up, allowing for Beijing to openly declare its ´core national interest´, and long-term 
Grand Strategy in 2011-2012. 
 U.S. and China are mainly geo-economics competitors and rivals. The assertive and 
open confrontational geopolitical vector in their blateral relationship is currently left aside 
into a latent status. U.S.´ 2017 NSS treatment of China, the latest 2018 signs of potential 
reciprocal trade war, and Trump´s complains that globalization and WTO´s rules are ´unfair 
towards the U.S.´ are good examples of reference. 
 In a way U.S. and China have changed their role models. After WWII, China absent, 
it was Washington who created and shaped the global iberal economic model of free trade, 
and the non-protectionism based globalization. Now, China, that admittedly has hugely 
benefited from the U.S.´ imposed Bretton Woods model, is the one who firmly and openly 
tries to safeguard and lead the processes of Globalization 2.0, while the U.S. works to change 
and modify the economic and trade rules and principles it has created. 
 Not underestimating the zero-sum potential of the U.S.-China geopolitical 
contention and competition, it seems evident that te geo-economics priorities of their Grand 
Strategies will shape and lead the bilateral relation into the next decades of the 21st century, 




















CHAPTER 3: BASIC COMPONENTS OF´´CHINA DREAM´´GRAND STRATEGY.  
     
 In this chapter I research and address the general structural roots and trends that have 
shaped Beijing´s 2009-2011 official establishment of China´s firm ´core national interests´. 
The latter being the ideational and practical base for President Xi´s 2012 launch and 
pragmatic steps/gradual building blocks that followed his announcement of China Dream 
Grand Strategy policies, both domestically and externally as objective processes, and through 
the lenses of Xi´s personality and deeply structured b liefs. 
 
 Origins and evolution 
 
 In 2012, couple of months before the 18th CCP Congress and Xi`s elevation to power, 
in their Foreign Affairs̀analysis ”How China Sees America: The Sum of Beijing Fears”, 
Nathan and Scobell wrote: “`Great Power` is a vague term, but China deserves it by any 
measure: the extent and strategic location of its territory, the size and dynamism of its 
population, the value and growth rate of its economy, the massive size of its share of global 
trade, and the strength of its military… And most importantly, China is the only country 
widely seen as a possible threat to U.S. predominance … with fears that one day may supplant 
the United States as a global hegemon”.439 
 In spite the Chinese “assertive moves” in East andSouth China Seas in 2009 and 
2010, the widespread perceptions of China as an aggressive, expansionist power, the authors 
regarded them as off base, defining Beijing`s strategic quest – to reach a global role that 
serves its interests as well as winning acceptance from the other major powers and mainly 
from the United States. 
 Labeling China “an offensive realist”, the authors suggested that the best solution for 
both China and the West is to create a new equilibri m of power that maintains the current 
world system, but with a larger role for China. Beijing, they claim, has good reason to seek 
that outcome, because even, and if, it becomes the world`s largest economy, its prosperity will 
depend on the prosperity of its global rivals (and vice versa), including the U.S. and Japan. 
Washington must back its policies with credible U.S. power, in two main domains: “First, the 
United States must maintain its military predominance in the Western Pacific, including the 
East and South China Seas …Second, the United States should continue to push back against 
Chinese efforts to remake global legal regimes in ways that do not serve the interests of the 
West …and as long as the U.S. addresses its problems at home and holds tight to its own 
values, it can manage China`s rise ”.440 
 These same ideas and suggestions were already in actio nd used as tools in the U.S. 
China strategy playbook. When Barack Obama arrived at the White House in 2009, his Asian 
team met with its Chinese counterpart and exchanged views on how each side envisioned the 
bilateral relationship evolving in the years ahead. Chinese strategists offered their suggestion: 
by elevating the U.S.-China relationship to a so-called “strategic partnership” and that the 
U.S. would show respect for China`s rising status and interests in the world and build trust 
among the people of the two countries. Only then could Washington and Beijing begin 
engaging and cooperating in new more mature way. The U.S. could not agree to changing the 
definition of the relationship until the two countries began acting and cooperating like 
strategic partners, implying quality rather than slogans.  
 In the administration`s first major policy speech on China, in September 2009, at the 
Center for New American Security, then Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg 
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introduced the concept of “strategic reassurance”, which he defined in the following way: 
“Just as we and our allies must make clear that we are prepared to welcome China`s 
`arrival`…as prosperous and successful power, China must reassure the rest of the world that 
its development and growing global role will not come at the expense of the security and 
well-being of others”. China would need to “reassure others that this buildup does not present 
a threat”, it would need to “increase its military transparency in order to reassure all the 
countries in the rest of Asia and globally about its intentions” and demonstrate that it 
“respects the rule of law and universal norms”.441 
 “To Chinese analysts, such statements send the messag  that Washington wants 
cooperation on its own terms, seeks to deter Beijing from developing a military capability 
adequate to defend its interests, and intends to promote change in the character of the Chinese 
regime”.442 
 Issues, China officially and firmly identified as “core national interests” since 2009-
2011, including Tibet, Taiwan, and increasingly theEast and South China Seas, have a long 
and complex balancing political hedging in the U.S., and made serious compromises on these 
most important to China “hot topics”, all but inadmissible. With Obama facing a host of 
domestic criticism in many other fields, his China advisers were very sensitive to attacks and 
criticism that they were “accommodative” to the PRC. The Obama administration`s initial 
concept of “strategic reassurance” was rhetorically t ken off the agenda, largely because of 
conservative forces and media outcry that it meant caving to Chinese interests.443
 Coming to office into the middle of the second to the Great Depression financial crisis, 
for Obama, foreign policy issues seemed a secondary concern, as his first priority was 
obviously to put right America`s domestic financial and economic woes.  
 Taking the genuine role of world leadership, Obama`s top priority was to coordinate a 
global response to the crisis. The administration believed that Beijing would be an 
indispensable “responsible stakeholder” in this urgent task and sought to partner with China to 
“form a two-member How-To-Save-The-World Club”.444 
 President Obama and President Hu first met at the April 2009 G-20 Summit in 
London, which was shortly convened with the main goal f coordinating international 
cooperation to combat the extending financial crisis. Hu`s participation in the summit was 
important as China`s early stimulus measures were already driving its domestic recovery from 
the first worst shocks of the crisis.U.S. active support, China participation, and the ability of 
world leaders to map out an initial global economic strategy at the London Summit helped 
cement the club`s place as the leading global economic and financial forum. By 2010, the 
White House was assessing the G-20 as the “premier international economic forum” putting it 
ahead of the exclusive G-8.445 The shift to the G-20 centrality better reflected he changing 
balance of power in the face of the “emerging centers of influence”- notably Asia and China. 
 In April 2009 both Obama and Hu announced the upgrade of Bush Junior presidency`s 
– Senior Dialogue and Strategic Economic Dialogue between the two countries into a new 
U.S.- China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), a high-level annual, alternative in 
both capitals, meetings and discussions on wide range of regional and global strategic and 
economic topics. 
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            In certain ways, 2008-2009 marked an important turning point in U.S.- China relations 
mainly due to the global financial crisis and its much deeper negative consequences. The 
crisis, which many in China, including official publications, blamed on American policies, 
altered the balance of U.S.- China relations.446 For China, the financial crisis was a strong 
argument to display to the world and to validate its own economic and financial strategies, 
pointing out the flaws and risks of the Western liberal model. More so, after China`s 
successful hosting of the 2008 Olimpics, long aspired to demonstrate China`s increased 
comprehensive power, the Chinese leadership assumed that PRC`s time of being regarded as a 
world power had finally come.  
 At the beginning of 2009, when Obama took office, the trends were pointing at 
China`s continuing rise, and at the same time American power seemed to be at its weakest 
point in decades. This shifting geo-strategic landscape and context changed the perceptions 
and the actions of Chinese decision-makers and strategists, in a subtle, smart ways with 
“Chinese characteristics”.447 
 Pressed by the changing and more “Realpolitik” actions of the Chinese leadership in 
2009-2010, Obama tasked for an adequate and more app opriate U.S. long-term strategy for 
his China policy. His China team advisors, largely made up of strategists and analysts, who 
had served under Bill Clinton, were guided to “correct the mistakes of the 1990s” – a strategy 
that proved ineffective and that had missed the current changes in China`s policies.448 
 Obama administration`s new Asian-Pacific strategy projecting American military, 
diplomatic and economic `Pivot` or `Rebalancing` towards Asia and the Pacific was revealed 
in a concentrated and prioritized order in Secretary of State Hillary Clinton`s publication in 
Foreign Policy in November 2011, under the title “America`s Pacific Century”.449 
Emphasizing the importance of the Asia-Pacific, the `Pivot` strategy, according to Clinton, 
will proceed along six courses of action: strengthening bilateral security alliances, deepening 
America`s relationships with rising powers, including China, engaging with regional 
multilateral institutions, expanding trade and investment, forging a broad-based military 
presence, and advancing democracy and human rights. Strategically, maintaining peace and 
security across the Asia-Pacific was increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through 
defending freedom of navigation in the South China Se , countering the nuclear proliferation 
efforts of North Korea, or ensuring transparency in military activities of the region`s key 
players.450 
 `Rebalancing to Asia-Pacific` strategy was enshrined in U.S. 2015 National Security 
Strategy, in President Obama`s cover letter and as a fir t priority in Section V – International 
Order.451 
 While many in the region have welcomed this renewed U.S. commitment, the `Pivot` 
to Asia-Pacific has created heightened concerns in Chi a about Washington intentions and 
viewed by many in Beijing as directly aimed at constraining China`s rise and as principle 
cause of regional instability, as well as deteriorat n of China`s strategic environment by 
maintaining U.S. hegemony in the region. 
 Leading Chinese strategists analyzed the `Pivot` as undermining China`s security and 
increasingly believe the unifying scopes of such a seemingly coordinated U.S. approach are to 
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constrain China`s rise.452 Two major arguments form the basis for Chinese accusations about 
how the U.S. renewed commitment to Asia-Pacific is destabilizing to regional security: 
proactively fomenting conflict between Beijing and other regional neighbors like the 
Philippines, Vietnam, and Japan, pulling strings and artificially overexposing divisive 
disputable topics, like the South China Sea, and by actively guiding and encouraging 
countries to challenge China453; and the second, softer argument was that the reason why 
some countries are so unbridled may be related with the adjusted geo-strategy of the United 
States.  
 Defense Department`s January 2012 strategic guidance document articulated that the 
United States “will of necessity rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region.” Secretary of 
Defense Panetta`s June 2012 speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore reiterated this 
commitment and declared that “by 2020 the Navy willre-dislocate its forces from roughly 
50:50 percent split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to about 60:40”,454 indicating that the 
`Pivot` strategy should be regarded as a decade-long c mplex and multi-dimensional costly 
initial project. 
 
 Gradual building blocks of China`s Grand Strategy 
 
 Sun Tzu`s “Art of War” provides a classical play book of how a war should be fought 
– if war cannot be avoided, and allegorically can be found reflected in modern sophisticated 
and idealistic-constructivist parlance in Joseph Nye`s Smart Power strategy concept of 
masterly combination and employment of “hard” and “soft” power. 
 “Art of War”`s legacy, and major guiding points roughly consist of: “to fight and 
conquer … is not supreme excellence…, but to break the enemy`s resistance without fighting, 
have a clear strategy, organize and concentrate your forces, know yourself and your 
adversary, and engage at a time, in terms, and on a terrain which is advantageous to yourself, 
no alliances, but undermine the alliances of others…”455, all of which should be regarded as 
vital to the State, a matter of life and death, a road either to security or to ruin. 
 There is no clear evidence how much classical Chinese strategic thought is shaping 
and underpinning the current Grand Strategy, but the constant and genuine references and 
parallels that President Xi, Premier Li, and other s nior Chinese officials make to Confucius, 
Mencius, Sima and other ancient political philosophers and strategists, allows for the 
assessment that indeed it is having the `continuity through changes` modern “Chinese 
characteristics” at its core. 
 In the classical work published in the mid-1940s, “ Makers of Modern Strategy: 
Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler”, editor Edward Meade Earle defined Grand 
Strategy as “ the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation … to the end that its 
vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against e emies, actual, potential, or 
presumed”.  
 “For the United States, Grand Strategy has long focused on acquiring and maintaining 
preeminent power over various rivals. In the face of a rising China, however, the United 
States has failed to apply this century long approach to its national security,”456 
  Emulating selectively and pragmatically U.S.´ successful practice, feeling more self-
confident, strong and wealthy in 2008-2010, the first fundamental building block of the new 
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China Dream Grand Strategy was laid down by Beijing in 2010-2011 with the formulation 
and officially announced Chinese “core national interests”. Not that they were in totality 
new, but it was the first time that the Chinese leadership notified them as firm “red lines”, 
elevating their meaning to parity to the U.S.`s – “national security interests” and “vital 
national interests”, in bold demand for their equal st tus and treatment in bilateral  China-U.S. 
relationship.  
 Thus security, sovereignty, and development are officially regarded as the 
undisputable “core national interests”. They are seen as a closely interrelated trinity, in 
which the security of the state and the political system is the key driver, and the other two 
constitute the enabling and complementary indispensable supporting pillars. Respectively, 
security, i.e. the security of the state and the political system, is the most important component 
of the Grand Strategy, while sovereignty and economic development are both crucial 
prerequisites, providing the political and economic foundations for the legitimacy of the state 
and the political system of the country, basic mandatory preconditions for China`s security. 
As a basic component of core national interests, sovereignty is the area wherein China`s 
positions will become firmer, more assertive and tough, and even limited military action 
cannot be excluded.457 
 The firm ‘red line’ position of China on its `core interests` was confirmed during the 
Obama-Xi meeting late March 2016, ahead of the Global Nuclear Security Summit in 
Washington, where they discussed a long list of issue  that have strained their bilateral 
relations in the last years. Joint statements on climate change and nuclear security were 
issued.  
 On the issues, which China considers its core interes s President Xi has been firm 
and blunt: warned that China would not accept South China Sea violations of its sovereignty 
under the pretext of freedom of navigation, urged the U.S. to stick to its “One China” policy 
and take concrete actions to safeguard peaceful cross-strait relations, and stressed that the 
alleged U.S. plans to deploy THAAD missile system in South Korea would affect other 
countries` security interests and regional strategic balance, as the system has a range that 
extends far beyond the Korean peninsula into China.458 
 Another building block of China`s Grand Strategy is represented by the gradual shift 
and `continuity through change` from a KLP to a middle course mixed and selective KLP – 
SFA international relations and foreign policy strategy, whereas “continuity, as far as 
ultimate goals, overall designs, and strategic policies are concerned, constitutes the primary 
feature of China`s Grand Strategy”.459 
 Strategic cautious shift was engineered and put into practice by President Xi after he 
assumed top leadership in 2012. He believed that time has come for increasingly powerful and 
wealthy China to be respected, admitted to the statu  she deserves, regionally and globally, 
and to counter U.S. `Pivot` to Asia-Pacific and TPP strategies, then regarded as “containment 
tools” for China`s continuous rise.  Four major events and concepts shaped and energized this 
Zhongyong dialectics approach. 
 First, and most important was the 2012 concept and policy playbook that Xi wanted 
to introduce and implant as pillar in bilateral China-U.S. relationship under the principle of 
“New Type of Major-Countries Relations” (NTMCR), inthe sense of: mutual respect; no 
confrontation; no conflict; and a win-win approach to mutual cooperation  
 For U.S. strategists, analysts and IR scholars the s rategic and intellectual roots of 
this concept was clear and obvious. A principle task and puzzle for the Chinese leadership has 
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been founding out and establishing a pragmatic and safemodus vivendi, particularly while 
China`s rise and military power are still incomplete, as “building a new type of relations 
between major powers is the only way to prevent  two countries from entering violent conflict 
as previous major powers did”.460 
 For some U.S. analysts, the concept was a “poison pill” and its particular language 
irrelevant as China was aiming at Washington aborting enduring elements of U.S. national 
security strategy that are unlikely to change solely to accommodate China`s anxieties. What 
matters most for the future U.S. – China relations is that United States is unlikely to take, 
even minority of the actions, Beijing would deem necessary, to solidify strategic trust and 
provide China with a satisfying dose of regional security.461 
 Since 2012-2013 China has been insistently calling upon the United States to walk 
the talk and move beyond rhetoric statements about seeking a cooperative partnership. “New 
Type of Major-Countries Relationship” remained always President Xi`s number one topic on 
the agenda when meeting President Obama. Their March 2016 meeting in Washington was no 
exception, and also ranked # 1 in Xi´s agenda talking points during his two encounters with 
President Trump in 2017. 
 China`s foreign policy had for decades reflected an bided to the principles of 
biding time and KLP, pursuing a restrained non-leadership foreign posture, planning the first 
decades of the 21st century as a period of strategic opportunity to focus primarily on domestic 
economic and social development, within the concept of “Peaceful Development”. 
 After taking power in 2012, not neglecting the population mobilizing and energizing 
factor of the latter, President Xi, in his urgent pragmatic and SFA manner took, besides the 
U.S. addressed NTMCR, major foreign policy initiatives, series of additional comprehensive 
steps for strengthening China`s posture and image in the region, and globally, shaping and 
finalizing the overall Grand Strategy. 
 The second external policy building block of the strategy was to address the 
insecurity and anxiety of the neighboring countries in connection with China`s rise and future 
intentions. Emphasizing the importance that China attaches to its relations with the 
neighboring countries Xi personally presided an unprecedented high level Conference in 
October 2013, bringing along all Chinese top party, foreign policy, economic and military 
leadership, addressing China`s periphery overall political, economic and diplomacy policies. 
His main massage was – China offers new pro-active economic and foreign policy principles 
in dealing with its neighbors, based on win-win, honesty, tolerance, patience, and case by case 
bilateral or multilateral dialogue and negotiations i  emergence of disputes.  
 One of the basic elements of the new Grand Strategy was a more active promotion 
of multilateralism, both regionally and globally. In the early post-Cold War period, Beijing 
was rather reluctant regional multilateralist, and remained cautious of any deep involvements, 
with concerns that these forums were utilized by the overwhelmingly economic superiority 
and manipulations of U.S. and Japan to put pressure and shape China`s policies, moreover in 
regards to the absoluteness of Chinese national sovereignty. New `Fuqiang` Chinese reality 
led to Beijing´s strategic assessment of possible benefits from working in multilateral 
platforms as much preferable to risks of isolation and encirclement. After the launching of the 
“Peaceful Rise” strategy and especially after Xi`s ascendance to power, the multilateral 
priority was geared towards the direct Asian periphery (zhoubian waijiao) and the region, as a 
prerequisite for the success of the new Grand Strategy. 
 In his October 2013 speech, President Xi directly pointed out the co-dependency of 
the necessity of sound peripheral environment with the final success of the “Two Century” 
strategic goals of the China Dream Grand Strategy. He stressed its strategic meaning for the 
                                                 
460 Yuan Peng, “Building new type of relations the only choice for China, U.S.” People`s Daily, May 8, 2012. 
461 See Ely Ratner, “Rebalancing to Asia with an Insecur  China”, The Wasington Quarterly, 36, No. 2, Spring 2013, pp. 27-29. 
 122 
overall Chinese future peaceful development in the context of the ideas of “inclusion” and the 
“new moment of the times tide”. Using both realist and idealist-constructivist “self” and 
“other” identity language President Xi gave his instructions and send his massage to the 
neighboring countries: “ make full use of the important strategic opportunity period for 
China`s development, maintain national sovereignty and security …give mutual support, 
pursue equality and affection, meet and exchange frequently, do more beneficial things, make 
peripheral countries kinder and more intimate to China, more recognizable and supportive to 
China, thereby increasing China`s affinity and influence …highlighting the ideas of sincerity, 
mutual benefit and tolerance …462 
  Although Chinese leaders have prioritized economic cooperation in their policy 
statements on China`s good neighborhood diplomacy, Xi has also emphasized and included 
the strategic importance of increasing new type of regional cooperation on security issues, on 
terrorism, energy and resource security, which represents the third external/security policy 
building block of the China Dream Grand Strategy. 
 Speaking at the Fourth Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence 
Building Measures in Asia (CICA), held in Shanghai in May 2014, President Putin present, 
Xi set out his project for a “New Asian Security Concept”. He declared: “In the final analysis 
it is for the people of Asia to run affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the 
security of Asia. The people of Asia have the capacity and wisdom to achieve peace and 
stability in the region through enhanced cooperation”463, quite echoing the U.S. Monroe 
Doctrine of 1823. Xi called for increased coordinaton within CICA, including through the 
establishment of a “defense consultation mechanisms” rejecting the conflicting warmongering 
Cold War mentality and practices, and for replacing the current alliance system.464 
 For Beijing`s strategists, countries in Asia have little choice but to manage the 
economic, political and especially the closeness of the geographical realities of a rising China, 
and in doing so, they assume, few countries are willing to sign up for an overt hostile counter-
balancing coalition against China. Beijing is well aware of the fact that “leaders throughout 
Asia have made clear to Washington that they have littl  interest in choosing sides between 
the two giants”465 or of being dragged into an adversarial offensive realism structural 
dynamic. 
 For Washington`s strategists, the `Pivot`, U.S. trade agenda, and progress of TTP 
would likely not prevail if China becomes more actively committed to using its economic and 
financial muscle to counter U.S. vital interests, a was proved with the U.S.`s closest allies 
and partners` alignment and signing up to the China-led AIIB and demonstrated active interest 
in the OBOR/BRI plans. The U.S. is interested in practical cooperation with China, and 
“Washington should also continue to reiterate – perhaps with greater emphasis – that it prefers 
others in the region to also have strong and positive ties with Beijing, communicating to allies 
and partners that the U.S. rebalancing to Asia does not give regional states the license to 
challenge or provoke China”.466 
 The importance China`s new leadership has attached to neighborhood foreign policy 
coalesced at the Party Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs (FAWC) , 
held in late November 2014. The forum represented th  fourth external building block of the 
New China Dream Grand Strategy.  
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 Xi Jinping`s speech at FAWC embarked the most significa t innovative goals and 
guidelines put forward by new Chinese leadership for m re pro-active and security-oriented 
approach to PRC`s international relations and foreign policy. The Party Conference, first 
since 2006, presided over by Premier Li Keqiang, included entire PBSC, unprecedented 
number of top central and local Chinese civilian and military officials, closely every Chinese 
ambassador overseas, and Commissioners of MFA to Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region and Macao Special Administrative Region.  
 In his FAWC speech, Xi sought to establish the guidelines, basic new principles, 
strategic goals and major mission of China`s external relations in the new era of pursuit of the 
China Dream of national rejuvenation. For him, achieving its “Double Centenary” strategic 
goals and long-term strategic approach to peaceful development, China will endure the 21st 
century in the context of both economic growth and security.467 
 The main assessments and pro-active guidelines formulated and emphasized by Xi 
that point to a Grand Strategy approach can be summed up as follows: 
 - In its interactions with the world, China`s biggest opportunity lies in its steady 
development and growth in its strength, an obvious contrast with the 2006 FAWC statement 
by then-President Hu Jintao that “China is and willremain for a long time to come in the 
initial stage of socialism”;468 
 - China must develop a distinctive foreign policy approach befitting its posture of a 
major country and must conduct diplomacy with a salient Chinese feature and a Chinese 
vision in pursuit of a new type of international relations. The latter should be aiming win-win 
cooperation, reforming the international system, prope ly handling of sovereignty disputes, 
and enhancement of CCP leadership, and the reform of the PRC foreign policy processes,469 
in seeking other countries` understanding of and support for China Dream, which is about 
peace, development, cooperation and win-win outcomes;470 
 - To actively advance the building of the Silk Road Economic Belt (OBOR) and the 
21st Century Maritime Silk Road, working hard to expand the converging interests of various 
parties, and achieve win-win outcomes; 
 - Firmly uphold China`s territorial sovereignty, maritime rights and interests and 
national unity, and properly handle territorial and island disputes. Protect China`s overseas 
interests and improve capacities that provide such protection, explicitly emphasizing that the 
new Chinese leadership is firm in safeguarding China`s “core national interests”. 
 Xi`s speech, its assessments and guidelines became the object of thorough and 
scrutinized analysis and commentary by leading Chinese and Western strategists and IR 
scholars, some labeling the speech as a “Diplomatic manifesto to secure the China Dream”.471  
 For Michael Swaine, one of the four leading U.S. China watchers, Xi`s speech 
stands as the most authoritative and comprehensive stat ment on China`s international 
relations and foreign policy, ever, defining China`s place in a changing world order and the 
unprecedented critical role Chinese external more sophi ticated, strategic and dynamic 
policies must play in advancing and protecting China`s most vital interests at home and 
abroad. According to him, Xi has shaped these goals in a more long-term, strategic manner, 
connecting them explicitly with the so-called “double centenary” objectives of creating a rich 
and powerful nation by 2049. How the United States responds to this challenge will largely 
determine the strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific for decades to come”.472 
                                                 
467 “Xi eyes more enabling int`l environment for China`s peaceful development”, Xinhua, November 30, 2014. 
468 See “PRC President Hu Jintao Addresses Central Foreign Work Meeting in Beijing”, Xinhua, August 23, 2006. 
469 “Xi eyes more enabling int`l environment for China`s peaceful development”, 
470 Michael D. Swaine, “Xi Jinping`s Address to the Central Conference on Work Related to Foreign Affairs: A sessing and Advancing 
Major-Power Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics, China Leadership Monitor, No. 46, March 2, 2015, p. 5. 
471 Chen Xiangyang, “A Diplomatic Manifesto to Secure th China Dream”, China-U.S. Focus, December 31, 2014. 
472 Michael D. Swaine, “Xi Jinping`s Address to the Central Conference on Work Related to Foreign Affairs, p. 15. 
 124 
 In contrast to Hu Jintao, who analysts assess, did not have a strong hold of the army 
top brass, under the decisive leadership of President Xi, the People`s Liberation Army (PLA) 
has launched its most comprehensive reform program to date, embodying another 
important building block of the new Grand Strategy. His initiated measures will optimize the 
PLA`s size, structure and combat strategies with aims of improving capabilities and 
effectiveness, administrative efficiency, and defernce to CCP leadership. The planned new 
300000 personnel cut, saving finance and paying for manpower-saving modern defense 
technologies, will still leave China with the world`s largest arms forces in terms of numbers – 
about two million active duty military and huge reservist corp. 
 China is studying best foreign modern warfare experience and practice, and is 
reorganizing its operational structure to create five standing combatant commands, with 
permanent staff responsible for both peacetime and wartime missions in China and 
neighboring regions. The reforming steps aim to break down barriers between rival 
commanders, and make them focus on fighting as an integrated team regardless of their 
military service or the platform they have under their command. The decision to create a 
separate ground forces command reinforces the rebalancing among the military services and 
targets integrated joint operations, as the worst scenario opponents, Japan, the U.S., and the 
ASEAN states, contesting Beijing`s claims in the South China Sea will most likely engage 
China on the air or sea rather than on land. 
 The most important change has been the establishment of two new structures, the 
PLA Strategic Support Forces (PLASSF) and the PLA Rocket Forces (PLARF), as well the 
restructuring of the Central Military Commission.473 
 The PLASSF is much more than a simple support force, and besides having the 
same capacity of independent operations as the PLARF, it will include “new type of forces”, 
such with cyber, space, and electromagnetic capabilities. Concentrating resources on cyber 
network defense, information and psychological operations, this step also will sustain the 
PLA`s focus on building anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD). These advances will make the 
PLA capable of attacking U.S. Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance systems. The aim is to exploit U.S. 
asymmetrical vulnerabilities such as dependence on information technology, outer space 
systems, and other enabling networks to allow the PLA to resist what are still superior U.S. 
conventional forces. 
 The new PLA Rocket Forces will support this A2/AD strategy. More than a dozen 
new administrative bodies will function under the nw CMC, creating a “force provider” 
chain of command from it to the military services, and a “force user” operational command 
that proceeds from the CMC to the new theater commands. 
 These ongoing reforms do not suggest a new cardinal foreign or national security 
strategy shift, and will lead to improved integration and flexibility rather than charging the 
military with new ventures.474   
 Having the PLA led by true Party believers may notmake PLA commanders more 
aggressive than the promotion of more traditional Chinese nationalism, and Xi`s cracking 
down on corruption will more clearly improve the PLA`s morale and use of resources. The 
most important constraint remains the PLA`s limited combat effectiveness, as the last fought 
major wars were in 1979 against Vietnam and in 1950-53 against the U.S. in Korea. 
 In May 2015, China adopted its Military Strategy. The available document stresses 
the principles of defense, self-defense and post-emptive strikes, that China will counter-attack 
if attacked – with focus on “winning informational local war” and international cooperation in 
“areas crucially related to overseas interests”. 
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  Beijing`s quest to restore China`s historic `greatn ss` and to attain international 
status as a military power commensurate with its economic standing is obvious and continues. 
Yet, with the `new normal` economic adjustment, GDP growth slowing, official (and 
probably debatable) rate of growth of defense spending ´decreasing´, and social and 
demographic headwinds mounting, Chinese leaders face in reasingly difficult trade offs 
concerning how to allocate government largess to the population in parallel with Xi`s 
ambitious military modernization and PLA reforms – prioritizing certain asymmetric weapons 
– missiles foremost among them, to assert China`s `core interests` on its contested periphery, 
threatening to place the U.S. and China`s neighbors on the costly end of a capabilities 
competition. 
 Accounts for Washington`s military spending as a ratio of its GDP during the USA 
initial period of rise are difficult to be found. Conventional historical parlance claims that 
before the entry into the Great War in 1914, U.S. military burden seldom if ever exceeded 1% 
of GDP, which for a fast growing and already the world`s largest economy was quite a 
considerable amount, but still generally less than that of the British and Russian Empires or 
Germany in that period.   
 Acquiring credible figures for China`s military spending as share of GDP after the 
initial rise period since 1978 is almost equally problematic, as Beijing was pushing down 
while Washington pitching high the Chinese official f gures.  
 According to Pentagon estimates, from 2005 to 2014, China`s official military 
budget grew an average of 9.5% annually, after adjusting for inflation, with the last single-
digit increase of 7.5% in 2010, 12.2% in 2014, and 10% in 2015 – reaching U.S.$ 136 billion. 
The highest hike was in 2007, when after the passage of the Anti-Secession Law in 2005, 
allowing for a forceful unification with Taiwan, Beijing increased its military budget by 
17.8%, leading to frictions with the U.S.475 
 In his annual legislature report to the NPC in March 2016, Premier Li Keqiang 
announced, in surprise to the much higher Western projections, a rise of 7.6% of the PRC 
military budget for 2016 to U.S.$ 146 billions, an increase reflecting the domestic economic 
environment, and partly a gesture to mollify China`s neighbors about its intentions in the 
South China Sea. 2017 military budget rose by 7%, 2018 – by 8.1%, reflecting China´s 
negative assessments for existing risks and military h eats in the international security 
environment, especially in its neighborhood ( Korean peninsula, East and South China Seas, 
and the Middle East). 
 Chinese official figure for 2016 military budget is far less than the figure given by 
SIPRI – U.S. $ 214.787 billions, making a well-informed guess and compromise to a real 
figure somewhere in the middle. The SIPRI estimates for the U.S. military budget for 2016 
are – U.S. $ 573 billion, down from 596 billion in 2015.476 
 Even as China is now pulling ahead in its military spending comparable to that of 
Russia and major EU countries, it still falls extremely far short of the massive $ 700 billion 
U.S. 2018 figure. In some parallel with the rise of the United States, therefore, China has 
favored pragmatic economic development and growth over excessive military expenditure, in 
spite of the fact that Deng Xiaoping`s Four Modernization drive, included PLA 
modernization.  
 China`s overall current military policy is aimed at building sea control to its first 
island chain, already in motion by the island construction in the South China Sea and the 
assertive claims in the East China Sea. Like United States in its rise period, China is 
accumulating power to either initially share preeminence with, or exclude outside great 
powers from its region exemplified by Xi`s vision of the new Asian Security Concept. 
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 Dynamics and Chinese actions in the South China Sea demonstrate the structural 
importance China Dream Grand Strategy attaches to balancing and blocking U.S.´ naval 
dominance in the allegedly most important region of the 21st century. China currently has no 
potential in controlling the seas and oceans´ military and economic lanes, and is in search for 
alternative routes and in bypassing the 7th, 8th, and 9th U.S. fleets that strategically ring the 
Eurasian landmass. Besides attempts of sharing preemin nce and strategic presence in the 
South China Sea and pushing for polar Silk Road with Russia, Beijing is trying to diminish 
the importance of the sea-power paradigm, and increase the role and priority of the land-
power alternative model. To that end the first testrain from China arrived directly in London 
in July 2017, taking 20 days less than by sea. 
 In parallel, China continues to quietly dig in on disputed islands in the South China 
Sea with the obvious perspective of converting them into naval and air bases with future 
potential of checking and balancing U.S. naval military superiority in the region, a ´´steady 
progress´´ of Chinese construction and land reclamation in the disputed sea, praised by 
President Xi Jinping in his report at the 19th Communist Party Congress in October 2017. 
More so, Beijing has warned the U.S. to stop meddling in South China Sea territorial disputes 
in advance to President Trump´s November 2017 visit to several East Asian nations, including 
Japan, the Philippines, China and South Korea.  
 According to Cui Tiankai, China´s ambassador to the USA, ´´matters of 
disagreement in the South China Sea should be resolved by a ´Code of conduct´ created by 
regional parties, as opposed to U.S. arbitration.´´477  
 Economic and financial power and incentives form the second basic pillar set of 
building blocks of the new China Dream Grand Strategy. The energetic and expedient 
actions and practical pragmatic moves of Beijing in these directions embody the responses of 
China to the five long-term trends in world politics that President Xi identified at the FAWC 
in November 2014: multipolar world; globalization; peace and development; reform of the 
international system and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, and also the Chinese vision on 
the crucial economic strategic component in the balance of power with the U.S. 
 “One Belt, One Road strategy represents a striking departure in Chinese policy. For 
the first time China is seeking to export its development model to other countries … and it is 
different from that of the West: its purpose is to develop industrial capacity and consumer 
demand in countries outside of China. Rather than extracting raw materials, China is seeking 
to shift its heavy industry to less developed countries, making them richer and encouraging 
demand for Chinese products”.478 
 China is planning the construction of the world`s greatest economic, energy, trade, 
infrastructure and construction project ever undertaken. The new land and maritime Silk 
Road (OBOR) ambitious vision and strategy aims a revolutionary change in the overall 
economic map of the world, extending more than 8000 miles from Shanghai to Germany, 
creating economic zones and corridors that equals over one third of the global circumference, 
and if realized in entirety, will affect the economies of roughly 100 countries, covering a 
population of 4.4 billion people and an initial economic output of about U.S. $ 23-25 trillions. 
  “Go West” strategy was not very new initiative, initially taken seriously after the 
collapse of the USSR in the form of the Shanghai Five mechanism established in 1996, then 
slowed down by Deng`s legacy of priority economic development based on China`s coastal 
opportunities, with less impulses for development of the inland parts of the PRC.  
 The origins of the strategy`s revival have deep and complex roots and far-sighted 
motivations, economic, security and major country prestige goals. Besides 2011 U.S. `Pivot` 
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to Asia-Pacific, TPP and other derivative U.S. initiat ves in the region, negative effects of  
global financial and economic crisis and the coming slow down and `new normal` economic 
model and growth, China needed to champion counter i itiatives offering lucrative choices479 
to its near neighborhood and adjacent regions. Beijing was in search for new and how to 
preserve existing markets, as well as to narrow the economic gap between coastal areas and  
much less developed inner regions, preserving political and social stability there, threatened 
by the “three evils” – terrorism, extremism, and separatism. 
 For less than a year after Xi – Li took Party, State nd government power, by end of 
2013, both leaders had visited 22 countries, out of which -  12 of China`s neighbors.480 Apart 
from the “China Dream” priority topic of Xi`s China future vision discourse, the OBOR/BRI 
supplementary strategy ranked second as topic when me ting foreign statesmen. 
 OBOR initiative was launched by President Xi during his landmark 10-day four-leg 
visit to Central Asia in September 2013 in Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyzstan. Xi oversaw the signing of deals valued at U.S. $ 30 billion in Kazakhstan, 
including oil and gas projects, and agreed to lend $ 3 billion into loans and infrastructure in 
Kyrgyzstan. He also took part in the 13th Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit 
in Bishkek and later attended G-20 summit in St. Peersburg, meeting separately Putin for the 
5th time in 2013. 
 The strategy was introduced in Xi`s address in Kazakhstan and reiterated in his 
speech at the SCO meeting in the initial form of five-point proposal offering the joint 
construction of the OBOR, with the scope of increasing the economic cooperation between 
China, Central Asia and Europe.  
 ASEAN was the other Asia-Pacific strategic direction included in Beijing`s 
OBOR/BRI planning through the establishment of the new Maritime Silk Road. Concertedly, 
the project was introduced by both President Xi andPremier Li during the former`s speech in 
the Indonesian Parliament and the latter`s attendance t the 16th ASEAN + China summit in 
Brunei, in early October 2013. Main emphasis was laid upon enhanced economic cooperation 
and related financial issues, closer cooperation on joint infrastructure projects (roads and 
railways), security cooperation, and the promotion of a “21st century maritime Silk Road” 
through strengthened “maritime economy, environment, technical and scientific 
cooperation.”481 It entailed building or expanding ports and industrial parks across Southeast 
Asia and in places including Sri Lanka, Kenya and Greece, along with a goal of expanding 
bilateral trade with Southeast Asia to $ 1 trillion by 2020 – more than double its 2012 level. 
 Between 2007 and 2014, China crossed its countryside w th 9000 miles of new high-
speed rail, more than the rest of the world combined. The system now carries 2.5 million 
passengers daily at top speeds of over 250 km. per hour. By the time the system is completed 
in 2030, it will have added up to 16000 miles of high-speed track at a cost of U.S. $ 300 
billion, connecting all of China`s major cities. Starting in 2008, the Germans and Russians 
joined the Chinese in launching the “Eurasian Land Bri ge”. Two East-West routes, the old 
Trans-Siberian in the North and a new Southern route along the ancient Silk Road through 
Kazakhstan are planned to bind all of Eurasia together. On the faster Southern route, 
containers of high-value manufactured goods, computers, and auto parts began traversing 
6700 miles from Leipzig to Chongqing in China, in just 20 days, about half the 35 days such 
goods now take via cargo ships.  
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 In 2013, Deutsche Bahn AG began preparing a third route connecting Hamburg and 
Zhengzhou that has now cut travel time to just 15 days, while Kazakh Rail opened a 
Chongqing – Duisburg link with similar time-schedule. In 2014, China announced plans for 
the construction of the world`s longest high-speed rail line at a cost of U.S. $ 230 billions. 
According to plans, trains will traverse the 4300 miles between Beijing and Moscow in just 
two days. 
 China is also building two spur lines running Southwest and due South towards the 
world island`s maritime periphery. In April 2015, President Xi reached an agreement with 
Pakistan to spend U.S. $ 46 billion on China – Pakist n Economic Corridor.482 Highway, rail 
links, and pipelines will stretch nearly 2000 miles from Kashgar in Xinjiang, China`s 
westernmost province, to a joint port facility in Gwadar, Pakistan, opened back in 2007. 
China has invested more than U.S. $ 200 billion in the building of this strategic port at 
Gwadar on the Arabia Sea, just 370 miles from the Persian Gulf. Starting in 2011, China also 
began extending its rail lines through Laos into Southeast Asia at an initial cost of U.S. $ 6.2 
billion. A high-speed line is expected to take passengers and goods for just 10 hours from 
Kunming to Singapore. 
 In this dynamic decade, China has constructed a comprehensive network of trans-
continental gas and oil pipelines to import fuels from the whole of Eurasia for its population 
centers – in the North, Center, and Southeast. In 2009, after a decade of construction, the 
state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNP ) opened the final stage of the 
Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline, stretching 1400 miles from the Caspian Sea to Xinjiang. 
Simultaneously, CNPC collaborated with Turkmenistan to inaugurate the Central Asia-China 
gas pipeline. Running for 1200 miles largely parallel to the Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline, it 
is the first to bring the region`s natural gas to China. To bypass the Straits of Malacca 
controlled by the U.S. Navy, where almost 80% of Chinese trade and energy imports are 
shipped, CNPC opened a Sino-Myanmar pipeline in 2013 to carry both Middle Eastern oil 
and Burmese natural gas 1500 miles from the Bay of Bengal to China`s remote Southwestern 
region. In May 2014, the company sighed a U.S. $ 400 billion, 30 years deal with the Russian 
energy giant Gazprom to deliver 38 billion cubic meters natural gas annually by 2018 via a 
still-to-be completed Northern network of pipelines across Siberia and into Manchuria. 
 Though massive, these projects are just part of an ongoing construction spree that, 
over the past five years, has woven an impressive cradle of oil and gas lines (and many in 
projection) across Central Asia and South into Iranand Pakistan. In case of success, the result 
will be an integrated inland energy infrastructure, including Russia`s own vast network of 
pipelines, extending across the whole of Eurasia, from the Atlantic to South China Sea. On 
May 8, 2015, in Moscow, presidents Putin and Xi signed an agreement, setting out the 
framework for cooperation between Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and 
China`s OBOR/BRI. 
 What was originally known as the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century 
Maritime Silk Road were endorsed by the Third Plenum of the 18th CCP Central Committee 
in November 2013. Only after the release of the official document, “Visions and Actions on 
Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Roads”, in March 
2015, the whole project was finally renamed  Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), displaying its 
structural importance and strategic engagement of the Xi presidency. 
 According to early estimates of the World Bank, the development of BRI will likely 
influence FDI activity in developing participating regions, because the initiative involves 
more than 60 countries and a combined inward FDI stock of around $ 6 trillion. Connecting 
some 65 countries and 4.4 billion people, in 2016 Chinese companies signed 8158 contracts 
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worth $ 150 billion, and China´s trade with BRI countries reached $ 953 billion. In the first 
three quarters of 2017 trade between China and countries along BRI amounted to $ 786 
billion, 15% increase from the same 2016 period. 
 “We have to make sure America writes the rules of the global economy, and we 
should do it today while our economy is in a positin of global strength. If we don`t write the 
rules for trade around the world guess what, China will!” 483  
 In line with this vision of President Obama, in October 2015, the U.S.-led TPP was 
signed, remaining to be ratified, and the 12 member states agreed on new rules in their 
interactions. On November 2, 2015, during Secretary of State John Kerry`s Central Asian 
tour, in Astana, Kazakhstan, he invited China, Russia, and other countries to join TTP,  “as 
long as they want to raise the standards and live up to the highest standards of protecting 
people and doing business openly and transparently a d accountably”.484 
 Officially China wished the TPP success, but currently, as President Trump has 
pulled the U.S. out of TPP, Beijing is trying to figure out what, besides attempts of ´trade 
wars´, Trump´s strategic economic, trade and investm n  substitute for it in the Asia-Pacific 
would look like.  
 Aware of the outside perceptions and assessments tha  the BRI strategy would 
introduce a new geo-strategic landscape in the region, that the U.S. is upset, and that Japan, 
India and Australia are wary of its strategic implicat ons, and in spite of the economic slow 
down and the “new normal” growth model, Beijing did not change course.  
 Addressing the opening ceremony of the Asia-Europe (ASEM) Industry Dialogue on 
Connectivity, in May 2015, member of the PBSC and Executive Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli 
announced that within the framework of BRI China is considering the construction of six 
economic corridors to substantially upgrade the economic connectivity between Asia and 
Europe, as the necessities of such stronger relationsh ps were “a trend of the times and a 
global concern”.485 The corridors were set to run through China-Mongolia and Russia; New 
Eurasian Land Bridge; China and Central and West Asia; China and the Indo-China 
Peninsula: China and Pakistan, and Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar. In his promotion 
statement the Executive Vice-Premier emphasized that “connectivity” involves not only 
economic and physical infrastructure, but also policy coordination, capital flow, and people-
to-people exchanges, a comprehensive qualitative upgrade of Asia-Europe partnership. 
Highlighting transportation, communications and energy as important sectors for connectivity, 
Zhang urged the participants for “consolidation of the social foundation for connectivity”, by 
ensuring openness in their education, employment and ourism markets. 
 Meanwhile, China Development Bank, one of the country`s policy implementing 
banks, announced its plans to invest more than U.S. $ 890 billion into over 900 jointly run 
projects, involving 60 countries, as the bank`s contribution to support and further develop the 
BRI. As practical steps, the bank has recently alloc ted over U.S. $ 10 billion for initiatives in 
coal and gas, mining, electricity, telecommunications, infrastructure and agriculture.486 
 The comprehensive and holistic economic and financial building blocks of the new 
China Dream Grand Strategy, underpinning and servicing the BRI strategy, included also – 
Beijing initiated Asian-Pacific Free Trade Agreement (APFTA) and Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) – multilateral agreements that link the economies of China, 
Japan, India, Australia, South Korea and New Zealand along with the 10 ASEAN countries 
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(including China, but excluding U.S.)487, $ 50 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB), and $ 40 billion Silk Road Fund (SRF).  
 In the run-up to the 26th Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in 
Beijing (November 10-12, 2014), U.S. blocked China`s efforts to begin negotiations on the 
APFTA, as conflicting with the preparations for the U.S.-led TPP. Beijing continued to 
promote the agreement in pre-summit meetings but won endorsement for it only as a long-
term goal.488 
 The launch of the AIIB and the SRF was announced by President Xi in early 
November 2014, prior to the APEC summit, underlining their inclusiveness and that they 
would complement, and not substitute the existing international financial institutions. Party 
loudspeaker Global Times defined the moves as example of new major country`s relations and 
breaking U.S. containment policies.489 
  In spite of U.S. lobbying and obstructions, known and documented in Beijing, the 
formal official launch of the AIIB took place in late June 2015, when 57 countries signed 
on to become Charter Bank members, out of which as founding members - 12 NATO 
countries and three of the main U.S. military allies in Asia – Australia, South Korea and New 
Zealand. Another 30 plus countries are on the queue, y ing future membership, including 
Thailand and Taiwan. That will probably surpass the 67 members, Manila based, and Japan 
and U.S. dominated Asia Development Bank (ADB), in which Beijing has one sixth of the 
26% blocking voting rights of both Tokyo and Washington. 
 Beijing`s official rationale and parlance in explaining the necessity of the AIIB is 
centered on the claims in Chinese leaders` statements and government publications that by 
2050 Asia will have 11 out of the 25 world leading economies in GDP (PPP) terms and that 
Asia is and will be infrastructure funding thirsty. There are references to a 2010 ADB report, 
and its estimates that Asia would need $ 8 trillion f r infrastructure development in the 
coming decade, or roughly $ 800 billion annually. For some analysts, the operations of the 
ADB, WB, or the IMF are obsolete, for they can no longer represent and meet the needs of the 
emerging economies and do not reflect the realities of the current global economy, giving 
example with the only $ 13 billion annual credit capacity of the ABD. During his state visits 
to the United State and United Kingdom in 2015, Presid nt Xi personally lobbied and 
supported the AIIB by pointing out that as an interational financial institution the policies 
and the rules of operations of the bank will not be decided by China alone (26% voting 
rights), but transparently and by its Charter members through dialogue and consultations.490 
 China plans to inject initially at least $ 62 billion into 3 banks to support BRI 
strategy: 32 billion – for China Development Bank; 30 billion into Exim Bank, and to pump 
additional capital into the Agricultural Development Bank of China. For Beijing, the project is 
to take decades, costing hundreds of billions, even trillions of U.S. dollars, noting with 
satisfaction that the world`s largest hedge funds, like Goldman Sachs and Blackstone are 
rushing to market new multi-billion dollars international infrastructure investment funds along 
with the Chinese financial funding efforts. 
 The “continuity through change”- Zhongyong dialectics` new China Dream Grand 
Strategy has a defined third pillar set of building blocks – political; ideological, and 
legal/anticorruption.  President Xi Jinping is trying to activate and use them as the bedrock 
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fundamentals underpinning the strategy, in addition o the patriotic-nationalistic feelings and 
attitudes he massively cultivates and ignites, especially among the young generation. For him,  
“domestic political and social stability and unity, leadership of the CCP, represent the most 
important `core national interest` of China”.491  
 Xi`s audacious paramount leadership style sets him apart from the modern Chinese 
norm. In personality and policy criteria, he represent  both continuity and change, as most 
powerful leader since Deng and Mao, while most of his current strategic policies have their 
initial roots in the previous Hu-Wen leadership period, especially after 2008-2009. Xi is 
driven by a deep sense of personal integrity, personal destiny and the decisive conviction for 
the role that he is to play in bringing about two great historical missions for his country: first, 
national rejuvenation through the China Dream, thereby restoring the fully merited China 
status and role as a respected great power, and second, curing and saving the CCP itself from 
the cancer of “liberal degradation” and corruption, thereby securing the party`s future, 
difficult as it may be, as the undisputed leading political force that will celebrate the centenary 
anniversary of the People`s Republic in 2049.492 
 Is President Xi a communist or a Chinese? Analytically well informed answer is that 
he is very loyal to both. Deeply and widely read in Chinese history, culture and classical 
political philosophy he has made his personal and China`s self-audit and is deeply convinced 
that the “Chinese characteristics” copy right attached to everything that China does must 
always be present, mostly for popular appeal. He is carefully cultivating Chinese self-esteem 
and mass mobilization under the leadership of the CCP, the original author of the concept and 
the sole factor who made it possible that now, after 150 years, China has regained its proper 
place in the world.  
 He is loyal to Mao Zedong`s positive legacy as the symbol of 1949 New China. This 
was apparent in his decision to call a meeting in 2014 of hundreds of generals and military 
officials in Gutian County, the historic site where Mao first declared that the military must 
always be loyal to the Party.493 
 Xi has an encyclopedic knowledge of the history of the CCP. Being pragmatic realist 
often leaning on ideational-constructivist classical Chinese rhetoric, he has absorbed Deng 
Xiaooping`s theory of practical political and economic ideologies, not rejecting Marxism-
Leninism or Mao Zedong Thought, but instead trying to adapt them to the current existing 
socio-economic conditions in China. Xi sticks to Deng`s `one country, two systems` and `seek 
truth from facts` political and economic pragmatism, because in reality he now faces, even 
more gravely, the problems which were challenging Deng Xiaoping in the early reform and 
opening up period. He is challenged now by the basic structural issues of how to promote 
further the economic development and growth while pr serving the ideological unity of the 
CCP and its control and management of the risky processes of the `new normal` model of 
development. The ideological conservatism of Deng`s theory – to uphold the “Four Cardinal 
Principles”: the basic spirit of Communism, People`s democratic dictatorship political system, 
leadership of the CCC, Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought remain enshrined in 
today`s CCP Charter. His postulates, `socialist market economy´, `socialism with Chinese 
characteristics`, and the `Chinese characteristics` attributes, when describing almost any 
political, external, economic, legal, and social policy remain omnipresent.  
 Xi is also pragmatically using the politico-theoretical contributions with `Chinese 
characteristics` to Marxism-Leninism of his predecessors Jiang and Hu, as they both, too, ran 
in direction of enhancing and consolidating the power and role of CCP in the socio-economic 
and political life in China. 
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 Jiang Zemin`s 2000, enshrined in the Party Charter in 2002, “Three Represents 
Theory”, aims at solidifying and strengthening of the CCP organizational and ideological 
influence among the population. It also represents a leverage in the fight against corruption, 
called by Hu Jintao, the `soul of the 2002 16th Party Congress`, and important development of 
Deng`s “Theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics”.494 The theory`s 
developmental, consolidation and unifying platform is based on the concept that the CCP is 
the avant-garde political force that represents: advanced productive forces, advanced culture; 
and the fundamental interests of the vast majority f the Chinese people. The aim of the first 
two representational functions is obvious and clear. The third, much criticized by then 
conservative hardliners in the Party, in reality, pragmatically targets the expanding posture 
and ideological influence of the CCP by including i its social base and structures, besides – 
workers, peasants and army, also mass representativs of the new social strata that have 
emerged as result of the reform and opening up since 1978, including private commerce 
owners, entrepreneurs, even big business. 
 Based on Zhongyong dialectics, President Xi is making pragmatic use and leans on 
the legacy of his direct predecessor Hu Jintao, whom e supported and worked actively with 
as his Vice President and PBSC member since 2007-208. 
 President Hu`s overarching political and ideological vision is summarized by three 
concepts and policies related to domestic issues – Harmonious Society; Scientific 
Perspective on Development and Putting People First, and by two concepts related to 
international relations and foreign policy – Peaceful Development and Harmonious World. 
 Harmonious Society is the goal, stressing social and political reform and seeking 
fairness and equity (if not equality) across China`s enormous and diverse population and 
regions. It should feature democracy, rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity and vitality 
… giving full scope to people`s talent and creativity, enable all people to share the wealth 
brought by reform and development, and forge an even closer bond between the people and 
government.495 
 Scientific Perspective on Development is the strategy for achieving this goal of a 
Harmonious Society. It calls for integrated set of s lutions to arrays of economic, social, 
political and cultural problems – while always retaining economic development as the 
primary driver. For Hu, it seeks the rectification f economic imbalances (rural-urban, 
coastal-inland), and includes sustainable development and environmental protection as 
requirements. It is a strategy of optimizing multiple objectives, as opposed to maximizing the 
single objective of economic growth to the detrimental growth of other social public goods. 
 Puting People First is the reason for setting the goal, the underlying motivation for 
creating a Harmonious Society, thus - the fundamental principle upon which all other policies 
are built. Harmonious World in Hu`s view meant that the world is “multi-polar”, its diversity 
should be guarded, and that the right of nations to choose their own systems is sacrosanct. 
 Xi insists that CCP should have a cautious appraisal of its accomplishments. Chinese 
leaders should not be satisfied with the status quo, and are responsible to be decisive and 
action oriented, to make good things happen and aspire to China`s next higher [strategic] 
goal”.496 
 Stepping on the ideational building blocks of his predecessors, and launching his 
grandiose China Dream strategic project in November 2012, President Xi was well aware that 
for the project to succeed he needed consolidation, unification, and the alignment of the major 
part of the population. He permanently addresses and reaches at people`s trust and confidence 
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that the existing “rule of law” problems and malpractices are being fought in decisive and 
practical manner.  
 The 4th Plenum of the CC of the CCP, addressing the initial phase of the legal 
reform in China, took place in October 2014. In preparation for the Plenum, Xi started his 
anti-corruption drive in November 2012. Until the 4th Plenum, in two years time, more than 
40 high-level officials came under investigation: current and former municipal and provincial 
party secretaries and vice governors, senior governm nt officials, and executives at state-
owned enterprises. The highest-profile politician to be investigated was China`s former 
security top leader and PBSC member Zhou Yongkang. In July 2014, the CCP officially 
accused him of “serious disciplinary violations” – the first criminal case against a former 
PBSC member in more than 30 years, breaking an unofficial taboo against investigating the 
Party`s decision-making 9 top leaders. In June 2015, he was sentenced to life in prison for 
corruption and other crimes.497 
 The other major and most politically charged trial was the conviction for bribery, 
embezzlement and abuse of power of CCP hopeful and Party Secretary of Chogqing, Bo 
Xilai, former member of the Poliburo and son of legendary Party elderly leader Bo Yibo, 
sentenced to life in prison in September 2013. The PLA was not spared, with the arrest of the 
former general and Vice Chairman of the CMC Xu Caihou for corruption in 2014. 
 The 4th Plenum, first of its kind in the history of CCP, devoted to the controversial 
and sensible for CCP issue of “rule of law”, was presented as a milestone in China`s political 
and legal reforms, progress in promoting the modernization of the governing and legal 
systems with ´Chinese characteristics´ from top level, and as decisive step for improving the 
social justice in the country. Besides general guideline decisions, the four-day Plenum has 
also decided that: China will promote transparency of government affairs, NPC should play a 
better role in supervising the Constitution`s implementation, Supreme People`s Court to set 
up circuit courts, the establishment of cross-administrative regional courts and attorneys to be 
explored, allow prosecutors to file public interest litigation cases and to enhance the 
protection of human rights in judicial procedures. The forum obliged the CCP to improve its 
internal rules and mechanisms, the PLA to promote the rule of law and enforce strict 
discipline, and China to guarantee the practice of the “one country, two systems” principle 
and to promote the national reunification in line with the law.498  
 At the end of the plenary session meeting 6 former high officials and members of the 
CC of the CCP were expelled from the party, for violati n of party discipline and corruption, 
replaced by only 3 new members.  
 The ambitious, well calculated, sometimes forceful actions and tough decisions by 
President Xi spoke for “the iron in his soul”499 and firm determination for the success of his 
strategic visions.  
 Some strategists and analysts argue, that one downside to Xi`s breathtaking success 
in consolidating power is that it has left him with near total responsibility for his 
government`s policy missteps, his visibility on allstrategic issues and his dominance of the 
decision-making process have made him enormously powerful but potentially exposed 
leader.500 Indeed, Xi must address countless domestic challenges for which he is now 
accountable, and a major failure could be costly to his strategic goals and position. The largest 
problem looming over Xi`s tenure represents China`s economic slowdown and its related 
manifestations, including unemployment, financial rsks, income and stock market volatility. 
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The government was forced to reduce its 13th FYP growth target to a record-low 6.5%. Xi´s 
top challenge is to smoothly reorient the economy towards innovation, consumption and 
services, away from the old export and investment model, even as growth continues to fall, 
and it could take years before he sees results. The sudden decline in the Chinese stock market 
in the summer of 2015 and again in January 2016 raised worries in China and around the 
world that the Party under Xi will fail to make this structurally difficult transition.  
 China`s economic travails began years before Xi came to power. The real risk to 
China`s economy, and to Xi`s ambitious strategic plans, main concerns and domestic 
preocupations come not from the stock market`s raw economic impact but from the potential 
damage that can affect the Party and the government`s credibility and mobilizing force. 
 As a faithful son of an idealistic revolutionary who has fought for China`s 1949 
revolution, Xi has long deep-seated disdain for `liberal decadence` and corruption of party 
officials, whose greed threatens the Party`s people support. Deeply suspicious of Western 
values and intentions, he is especially concerned about possible parallels with the USSR`s 
collapse and disintegration, and the country`s unity and stability is his top priority. 
 Xi`s sense of personal and national urgency is underpinned by enormous, Confucian 
work ethic, which he also expects and demands from his Party decision-making partners and 
policy advisors. Although he is loyal to Deng`s legacy of guiding the gradual process of 
reforms and ascendancy, Xi is “frustrated by the interminable processes of the Chinese 
bureaucracy, and its predisposition for formulaic responses to real policy challenges. He is 
very much a man in a hurry”.501 For China itself, given the sheer size of its political, 
government and military apparatus, requires all major policy direction and strategies to be 
simplified into manageable, sometimes ideationally symbolic classical formulations and 
allegories for its 89 million party members and the public at large. 
 Xi has significantly reformed the system of Chinese governance. The bureaucratic 
lavish procedures and prerogatives no longer functio  as before. His centralized actions have 
given him greater freedom and leverage for exigency and efficiency. Xi has been able to 
achieve this dramatic transformation by amassing power quickly, in part through his 
unprecedented campaign against corruption. His right-hand advisor, PBSC member and 
head of the Party`s Commission for Discipline Wang Qishan, has used the campaign to 
demonstrate that Xi is firmly determined to go along till the end. Zhou, Bo, Xu cases, and tens 
of thousands party and government officials` investigations have proven that the campaign 
will not be one act drive, but a permanent party priority, with the military, no exception. 2018 
NPC annual session elected Wang Qishan as Vice-President of the PRC, a clear indication 
that the fight agains corruption is still very much high on Xi´s domestic priority agenda. 
 The new Chinese society`s wealthy cast of businessm n, industrial and commercial 
entrepreneurs, too, were given a warning. President Xi directly and personally told them to toe 
the party line and policies, and set a good example to the public, reminding and urging them 
to be mindful of their behavior and words. In March 2016, speaking at a panel discussion with 
delegates from the China Democratic National Construction Association and the All-China 
Federation of Industry and Commerce, he told the participants that wealthy businessmen 
should maintain political loyalty to the party and follow the socialist path, requiring that they, 
“actively exercise core values of socialism” and show “their love to the motherland, the 
people and the party”.502 
 Unlike recent Chinese leaders, Xi seems to have the charisma and an intuitive grasp 
of public sentiment that calls him a brash, assertiv , yet popular and down to earth leader. 
This image is buttressed by a relentless and active social media participation that portrays Xi 
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as an incorruptible and self-sacrificial exemplary statesman. Public opinion is one of the 
pillars of his power, with a Harvard study finding that Xi had a higher approval rating 
domestically than any other world leader in 2014.503 
 As a culmination of Xi`s personal overall politico-ideological contribution during his 
first five years of top leadership tenure, October 2017 19th Congress established and wrote 
into the Party Constitution – “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics for a New Era”. The forum incorporated also his “Four Comprehensives” – 
Xi`s overarching development and governance philosophy and four-pronged Grand Strategy, 
having Chinese prosperous society as goal number one, deepening reform as a means, rule of 
law as a principle, and the strict governance of the Party like action of state of affairs, 
highlighting China`s critical moment at present in terms of its domestic development and its 
nonlinear engagement with the world, and the deep-rooted complexity of what will take to 
achieve the China Dream. 
  
 Xi`s Nationalism and China Dream Grand Strategy 
 
 Foreign strategists and analysts` conventional wisdom and narrative usually goes 
that, “ever since Deng Xiaoping dispatched communist ideology in favor of pragmatic 
capitalist reforms, CCP`s legitimacy has been built on two pillars: economic growth and 
nationalist ideology. Now that the former is fading, the story goes on, the latter may be the 
primary tool to support the edifice of the party and Xi`s strongman image.”504 
 Although nationalism is not key variable in realist theory, most leading realists 
appear to believe that nationalism has been especially powerful force in international politics, 
and that realism and nationalism as particularistic theories at their most basic level are 
“kissing cousins”505. The former having the state as central unit of analysis, and the latter – 
the nation - with the state as its key institution, each privileging two key concepts: the state 
and its survival. 
 After 1800, the dynastic state gave way to the natio -state comprised of more than 
one nation, and that political structure eventually spread across the globe. “The great political 
fact of global history in the last 500 years is theemergence of a world of states from a world 
of empires. The fact – more than the expansion of democracy, more than nationalism, more 
than the language of rights, more even than globalization – fundamentally defines the political 
universe we all inhabit”.506 
 In spite of Kissinger`s claim in 2010, that “China is not a nation-state, but a 
continental expression of an ancient and great culture”507, to a very large degree China turned 
into a nation-state since 1949, with all the attributes of that political concept, including the 
real-world phenomenon of power politics for its survival, and succinctly captures what 
nationalism is all about: self-glorifying; whitewashing, and other-maligning.508 
 Offensive realism´s “China cannot rise peacefully” theory also refers to how 
nationalism affects the balance of power, the likelihood of war, and the probability that 
threatened states ( China`s closest and regional neighbors ) will balance, not bandwagon with 
Beijing, and openly advocates the necessity of a similar to the Napoleonic France balancing 
coalition against the rise of China. Mearsheimer ses the absolute mandatory role of Russia in 
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such an anti-China coalition. He is perhaps the only leading U.S. IR scholar who openly 
criticizes Washington`s current policies versus Moscow, and defines the February 2014 
events in Kiev, as a coup, implying that the U.S.` real 21st century threat is China, not Russia. 
 Unlike realists, modern liberals distinguish between different types of states; liberal 
states, which are peace loving and good509; and non-liberal states, which are troublemakers. 
Naturally inclined to spread liberalism across the globe, in search of a world where there are 
only liberal states, emphasis is placed on the notio  hat there is a “sovereign equality of 
states”,510 not just equals, but a community: international community, Atlantic community, 
European Community, security community, allies and partners more generally. This rhetoric 
in a way acknowledges that modern liberalism is universalistic in its outlook, a transnational 
theory, not a particularistic one like nationalism, and the driving force is the respect for the 
universal individual rights that sits at the core of this paradigm. Nationalism, by contrast, 
invariably treats a member of his or her group differently than someone from another group. 
“Today`s diffusion of power and nationalism, social nd political mobilization, with 
politically aware people and groups, who usually do not like others to come and tell them how 
to live, we shall always run to a nationalist resistance..”511 
              Modern liberalism does not have a hard shell view of the state like nationalism, and 
sovereignty is not that much cherished principle, directly clashing with President Xi``s China 
Dream Grand Strategy, which puts China first, with secondary trickling down effects for the 
individual person. For Xi, it would sound strange and unacceptable that China need not worry 
about her survival when reading John Ikenberry`s assessment that, “there is an optimist 
assumption lurking in liberal internationalism that states can overcome constraints and 
cooperate to solve security dilemmas, pursue collective actions, and create an open, stable 
system”.512 He is well read in history and knows that power politics and nationalism have well 
interacted with each other in different up-down ways playing a major role in shaping the 
modern Chinese state system. 
 For modern constructivists, as China`s slow down and the wane of communist 
ideology are bringing identity-related questions to the fore in Chinese domestic and IR 
debates, it seems reasonable to expect that Chinese civilization distinctiveness will play an 
increasingly prominent role in this “self-investigative” process, and they ask: “Will China turn 
out to be a revisionist state”?513 Challenging realism and liberalism, the constructivist 
perspective argues that more attention should be paid to how the self-understanding of China 
will constitute its overall interests and thus her Grand Strategy goals. Shunning from the 
nationalistic labeling, some constructivists emphasize the four fundamental markers - `Sino-
civilization`, `Confucian ideology`, `dynastic centralism` and `Han-ethnocentrism`, even 
though they have been temporarily repressed during China`s communist era, as the base of 
Sino-centrism that will propagate a different vision f world order than the current liberal one 
instituted by the Western powers. Conclusions and recommendations are given: the Sino-
centric tendency does not seem sufficiently strong to ensure that an ascending China will 
challenge all of the norms and values of the liberal international order, but to reduce the risk 
of ideological conflict, Western governments should not proclaim such institutions to be 
universal standards; and second, though Sino-centri tendency is gaining prominence in 
China, such a development may be counteracted by lending credence to those actors within 
China who favor a globalist-integration outlook and may check the Sino-centric identity 
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dynamics. For the West – that is, the United States, prepare for alternative scenarios and 
hedge against the possibility of an increasingly Sino-centric China by retaining its forward 
presence in South East Asia to ensure that the countries there do not feel compelled to submit 
to particularistic Chinese interests.514 
 For the English School, in spite of their massive cultural difference, which might 
broadly be summed up as being individualist versus collectivist societies, “Chinese and 
American societies have much in common including amongst other things a strong sense of 
patriotic pride (often verging on the chauvinist) married to a much-commented upon 
commitment to materialism and materialist measures of success.”515 This may in part explain 
America`s very real fascination with a modern entrepreneurial China that might have much 
more in common with the United States than some Americans would care to admit. It would 
also help explain China`s very deep respect for American power and American economic 
success, and at political level some of their similarit es may also explain why both sides are 
much inclined to bean counting in terms of their economic and military strength. English 
School charges the quantitative approach to power which plays easily into zero-sum, realist, 
materialist way of thinking about international relations, as it reinforces the views of those on 
both sides in Beijing and Washington who either want to, or think they have to, construct their 
relationship as one of rivals or enemy. 
 Recent strategic publication, arguing the necessity of a new resolve U.S. Grand 
Strategy towards China, and claiming that President Xi will inevitably turn to and exploit 
“Chinese nationalism” was the February 2016, Council on Foreign Relations` Special Report, 
titled “Xi Jinping on the Global Stage” 516 For less than a year, this was the second CFR`s 
Special Report on China, recommending to Washington to devise a new Grand Strategy, a 
lithe version of the April 2015 – “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Towards China”, 517 perhaps 
in the context of the forthcoming change of guard at the White House in January  2017. 
 For Blackwill and Campbell, the real risk to China`s economy and to President Xi` 
standing, comes not from the 2015-2016 stock market`s raw economic impact but from the 
damage done to the party`s leading role, as the expcted prolonged slowdown will directly 
affect the welfare of the average Chinese citizen, and will worsen a number of domestic 
trends. The labor market already struggling to absorb the eight million college graduates 
China`s universities perform each year, and for well over a year layoffs continue in coastal 
factories, with labor disputes doubling in 2014 and again in 2015.518 If the government`s 
reputation diminishes and economic growth remains stagnant, then the leadership will grow 
increasingly worried about social unrest, and Xi`s constraints will not abate in the next few 
years. 
 “Above all, he [Xi Jinping] will almost certainly choose to intensify and stimulate 
Chinese nationalism in response to slower growth…The foundations for a turn to nationalism 
have been laid for decades. After Tiananmen Square, th  party inculcated nationalist 
sentiment through relentless propaganda, a barrage of chauvinistic television shows and 
movies, and a “patriotic education campaign” in thecountry`s schools. According to the 
government`s nationalist narrative, which downplays the party`s failure … to position Xi`s 
leadership within the arc of a larger narrative that portrays the party as responsible for 
restoring China`s historic place in the world. In December 2015, the Communist Party Central 
Committee held a group study of Chinese patriotism and Xi himself called for further 
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“promoting patriotism to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. By connecting 
patriotism to Xi`s mission to restore Chinese greatn ss, that link is being made even more 
concrete…, and by stoking Chinese nationalism, Xi will seek to protect himself and the party 
from the worst of the economic downturn”.519 
 Other IR scholars, China strategists and analysts do not devote too much research 
time and energy on the issue of “Chinese nationalism”, taking it as granted and at par with the 
other existing ´great power nationalisms´, worth considering - but not as a crucial China threat 
issue. They try to promote and advance the agenda of mutual win-win interactions, dialogue,   
and constructive U.S.-China competition, challenging, as they claim, the biggest fiction in 




 President Xi´s 2012 Grand Strategy project is not a heoretical and utopian 
enterprise. It represents a deeply well-thought and strategically underpinned realistic, complex 
and organically interwoven system of accumulated past ositive achievements of China, to 
which after 2012, new and gradual Grand Strategy building block are dialectically added up in 
all spheres of life – security, international relations and diplomacy, economy, ideology, 
military, legal system, fight against corruption and as a whole – united nation building. 
  To believe and assume that China`s politico-ideological party and economic-
financial government elites, with the strong Xi hand on top, will somehow prove to be less apt 
and creative in meeting the current, and potential follow up set of political, ideological, 
economic and financial problems and challenges, than ey have been in the previous 40 
years, is mildly a wishful thinking. It would also be imprudent and misleading in the extreme 
for any China policy to be based on an implicit (and sometimes explicit) assumption and 
hope, that if “Chinese nationalism”, suddenly looses ground, crushes or turns against the party 
and government, we would expect political implosion r the “China collapse” scenario, 
recently advanced by David Shambaugh. President Xi, Premier Li and overall Chinese policy 
elites know well what is at stake, and are much more s phisticated now than at any time since 
1978, determined and capable of rapid and flexible hard or soft policy responses and carefully 
calculated actions when necessary. 
 More over, President Xi and his team are researching, and experimenting a 
fundamentally new `continuity through change` approach to the overly explored and exploited 
concept of “Chinese nationalism”. They aim to give t new life, positive connotation and 
optimistic future vision by the new China Dream Grand Strategy and the rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation, with the idea of realizing a vital bottom-up broad idealistic-constructivist 
country-and-self-motivated identity concentration of the national energy and power for the 
21st century, especially among the younger generation.   
 The horrific memories and traumatic connotations of the Century of humiliation  
(Western and more so, Japanese `demons`, and the Chinese fixation with Taiwan as 
America`s `unsinkable aircraft carrier`), will tactically remain and exist. But, as Zhongyong 
complementary co-evolutionary dialectics of due measure and degree teaches, and guides, the 
Century of Humiliation and the China Dream Century will inclusively, selectively and 
flexibly co-exist towards a new higher level of practical, and workable synthesis of managed 
nationalism and patriotism with `Chinese characteris ics`.  
 Well read and informed in political history, Xi, it seems, is doing his best to evade 
cultivation of open and extreme hostilities for domestic purposes, the way it was behind the 
rise of Anglo-German warmongering antagonism that led to the Great War. His China Dream 
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is a proactive realist, Zhongyong, and psychological attempt to selectively  emulate, with 
Chinese characteristics, the success moments and achievements of the American Dream, and 
to announce to the world that there is a resolute newcomer who intends to be Fuqiang and 
















































CHAPTER 4: “CHINA DREAM” GRAND STRATRGY 
 
The chapter, following the title, constructs and analyzes the main pillars of the 
dissertation thesis, the structure and content of the Grand Strategy, optional Chinese 
operational behavior based on it, and potential U.S Grand Strategy reaction which will lead 
and allow for the formulation and of scholarly sustainable and objective assessments and 
conclusions in the last chapter, in response to the leading research questions that are posed in 
the work.  
“The great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation must go hand in hand with a rich and 
powerful army. In order to achieve this goal, China must dare to strengthen its military force, 
not just its economy”.  
The quote comes from the book China Dream (Zhongguo meng) by Liu Mingfu, a 
retired PLA colonel, originally published in 2010, and in English in 2015.520 In high demand 
even before publication, with biding war from dozens of Chinese commercial publishers, the 
book was met with great success, but then removed from bookshops over fears it would 
damage relations with the United States.521 
Liu claims that it has been China`s dream for a century to become the world`s leading 
nation, combining the continuous ideals and efforts f three of China`s greatest 20th century 
leaders: Sun Yat-sen; Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.  
The emphasis lies on Deng`s most progressive role, and his wise, quiet KLP policies 
in the new successful era of reform and opening up. 
Quoting and challenging the assertion of one of President Obama`s most important 
China advisor, David Lampton, that “China and the United States are involuntarily engaged in 
a `double gamble` with history”, Liu argues, that for him, “the Sino-American competition in 
the 21st century seems more a game than gamble … For him, whoever can create more 
appealing fruits of development, and whoever becomes stronger first, will win the influence 
necessary to lead and direct the progress of the world, a competition/power game never seen 
before. The ´game´ will represent a new era in human history, irrevocably changing the world. 
Liu also argues that besides being competitors, America and China are far from being enemies 
or antagonists,” and that a “great strategy requires a great thinking”.522 
New Chinese leader Xi Jinping`s China Dream speech in late November 2012,523 was met 
with speculations that the title of the book most probably has influenced Xi to adopt it as 
euphemism for his major policy Grand Strategy compass. 
In mid-April 2016 program-article in The American Interest, titled, ´´Towards a 
Global Realignment, Brzezinski raised his proposal for a new U.S. Grand Strategy. 524 By 
leaving aside the undisputable global leadership posture, he declares that “as its era of global 
dominance ends, the United States needs to take the lead in realigning the global power 
architecture”. Five basic verities  are signaling the coming of a new international political era: 
U.S. is no longer the global imperial power, but neither is any other major power, Russia is 
not fatally precluded – and if it acts wisely, may eventually become a leading European 
nation-state, China is rising steadily as America`s eventual coequal and likely rival, careful 
currently not to pose an outright challenge to America, Europe is not, and is not likely to 
become a global power, but can play a constructive role to global wellbeing and even human 
survival …, the currently violent political awakening among post-colonial Muslims, is, in 
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part, a belated reaction to their occasionally brutal suppression mostly by European 
powers…525  
For Brzezinski, assessed as a unified framework, these five verities tell that the United 
States must take the lead, with patient persistence, i  r aligning the global power architecture, 
and forge coalition that involves, in varying degrees, also China and Russia, a kind of a global 
power triumvirate.526 
The probability of global chaos behooves the United States to fashion a policy in 
which at least one of the two potentially threatening states becomes a partner in the quest for 
regional and then wider global stability, thus contai ing the least predictable but potentially 
the most likely rival to overreach. Currently, his logic goes, the more likely to overreach is 
Russia, but in the longer run it could be China..  
In April 2016, Russian foreign minister Serghey Lavrov openly, and officially for the 
first time, announced, that under President Putin`s direct instructions, Russia will start to 
firmly and actively promote and practically realize a new foreign policy strategy for the 
construction of polycentric global political system. Speaking at the press-free 24th Assembly 
of Russia`s Supreme Council on Foreign and Defense Policies, on April 9, Lavrov has stated 
that the competent bodies are working over the new editions of the National Security Strategy 
and the Foreign Policy Doctrine of the Russian Federation, where the new principles and 
strategic policies reflecting the changing global trends and realities will be officially 
enshrined,527 a state guarantee for their practical and resolve implementation. 
Besides these foreign policy shifts, Moscow is researching and working on its Russian 
Civilizational Project with emphasis on home-grown concepts of “justice” and “national 
will”, distinct and different from the ideational paradigm of the Western`s liberalism and the 
concept of “Chinese characteristics”.  
On June 28, 2016, five days after the Brexit referendum vote, in the Conclusions of the 
European Council meeting, under item 20 (out of 23 altogether) could be read, “The European 
Council welcomes the presentation of the Global Strategy for the European Union`s Foreign 
and Security Policy by the High Representative and invites the High Representative, the 
Commission and the Council to take the work forward.”528 
As Blackwill, Tellis, Campbell, and other U.S. eminent strategists and scholars insist, 
the United States should devise a Grand Strategy for Asia/China at least as coherent and 
coordinated as the one [Grand Strategy] that has been formulated in Beijing, and which 
appears designed to maximize China`s power while challenging the long-standing role and 
alliance dominance of the United States in the region. 
In spite of their claim, there is still a broad debate both abroad and domestically about 
whether China has a Grand Strategy or not. As officially and documentary there is no clear 
evidence, the general assumptions are that most probably China should have such a strategy, 
while many believe it does not, arguing that Beijing`s inconsistent and incoherent policies 
prove the lack of a Grand Strategy.529 There are scholars who see China as drifting along, 
gaining experience in course of practice,530 and others, that see indirect indications of its 
building blocks, though with no official commitments.531  Heath, in his 2012 work, using and 
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analyzing CCP`s documents, claims that there is supporting evidence for elements of new 
`national strategy`, more than the usual conventional IR rhetoric on the subject.532 
In the dissertation I argue that China has a Grand Strategy, and I have given it the 
idealistic-constructivist name of “China Dream Grand Strategy”.  Some IR scholars and 
analysts call “China Dream” a slogan and mantra, others – a concept. 
 There are no foreign or Chinese policy-makers, IR scholars, strategists, or analysts 
that have defined and titled an allegedly Chinese Grand Strategy. Even American realists, 
who mostly claim that China already is guided by and implementing a Grand Strategy, have 
not yet given it a name or coherent detailed characte istics, structural composition, and 
strategic building blocks. 
The only other case of name labeling exception is Barry Buzan, who in his 2014 
analysis, calls it Peaceful Rise/Development (PR/D) Grand Strategy.533 
My point, arguments and explanatory emphasis, is not o  the fact of the name itself, 
but on the overall core strategic political, party and state centered, developmental, 
psychological and mobilizing effect, domestic economic charge, external realist and 
symbolic/ideational message that President Xi implies, conveys, and strongly promotes when 
using the “China Dream” Grand Strategy loaded vision, guidelines and language. 
 On November 29, 2012, newly elected Xi, accompanied by all PBSC members, made 
a high profile and accordingly media covered visit at “The Road to Rejuvenation” exhibition 
at the National Museum in Beijing. In his first public “China Dream” strategic program 
speech,534 the paramount leader specified and firmly outlined the overall attributes of   
medium and long-term Grand Strategy for China under th  leadership of the CCP. For him, 
the Strategy has to achieve a “moderately well-off China” (xiaokang shehui) by 2021 when 
during his tenure the Party celebrates its centenary. Second, “wealthy and strong” (Fuqiang) 
China by 2049 on the centenary of the People`s Republic, or to use Mearsheimer`s metaphor, 
“when we shall have an economic mainland China of Hong Kong or Singapore type”.  
At the October 2017, 19th CCP Congress, intermediate strategic target time-lne was 
introduced, defining 2035 as the period when China, Chinese society and army should have 
obtained the characteristics of a modern nation state. In 2035 Xi Jinping will be 82, quite 
youger than Deng Xiaoping, who as a shadow paramount Chi ese leader made his final active 
political South China tour in 1992, at the age of 88. 
 The ideational and material strategic visions and messages of Xi are obvious: “the 
present of the Chinese nation can well be called `the right human way brings great changes` 
… and in the end, it found a correct path to realiz the great rejuvenation of the Chinese 
nation called – Socialism with Chinese characteristics… with more confidence and ability to 
realize this objective than at any time in history; What is the China Dream? We believe that 
realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese natio  is the greatest China Dream … in 
modern times …concentrated and endowed the long cherished wish of many Chinese 
generations, it reflects the comprehensive interests …and it is a common expectation of all 
sons and daughters of China … Only when the country does well, and the nation does well, 
can everyone do well …and the objective of building our country into a modern Socialist 
country that is rich, strong, democratic, civilized and harmonious can absolutely be 
realized.535 
The dissertation research uses the 2008 global financ al crisis as a demarcation line in 
the periodicity of China`s final rise and Grand Strategy formation process. The post-2008 
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period marked a gradual shift from KLP accentuated to a complex-mixed `continuity through 
adjustment and change` - KLP-SFA overall Chinese policies, beginning with 2008-2010. This 
pragmatic strategic shift began after the introduction, and application in China`s international 
relations and foreign policy stands of the undisputable red-lines of the new officially declared 
Chinese “core national interests”, since 2010-2011.  
Never in its millennium history – being Empire, Republic from 1912, or People`s 
Republic since 1949, has China ever been in the classi l sense – a strictly status quo or 
revisionist entity. It has been, and still, is both – in due measure, degree, and in different 
periods of time, based on pragmatic `continuity through adjustments and change` assessments 
of its comprehensive power, the strategic environment, and in pursuit of its tactical and 
strategic national interests. There were ups and downs, even moments of national survival 
during the “century of humiliation”, and in the present period of “strategic opportunity” 
President Xi Jinping seems firmly determined not to miss the unique chance and case in world 
history that a country aspires to climb twice the ladder to global eminence. 
It all began with Deng Xiaoping`s strategic and promising KLP status-quo behavior 
shift from Maoist revolutionary ideology to liberal market economy with `Chinese 
characteristics` in 1978, under the slogan of reform and opening up. This radical change 
coincided with the brilliant idea of the then Fed Chairman Paul Volcker, admittedly 
accredited as the U.S savior from the oil and stagflation crisis in the 1970s, and one of the 
initiators of Nixon`s August 15, 1971, suspension of the U.S. dollar gold convertibility. 
Volcker sought international solution of the U.S. monetary problems by recycling the world`s 
surpluses, including by opening the U.S. markets to the expected Chinese manufacturing 
boom. Trade data from U.S. Census Bureau shows that C ina has been running a big trade 
surplus with the U.S. since 1985 and has been steadily accumulating American debt – U.S. 
Treasury securities and other dollar denominated assets for decades.536 The bigger the Chinese 
economy grew, the larger and tighter the economic and financial interdependence became. 
China today is the biggest American foreign creditor and owner of U.S. assets in the range of 
around U.S. $ 2 trillion, out of which almost 1.2 trillion in Treasuries. Flash back-ward to the 
20th century. Beginning with the Great War, the United States became for many decades the 
biggest creditor of the ailing British Empire, and to the West as a whole, with only the 
Marshall Plan – to the tune of U.S. $ 14 billion. Dominant Washington threatened London to 
crash the pound sterling during the Suez crisis in 1956, leading to the latter´s decision in 1967  
to withdraw from all bases “East of Suez”. Arguably, only economic superpowers and 
dictatorships can drive Grand Strategy independently of domestic considerations – and Britain 
was neither in 1967. 
Deng`s strategic turn in 1978, “required that China engage economically with the 
developed wealthy West, its neighbors, and to becom [status quo] part of the global system 
of finance, trade and investment”.537 The strategic calculus of Deng, targeting a China status 
quo (with shy elements of revisionism) `quasi alliance` with the U.S., which came to fruition 
in early 1980s, was also enabled by the short border Sino-Vietnamese war in 1979, as result 
of the Vietnamese termination of the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge rule in Cambodia in 
1978. Deng Xiaoping attributed this to a Soviet attempt “to extend its evil tentacles to 
Southeast Asia and … carry out expansion there” demonstrating the long-standing Sino-
Soviet split, and implying that Washington can rely on Beijing in containing Moscow.  
Kissinger noted that “whatever the shortcomings of its execution, the 1979 Chinese campaign 
                                                 
536 Shobhit Seth, The Reasons Why China Buys U.S. Treasu y bonds, at http://www.investopedia.cm/articles/investing/040115/reasons-
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537 See Buzan and Cox, `China and the U.S.` p. 114. 
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reflected a serious, long-term strategic analysis” and explained U.S. backing of Beijing by, 
“American ideals had encountered the imperatives of ge political reality”.538 
Like Britain in relation to the United States, the U.S. and its multinational corporations 
have played a significant facilitating role in the China power accumulation status quo period, 
mainly in terms of economic policy and investment capital inflows for the construction of 
China`s enormous manufacturing power base.“Like the United States, China is similarly 
reticent about acknowledging this helping hand from the leading liberal power …”.539 By 
2010 China became the second largest world economy surpassing Japan, and in 2012 – the 
most important FDI world wide destination, overtaking the U.S., even though the gradual shift 
from its status quo KLP policy to a more proactive and assertive mixed KLP-SFA strategy has 
been on display since 2008-2009, well to the knowledge of the foreign investors. In 2015, 
from the overall bilateral U.S.-China trade of $ 598 billion, the U.S. deficit reached $ 366 
billion, slightly reduced to $ 347 billion in 2016, according to U.S. Census.540 
Does President Xi has a strategic vision and strategic opportunity Grand Strategy for 
China, and what is a Grand Strategy? Is it Earle`s 1943 vision, George Kenan`s 1946 
intersection of strategy, war and statecraft, or Gaddis` 2009 – “endangered ecological 
discipline, about seeing forests and not just trees, about viewing the world as round and not 
square, about relating of the means at your disposal t  the ends you have in view”.541 
The analytical eclectic research thesis rather shuns from the dichotomous Hegelian 
conflicting dialectics of “either – or” logic. Analyzing China Dream, it shows more affinity 
and explores the “continuity through adjustment andchange”, Zhongyong – middle course of 
“passing the river stepping on the stones one by one, a d when necessary, stepping back”, by 
concentrating and `stepping with the explanatory narrative in the way the Chinese think and 
do´´.542 
Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth`s `Don`t Come Home America`s definition of Grand 
Strategy543, drawing on Art, Betts, and Terry L. Diebel544, is – “a set of ideas for deploying a 
nation`s resources to achieve its interests over the long run”. 
For Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth, for more than sixty years, the United States has 
sought to advance its core interests in security, prosperity, and domestic liberty by pursuing 
three overlapping objectives: managing the external e vironment to reduce near and long-
term threats to U.S. national security, promoting a liberal economic order to expand global 
economy and maximize domestic prosperity, and creating, sustaining, and revising global 
institutional order to secure necessary interstate cooperation on terms favorable to U.S. 
interests… Woven through official U.S. speeches andstrategy documents over the last six 
decades is a set of broader grand strategic arguments that the security commitments are a 
necessary conditions of U.S. leadership, and that leadership is necessary to pursue the [Grand] 
strategy`s three core objectives”.545 
The eclectic approach shows some mixed affinity to Mearsheimer`s open realpolitik 
offensive realist analysis of U.S. Grand Strategy and China`s future options in its quest for 
global posture. Still, the dissertation prefers to make the case of China Dream based on 
comparison with the liberal internationalist Ikenberry paradigmatic construction, much 
preferable in predominantly realist Beijing. For China, the ideational idealistic-constructivist 
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connotation of “China Dream”`s real meaning is “no-conflict, no-war, let China `dream` at 
least till 2049”, a hopeful attempt to escape from the structural offensive realist cynical, risky, 
and war-like perspective. 
Analyzing Chinese official documents, leadership key statements, Wang and Yan`s  
echoing definition of the newly evolved China Grand Strategy, the latter, similarly to the 
above liberally defined U.S. Grand Strategy, also has three `continuity through change` 
realistic, selective and flexible core national objectives with Chinese characteristics: 
“security; sovereignty; and development. They represent closely interrelated dialectical 
trinity, in which the security of the state and political system is the key link, and the other two 
constitute the enabling and indispensable crucial factors – necessary conditions for 
security”.546 
Drawing on Buzan`s differentiated assessment that “American exceptionalism was 
outward looking and open” while “Chinese exceptionalism is inward looking and closed”547, 
the former is explicitly sustained by the above definition of the U.S. Grand Strategy of 
Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth. The dissertation argues that these `exceptionalisms` basic 
differences are in a process of change. The work supports the hypothesis that China is 
gradually and pragmatically emulating the successful elements in U.S.´ ascendancy to world 
preeminence, and its current, both third path inward nd outward China Dream Grand 
Strategy, is the leading driving force in this balanced status quo-revisionist long time-span 
patient process. 
The second and third core interests of the U.S, as defined in `Don`t Come Home, 
America` are: “promoting a liberal economic order to expand the global economy and 
maximize domestic prosperity, and creating, sustaining, and revising the global institutional 
order to secure necessary interstate cooperation on terms favorable to U.S. interests”548. 
Beijing`s recent mixed status quo and revisionist initiatives and moves, and most importantly 
the way they are officially announced and promoted, do emulate to a certain substantial extent 
the goals and content of the above defined U.S. core interests. 
“Promoting liberal economic and global institutional order, and interstate cooperation” 
goals of the U.S. Grand Strategy were underpinned by the 1944 Bretton Woods U.S. dollar 
based system and its institutions: the IMF, WB, andGATT (WTO), when the U.S. GDP was 
roughly 50% of the global ( owning 70% of the world`s gold reserves). Today`s China Dream 
Grand Strategy tries to parallel this approach by offering and organizing its own led economic 
and financial alternative structures and cooperation platforms (China model) under official 
liberal-constructivist rhetoric 
According to CCP`s Central Party School President, Li Junru, “China has become the 
main driver of the global economy (50% of world`s growth after the peak of the 2008 
financial and economic crisis, to 30% `new normal` at present) as after 2008 the global 
economy is exposed to growing volatility, instability and uncertainty.”549 
While keeping some overall status quo KLP policy elements in China`s approach to 
the UN, WTO, world`s climate threats, verbally and practically, besides the role and 
functioning of the G-20, all other recent Chinese policies and initiatives openly speak for a 
more pronounced and flexible  mixed KLP-SFA strategy. Beijing leaders have a profound 
sense that time has now come for China to have its own impact on Asia-Pacific and the world, 
and simultaneously deep concerns that others, particularly the United States, will try to block 
that from happening, as being a challenge to the U.S. global dominance. 
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China Dream hypothesis, bears the notion and pattern about how the current world is 
functioning, how China views its means and plans to position itself, to influence and be 
influenced by that world in mid- and long-term perspective in the light of its 2021, 2035, and 
2049 ends strategic goals, giving China Dream all the attributes to qualify as the current 
Chinese Grand Strategy. Xi believes in time-lines. 
The thesis research and analysis elaborates the following holistic structure of the 
China Dream Grand Strategy-Rejuvenation of the Chinese nation (see fig. A). 
Officially and explicitly three major sets of core strategic objectives are defined: 
1. 2021 -  middle-term task of achieving a “moderately prosperous Chinese society” 
2. 2035 - intermediate task of achieving “modern Chinese society and army”  






















CHINA DREAM GRAND STRATEGY 
1. Mid-term strategic goal – 2021 Moderate prosperous Chinese society 
2. Intermediate strategic goal – 2035 Modern Chinese society and army 
3. Long-term strategic goal – 2049 Wealthy and strong PR of China 
IDEOLOGICAL/IDEATIONAL 
PILLAR : 
 Leadership of the CCP 
- Marxism-Leninism 
- Mao Zedong Thought 
- Deng Xiaoping Theory/Four Cardinal 
Principles, Ideology of the Reform and 
Opening Up, 1978 
- The Three Represents Theory, (Jiang 
Zeming, 2000), enlarging the social base 
of the CCP 
- Scientific Development Theory (Hu 
Jintao, 2007), Harmonious socialist 
society and social welfare 
- Rule of law with `China characteristics`  
- China-Dream - rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation, and China model – first 
ever, that seeks to successfully combine 
both socialism and capitalism (2012) 
- “Four Comprehensives”, Xi, 2015 
- “Xi Thought … in the New Era”, 2017 
 
SOVEREIGNTY/SECURITY PILLAR 
(IR & FP) 
- Centrality of the UN & UNSC, new just, 
equitable and fair international order, not 
“global order”; “no hegemony; no alliance; 
no expansion” 
- 5 Principles of peaceful coexistence 
- New Type of Major Countries Relations 
- Peaceful rise/ Soft power in IR & FP 
- Economic and financial security centrality 
of G-20 with assistance from IMF, WTO, 
and WB: no protectionism and currency wars 
- Periphery Policy (2013):FAWC (2014) 
- 2015 new Military Strategy, 4 crucial 
security domains: ocean; outer space, cyber 
space, and nuclear forces, reform of the PLA 
- SCO, BRICS, CICA – new Asian Security 
Concept, “Community of common interests 
or a community of common future”, beyond 
old mentality of Power Politics 
- 2017 White Paper on Asian security 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PILLAR 
      -     Second phase of transformative reforms 
-     13th FYP (2016-2020) – “new normal” 6.5% annual growth and new supply economy model,                
more reforms and more opening up 
- Advancement of social productive forces; scientific and sustainable development 
- OBOR/BRI – Pivot to the West: Eurasia, Southwest Asia, Europe, Latin America and Africa 
- AIIB, Silk Road Fund, BRICS` New Development Bank, revitalizing RCEP, ARF and APEC, 
Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacific rather than TPP 
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 For achieving the China Dream core strategic objectiv s, the Grand Strategy is based 
upon a complex trinity of mutually supportive, interrelated and organically interwoven three 
major pillars, representing and safeguarding the thr e “core national interests” of China: 
Ideological/Ideational Pillar; Security/Sovereignty Pillar; and Socio-Economic Development 
Pillar. 
 The pillars include all positive, according to the current leadership, legacy, and 
successful theoretical and practical ideological, domestic stability, security and economic 
achievements of most previous Chinese leaderships, s nce 1949, even Sun Yat-sen visions, 
based on the “continuity through adjustments and change” Zhongyong dialectics, 
underpinning the strategic visions and practical step  of the current Xi leadership. 
 “The entire Party must keep in mind that the path decides destiny, and looking for a 
correct path is not easy at all, we must unwavering keep going …march a very long road 
…make long-term and arduous efforts … and I believe the objectives of building our country 
into a modern Socialist country that is rich, strong, democratic, civilized and harmonious can 
absolutely be realized”.550 These are the carved in stone guidelines for China`s p th till 2050 
that Xi Jinping laid out in his November 2012 strategic China Dream speech. 
 The analysis explores and rationalizes the following three still unknown IR puzzles, at 
least until late 2020s, when Xi will perhaps be still officially on top central stage:  
 1. What are the real goals of Xi`s China Dream Grand Strategy, where and how                             
credibly he thinks China Dream will lead China to? 
 In his 2011 Civilization, 2013 The Great Degeneration, and in numerous lectures and 
elite speeches, Niall Ferguson makes one of the most el quent Western diagnosis and analysis 
of the current world order and institutions, and answers why “It`s not fine” the way China 
relates to his story. For him, we should at least feel some disquiet and it would be dangerously 
complacent to think that “does it matter; it`s fine, ah, whatever”, when we discuss about one 
party state, where rule of law is highly compromised by the arbitrary power of the CCP, 
centrally, and above all at local levels, and according the projections of IMF, an economy that 
is run by a communist party, in 4 years time will become the largest in the world. The 
problem, he claims, is that unlike in the Cold War, the ideological antagonist is going to win 
the economic race and the leadership will pass on to a society that is not based on individual 
freedom, and `who says the opposite does not understand the lessons of historical processes 
that such transitions are seldom peaceful.551 
 Ferguson, indeed, makes a sharp observation, as inXi`s 2012 China Dream speech, 
the collectivist, not individualist political dialectics, and most obviously – the 2050 leading 
role of the CCP, show what Xi really thinks and what strategic goals underpin his Grand 
Strategy. “This path is Socialism with Chinese characteristics, …and only when the country 
does well, and the nation does well, can everyone do well”.552, which paraphrases Deng`s 
legacy – “to be rich is glorious” into – “for society to be rich is glorious”. In line with Deng`s 
theoretical work analysis that policy must answer pragmatic questions of the present, and 
must change with the times, Xi explicitly places emphasis on the first strategic 2021 goal on 
achieving “moderately prosperous society”. 
 What Xi is trying to promote and promising to achieve, is an unified collectivistic 
China Dream – both for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and society, and laying out 
incentives, motivation, and nationalistic pride for the individual, especially targeting the 
younger generation`s expectations and collective sense of life, for them and for their country. 
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He is promising: a better society, prosperity and improvement of people`s livelihood, strong 
and respected standing of powerful (soft and hard) China in the world, a national glory. 
 As a whole, China Dream is an unprecedented holistic project of state and nation 
building of profound proportions, which can be seen in state press, printed and electronic 
media, TV, in schools and universities, and on the millions bill-boards around the country. 
 From social psychology and social identity theory point of view, China Dream 
represents a genuine mix and Zhongyong dialectics exploiting all of the general three strategic 
options for policy and actions: social mobility; social competition and social creativity. The 
psychologically driven effects and goals have both internal domestic and external foreign 
audience and public as targets and addressees. 
 It did not take too long for Xi to make his China Dream proposition and concrete 
offers. He pragmatically used the occasion, copying China`s successful past experience with 
foreign corporations and private business, and made his initial Asia-Pacific offer and 
announcement during a speech to industry leaders at the opening of the APEC summit in 
Beijing in November 2014. As PRC`s role in the Asia-P cific was getting larger, broader and 
more heavily scrutinized, Xi`s announcement was timely and supportive by the continuing 
global economic slowdown when he described the Asia-Pacific dream (and China Dream  part 
of it) as “acting in the spirit of the Asia-Pacific community and out of a sense of shared 
destinies, following the trend of peace, development and mutually-beneficial cooperation, and 
jointly working for the prosperity and progress of the region”.553 
 Massive alignment, participation, even from the West, and expressed interest in the 
major projects – OBOR/BRI and the AIIB, that underpin the strategy, shows that Xi`s appeals 
and offers were not merely brushed away skeptically, but taken seriously into consideration. 
 When Xi took the reigns of power at the 2012 18th Party Congress, the first 2021 
“moderately prosperous society” strategic goal of China Dream in concrete figures meant that 
China`s 2010 GDP has to double, i.e. increase by 100% by 2021. Doubling per capita income 
in the same period was a derivative flowing from an assumption that the division between 
investment and consumption will remain essentially constant. 
 The foundation of the term “moderately prosperous society” is obviously economic, 
with ´Chinese characteristics´, as it cannot be ident fi d to international terminology, and 
relates to GDP per capita, not total GDP. To help make international comparison it is useful to 
relate it to IMF figures and World Bank definitions. According to IMF estimates, China`s 
2010 GDP was $ 6.03 trillion, with projections for 2021 - $ 17.76 trillion, meaning that the 
doubling GDP China Dream target will be achieved even earlier. China`s official National 
Bureau of Statistics 2010 GDP per capita figure is $ 4,433, so when doubled by 2021 it 
should be in the range of $ 8,900. (figure given for 2015 is $ 7, 847). IMF figures are even 
higher: 2010 GDP per capita - $ 4, 478, and projections for 2021 – $ 12, 542554. which implies 
that according to WB`s classification of a High Income Economy (HIE) China will become as 
such sometime in mid-plus 2020s. Conservative or overestimated, these figures are 
conditional, as China`s official statistics are usually questioned, while IMF is famous for its 
regular corrections of estimates and GDP projections. In its April 2016 IMF World Economic 
Outlook, titled `Global Economy Faltering from Too Slow Growth for Too Long`, assessing 
that “Uncertainty has increased, and risks of weaker growth scenarios are becoming more 
tangible. The fragile conjuncture increases the urgency of broad-base policy response to raise 
growth and manage vulnerabilities”, the IMF changed its January projections for 2016 world 
GDP growth of 3.4% to 3.2% just in two months time. To quote Mme Lagarde, “The IMF is 
not alarmed, but in increased vigilance!” 
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 2. What do we project China`s capabilities and aggregate national power will be 
in 2023; its political system; net performance of the new Chinese economic 
growth model; societal and environmental constraints; where China`s energy 
security will lie?  
 For China to become HIE would dramatically change the world economy – China`s 
1.35 billion population is roughly equal to the entire global population living in such 
economies at present. It would also transform Chinese population`s housing, quality of 
domestic goods, incomes, environment, leisure times, h alth and culture, much in compliance 
with the first strategic China Dream target and Xi`s promises. It would equally transform the 
world markets in the industries supplying these needs. Whether China wishes to refer the level 
of GDP per capita and living standards which can be achieved by 2021 as a “moderately 
prosperous society” is for the Chinese people to decide and judge. Perhaps for the world, 
based on international comparison, would be more comprehensible to expect that within the 
next 10-12 years China may most probably enter the ranks of high income economies, 
notwithstanding the `new normal` slowed economic model of growth and the “China 
collapse” prophecies. 
 The highest level decision (jueding) for transformation of the Chinese growth model is 
irreversible – enshrined in party and government basic guidance documents. At the same time 
it is cautious, and with Chinese characteristics – tep by step, leaving options for selective 
reversals if necessary, as it will be a rocky political road for Xi, and offers political economy 
scholars and analysts research challenges in the years ahead. 
 The model that served China well for the last 35-40 years: low wages; labor intensive; 
manufacturing; savings friendly; trade exports and investments has produced, as discussed, 
rapid economic growth, but equally, has exposed serious socio-economic challenges and 
problems that face Xi`s leadership. 
 There are no convincing signs and plausible data for the argument that China`s 
transformation to the new economic model based on household consumption, the services 
sector and a strongly innovative private sector is somehow doomed to failure. The `new 
normal` is a complex sophisticated policy project, prudently anticipated, and developed over 
many years. According to Xi, China Dream urgently needs a second phase of adjusted to the 
new objective economic realities, market reforms, and there is strong political backing to 
drive implementation. 
 The sustainability of Chinese economic growth as the continuing basis of Chinese 
comprehensive national power, on balance, it can be assumed that a growth rate in the 
medium to medium-high scale of around 4-6% is relatively probable for the period till 2023, 
taking in consideration some reservations regarding the Chinese official statistics. This 
assumption also takes into account the lower level of global demand for Chinese goods, high 
level of domestic debt, signs of demographically driven shrinking in labor, continued high 
levels of domestic savings, still modest rate of consumption, an expanding private sector 
though constrained by state-owned entities, hesitant financial reform, and a growing 
environmental crisis, where pollution in its diversified forms is number one political problem 
for the CCP.555 
 If China`s growth rate begins to falter, China hassufficient fiscal and monetary policy 
capacity to intervene for sustaining the growth rate in the range of 6%, which is broadly the 
rapper Chinese policymakers consider to be observed to maintain social stability. Besides, if 
we trust Christine Lagarde and IMF`s gloomy forecast for “Global Too Slow Growth for Too 
Long”, except for speculators, nobody would existentially hope and seek China`s failure or 
collapse at this moment, as it would totally crash the global economy into a deep depression. 
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 China`s August 11, 2015, slightly over 3% devaluation of its currency – the RMB, 
brought down the global markets, and its overall devaluation of around 5% from September 
2015 to January 2016, due to globalization and interdependence, according to Bloomberg and 
Reuters inflicted loses in North America, Europe and Asia in the range of U.S. $ 2.5 trillion, 
and only to Apple - $ 50 billion of its capitalization. All major world Central Banks feel and 
know they are in the same boat, and would prefer some kind of cooperation rather than lethal 
currency wars. Although there were U.S. strings attached, in a form of appeasement, in 
November 2015, the Chinese RMB was included in the IMF`s SDR currency basket as the 
fifth, next to the U.S. dollar, the Euro, British pound sterling and the Japanese Yen. 
 Although democracy and rule of law exist as characteristics in Xi`s China Dream, it 
would be unrealistic to be expected any substantial ch nges in China`s political system by 
2023. Individual freedom and civil restrictions will continue to be implemented as seen with 
the recent restrictive media policy556, selective tightened Internet control and foreign NGO 
legislative regulations. Xi`s personal remarks that t ey all should abide by the Chinese laws, 
at the joint press conference with President Obama, in November 2014, are much telling. In 
fact, he sees this as “the essence of the `China Model` (Zhongguo moshi) that is different 
from the inapplicable in China liberal democratic capitalism of the West”.557 
 As pointed out, pollution is a primary problem of the CCP and the government. Bad 
air is all over the big cities, even in the rural areas. Good potable water is a treasure. The 13th 
FYP has put forward numerous and costly projects for tackling these issues, but it will take 
constant and long-term efforts and practical measures, including beyond Xi`s term in power. 
 It is widely accepted in IR and IPE to associate en rgy security with reliability, 
affordability, and environmental sustainability, where reliability reflects the continuity 
(security) of energy supply. The topic is vast and can be a subject of a separate dissertation. 
Among many definitions, “energy is an important physical base of economic development, 
social progress and the construction of modern civilizat on [as well as] a strategic material 
and major element of a country`s Grand Strategy, which links national and foreign security 
policies”.558 
 China has no problem with the affordability variable, given the present low energy 
prices, projections that they would remain in the reasonable affordable scale due to the overall 
global economic slowdown, reemergence of Iran on the energy markets, and OPEC (Saudi 
Arabia) oil production policy. 
 The environmental sustainability issue is taken seriously. Premier Li Keqiang 
launched a `war against pollution`, while in April 2016, the largest electric utility company in 
the world, State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC) proposed the largest long-term electricity 
project in history: U.S. $ 50 trillion clean energy network that would power the planet, and 
that actually could work … if politics, money and geography do not get in the way. According 
to the former U.S. acting undersecretary of energy David Sandalow, “most of the premises of 
the plan are fundamentally correct … and it is an open question whether national governments 
will be open to such a revolutionary idea”.559 It would be prudent to expect in the future 
similar Chinese initiatives, reflecting the China Dream external components for delivery of 
global public goods, initially regionally in the Asia-Pacific, and then gradually in the rest of 
the world. 
 The most serious energy security problem China faces is the variable regarding the 
reliability – the secure continuity of energy supply. As discussed above, China has a large 
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diversified mix of imported energy resources and suppliers, and will never lay “all the eggs in 
one basket”. China Dream Grand Strategy`s basic components – the OBOR/BRI strategic 
initiative and the new Chinese military strategy, both aim at constructing and safeguarding 
additional diversified secure routes for continuous inflows of energy supply, in attempt to 
bypass the existing, and of China`s concern, trade maritime routes control of the U.S. Navy. 
In spite of the current global economic slowdown, World Energy Statistics still project that 
2035 total energy supply will be 33% higher than the crisis level of 2010.560 
 In concluding the generalized analysis of China`s comprehensive national power it is 
worth referring to Kevin Rudd`s remarks made at his 2014 China lecture in Singapore. In a 
new book by China`s moral realist Yan Xuetong561, to which Rudd was kindly asked to write 
the foreword, the Chinese professor had made the following 3 basic comparative projections 
for 2023: China`s GDP would be in the range of U.S $ 21 trillion, that of the U.S. – 19 
trillion; over 50% of world trade and world currency reserves would be in Chinese RMB; and 
Chinese military expenditures will be around 60-70% of the U.S.´. Additionally China will 
have – a manned space station, 3-4 air-carrier battle groups, 4-5 strategic nuclear submarines 
with missile range of over 8000 miles and 5th generation jet fighters in service.562 
 In Rudd`s analysis and comments, “if all of these projections would come true, and 
especially the GDP projection of China surpassing the U.S. not in PPP but in nominal GDP 
terms, it would represent a big victory and award to Xi Jinping`s China Dream strategy. Also 
according to Rudd, SIPRI`s estimates showed that by 2035 China`s military spending might 
surpass the U.S.`, and only because the United States has accumulated massive stock and 
technological military capabilities, Beijing may claim military parity with Washington around 
2050, a challenge worthy of reflection and deep, cold analysis.563 
4. What are China`s regional and global strategic intentions in the context of 
Beijing`s operational behavior? 
 Deng`s influential legacy that China should keep a low profile (KLP) and not flaunt its 
power, was part of the package of putting development as the first priority of China`s 1978 
Grand Strategy, giving an important indication about its ´means´ variable. Gradually, the 
´Search of a Grand Strategy´ debate raised the issu about whether China`s rise was then 
sufficiently advanced and strong that KLP should be modified or even abandoned. 
 This was the time of the active domestic U.S. debate about American Grand Strategy 
between two main philosophies: Liberal Hegemony or Restraint, seen in advance and during 
the 2016 campaign in the dichotomy: Hillary Clinton – Donald Trump.  At the 2014 FAWC, 
the unusual for Chinese leader, sharp language of Xi Jinping`s announcement that China was 
engaged in “a struggle for the international order”, with great emphasis on “multipolarity”, 
was understood as a transition away from the United States` brief “unipolar moment”. At this 
conference, Xi stated for the first time the modificat on of China`s KLP strategy into a 
complex Zhongyong mix of KLP-SFA, by placing security/sovereignty on equal, even on 
higher par with economic development on the Party agenda in the current “important period 
of strategic opportunity”.564 
 Reconciling the vastly different Chinese and Western worldviews and notions of 
international order is seemingly a core 21st century challenge and problem. We are not yet in a 
bipolar international system, as during the Cold War, but division into two or more camps is 
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real and potentially viable. A long-term power diffusion and shift from West to East would 
challenge almost every preconception and socio-political paradigms Westerners have grown 
up with. Above all, it would challenge and put to test the fundamental questions – can 
Washington and Beijing work together to sustain, strengthen, and reform the status quo world 
order against forces seeking to erode it, and does China make part of the latter, and to what 
extent, scale and proportions does it want to reform it. 
 International community always demands and wants to know earlier as to what 
China`s intentions are. With the exception of the September 2016 “Hangzhou Consensus” G-
20 global economic governance initiatives, and Xi´s 2017 Davos economic globalization 
speech, Beijing has not yet articulated clearly defined and authoritative blueprint of its holistic 
vision for the future of the global order, or to use its parlance – “the international system”.  
Still, since 2012, its outlines are becoming more clear, indicative, and determinate by China`s 
categorical continuous insistence for a “New Type of Major Countries Relations” with the 
U.S., its “struggle for the international system”, permanent restatements in line with 
adherence to the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” and “no hegemony, no expansion, 
no alliance” peaceful policies. Francis Fukuyama`s observations that through the 
BRI+AIIB+NDB strategy Beijing for the first time is exporting its “China Development 
Model”, convincingly show that China has shifted to a KLP-SFA Grand Strategy, implying 
that its “Chinese characteristics” do not take part in the management of the U.S.-led global 
order. All the above is confirmed also by Beijing`s more powerful regional and global 
operational behavior combined with idealistic-constructivist ideas and rhetoric of peace, win-
win cooperation, community of common destiny, and world harmonious identity international 
relations. 
 As Hughes points out, Deng`s three goals from the 1980s were: national unification, 
anti-hegemony and economic development,565 very likely the definitions that Wang 2011 and 
Yan 2014 echo regarding the “core national interest” of China and their priority ranking 
within the Xi`s  modified KLP Grand Strategy, turned China Dream. 
 In regards to the current China Dream Grand Strategy operational behavior it is worth 
also to promote and give strong IR theoretical connotation to the practical need of searching 
and finding peaceful means and approaches to China`s pl ce and role into a changing world of 
the 21st century, based on Buzan`s concept – `A World Order without Superpowers: 
Decentered Globalism`.566 
 The hypothesis and China Dream Grand Strategy argument is based on well 
documented primary and secondary source evidence. Being very powerful pragmatic and 
highly ambitious nationalistic strategist, Xi Jinpig will never openly comment and disclose 
his real and true operational behavior intentions. They are exhibited flexibly and selectively, 
case by case, within pragmatic Zhongyong dialectics` mixed approaches and strategic 
policies.  Unpredictability and suspense remain his strongest strategic attributes and assets, as 
the West still asks the question – what does China really want? His moves, initiatives, 
speeches and statements have to be carefully read in between the lines, and analyzed in a non 
Western manner, the way and the moments he chooses t  address important issues, referring 
to – “gradual processes”, “dialogue, consultations and negotiations”, and never ending 
Chinese classical proverbs, sayings and idioms. According to David Lampton, the 
National Security Commission that Xi Jinping announced end of 2013, and created in January 
2014, is not only increasing Xi`s personal power as its chairman, but also aims coordination 
and streamlining of the foreign policy and domestic security policy-making processes, 
confirmed in Xi`s speech at the 2014 FAWC: “We must enhance the central and unified 
leadership of the Party, reform and improve institutions and mechanisms concerning foreign 
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affairs, step up coordination among different sectors, government bodies, and localities, 
increase strategic input, ensure well-regulated foreign affairs management, and strengthen the 
ranks of officials managing foreign affairs”.567 
 China Dream Grand Strategy`s and Chinese foreign policy`s concrete steps, intentions, 
and `gradual processes` of initiatives and policies still remain an open question. For Xi, no 
single country can monopolize the international system, but ´´once changes are made, things 
will improve”, for more equitable, just and fair world.568 
  When the international community inquires and wants to know earlier as to what 
China Dream, the globally and regionally foreign policy plans and intentions of Beijing are, 
the usual response from senior ministers, policy advisors, and specialized think-tanks is: “We 
are working on that”. When asked, state councilor for foreign policy Yang Jiechi and foreign 
minister Wang Yi respond, that the purpose of Chinese foreign policy is not only to assist to 
the realization of the China Dream but to create also better strategic environment in China`s 
neighboring states and immediate region for the fair and just future of China, the region and 
the global international system. They never specify and elaborate more concretely what does 
`better strategic environment, more fair and just rles` exactly mean, and imply from Chinese 
operational behavior point of view.569 
 As analyzed, Xi`s anecdotal pursuit of establishing a “New Type of Major Countries 
Relationships” (NTMCR) with the United States is one of the external building blocks of 
China Dream Grand Strategy. Beijing is deeply convinced that Washington will never cease 
its efforts to undermine the socio-political system and the leadership role of the CCP – the 
priority top “core national interest” of China. The main operational rationale and motives 
behind Xi`s NTMCR is to formally engage the U.S. and make it commit itself of not working 
against the political status quo in China, and alsoto accept equality, power sharing and parity 
with Beijing initially in Asia-Pacific570, and then to use Xi`s favorite term – “gradually” 
globally. As far as the results show, Washington well understands the meaning of the proposal 
and politely declines any serious and formal discusions on the topic, in spite of the fact that 
President Xi permanently floats the rhetoric that he and President Obama had made the 
strategic decision of jointly building the NTMCR attheir California informal summit in 
2013.571 
 In regards to the U.S., China has no appetite for any kind of serious military accidents 
or conflict. Xi is in a hurry, but also cautious, knowing he still needs time and peaceful 
environment, as China is not yet match, in case of necessity, to the U.S. military capabilities 
and regional security architecture of Washington-led alliances and partnerships. The 
operational behavior is one of mixed KLP and mild/hard SFA. Xi believes time is on China`s 
side, and that as its comprehensive power grows further, the U.S. perhaps reluctantly, will 
begin sharing power, agreeing to initially minor accommodations, the way it did with 
allowing the inclusion of the Chinese RMB in the IMF`s SDR basket. Chinese officials never 
miss the opportunity to emphasize that the United States is still the only global superpower 
and that China`s economy is second to the American, in attempts to lure, calm down 
anxieties, by not provoking and exacerbating growing U.S. sensibilities.  
 At the same time, when Beijing believes that its officially declared `red lines` are 
stepped over and `core national interests` threatend, balanced, some times decisive measures 
are taken, disregarding Washington`s official positi n or claims. End of April 2016, Beijing 
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approved the long controversial and externally opposed NGO law, clapping down and 
restricting the activities of some 7000 foreign organizations, including such from the USA, 
under the pretext of “rule of law”, but actually due to allegations of “interference in China`s 
internal affairs”. Xi was blunt enough to declare during his September 2015 U.S´. state visit 
that China does not accept the `freedom of navigation` argument of Washington, pointing out 
that, “fully backed by historical and legal evidenc the Nansha Islands have been China`s 
territory since ancient times”. He firmly declared - “those issues that cannot be resolved for 
the time being, should be managed in constructive way, making sure that they are not 
exacerbated or escalated”.572 China`s consistent and nonnegotiable position regarding its 
territorial claims in the South China Sea are becoming more clear by the recent 
announcements of its intentions to develop floating nuclear power plants aimed at providing 
energy to its constructed islands in the region,573 not accepting and recognizing the rulings of 
the Philippines` initiated international arbitrage, emulating in a certain way Washington`s 
disregard toward the ICC in the Hague.  
 One of Beijing`s favored operational behavior and approach, actively implemented 
globally, regionally, and on bilateral interstate level, is the set of tools of financial and 
economic incentives and opportunities that China uses and offers to those who do not oppose 
openly its policies and seek gains and profits. Notsurprisingly, President Xi`s September 
2015 U.S. state visit began at Seattle, where he also saw Boing`s plant and Microsoft`s 
campus in Redmond, and took part at roundtable-discussion with tech executives like Apple`s 
Tim Cook and Amazon`s Jeff Bezos. He was given a high level official dinner attended by 
hundreds of representatives of American corporations a d big businesses, longstanding 
participants and beneficiaries of China`s `economic iracle`, a very handy “Chinese lobby” in 
Washington. In his speech at the dinner574, and in the same day interview in The Wall Street 
Journal, he reminded the big business audience that “together, China and the United States 
account for one-third of the world economy, one-forth of the global population, and one-fifth 
of global trade”, emphasizing the huge consumer potential of the current 300 million Chinese 
middle class. He strongly implied that he is undisputedly in charge in China, and that his 
campaign against corruption has nothing to do with power struggle in China and Kevin 
Spacy`s famous TV film serial – “House of Cards”. He also pledged no protectionism and 
currency/trade wars, as China works for and contributes to regional and global development, 
and welcomed U.S., other countries and international rganizations to participate in the open 
and inclusive BRI and AIIB projects.575 
  When meeting, contacting, and addressing selective and targeted audiences, President 
Xi`s operational behavior of creating confidence and trust is worth analyzing. He seldom uses 
the term “communism” abroad even when implying and enumerating the gradual 
achievements of his Party. He talks freely, openly, and emphasizes the deepening of reforms 
and further opening up, about China`s progress in building the socialist market economy, 
democracy, advanced culture, harmonious society, and sound environment. He always implies 
and suggests that China is like any other country in the world, not that different, and who 
wants to develop and profit can do business with her. At the same time, he does not shun and 
evade difficult and provocative, from Chinese official perspective, questions and accusations. 
When asked in his WSJ interview about the forthcoming restrictive foreign NGO law, 
referring to and ranking China`s “core national interests” he declared: “Rule of law also 
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applies to the Internet, with the need to safeguard a country`s sovereignty, security and 
development interests as relevant as in the real world”.576 
 China`s regional operational behavior is equally subtle, sophisticated, pragmatically 
flexible and complex – Beijing is in search of leadrship role, strategic partners and friends. 
Besides President Xi`s guidance at the Periphery Foeign Affairs Central Conference in 2013, 
for benevolent, constructive and friendly win-win relations with neighborly and regional  
countries, his main message was – patience and pragmatism, underpinned by a mixed case by 
case gradual KLP-SFA strategy. 
 Cato Institute senior fellow Bandow has a point when he argues that China needs a 
strategy that makes friends. For him, the U.S. dominates the globe with policies that have 
emphasized making friends and acquiring allies. Shared interests were buttressed by a basic 
trust in Washington`s objectives, while today`s China s essentially friendless, concluding 
that: “If Beijing cannot find a way to win favor from at least some of its neighbors and other 
influential nations around the globe, it may remain  modest geopolitical player”.577 
 Chinese realist Yan Xuetong holds a similar view, arguing until recently, that China`s 
“non-alliance” principle blocks the country`s path to world preeminence. 
  The strategic operational behavior of Xi and Chinese leadership is based on different 
rationale and far-sighted vision and intentions. Their first China Dream Grand Strategy 
operational goal is clearly set and determined – toachieve equality and parity in the relations 
with the U.S., and if possible to surpass the American economy by mid to late 2020s. Can 
Beijing succeed? That is perhaps in the affirmative, as the doubling of the 2010 nominal and 
per capita GDP by 2020, most probably has been well in advance calculated and assessed as 
achievable, otherwise it would not have been announced officially as strategic goal (the 
official 2000 GDP target was reached in 1995). For Xi, this would be the crossroad that marks 
his strategy to make  China Dream, not only national but also a project with global projection, 
in line with Bandow`s reasoning for trust, credibility, and shared interests. Until that time 
comes Beijing may firmly stick to the “non-alliance” principle, as a “China model”, evading 
suspicion, tensions, and potential conflicts, parting way with the “American Dream”´s Cold 
War model. Even if in the future the principle is conditionally abandoned, the analysis and 
assessment of the trends show that Beijing would not likely be the initiator, but would rather 
pretend that other countries have come to him and kindly requested an alliance relationship. 
 As first steps in this strategic behavior calculus Beijing initiated the building of the 
world`s greatest BRI economic, infrastructure and construction project ever undertaken. BRI  
and its financial component – the AIIB, are concrete manation of the SFA leg of the China 
Dream Grand Strategy. So far, for Beijing, the outcme is not discouraging. Over 65 countries 
have expressed initial interest in BRI`s projects participation; while 64 countries (20 prospect 
members), have joined AIIB: 4 of 5 UNSC members, 18 of the 34 OECD, all the ASEAN, 6 
out of 8 South Asian states, 5 out of 6 GCC, and many NATO member states. According 
AIIB`s president Jin Liqun, “more than 30 countries are on the waiting list eager to join”,578 
and as admitted by the Canadian PM Trudeau in his 2016 China G-20 interview, Canada may 
well be the first North American country to do so. 
 China`s rhetoric and official argument for the creation of the AIIB is based on WB and 
Asian Development Bank`s (ADB) projections that from 2010 to 2020, the annual shortfall in 
funding for Asian infrastructural development would be around U.S.$ 800 billion, and that the 
AIIB would respond to these needs as a new complementary option to other multilateral 
development banks. The funding shortage being huge, AIIB alone could not possibly meet 
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such demand. As an open and inclusive multilateral development agency China welcomes 
new members, including the U.S., to join the bank.579 The message was well read and 
understood, which explains the massive regional and neighborly alignment and participation 
in both the Chinese initiatives, partly pushed also by the fact that recently China has slightly 
turned away from its 2000s regional ASEAN centrality of attention and engagements. 
 “Unlike any other countries, Germany or Japan, China wants to be accepted as China, 
not as a member of the West. They expect us, Asians and neighbors, to be more respectful of 
China as it becomes more influential and more powerful. They tell us that all countries, small 
and big, are equal, we are not a hegemon. But when you do something they don`t like, they 
say: you have made 1.3 billion people unhappy, so please, know your place …”580 To this 
precise and masterly summing-up of China`s operation l behavior by one of the best China 
connoisseurs Lee Kuan Yew, can also be added Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi`s 2010 
ASEAN meeting remark that: `China is a big country and others are small countries, and 
that`s just a fact`.581 
 Along with the external economic and financial SFA pillars of the China Dream Grand 
Strategy, Beijing has also embarked on a more Sino-ce tric leadership, pro-active and 
initiative loaded security aspect of its regional operational behavior.  
 At the CICA Summit in Shanghai in 2014, President Xi proposed a self-defined vision 
on common, comprehensive and sustainable security in Asia, and called for joint efforts to 
explore an inclusive and win-win approach to Asian security, a security governance model 
with Asian features, for all and by all Asians, implicitly excluding the U.S.  
 On April 28, 2016, addressing the fifth foreign ministers` meeting of the CICA in 
Beijing, he elaborated further his Asian Security Concept, outlining China`s position on 
security hotspots in the region, including the South China Sea. For Xi, Asia enjoys vibrant 
regional cooperation, integration, and a rising strategic status in the global development 
processes, yet, some parts of the continent are still plagued by turbulence and conflicts caused 
by traditional, old way mentality of security challenges. The main emphasis, assessments, and 
proposals in his Asian analysis were concentrated again on: win-win cooperation, respect, 
equality, mutual assistance, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation and peaceful 
settlement of disputes through dialogue and consultations. As a novice, Xi floated the idea of 
an Asia Civilization Dialogue Conference, to pool wisdom, strength and to solidify the 
foundation for comprehensive regional security governance. 
 Reiterating that China firmly stands by its sovereignty, rights, and interests in the 
South China Sea, Xi pledged that China remains committed to resolving disputes peacefully 
through friendly consultations and negotiations with countries directly concerned, and that 
Beijing will continue to work with ASEAN countries to make the South China Sea a sea of 
peace, friendship and cooperation,582 directly implying that China will seek only bilateral 
resolution of the territorial disputes there, and does not accept Mearsheimer`s `pacifier` and 
broker`s U.S. role in the region. 
 At the 12th Party Congress in 1982, Deng`s “non-alliance” principle was adopted as a 
priority cornerstone element of China`s international relations and foreign policy. The goal 
was not only avoiding getting China entangled in the Cold War, and demonstration that 
Beijing is no junior partner in the `quasi alliance` with the U.S. in containing the USSR. In 
practice it sought more flexibility, space, and freedom from obligations that would allow 
China to focus and accelerate the building of its comprehensive economic power. 
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 This principle is still on the Grand Strategy agenda of Beijing. It can be traced in the 
broader Chinese international relations, even at regional level, where Beijing accentuates 
more on the bilateral operational behavior with “Chinese characteristics”. China 1996 
initiated, 2001 formalized, hosted and energized Shang ai Cooperation Organization (SCO) , 
though having political, economic and security compnents, is by Chinese firm understanding 
and official treatment, not an alliance, but a traditional regional international organization. 
 China`s current paradigmatic operational behavior, based on “ bilateral – no-alliance 
rooted” relationship list of partners-friends - targets about 70 “strategic partnerships” or 
“cooperation partnerships”, including with many U.S. allies and NATO members, such as 
Britain, France, Germany, Italy. In October 2015, China concluded ´strategic partnership´ 
with the Czech Republic, after its President Milos Zeman, was the only one from a NATO 
country officially attending the 2015 extravagant military parade in Beijing celebrating the 
victorious end of the Sino-Japanese war 70 years ago.583 
 China´s last ´friendly strategic partnership´ was established on April 8, 2018, with 
Austria, during an unprecedented high level official st te visit of the Austrian president Van 
der Bellen heading a large delegation including Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz, four 
cabinet ministers, and members of the business community. 
 Yan Xuetong, China`s most active, leading realist IR theorist in opposing the “non-
alliance” posture of Beijing, makes his case based on several main premises: New Cold War 
between China and the United States is less probable in the visible future due to lack of 
ideological struggle and the existing tight bilaterl MAD`s economic and financial 
interdependence. For China to become a U.S. model sup rpower, Yan claims, Beijing needs a 
new strategy that fully covers genuine alliances, not just the so-called “strategic partnerships”- 
a nice diplomatic jargon for mostly economic and financial bilateral agreements. These in 
reality fall short of true alliances, unlike the U.S.` 60 plus fully-fledged treaty allies, involved 
in military cooperation with Washington – even some in China`s regional neighborhood. In 
concert with its “improving political ties through economic approaches” (yi-jing-cu-zheng) 
principle, China should also start forming alliances in its own neighborhood - to attain support 
for the strategic goal of “national rejuvenation”.584 
 For Yan, it is hard to imagine that China can become a leading world power without a 
neighborhood majority acceptance of its regional ledership, especially from American allies. 
This can and will function as preventative cooperation for maintaining regional peace after 
China becomes a full-fledged superpower in the next decade, in three aspects: reduce the 
“security dilemma” between China and its new allies, decrease the threat of American 
involvement, and transfer the asymmetric to relative symmetric balance of power in the Asia-
Pacific, making both China and the U.S. more realistic and cautious about any military 
miscalculations and hostile actions. 
 Beijing is not underestimating the importance of its close neighborhood and the Asia-
Pacific region as a whole, underpinned by the BRI and AIIB strategic projects. China`s main 
Western operational strategic behavior is concentrated on winning equality and U.S. parity in 
the relationships with the latter`s main strategic allies –  UK, Germany, and France, trying to 
emulate and even neutralize, the United States` “special relationships”, especially with the 
former two, which with some ups and downs were characte istic during the U.S. Grand 
Strategy period of rise in the 20th century, i.e. to neutralize and balance from within t e main 
European pillars of the American post-WWII global alliance system. 
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 Important results from recent research on the “Americanization of the world” and the 
“American century”585 basically show that the U.S. did not ruthlessly rumble into other 
countries like a steamroller that flattened all indigenous socio-economic, political, and 
cultural traditions and practices. Conventional wisdom now generally accepts that, while there 
were enthusiasm for “America” and for the “American Dream” on part of some countries, 
societies and social groups, there was also rejection and resistance by others – until more 
influential political, economic, financial and “soft” power trends either asserted themselves or 
compromises were forged that combined or mediated pr vious divergent positions. Actually, 
this is the model and the path that China Dream wants to emulate and patiently achieve in its 
long-term Grand Strategy with all available realist-idealist-constructivist incentives and socio-
psychological pledges – a `role model` for peace, justice, fairness, win-win cooperation for 
common harmonious, rejuvenated world destiny, in times of transformational changes. 
  
 Trends and options for U.S. Grand Strategy response to China Dream 
 
 It is a common place, around the world, that opposing political candidates for 
President regularly campaign on the premise that the incumbent has done almost everything 
wrong, and on the promise that they will do things very differently if elected. Once elected, 
many great power Presidents find themselves delivering a Grand Strategy that has more 
continuity than change, quite in tune with the classical Chinese Zhongyong dialectics. Few 
U.S. Presidents have followed this pattern as dramatically as President Obama. His 2008 
campaign was built entirely around the theme “Change and Hope”, and especially around the 
repudiation of the foreign policy of his predecessor, George W. Bush. The Obama 
Administration has kept the same campaign rhetoric h oughout, but at the level of policy and 
Grand Strategy, there has been a substantial degree of continuity, and admittedly some areas 
of significant changes. The continuity compound element is more striking and, importantly, 
the continuity has mostly worked for Obama, certainly more so than have any changes. 
 As analyzed, the Obama design spelled out in the 2010 National Security Strategy 
(NSS) is remarkably similar to Bush`s 2006 NSS. Both prioritize American leadership.  
 U.S. 2016 Presidential contenders faced: non-bending China and the South China Sea 
disputes, Ukraine and a failed “reset” with resurgent Russia, Syria-Russia and ISIS, lingering 
Iraq and Afghanistan, Libya and Yemen. U.S. witnessed volatile and fearful world economy 
with fragile recovery and gloomy expectations, official modest U.S. GDP growth for the 2016 
first quarter in contrast to the higher initial projections, as well as Moscow and Beijing`s 
attempts for de-dollarization of the world economy, and still strongly politically divided 
country. 
 By early May 2016, the number of the remaining contenders for the 2017 White 
House shrank to three: the allegedly Democratic favorite Hillary Clinton and her co-partisan, 
election surprise, and self defined progressive socialist Bernie Sanders, and the mildly put, not 
so well accepted by the GOP establishment self proclaimed Republican Donald Trump.  
 Did the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign represented a coherent expression of “anger” 
or “revolt”, and how can that relate to the future U.S.- China 21st century relationship? 
 With some conditionality, the Republican candidate Trump emanated the rise of a sui 
generis national-populist rightist, or rather left-right am lgam movement in the Republican 
Party that reflected the fragmented electorate and deep vertical and horizontal fissures 
characterizing the U.S. ethno-social structure. Its fundamental strength was in its spontaneity, 
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novelty, hostile focus on strategic elites, importantly supplemented by the gradual submission 
and band-wagon of the mass-and-social media. 
 Trump`s electoral campaign messages and promises had a little of everything, for all 
representative clusters of American society, that in aggregate, he claimed, will lead to 
“America First” and “Make America Great Again”. In return he psychologically appealed for 
their support of his Grand Strategy - a new “American Dream 2.0”, the panacea for most 
American woes and travails.  
 The analysis of Trump`s April 27, 2016 Mayflower pe-election Grand Strategy 
speech586 shows a striking similarity of his unorthodox and challenging views and intentions 
with the main tenets and geopolitical constructions in Brzezinski`s April 17, 2016, renewed 
American realist`s strategic version of `Global Zero` for the 21st century, guiding strategic 
piece, “Towards a Global Realignment”.587 
 Echoing, in his peculiar aggressive way, the start up assessment in Brzezinski`s 
program analysis, “As its era of global dominance ends, the United States needs to take the 
lead in realigning the global power structure”, Trump was the first ever Republican 
frontrunner candidate who openly claimed that the U.S. is in decline, and not winning, with 
the leading statement in his Mayflower speech: ”Foreign policy is complete and total disaster, 
no vision, no purpose, no direction, no strategy. The legacy of Obama-Clinton interventions 
will be weakness, confusion and disarray, a mess…A Trump Administration will lead a free 
world…”. 
 As briefly discussed above, Brzezinski´s five basic verities regarding the emerging 
redistribution of global political power, which signal the coming of a new global realignment, 
taken together as unified framework, and telling how the U.S. should take the lead in that 
process without destroying the global order, were all present in Trump`s program speech in 
one form or another, with stronger assertive language nd formulations. In addition to 
Brzezinski`s predominant geopolitical focus, Trump also added in his Grand Strategy vision 
the geo-economic strategic leverage component, mainly in regards to China, world trade/TPP, 
dismissed “the false song of globalism”, and priorit zed the role of the nation-state.  
 First, the Cold War strategist`s assessment that te U.S. is no longer the global 
imperial power, but still the world`s politically, economically, and militarily most powerful 
entity, was paralleled and emphasized by Trump`s: “America First”; “lead the free world”; 
“negotiate from position of strength”; “if America fights, it must only fight to win”; and “our 
power will be used if others do not play by the rule”. 
 On the second and third verities – Russia and China, Brzezinski saw several options 
and makes projections, which he reasoned, cover also the interests of Moscow and Beijing:  
 Trump`s attitudes towards Russia and China in his 2016 Mayflower speech were also 
cooperative, pragmatic and negotiable, “We desire to live peacefully and in friendship with 
Russia and China. We have serious differences with these two nations, and must regard them 
with open eyes, but we are not bound to be adversari s. We should seek common ground 
based on shared interests”. “I believe in easing tesions, and improved relations with Russia 
from a position of strength …a deal, that is great for America, but also good for Russia”.588 
 With more emphasis on the geo-economic competition with China, Trump still 
searched a balance, “Fixing our relations with China is another important step… a strong and 
smart America is an America that will find a better friend in China, better than we have right 
now. Look at what China is doing in the South China Sea. They`re not supposed to be doing 
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it.” This is the only mild rebuke by Trump regarding China`s actions in the South China Sea, 
while neither he nor Brzezinski ever mentioned the issue of Crimea when addressing Russia, 
at the same time recognizing that the “Russians and Chinese have rapidly expanded their 
military capability”.  
 For Trump, U.S.` allies, including in NATO, are not paying their fair share in the 
tremendous security burden, and if not, the United States must be prepared to let these 
countries defend themselves, as the U.S. has no other choice. He pledges the “U.S. to finally 
have a coherent foreign policy based upon American nterests and the shared interest of its 
allies”. As president, Trump plans to call for a NATO summit, and for a separate summit with 
U.S.` Asian allies, for discussing a rebalancing of financial commitments, new strategies for 
tackling common challenges, upgrading NATO`s outdate  mission and structure, including 
for confronting migration and Islamic terrorism. Finally, he promised to work with U.S.` 
allies to reinvigorate Western values and institutions, “Instead of trying to spread universal 
values that not everybody shares or wants, we should understand that strengthening and 
promoting Western civilization and its accomplishments will do more to inspire positive 
reforms around the world than military interventions589 
 Echoing Brzezinski`s main geopolitical considerations concerning the global 
leadership role of the United States, and the strategic threats of Middle East originated 
violence towards the rest of the world, Trump`s Mayflower program-speech attributed 
detailed offensive attention to the latter. He declared, “First, we need a long-term plan to halt 
the spread and reach of radical Islam. Containing the spread of radical Islam must be a major 
foreign policy of the United States and indeed the world…Our actions in Iraq, Libya and 
Syria have helped unleash ISIS, and we`re in a war ag inst radical Islam …We are getting out 
of nation-building business and instead focusing on creating stability in the world…We are 
going to be working very closely with our allies in the Muslim world, all of which are at risk 
from radical Islamic violence, attacks and everything else. It is a dangerous world, more 
dangerous now than it has ever been… And then, there is ISIS. I have a simple message for 
them. Their days are numbered…590” 
 The leitmotifs of Trump`s program speech: “America First”, American and mutual 
interests, making deals, peace, world stability andfriendship, nation-state, no globalization 
and nation-building, etc, brought a lot of sneer, rjections and accusations of `isolationism`, 
`non-conservatism`, and lack of understanding of what real threats America faces, even adds 
that Trump is the “Kremlin candidate”. 
 His speech did not deviate considerably from the themes he had already enunciated 
during his election campaign, and it showed that if elected, he is firmly determined and 
willing to go very far indeed, though not abandoning entirely the tenets of Washington`s 
Grand Strategy playbook. Nothing similar has ever been heard from a Republican candidate 
on foreign policy in decades, and it seems that Trump does not only want to modify the 
GOP`s foreign policy stands, but that he is out to destroy some of them, dispensing with an 
entire wing of the Republican Party that has controlled the commanding heights of Grand 
Strategy over recent decades. 
 The “Never Trump” campaign also led to an open letter from 121 Republican Party 
affiliated foreign and security policy strategists and leaders, declaring that if elected, they will 
not work with Trump,591 among whom very influential China experts, such as Robert D. 
Blackwill, Aaron Friedberg, Daniel A. Blumenthal, Colin Dueck, and others. 
                                                 
589 Ibid. 
590 See Ryan Teague Beckwith, `Read Donald Trump`s `America F rst` Foreign Policy Speech. 
591 `Open Letter on Donald Trump from GOP National Security Leaders`, War on the Rocks, March 2, 2016, at http://warontherocks.com 
/2016/03/open-letter-on-donald-trump-from-gop-national-security-leaders/ 
 161 
 Trump`s response, in his speech, was blunt and direct, “I will also look for talented 
experts with new approaches, and practical ideas, rathe  than surrounding myself with those 
who have perfect resumes but very little to brag about except responsibility for a long history 
of failed policies and continued losses at war”.592 
 
 New evolutionary pillars of U.S. Grand Strategy in 2017 
 
 President Trump´s major foreign policy speech593 in Riyadh on May 21, 2017, gave 
food for thought, and raised different assessments a d policy questions: 
For the first time Trump openly announced that the U.S. is adopting a new Grand 
Strategy – based on ´Principled Realism´ paradigm, not only for the Middle East but for the 
whole world, rooted in common values, shared interests, and common sense. For that, U.S. is 
committed to adjust its old strategies to meet evolving threats, discarding those that have not 
worked, using new approaches informed by experience, talent, and judgement. 
Declaring that friends will never question U.S.´ support and enemies will never doubt 
U.S.´ determination, Trump emphasized that U.S.´ partnerships will advance security not 
through radical disruptions, decisions will be based on real world outcomes, not on inflexible 
ideology, guided by the lessons of experience, not the confines of rigid thinking. 
Wherever possible, Trump pledged, the U.S. will look f r gradual reforms, not 
sudden interventions, as it seeks partners, not perfection, and to make allies of all who share 
U.S.´ views and work for peace. 
As key phrases - ´´security guarantees, faith (implying also fight for human rights); 
fight of Good versus Evil (echoing Reagan´s  Cold War fight with the ´evil empire´, and 
Bush Junior 2002 NSS´s formulations of Good versus Bad, just before the 2003 Iraqi 
invasion), partners and allies´´, can be singled out in Trump´s program speech. Explaining 
his motivations and the logic behind his consequent visi s to Saudi Arabia, Israel and the 
Vatican, he floats the vision of faith (Islam, Judaism, and Christianity) as uniting and 
cementing a partnership of civilizations by bringing the three religions together in the fight of 
Good against Evil – i.e. versus terrorism, radical extremism (the term – Islamic, not used), 
and notably – Iran. This type of Islamic-Judaic-Christian, faith based pattern of coalition 
quite resembles their respective roles, especially that of the Polish Catholic Pope and the 
Muslim Taliban in Afghanistan, during the Cold War´s fight against the faithless, atheistic, 
and communist former Soviet Union. 
According to Chinese IR experts594, current U.S. GDP is around $ 18 trillion, but only 
$ 7-8 trillion is from real productive economy. What America exports most is security 
guarantees, which now Trump demands to be well-paid, digital dollars and issues debt. In 
Congress approved government spending of $ 1.17 trillion, until the end of 2017 fiscal year, 
September 30, 2017, almost all of Trump´s demands for funding increases were cut. From $ 
54 billion demand for defence spending, only $ 15 billion were allocated.  
At the backdrop of its economic, financial, and debt problems, Washington is not able 
to launch and promote similar to the OBOR/BRI intercontinental integration and 
development project in infrastructure, industry, trade, energy, science and technology. 
Decades long-term projects will sooner or later begin to be financed in Chinese RMB or in 
local currencies of the participating countries 
President Trump has constantly indicated that he needs weak dollar, huge flows of 
dollars back to the U.S. to fence off higher inflation, avoid $ devaluation, and strengthen the 
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global reserve currency status of the U.S. dollar. Switching away from his electoral promises 
platform of disengagement from foreign ventures to recent overt military actions in 5 
locations (Yemen, Syria, threats and Navy concentration against North Korea, Eastern 
Afghanistan, more troops to Northern Iraq and Eastern Syria), Iran probably pending, show 
that something major has changed Trump´s declared Gand Strategy philosophy, leading to 
the Riyadh major speech. 
His renewed desire to escalate the faith based coalition fight of Good versus Evil and 
potential military tensions, may be considered as a front for America´s continual financial 
warfare, this time directed at regions where signifcant quantities of U.S. dollars are owned 
and invested – the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, South Korea and Japan, 
offering the potential for capital flight, including due to his huge tax cuts bill. 
By issuing debt, the U.S. brings a large amount of dollars from overseas back to the 
U.S.´ three big markets: the commodity market, the Tr asury Bills market, and the stock 
market. By recycling: print $, export $ (foreign owned dollars never leave the U.S., only their 
function), and bringing back $, the U.S. has become a financialized economy, and partly 
America´s wealth is sustained by a pump-and-dump operations facilitated by the dollar´s 
reserve currency status. The U.S. government causes dollars to be diverted from foreign trade 
and investment in real economy and manufacturing, to be invested in Treasuries, by 
increasing the risks of other uses compared with owning U.S. Treasuries, which are deemed 
to be ´risk free´. Mostly due to the Ukraine crisis, Russian outflow of capital for the last 
couple of years has amounted to almost $ 100 billion per annum. By threatening North 
Korea, dollar investment is likely to flow out of trade and investment in South Korea and 
Japan, back to U.S. Treasuries. 
The second reason for the new ´Principled Realism´ Grand Strategy perhaps aims the 
strengthening of the control over the Gulf States rega ding oil sales in U.S. dollars, and not in 
other currencies, especially not in Chinese RMB, whereas the recycle scheme will deliver 
huge profits. The opening of Global Centre for Combating Terrorism, especially its 
financing, during Trump´s visit in Riyadh, also serves to that purpose, as well as opens the 
door more broadly for permanent and additional risks generating arms sales to the region. 
Third, anti-Iran sabre-rattling and potential sanctions will substantially increase the 
conflict risk indexes in the region and will diminish Iran´s important integration role and 
function in the OBOR/BRI, not to mention the unknown outcome in case of regime change. 
Fourth, Trump probably is assuming that by launching a new stage of ´Global War on 
Terror´ it would be easier to persuade Congress to anction an increase in the debt ceiling, as 
it has always been easier to press Congress to finance n administration in ´war-like´ 
situation. Besides, the necessary dollar-denominated capital inflows will block the otherwise 
pending increases of interest rates by the Fed, thus minimizing the risk of triggering of a full-
blown debt crisis. 
Finally, as was the case with the Asian crisis, it seems China will avoid being 
undermined by the above mentioned hypothetical negative consequences of capital flows and 
regional security destabilization damaging the OBOR/BRI. It also seems that America has 
already failed in its financial warfare against China, and needs new alternatives, which is 
why the attention has switched to the Korean peninsula as well as the Middle East. 
Trump now realizes the only way his presidency can deliver, survive and prosper is to 
encourage capital flight into America from abroad, nd lift the debt limit to accommodate it. 
As regarding the future of the faith-based coalition, for the Chinese scholars, it 
remains to be an object of additional academic research and analysis, as to how, when, and if 
it will have a serious impact on communist/atheistic China´s relationships with the Islamic 
and Christian world. Not surprisingly, China is actively working to sign an agreement with 
Pope Francis on the appointment of Catholic Bishops in the PRC. 
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2017 U.S.´ NSS 
 
No U.S. administration has ever released its Nationl Security Strategy (NSS) in its 
first year in office, offering the President´s appraisal of America´s core interests, challenges, 
and opportunities, and (to a lesser degree) the means by which the administration intends to 
achieve its Grand Strategy vision. Each needed timeo r concile campaign-driven rhetoric 
with an unforgiving world that even astute foreign policy and security advisors did not fully 
appreciate when campaigning. 2001 Bush Junior administration issued its first NSS in 
September 2002, while 2009 Obama administration releas d it in May 2010, with none of the 
two Presidents present or speaking at the launching ceremony in their official capacity. 
On December 18, 2017, only after 11 months in office, President Trump personally 
launched and delivered remarks regarding his administrat on´s National Security Strategy595 
(17th edition) defined as ´America First NSS´, at the Ronald Reagan Building and 
International Trade Centre in Washington D.C. 
The 68 pages document begins with President Trump´s signed address to fellow 
Americans, giving account of his initial period in office. For him, the United States faces an 
extraordinary dangerous world, filled with a wide range of threats that have intensified in 
recent years with rival powers aggressively undermining American interests around the 
globe. Nearly one year in office, although serious challenges remain, the U.S. is charting a 
new, very different course, and this NSS puts America First, as a duty of the government and 
the foundation of U.S. leadership in the world, andshows the way. 
In comparison with the previous 16 editions of NSS, the construct of this one is 
genuinely new and innovative: Introduction; Pillar I – Protect the American People, the 
Homeland and the American Way of Life; Pillar II – Promote American Prosperity; Pillar III 
– Preserve Peace through Strength; Pillar IV – Advance American Influence; The Strategy in 
a Regional Context and Conclusion. 
The Competitive World section of the first pillar points out that the U.S. will respond 
to the growing political, economic, and military competitions that it faces around the world, 
where China and Russia challenge American power, influe ce, and interests, attempting to 
erode American security and prosperity, determined to make economies less free and less 
fair, to grow their militaries, to control information and data to repress their societies and 
expand their influence. 
Second pillar´s promotion of American prosperity will be based on rejuvenating of 
the American economy, on fair and reciprocal economic relationships to address trade 
imbalances, on lead in research and technology, on pr tecting the economy from competitors 
who unfairly acquire U.S.´ intellectual property, and on America´s energy dominance. 
Third pillar´s preservation of peace through strength will be achieved by rebuilding 
U.S. military, if necessary to be able to fight and win, and by competing with all tools of 
national power to ensure that regions of the world a e not dominated by one power. Allies 
and partners are expected to magnify U.S. power and to shoulder a fair share of the burden of 
responsibility to protect against common threats. 
The main assessment in this section of the NSS is that: ´´A central continuity in 
history is the contest for power. The present time period is no different. Three main sets of 
challengers – the revisionist powers of China and Russia, the rogue states of Iran and North 
                                                 






Korea, and trans-national threat organizations, particularly jihadist terrorist groups – are 
actively competing against the United States and our allies and partners.´´596 
Fourth pillar´s advancement of American influence will be based upon a world that 
supports American interests, reflects U.S.´ values, and makes America more secure and 
prosperous, while U.S. will compete and lead in multilateral organizations so that American 
interests and principles are protected. Together with allies, partners, and aspiring partners, the 
United States will pursue cooperation with reciprocity, as cooperation means sharing 
responsibilities and burdens. 
The threat assessment analysis of the section – The Strategy in a Regional Context of 
the NSS, and the priority grading of the regions: Indo-Pacific (instead of Asia-Pacific); 
Europe; Middle East …, shows the pivotal concerns and ttention that the document attaches 
to China as a primordial peer-competitor, not only i  the Indo-Pacific region, but also for the 
first time in a NSS, in Europe, next to Russia. 
The conclusion of the December 2017 NSS clarifies and emphasizes that the strategy 
is guided by a Principled Realism paradigm, being realist, because it acknowledges the 
central role of power in international politics, affirms that sovereign states are the best hope 
for a peaceful world, and clearly defines U.S. national interests597. 
President Trump´s first NSS as a whole envisions a world in which the United States 
confronts two ´revisionist´ great powers – China and Russia – both of which are seeking to 
change the global status quo, often to the detriment of America´s interests. 
Particularly after a change of party, an administration’s first NSS inevitably pledges a 
sharp break with the foreign policy of its predecessor. Presidents Obama, George W. Bush, 
and Clinton defined their early foreign policies by contrast with their predecessors, but then 
managed to articulate more affirmative visions through their respective NSS. Trump’s 
penchant for ad hominem invective suggests he might struggle with an NSS that does not use 
Obama’s foreign policy as a guiding foil. Objectively and empirically, the main structural 
focus of attention and analysis of China´s role as the main challenger and peer-competitor to 
the USA, almost explicitly labelled - ´an economic aggressor´ in this NSS, can be read by the 
following comparison: In Obama´s 2015 NSS China wasanalyzed and mentioned 12 times; 
Russia – 15 times; the Ukraine – 5 times. In Trump´s 2017 NSS the numbers are inverted: 
China – 32 times; Russia – 25 times; the Ukraine – once. 
While President Obama´s two national security strategies emphasized cooperation 
with allies and economic partners, the new 2017 NSS attempts to walk the line between 
Trump´s campaign slogan of ´America First´ and the insistence that he is not rejecting 
working with American partners – as long as they do so on terms advantageous to the United 
States. Moreover, Trump´s NSS contains more than a few hints of a return to a Cold War 
view of the world, including the open option for a new arms race and the ideological variable 
of the American model versus the Chinese model. While Obama used his strategies to de-
emphasize nuclear weapons as a key to American defese, Trump calls those weapons ´´the 
foundation of his strategy to preserve peace and stability by deterring aggression against the 
United States, allies and partners.´´ 
In another shift from his predecessor, President Trump´s NSS does not recognize  
climate change as a threat to national security. The document instead places climate under 
the section on embracing ´´Energy Dominance´´, and declares that while ´´climate policies 
will continue to shape the global energy system, ´´American leadership will be 
´´indispensable to countering anti-growth energy agenda.´´598 
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´´In his speech announcing the NSS Mr Trump said: ´America is in the game, and 
America is going to win´, to an audience that included cabinet members and military officers. 
The disconnect between the president´s speech and the analysis in his administration´s 
document attests to the broader challenge his national security advisers have faced, as they 
have struggled to develop an intellectual framework that encompasses Mr Trump´s 
unpredictable, domestically driven and Twitter-fueled approach to foreign policy. The same 
confusion has confronted foreign governments trying to understand Mr Trump´s conflicting 
signals. …Some foreign policy experts praised the repo t for its vigorous tone. For Nile 
Gardiner, director of the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom at the Heritage Foundation,  
´´It´s a robust statement of U.S. leadership on the world stage, it´s a rejection of 
isolationism.´´599 
For others, however, the disjunction between Mr Trump and his national security 
team raised questions about how relevant the strategy would be. ´´Who does it represent? 
What does it represent? How seriously should we takit?´´ asked Richard N. Haass, who 
served in the State Department during George W. Bush administration and is currently the 
president of the Council on Foreign Relations.600 
The immediate Chinese reaction to President Trump´s s eech and launching of the 
NSS was expressed in several publications/editorials in the official government and Party 
organs, ranging from cautious preliminary analysis, di appointments over the hegemonic 
approach, emphasis on the U.S.-China cooperation options in the document, even sort of 
mockery.601  
´´We urge the United States to stop deliberately distorting China´s strategic 
intentions, and abandon outdated concepts such as a Cold War mentality and a zero-sum 
game. Otherwise it will only harm everyone,´´ Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua 




The ultimate challenge for the 21st century: how to build a shared international order in 
a world of different historical perspectives and national interests, violent conflicts and 
ideological extremism verging to chaos, financial and economic crisis – bail outs, bail-ins, 
currency and trade wars, zero and negative interest rates, austerity and ecological threats, is 
high on the agenda of policy-makers and IR scholars all around the globe, with calls and 
attempts for coherent new respective Grand Strategies in this age of transformations and 
power shifts. 
President Xi Jinping, unlike his recent predecessors and especially after October 2017 
CCP Congress, and March 2018 NPC annual session, has skyrocketed his personal paramount 
power, authority, policy tools, and flexibility to seek realization of his China Dream, and his 
intentions should not be simply discarded as a piece of Chinese propaganda. 
The 2013 OBOR strategic initiative, AIIB, New Development Bank, Silk Road Fund, 
calls for a new Asian Security Concept, Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and 
APFTA, all work in that direction of assessments and geopolitical logic. The formal 
alignment, participation and expressed willingness of good number of countries to take active 
part in these projects of magnitude also shows that China has not embarked on the self-
empowering realist structural paradigm, but will seek and pursue as much as possible 
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multilateral auxiliary solutions to its strategic goals, projecting her alternative to the current 
volatile, disorderly and chaotic world, image, as a `peacefully dreaming China`. 
For all his faults and statements` contradictions as a candidate, after being elected, 
Trump is trying to survive politically domestically, and to force a sea change in the American 
political discourse. In case he gradually achieves po itive results in his urgent American 
centered Grand Strategy, which on balance is not “isolationist”, but a `continuity through 
change` - unpredictable, ambitious and flexible mix of “global leadership plus controlled 
accommodations”, as suggested by Brzezinski, then in the 21st century we may witness risky, 
unprecedented competition and rivalry, balancing and hedging, between China Dream and 










































 CHAPTER 5: NEW SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS? 
UN; EU; G-7; G-20; BRICS; SCO: which way into the 21st century?  
 
The chapter researches and analyzes different theorizing on current geopolitical shifts 
in the system of IR. Based on empirical documentary data on recent major international 
events, platforms and forums, including Chinese systemic structured initiatives and positions 
towards global players, I try to elucidate Beijing´s drive and intentions for the elaboration of a 
new system of global governance and international rel tions. Complementing and in strong 
cohesion with the previous ones, the chapter adds value to the overall research design of 
demonstrating China´s third path geo-strategic operational behavior from within and from 
outside of the existing system of international relations that leads its China Dream Grand 
Strategy in dealing with global and regional multilateral institutions. 
 
Chinese approach and strategy 
 
“ The global governance system is built and shared by the world, not monopolizes by a 
single country. China certainly has no intention to do so. China is involved in building the 
current international system…to uphold the international order and system with the UN as its 
core and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter s its foundation…It is necessary to 
adjust and reform the global governance system and mechanism. Such reform is not about 
dismantling the existing system and creating a new one to replace it. Rather, it aims to 
improve it in an innovative way …To build a more equitable, just and effective architecture of 
global governance meets the common aspiration of all countries. China and the U.S. share 
broad interests … should work together to improve the global governance system … jointly 
respond to major challenges facing mankind…China stands ready to work with all the other 
UN member states to build a new type of internationl relationship featuring win-win 
cooperation, improve the architecture of global governance, and build a community of shared 
future for mankind”.602  
This is how President Xi Jinping began The Wall Street Journal interview during his 
September 2015 state visit to the United States. The plain English translation of this 
politically correct, non-confrontational, and idealistic-constructivist charged position, and 
how really Beijing thinks, can be found in the official CCP´s analysis, and the theorizing of 
leading Chinese IR scholars regarding the current international relations/global governance 
system. 
China´s swift response to the special report ´´Post-truth, post-West, post-Order´´ 
submitted for discussions at the 53rd Munich Security Conference (MSC) February 17-19, 
2017, was published in the Party propaganda organ Re min Ribao (People´s Daily) on 
February 22, 2017.603 It played down the report´s anxieties and concerns that the world is 
facing an era shaped by disorder and illiberal actors, that world order could be on the verge of 
collapse due to the rise of populism, anti-globalization tide in the West, as well as the divided 
relations between Western countries. The editorial claimed that the two Western narratives 
about history and status quo of the world must be corre ted, as it was unfair to label the 
current international order being ´´created by the West´´ while neglecting the rising 
international strength of the developing countries. Sketching a gloomy current global status 
quo, still, Renmin Ribao pointed out that the world is definitely not out of order. For Beijing, 
the multilateral framework and mechanisms built after WWII continue to play key and 
irreplaceable part and role in maintaining world peace and development. As long as every 
country abides by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, disputes and conflicts can be 
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resolved and win-win outcomes based on peaceful coexistence will dominate the system of 
international relations and global governance. ´´The more chaotic the world becomes, the 
more it needs countries like China to maintain world peace, contribute to global development, 
defend multilateralism, and make contributions to human peace via its own development 
model´´604, the editorial conclded. 
According to the former President of China Institute of Contemporary International 
Relations (CICIR) Cui Liru, the world has entered an era of multipolarization and is still in a 
process of historical transition. In the still existing space for changes in comparative strengths 
of old and new power centers, the old equilibrium has been broken, and a new one is yet to 
come. As undoubtedly the most important player in the process, the U.S. is taking advantage 
of its remaining power assets and tremendous clout in the current international system to 
sustain its dominant status in an emerging multipolar era, despite the irreversible weakening 
of its leadership.605 For the Chinese professor, President Obama`s attempts of adjustments in 
the U.S. foreign policy have been wise in that they were meant to modify the way the 
American Grand Strategy is practiced, the essence of which still remaining in safeguarding 
the United States` dominance in three role models: a dominant player, a leader, and a balancer 
in a new world order. According Cui`s analysis, within the Washington establishment exists 
disagreements over how to achieve U.S.-dominated equilibrium in strategy for handling 
contradictions with rising powers. Influential business community, led by major transnational 
corporations, and financial movers and shakers on Wall Street, seek to continue the pragmatic 
cooperation with China as a main stakeholder, yet, political hawks and special interest groups 
from within the military-industrial-security complex s, on the pretext of safeguarding U.S. 
leadership and national security push for tougher policies and actions versus potential 
strategic rivals, foremost against China and Russia. Obama administration`s Pivot to the Asia-
Pacific is viewed by Cui as a compromise scheme, th core of which still including power 
politics and hegemonic aspirations of the past. Unfortunately for Obama, his Grand Strategy 
adjustments have proven difficult due to financial restraints, the chaos in the Middle East, the 
Ukraine crisis, Europe`s debt and refugee travails, nd the Russian involvement in Syria.606 
According Michael Swaine`s definition of global governance, drawing on Rosenau 
and Keohane, “it refers to the ways in which global affairs are managed among nation states 
and non-states actors in the absence of a global government, normally denoting those 
structures, processes, and norms – usually organized into “regimes”- that provide public 
goods for the global community”.607  
How much and to what extent does China agree and accept this definition and the 
current form of global governance often described as the liberal international order and its set 
of values, institutions and processes centered on the promotion of open trade and liberal or 
free-market economic system? 
“The best solution for both China and the West is to create a new equilibrium of power 
to maintain the current world system, but with a larger role for China”.608 PRC, Nathan and 
Scobell claim, has good reason not to undermine the global governance system, because even, 
and if, it becomes the world`s largest economy, its prosperity will depend on the prosperity of 
its regional and global competitors. Washington should engage Beijing to accept this new 
equilibrium by drawing clear policy lines without threatening China, which as it rises will 
push against U.S. power. As China has not earned a voice equal to that of the United States in 
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a hypothetical Pacific Community  or a role in a global condominium as one member of a “G-
2”, Washington must back its policies with credible U.S. power, in two main domains: “First, 
the United States must maintain its military predominance in the Western Pacific, including 
the East and South China Seas …Second, the United States should continue to push back 
against Chinese efforts to remake regional and global legal regimes in ways that do not serve 
the interests of the West…, and it can manage China`s rise”.609 
Swaine`s claim that China has not changed much of its positions on global governance 
since 2008-9, is contradicted by Xi`s emphasis on the need of adjustments and reforms, and 
China´s active and practical policies of regional and global governance changes since 2012.  
Currently China regards itself as forced to play a junior role and by the rules written by 
others, while she seeks equality, parity, and will not accept to be managed or engaged as a 
secondary player, as suggested by Nathan and Scobell in 2012. 
China`s international relations and foreign policies have for decades reflected and 
abided to the principles of biding time and KLP, pursuing a restrained non-leadership foreign 
policy, comprehensive power building, and planning the first decades of the 21st century as a 
period of strategic opportunity.  
 One of the strategic goals of the new Grand Strategy was a more active promotion of 
multilateral governance with “Chinese characterictics”, both regionally and globally. In the 
early post-Cold War period, as discussed, Beijing was rather reluctant regional multilateralist, 
with concerns that regional forums were subject to the overwhelmingly economic superiority 
and manipulations by the Western-led alliances to put pressure and shape China`s policies, 
especially in regards to the absoluteness of China`s political system and national sovereignty. 
The new `Fuqiang` Chinese reality led to the strategic assessment of the possible benefits of 
working in multilateral forums as much preferable to the risks of isolation and encirclement to 
which Beijing regarded the Obama `Pivot` would lead to. Beijing targeted also the “China 
Threat” perceptions in the region with demonstration of responsible regional and international 
behavior. After the launching of the “Peaceful Rise” concept, and after Xi`s ascendance to 
power, the multilateral priority was geared towards the direct Asia-Pacific periphery, the 
region, and beyond, in the context of BRI.  
 . “Regarding the long term trends of world politics, Chinese leaders have, as pointed 
out, made five assessments: trend towards a multipolar world; trend of globalization; trend of 
Peace and Development; trend of reform of the international system and trend of growing 
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region”.610 At the 2014 FAWC, it was the first time, in recent 
decades, that top Chinese leader urged and instructed for more pro-active SFA global foreign 
policy that helps maximize China`s economic and security core interests. For Xi, that will 
lead in the long run to reforming the global international system, by implementing a “new 
major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics”, in order to construct and realize a “new 
type of major countries relationships”. 
  Beijing has not yet articulated fully defined and authoritative blueprint of its vision 
for the holistic future of the global order – “the international system”, emphasizing only that 
the current order has been hugely beneficial for the U.S, as was openly declared at the 2016 
Munich Security Conference.611 At the forum, China directly implied her understanding that 
there are two parallel notions: an international order in which China takes part, and “the U.S.-
led world order”. Fu Ying, representing Beijing, rhetorically asked: “Are we talking about the 
same order?” and gave China`s general, simplified definition. “The U.S.-led world order rests 
on three pillars: first, the American value system, which is also accepted as the Western one; 
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second, U.S. military alignment, which is claimed to be the security foundation for U.S. 
leadership; third, the international institutions including the UN system, and other element 
that fall in these categories”.612 The fact that the “Order(s)” in the title of her pre ared written 
speech was symbolically in plural, is a clear sign that China, as declared, does not consider 
itself as part of the “U.S.-led world order”.  
 Since 2012, China categorically and continuously insists for a “New Type of Major 
Countries Relations”. Xi`s “struggle for the international system”, firm restatements in line 
with adherence to the “five principles of peaceful coexistence” - “no hegemony, no 
expansion, no alliance”, and the BRI and AIIB `public goods` first time export of “China 
Development Model”, convincingly demonstrated that China has shifted to a KLP-SFA 
tactics and strategy. All the above underpins Beijing`s more powerful regional and global 
operational behavior combined with search of leadership status through cooperative active 
rhetoric for peace, win-win cooperation, community of common destiny, and world 
harmonious identity international relations. 
 China Dream Grand Strategy`s and Chinese foreign policy`s steps, intentions, and 
`gradual processes` of initiatives and policies still remain an open question regarding the 
concrete and real regional and global `ends`. For Xi, no single country can monopolize the 
international system, which is the general guideline, as to how China should concentrate its 
efforts in its “struggle for the international system”. His current priority and primordial 
concern and preoccupation is the success of the first 2021 strategic goal of the China Dream,  





 Official Chinese rhetoric on global governance and i ternational relations generally 
stresses six basic interrelated issues. First, to affirm and strengthen the principles of justice, 
equality, freedom and democracy, the increased status and effectiveness of international law 
and the bodies, which oversee and implement it, in particular the United Nations. Second, 
reforms needed, not to overturn the system, not only to correct “unjust and improper 
arrangements”, but also to manage an array of increasingly challenging global problems, such 
as – economics, health and nontraditional security. Third, reform-efforts to protect and 
advance the interests of developing states, against policies and actions, especially by 
developed nations. Fourth, core feature and bedrock status of “the principle of equality and 
sovereignty” – territorial integrity; no interference in internal affairs; rights to choose its own 
social order and development path”. Fifth, upholding the state sovereignty principle in 
international relations, and sixth, maintenance and expansion of open economic systems, with 
no protectionism.613 
 President Xi and China`s cautious and comprehensiv KLP/SFA ambitions to reshape 
and reform regional and global international system have never been so strategically driven. 
They overlap global financial and economic governance, by including also political (UN, 
BRICS, G-20 formal institutionalization), security (SCO, CICA,), environmental, cyber, 
civilization/cultural governance. New regimes and structured initiatives underpin China 
Dream Grand Strategy promotion and practical exemplary PR moves, actions, in search for 
recognition, support and credibility. Xi Jinping`s first September 28th 2015 statement at the 
General Debate of the 70th Session of the UNGA, “Working Together to Forge a New 
Partnership of Win-Win Cooperation and Create a Community of Shared Future for 
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Mankind” is a strong impulse and exemplary strategic policy direction in that aspect.614 
Clearly and firmly Xi reiterated in front of the international community that for China the 
United Nations (and its Charter) represent the universal and most authoritative international 
organization, a cornerstone that guides and establihes the fundamental principles of 
contemporary international relations. Using an ancie t Chinese adage – “The greatest ideal is 
to create a world truly shared by all”, for Xi, “Peace, development, equity, justice, democracy 
and freedom are common values of all mankind and the lofty goals of the United Nations”. 
For him, they are yet far from being achieved, and he urges the international community to 
renew its commitments to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter in building a new 
type of international relations featuring win-win cooperation, and create a community of 
shared future for mankind. Having gone through the test of time over the past seven decades, 
and having reached a new historical starting point, now the UN needs to address the central 
issue of how to better promote world peace and development in the 21st century”.615 
 Implying that the current international order does not function well for all, and that it 
has reached “a new historical starting point”, Xi outlined the Chinese assessments and vision 
for the efforts the UN member states should make to achieve the goal of a shared future for 
mankind: uphold the principle of sovereign equality of the UN Charter, creation of security 
architecture featuring fairness, justice, joint contribution and shared benefits, promote open, 
innovative and inclusive development, learn form the lessons of the 2008 crisis, and fully 
implement UN Sustainable Developmen Summit´s agenda. For Xi, increased inter-
civilizational exchanges should promote harmony, inclusiveness and respect for differences, 
as no civilization is superior to others. 616   
 Appealing to and luring the UN member states, President Xi also elaborated on his 
China Dream project of great national renewal as clo ely connected with the dreams of other 
peoples of the world. For him, China Dream cannot be realized without a peaceful 
international environment, a stable international system, understanding, support and help from 
the rest of the world. He pledged that China will continue to participate in building world 
peace and that no matter how the international landscape may evolve and how strong it might 
become, China will never pursue hegemony, expansion or sphere of influence. He also made 
commitments that China will continue to contribute to global development and will uphold 
the international order underpinned by the purposes and principles of UN Charter, as 
symbolically China was the first country to put its signature on it.617 
 The general budget of the UN is drawn up every two years, while the contribution of 
each member state is determined based on an assessment done every three years. Based on the 
new quota, China contributed $ 196 million in 2016 and $ 199 million in 2017, being the first 
one to pay its 2017 dues among the five UNSC member states. 
 To emphasize and to prove China`s credibility and practical involvement in the UN 
centrality in the international governance, Xi annou ced Beijing`s additional decision to 
establish a 10-year, U.S. $ 1 billion China-UN peace nd development fund to support the 
UN`s activities, advance multilateral cooperation and contribute more to world peace and 
development. He also announced that China will jointhe new UN Peacekeeping Capability 
Readiness System and has thus decided to take the lead in setting up a permanent 
peacekeeping police squad and build a peacekeeping sta dby force of 8000 troops, besides 
providing a total of U.S. $ 100 million of free military assistance to the African Union in the 
next five years to support the establishment of the African Standby Force and the African 
Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis. 
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 China`s global governance ideology, and the proposed changes to the existing 
international order, such as: reforming the `unjust` and `unfair` towards the developing 
countries past arrangements, and strengthening the la ter`s influence, strict application and 
equality of the principle of state sovereignty, reservations regarding the R2P – are still 
attempts, expressions of balancing and adjustments for that order, and not explicit intentions 
for departure or overturn. Beijing does not feel enough strong and influential, yet, for 
imposing radical regional and global governance initiatives and acts from position of open 
domination. The latter are becoming issues and resea ch topics under increasing debates in 
Chinese IR community. 
 In 2015, leading Chinese strategist on China-U.S. relations and security matters, IR 
theorist and promoter of moral realism theory, Yan Xuetong, contended that more likely 
present day world is leading towards a bipolar pattern featuring China and the United State, 
rather than a unipolar or multipolar global order.618 For him, the so called “Chinese century” 
must meet two preconditions: a unipolar international configuration and absolute Chinese 
dominance. Still, Chinese Comprehensive National Strength (CNS) is not global, and even if 
it successfully fulfills its 2049 second strategic centennial goal of “building a prosperous, 
strong, democratic, civilized, and harmonious modern socialist country” by then, the U.S. 
would not necessarily have lost its superpower statu  thereby. In his theorizing, international 
configuration is determined by two key factors: comparative strength and strategic 
relationships of major powers. From CNS point of view, China`s components are imbalanced, 
whereas its political and cultural influence is limited to the Western Pacific, and its military 
capabilities, the weakest link, have hardly gone beyond perimeter defense. The U.S. upgrades 
its military capabilities through wars, while China through military drills. From point of view 
of strategic relationships of major country, China`s global influence rests mainly on the 
economic component of its hard power, stands well only in front of Russia and Japan, but lags 
behind the U.S., Germany, GB, even France. 
 In 2016 article, Yan layed down the basic elements of his Chinese moral realism 
binary theory, according to which China can change the international system in the 21st 
century. 619 He claims that a rising state is able to displace  dominating hegemon in spite of 
its inferiority to the latter in terms of economic base, technical invention, education system, 
military strength and political system. As a binary theory, Yan defines that a states`s strength 
determines the strategic national interests while te types of political leadership determines 
the strategies for achieving those interests. Bringing back two key independent variables – 
political leadership and international strategic credibility, Yan posits that a strong political 
leadership with high international strategic credibility can facilitate changes in the 
international configuration towards new international orms and international system. 
 Admitting that his moral realism theory is still in ts infancy, and pending further 
development, he sends strong messages and urges for proactive approach from Beijing: 
 “China`s resurgence as a superpower may shape a new world order, yet, still difficult 
for moral realists to predict of what kind. China`s non-alliance principle adherence, in contrast 
to America`s strategy of alliance and partnership consolidation of its world leadership, hinders 
China from mobilizing international support for its national rejuvenation, and undermines 
Beijing`s strategic credibility. For moral realists, it is absolutely necessary for China to make 
alliances, as many as possible, and also to practice the ideology of fairness, justice, and 
civility, both at home and abroad, for the sake of its own strategic interests as well as those of 
the world”.620 
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 Concentrating more on the regional governance of the 21st century priority area of the 
Asia-Pacific, Cui Liru takes a more balanced, constructive, and cooperative approach. For 
him, globally, two increasingly conspicuous trends will shape the evolution of international 
order. First, at the level of global power structure, power is diffusing to more power centers, 
initiating a new round of balancing. The U.S. is striving to retain its dominant position in the 
de-centralizing (de-American hegemony) multipolar order, thereby enhancing containment of 
new, rising power centers, and regional major powers` increasing competition showing an 
even more complicated perspective of formulating regional order.621 
 Second, at the level of pattern of international relations, at the level of the degree of 
connectedness and ways of interaction between states, disruptive changes have occurred 
thanks to globalization – forming indivisible economic interdependence, social, personal 
mobility and Internet interconnectivity, etc, putting forward the need to redefine the concept 
of state-to-state relations in the macro picture of a networked world. He echoes to some extent 
Anne-Marie Slaughter`s proposal for U.S. “Grand Strategy of Network Centrality”, where she 
argues that the most important shift for America is not the rise of China and the alignment of 
power in the international system, but rather the ubiq ity and density of global networks, and 
that advancing U.S. interests, American strategists should analyze states as the principle hubs 
of intersecting regional and global networks instead of as poles in a unipolar, bipolar or 
multipolar system.622 
 In Cui`s view, as basic units of international relations, states and their foreign policies 
are caught in obvious contradictions resulting from the conflicting dynamics the above 
discussed dimensions have produced. In the structure of power dimension, the fundamental 
philosophy and strategy patterns are realistic, while in state-to-state relations` dimensions 
these are idealistic, pacifist and constructivist. Currently, international and regional orders are 
fumbling for balance between the two dimensions. Drawing on Kissinger`s World Order, and 
quoting his assessment that “although tremendous changes have taken place in the world, 
politicians` sense of history and geo-political awareness remain essential”, Cui shows his 
affinity to the doctrine of equilibrium as a basic truth in international order, and argues that 
China-U.S. cooperation in the construction of regional order for the Asia-Pacific, based on 
existing, realistic relations, is not only in their fundamental interest, but also their historical 
responsibility for the area.623 
 
 China-EU on global governance 
 
 Back on March 31, 2014, when meeting with then European Council President 
Herman Van Rompuy in Brussels, President Xi, for the first time, proposed that the two sides 
should jointly forge China-EU partnerships for peac, growth, reform and civilization to inject 
new impetus in their comprehensive strategic cooperation for the scope of new type of global 
governance and international relations. 
 Besides China, the EU, as the largest combined world GDP, is also in a search for a 
theoretical/practical framework and its copy right response to the changing global governance 
landscape. The long outdated 2003 EU Security Strategy was born out of a specific 
geopolitical context, where High Representative Javier Solana sought to heal the internal 
European wounds opened by the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and the acrimonious 
divisions, notably between the UK – France and Germany. The political message of the 2003 
ESS could well be read in the text: `effective multilateralism` emphasized the Franco-German 
                                                 
621 Cui Liru, `Building Order in Multipolar Era`, China-U.S. Focus, March 29, 2016. 
622 See Anne-Marie Slaughter, `A Grand Strategy of Network Centrality`, Richard Fontaine and Kristin M. Lord (eds.), `America`s Path: 
Grand Strategy for the Next Administration`, Center for New American Security, May 2012. pp. 45-46. 
623 See Cui Liru, `Building Order in Multipolar Era`. 
 174 
insistence to cement a European preference for multilateralism. Solana`s successor, Catherine 
Ashton, in old British way, made no secret of her skepticism towards a comprehensive EU 
updated Grand Strategy. 
 The first seeds, imposed by the real global governance adjustments, of what was to 
become the `EU strategic reflection process` were sown at the HR/VP designate Federica 
Mogherini`s hearing at the European Parliament in October 2014 when she called for a 
`strategic rethink` in EU foreign policy.624 In this complex and delicate endeavor she was 
enabled by the mandate entrusted to the HR/VP by the conclusions of the December 2013 
European Council. HR/VP was tasked, `in close cooperation with the Commission, to assess 
the impact of changes in the global environment, and to report to the Council in the course of 
2015 on the challenges and opportunities arising for the Union, following consultations with 
the Member States`. It was not new strategy production mandate, but one for reflection and 
assessments, showing the ambiguous positions within the European Council, where some 
member states were working for a new ESS, while the leading ones – Germany, France, and 
the UK were reluctant. 
 The period of relative European decline, financial, economic and refugee crisis, the 
rise of number of powers across the globe, diffusion of power beyond regional and global 
institutions, short supply of resources versus rising problems, and Lisbon Treaty that lacked in 
2003, finally made the European Council aware, thate primary purpose of an EU Global 
Strategy was actually the internal situation in the Union. After the HR/VP strategic 
assessment presentation at the June 2015 European Council, member states had to declare 
that: `the High Representative will continue the process of strategic reflection with a view to 
preparing an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy in close cooperation with 
member states, to be submitted to the European Council by June 2016`.625 While from 2008 to 
2013 there were divisions among major member states regarding EU global strategy, by 2015 
all agreed that the external global political, security, and economic environment had so 
radically changed – and not for the better – that str tegic decisions had become imperative. 
 Based on the 2015 EU Institute for Security Studies` analytical publication “An EU 
Global Strategy”626, prefaced by HR/VP Mogherini, a well informed expectation of the trends 
and potential content of the Global Strategy project that were to be introduced at the June 
2016 European Council could then be drawn. 
 The main assessments upon which the 2016 EU Global Str tegy was constructed and 
formulated, were, that since the 2003 ESS, the EU`s strategic environment has changed 
radically, the Union is surrounded by an arc of instability, into a more connected, contested 
and complex world,627 challenges and opportunities which the EU must confront, having the 
responsibility to protect its citizens while promoting the Union`s interests and universal 
values. 
 The analysis´ defined increased complexity of the world - global power shifts and 
power diffusion, was characterized as due to: U.S. continuous comprehensive global reach in 
the years to come, EU retaining one of the highest p r capita incomes in the world, and the 
end of the age of dominance by any single country. China was singled out as the prime 
amongst the new powers, with other emerging powers also rising in global rankings, but 
unlikely to form a single and cohesive bloc. For EUGS, different regions display different 
configuration of power, and globally power is diffusing beyond the nation state towards a 
network of state, non-state, inter-state and transntio al actors. Traditional multilateralism 
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was loosing steam, and emerging countries wanting to reform the post-WWII architecture – as 
much easier to oppose the existing than to create new global governance mechanisms.    
 According to the document, in the emerging global environment, the EU faces five 
broad sets of challenges and opportunities, ranked as follows: European Neighbors – support 
of reform in the Western Balkans, Turkey and the Eastern partners, strengthen statehood of 
Eastern partners, and engage Russia to restore sustainable European security architecture and 
address global challenges. North Africa and the Middle East – to tackle the immediate 
challenges in its South by sharpening its tools in the internal-external nexus and addressing 
immediate humanitarian crisis, to respond to old annew conflicts and help address the root 
causes of resentment through tailor-made responses. Africa  – to help unlock Africa`s 
potential by developing the right mix of migration and mobility policies, by bolstering 
security cooperation with the UN, the AU and other African partners, and by bridging fair 
trade and economic integration objectives. Atlantic Partnership  – to continue investing in a 
strong and sound privileged relationship across the Atlantic through closer cooperation 
between the EU and NATO and through the TTIP, deepen relations with Latin America and 
the Caribbean through bilateral partnerships and inter-regional arrangements. Asia –  EU to 
offer consistent and customized support to regional cooperation efforts in Asia and needs to 
foster a rules-based approach to conflict management and respond to  the opportunity 
presented by various developments in Asian connectivity drive – from ASEAN`s plans to 
China`s OBOR.628 
 Calling on the EU to tackle the challenges and seize the opportunities which the global 
environment presents, the analysis pointed out that effective responses depend on the Union`s 
ability to make choices and prioritize areas where it is willing and able to make difference 
depending on whether the EU`s external action instruments are fit for purpose, making 
reference to five key issues that need to be addressed: Direction; Flexibility; Leverage; 
Coordination; Capabilities. 
 Exemplifying the “comprehensive approach” pioneered by the CSDP, more relevant at 
present than a decade ago, where the “D” matters, the analysis urged for a joint-up EU 
approach in all aspects of the Union`s role in the world, for all actors and instruments of EU 
external action to work in synergy, as the EU needs a common, comprehensive and consistent 
Global Strategy. 
 The global functional integration of finance, industry, technology, and attempts to 
commonly address environment, and climate change has set the stage for what can be called 
global governance. Some American IR scholars´ vision that the U.S. wants to make best of de 
facto global governance networks, operating by virtue of myriad accords, business 
enterprises, government and non-government agencies, and international and transnational 
institutions,629 to some extent was echoed as an assessment of the `mor  complex world` in 
the 2015 EUISS` report, “while global power is diffusing beyond the nation state towards a 
network of state, non-state, inter-state and transntio al actors”.630 
 On June 28, 2016, VP/HR Mogherini reported and presented the Global Strategy for 
the European Union´s Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) to the European Council. There 
were few if any serious open reactions and comments from major powers and global public 
opinion – all of which were concentrated on the 5 days prior Brexit referendum outcome. 
Chinese leading ideological and propaganda machinery reaction was almost mute, except for 
a brief analysis by Chinese Academy of Social Sciences´ European researcher He Zhigao, 
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published at state controlled Global Times on July 7, 2016, entitled ´´EU´s security needs 
rethink after Brexit´´.631 
 The author´s, i.e. – Beijing´s initial assessments and conclusions were as follows: 
Brexit has overshadowed the EU´s Global Strategy, quoting Mogherini, ´´The purpose, even 
the existence, of our Union is being questioned´´. The EU is being questioned as both a model 
of regional integration and an example of regional security governance, which will cripple its 
international reputation. Brexit has severely impaired EU´s identity and position as an 
international actor. EU without the UK will not only have its foreign policy weakened but 
also its power to select policy tools, and constrain s will continue hampering the union´s 
diplomatic capability when it comes to security and defense issues; 
 By stating that the EU should transform its normative power and civilian power to a 
combination of soft and hard power, reinforcing cooperation with its strategic partners and the 
role of NATO instead of underlining its own strategic autonomy, and by turning its normative 
guidelines towards an integration of realism and idealism and especially stressing principled 
pragmatism, the author posits, ´´EU´s new Global Strategy has also changed to closely 
following the stability of eastern and southern Europe, meaning that its strategic emphasis has 
shifted to peripheral regions.´´ 
 Although East Asia and China are mentioned in the EUGS, the content related to Sino-
EU cooperation is mainly embodied in documents like ´´China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for 
Cooperation´´, EC´s June 22, 2016, ´´Elements for a new EU strategy on China´´ ( the latter 
being the seventh Brussels´ strategy document on Chi a since the EU and China forged 
diplomatic ties ), and so, the ´´model, fields and dynamics of Sino-EU cooperation remain to 
be seen in the post-Brexit era´´, the analysis concludes.632 
 On the sidelines of the 18th EU-China Summit in Beijing, 12-13 July 2016, HR/VP 
Mogherini gave a speech at the CASS, admittedly presenting and explaining for the first time 
to foreign audience the rationale of the new EUGS, after presenting the latter to the European 
Council at the end of June, including the EC´s June 22, 2016, ´´Elements for a new strategy 
on China´´.633 
 The key points and massages Mogherini conveyed in her speech at this Chinese 
leading party and state think-tank, were as follows:  
 It is in both EU and China mutual interest that they work through a united European 
interlocutor. EU together with China and the U.S. is in the world´s G-3, EU being China´s 
first trading partner, a global security provider, including in Asia. EU needs a strategy and 
needs it right now, as there are many questions about the future, first of all about the UK´s 
future and also about the future of the Union after th  Brexit. EU also has some certainties 
and some clear sense of direction, and what the EUGS is telling the world is: these are our 
priorities, this is kind of world we would want to work for, and the EU is ready to engage 
actively and pro-actively with all those who share th same priorities and the same goals, as 
´´engagement´´ is one of the key principles and one f the key words in both EU strategic 
documents. Engagement and cooperation are key words in EUGS: cooperation as vital and 
partnership – essential, particularly true for partne ship among the world powers, as 
confrontation leads nowhere. The European way of foreign policy being investing in 
partnerships, cooperation, in trying to find common ground for win-win solutions whenever it 
is possible, in the framework of international rules and international norms, and in full respect 
of international norms and rules. Singling out Afghanistan and Africa as examples where EU 
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and China can cooperate and work more closely, the second priority identified in the EUGS 
according to Mogherini is strengthening the resilience of states and societies in the European 
wider region, meaning: good jobs and economic growth, fighting climate change and its 
consequences, open societies and good governance, managing migration and giving shelter to 
refugees. Or, as a whole – making the next crisis les ikely to happen, very much linked to 
the full implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals – for which the EU feels a lot 
of ownership and responsibility and worked closely and cooperated with China to achieve this 
important result in 2015. For HR/VP,  new institution such as the AIIB can be important 
engine of development and resilience, and as resilience is not simply only about growth - 
´´development can only be sustainable if it doesn´t hurt the environment, and if it respects 
basic human rights´´.634 
 A third priority, beyond managing crisis and working for resilience, for Mogherini is – 
working for better global governance based on multilateralism and on international law, as 
Beijing is crucial interlocutor towards a more multilateral and cooperative world order. EU 
and China need to strengthen and deepen such cooperati n at international level and 
multilateralism by crucially respecting international commitments, implementing the 
decisions taken collectively and by abiding to the same sets of rules. EU insists on the need to 
address all maritime disputes in a peaceful way and in full respect of international norms and 
law, as violations of global rules make the entire int rnational system weaker, conflicts more 
likely and the world less secure. On the South China Sea, the EU underlines, without taking 
position on sovereignty aspects related to claims on land and maritime space, the fundamental 
importance of upholding the freedoms, rights and duties established in UNCLOS. In 
particular, the EU upholds the freedom of navigation and over-flight, and calls upon parties to 
fully respect decisions rendered by the relevant courts and tribunals, and always invites 
partners and friends to settle disputes in a peaceful and cooperative manner and avoid 
escalations that would be detrimental for the entir region. As partners, EU and China have 
interest for a strengthened multilateral system, and s the world keeps changing very fast 
better global governance calls for a reform of the UN and of the world financial institutions. 
Like China, EU believes that rather than unilateral approaches it is multilateral frameworks 
that need to be strengthened in more global and contested world. EU is ready to step up its 
engagement with China towards a more multilateral and cooperative, rather than multipolar, 
global order, as the EU believes in multilateralism and in a system that recognizes the 
different roles for different actors worldwide and the need of each having its place, its voice, 
its responsibility by the rules in a cooperative manner. 
 Being two leading world powers, representing two of the great civilizations of human 
history, EU and China and their peoples need each other and have the responsibility as an 
alliance of civilizations to lead the way towards shared progress for both and for the rest of 
the world.635 
 At the conclusion of the 18th EU-China Summit, the President of the European 
Council Donald Tusk made the following remarks: ´´ … We had rich and sometimes very 
candid discussions on all dimensions of our relations. …As result I can say that we moved the 
strategic partnership between the EU and China forward. …First of all we discussed the 
importance of international cooperation based on rules. A global order based on common 
rules is in our mutual interest but clearly we have our differences in what it means in 
practice…Secondly, ahead of the September G-20 summit in China I am happy that we 
agreed to tackle the migration crisis at the global level …Thirdly we agreed to have another 
round of dialogue about human rights still this year in Brussels. There is no doubt there are 
disagreements on this issue, but I welcome that China stands ready to engage. …Finally let 




me say this. We came here to discuss common challenges i  an open and friendly manner. It 
is not always easy to have such talks because the stakes are high and real differences 
persist….´´636  
 In its efforts and strategic reach for gradual transformative multipolar (not only 
multilateral) international system, the way it sees and defines it, Beijing, besides the UN, 
targets and exploits the more favorable geopolitica and geo-economic level playing field of 
the G-20 platform, where the G-7 and the U.S. Western-led security and alliance based world 
order dominance is more diffused, checked and balanced by the emerging and developing 
countries. 
 What was the global socio-economic, financial, institutional, developmental and 
general state of the play of globalization and globa  governance before the 2016 China G-20 
Leaders´ Summit that facilitated Beijing in its arguments for shaping the agenda of the 
Hangzhou meeting, including President Xi´s ideas, proposals and initiatives that dominated 
China´s G-20 Presidency? 
 ´´The third leg of the world´s intractable depression is yet to come. If trade economists 
at the UN are right, the next traumatic episode mayentail the greatest debt jubilee in history. 
It may also prove to be the definite crisis of globalized capitalism, the demise of the liberal 
free-market orthodoxies promoted for almost forty years by the Bretton Woods institutions, 
the OECD, and the Davos fraternity´´.637 For Pritchard, agreeing with the diagnosis and 
critique in the 2016 annual report of UNCTAD, ´´What is clear is that world will soon need a 
massive and coordinated push by governments to create d mand and bring the broken global 
system back into equilibrium. If this does not happen, it is sauve qui peut.´´638 
 The transition to a healthier and more realistically sustainable economic system will be 
the defining social battle of the remaining 21st century, as national social contracts worldwide  
are breaking down, with almost no serious global debat  about the role modern economic 
ideas played in the creation of the lingering 8-9 years financial and economic crisis. 
Governments responding to this with austerity and money-printing did not address the 
problems, becoming the defaulting contract parties when people anxiously ask and demand 
that social contracts be followed and respected - ´pacta sunt servanda´. Still, the over-
leveraged governments and banks´ balance sheets remain, aking a return to consumption 
driven growth almost impossible. Most obviously of all, almost no one has asked why the 
growth of the last 20 years has actually increased income inequality globally when modern-
day policy-makers and economists had promised it would do the opposite, or as put by 
Christine Lagarde -´´Global growth has been too lowf r too long and has benefited too 
few´´639 
The only sensible way to fix these problems seems to require Tolstoy´s ´´two most 
powerful warriors´´ - patience and time, which notably Beijing and President Xi masterly 
exploit and guide in their ´´struggle for the international system´´ and for the success of China 
Dream, as admitted by Ikenberry, ´´The world is in ome sort of global power transition, from 
concentrated power to multipolarity perhaps, or some kind of diffused system of power. 
Perhaps China is the greatest beneficiary of that.´´640 
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In Xi´s strategy and ´´struggle for the international system´´, besides the UN, G-20 is 
another current key level playing field were China seeks to demonstrate at least parity with 
the USA, using both geo-economics and geopolitics in its open challenge for a global 
leadership role of ´´rules making´´, leaving behind the ´´rules taking and sharing´´ role 
Beijing believes was supposedly assigned to. 
´´…Even though the G-8[7] and the G-20 remain controve sial in terms of legitimacy 
(they are self-appointed clubs trying to exert globa  leadership), they almost ´had to´ come 
into existence … both as European initiatives, originated from severe international monetary 
turbulence and financial crisis as indicators of deepening complex interdependence, or 
globalization, and the increased demand for internaio l cooperation the latter process 
entails… In the 1970s, there was a sense among Western leaders that dealing with crisis 
required high-level cooperation among the states that mattered most at that time. Leaders felt 
that the U.S. could no longer do it alone. In 1999, the G-7 realized that in its turn it had 
become too small, and that the new rising powers had to be brought on board. In fact, the 
creation of the G-8 and G-20 reflected the ongoing process of deepening multipolarity… By 
launching these bodies leaders wanted to add a new lay r of governance to the existing  global 
institutional architecture, namely two flexible and informal mechanisms among the most 
powerful states for consultation, coordination of domestic policies and giving the right 
impulses to official multilateralism. They deemed these new fora, with their very specific 
diplomatic methods, necessary to manage a world chara terized by both risk-prone 
globalization and multipolarity.´´641 
 Summitries through bodies such as G-7 and G-20 are predominantly Western ideas.642  
In the aftermath of the global financial - turned economic, crisis of 2008, large developing 
countries such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa, being very cautious, were not openly 
eager and active to fully engage in these mechanisms. In the last couple of years, China under 
Xi´s Grand Strategy radically reversed course in rega ds to G-20 aiming to grasp the ´strategic 
opportunity´ of being still the engine of world´s growth, and by way of example and ´wisdom´ 
– as driver and guardian of the emerging, developing and least developed countries (LDC), to 
gradually assert itself into an accepted unifying ad credulous world governance leadership 
role, initially on par with the West. 
As Yale´s Stephen Roach puts it -´´While seemingly elegant in theory, globalization 
suffers in practice…It also underpins the increasingly virulent anti-China backlash now 
sweeping the world…Those who worship at the altar of free trade – including me – must 
come to grips with this glaring disconnect…Trade liberalization – the elixir of globalization – 
promises benefits for all. That promise arguably holds in the long run, but a far tougher reality 
check invariably occurs in the short run. Brexit – the United Kingdom´ s withdrawal from the 
European Union – is just the latest case in point.´´643 
For the author of Unbalanced: The Codependency of America and China – the global 
growth is still made in China and despite all the hand-wringing over the vaunted China 
slowdown, that contribution is all the more important for preventing a global economy 
limping along at stall speed – and most likely unable to withstand a significant shock from 
toppling into a renewed recession. According to Roach, if Chinese official GDP target growth 
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reaches 6.7% in 2016 – China would account for 1.2 percentage points of the IMF expected 
3.1% global growth in 2016, or nearly 39% of the total. That share dwarfs the contribution of 
other major economies: U.S. – 0.3 percentage points; Europe – 0.2, and Japan – not even 0.1, 
making China´s contribution to global growth 50% larger than the combined 0.8 percentage-
point contribution likely to be made by all advanced economies in 2016.644 
Still, China´s economy is in a historic transition. Opportunities and challenges abound, 
with daunting problems, such as: ´new normal´ slower growth; social imbalances; industrial 
overcapacity; massive pollution – the list goes on. China Dream represents the overarching 
guiding strategy that addresses both domestically and externally these diverse and complex 
issues. According to President Xi Jinping, China´s development model, embodied into the 
´´Five Major Development Concepts´´ and adopted in the March 2016 13th FYP, going 
forward, will be driven domestically by the dialectical unity and interdependence of 
´´innovation; coordination; green; openness and sharing´´ within all the regions of the 
country.  
For Beijing to fulfill China Dream´s first comprehensive strategic goal of becoming a 
´´moderately prosperous society´´ by 2021, its economy must transition and its society must 
properly rebalance. Xi calls for market and governme t, or to use his metaphor - ´´the 
invisible and the visible hand´´, working together, to optimize and balance economic growth 
and efficiency with social fairness. The government in Xi´s philosophy is ´´smart´´, while the 
market is ´´decisive´´. 
President Xi is loyal to Deng Xiaoping´s definition a d legacy that China´s foreign 
policy and international relations are dialectical extensions of its domestic policies. Since 
2012-2013 China´s strategic operational behavior has proactively changed, including on 
global governance, and mainly regarding the G-20, – one of the major economic and financial 
platform of its global competition with the U.S. 
For Beijing, ´´major developed economies are witnessing the phenomenon of aging 
societies, inward looking and rising protectionism underpinned by surging anti-globalization 
which buffeted economic globalization and multilater l trading system, slowed down world 
trade and investment and given rise to accumulated financial risks of high leverage and 
expanding bubbles.´´645 
According to the Chinese University of Political Science and Law, September 2016 
report - ´States´ Participation Index of Global Governance (SPIGG) World Report´, China´s 
provision of public goods to the world is expected o be strengthened by taking more active 
role in the global governance process, especially given the current trends of de-globalization. 
A short-term plan focuses on promoting the sustainable growth of the global economy, 
improvement of the Financial Stability Board, the establishment of G-20 Secretariat and the 
implementation of the new BRI´´in which China and Asia will play the leading role to 
reinvigorate the economy and enhance regional cooperation´´ 646 
For the director of the Center for China and Globalization Wang Huiyao, ´´ China has 
benefited from globalization 1.0, wherein international organizations have supported China´s 
development. Now it´s an era of globalization 2.0, but the trend of de-globalization has taken 
shape … Global governance at this time is no longer about international organizations, but 
also nation states where China is to play more active role in the process´´647 
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The SPIGG report analyzes four main factors: mechanisms; performance; decision –
making and responsibilities in190 sovereign states cross the globe that constitute a solid base 
for understanding a nation´s role in the world, its participation in and contribution to global  
governance. While the average score being 287, China earned an impressing 600.7, placed 
after only France, the UK and the USA, the latter scoring 770 in total – 108 points higher than 
its closest competitor.The report notes the remarkable transformations that have lately taken 
place in economic growth and soft power, acknowledging the still existing gap between China 
and other Western powers, and points out that world lea ership is a status to be gained 


























Against this backdrop, China began its profound andpragmatic preparations for the 
2016 Hahgzhou G-20 Summit, right after Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott announced 
on November 16, 2014, at the Brisbane G-20, that China was selected to host the Summit in 
2016. 
 Two days prior to Abbott´s announcement, He Fan – Deputy Director of the Institute 
of World Economics and Politics, at President Xi´s favorite Chinese think-tank – Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, wrote: ´´Even though the world´s leading economies are 
preoccupied with their responses to the financial crisis, the global economy is losing 
momentum … IMF has downgraded its global growth forecast for both 2014 and 2015, … 
emerging markets are now suffering an unprecedented slowdown … and global trade has also 
turned down sharply…financial markets are still mispricing and potential crisis are lurking in 
the shadows.´´648 For the heavyweight advisor at the Chinese ministres for finance, 
commerce and foreign affairs it seems that the legitimacy of G-20 is declining, and people are 
increasingly cynical to what the Summits can achieve.  
For Fan, China is rising steadily and trying to find its place in the new alignment of 
global power, and as G-20 is a major platform for dialogue and coordination between 
developed and developing big countries, Beijing feels far more at ease at the G-20 than in 
other forums like the G-8. Assessing that China needs G-20 and G-20 needs China, and if and 
when China assumes the presidency, he posits that Beijing should seek to strike a balance 
between the developed and developing countries, granting the credibility to the G-20 it badly 
needs. 
According to Fan, ´´…positive reaction from the international community is also 
important. It has to be admitted that many Chinese people still have a deep-rooted distrust of 
the West, even as Chinese leaders are becoming more confident. China does not harbor 
interests to please the international community anylonger. Domestic politics influence 
diplomacy. The evolving economic and political changes in China may reflex on its 
international stance. A Cold War mindset and zero-sum game assumptions could poison and 
jeopardize G-20 cooperation. Look at how geopolitical conflicts tarnished the G-8. A failure 
of G-20 is unacceptable for all of its members… andG-20 could do better by upgrading to 
3.0, where economic growth is important but not the answer to all the questions. We have to 
look beyond the fluctuation of annual growth rates and address the issue of global governance 
gap. All the long-term issues with global governance and multilateral organizations should be 
on the G-20 agenda …and in spite of different diplomatic traditions member states will need 
to urgently develop a habit of thinking collectively about common challenges to global 
economic governance, 649, i.e. - floating the idea of changing the current liberal mode of 
globalization with an alleged new governance globalization with ´´Chinese characteristics´´. 
 Key agenda items of the 2016 G-20 Summit did not deviate largely from the above 
He Fan´s general assessments and prognosis. They promised China´s search and efforts for 
introducing ´novelties and change´ in the philosophy and nature of G-20, as the chosen theme 
of the 2016 Summit speaks for - ´´Towards an Innovative, Invigorated, Interconnected and 
Inclusive World Economy´´650, quite in line with China´s 2016 ´´Five Major Development 
Concepts´´ and Beijing´s push for ´´New Model of Major Country´s Relationships´´. 
When Western leaders visit China, and when and if given the chance to address 
student, academia and think-tank selected and prepared in advance audiences, they tend and 
legitimately prefer to usually raise the issues of democracy, rule of law, human rights, etc. 
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In contrast, Chinese leadership´s operational behavior, and especially that of President 
Xi, is to target and pragmatically address foreign national and multinational big business, 
industry and finance, which generally facilitated and contributed substantially to China´s 
economic development in the last three decades. Chinese leadership´s narrative usually 
concentrates on the success of China´s modernization, reforms and opening up, benefiting its 
over 1.3 billion population, an endeavor never undertak n in the history of mankind. The 
occasion of the 2016 G-20 Summit in Hangzhou was no exception. 
President Xi´s 47 minute keynote speech at the opening ceremony of Business-20  
Summit, on September 3, was the fora where all the current major economic and political 
messages which Beijing wanted to openly convey to the G-20 member and to the world, were 
on display, starting with the title of his speech - ´´ A new Starting Point for China´s 
development – A new Blueprint for Global Growth´´.651 
By openly promoting China´s development model, for President Xi, thirty-eight years 
of reform and opening-up has been a course of blazing a new trail, a Chinese own path of 
development of socialism with distinctive Chinese characteristics. China turned into the 
world´s second biggest economy with per capita GDP to close to 8000 U.S. dollars, lifting 
over 700 million Chinese out of poverty in just few decades what has taken other countries 
several hundred years to achieve, and has pursued independent foreign policy and 
international relations of peace and active involvement in building a fairer and more equitable 
international order with friends all over the world. 
Exemplifying the initial   success of China´s new development model, Xi informed the 
foreign business audience that in the first half of 2016, China´s GDP has grown by 6.7%. Its 
industrial upgrading and structural adjustments have picked up pace, the final consumption 
expenditure contributing 73.4% to GDP, and the added value of the tertiary industry up to 
54.1% of GDP, with steady household income growth, and 7.17 million new urban jobs, all of 
which added up gives even better prospects for China´s greater economic development 
contribution and lucrative options to the world. 
Using idealistic-constructivist parlance, Xi stressd that the new mechanisms and 
initiatives launched by China are not intended to reinvent the wheel or target any other 
country, but to complement and improve the current international mechanisms to achieve win-
win cooperation and common development – an open invitation to all, as China is not 
pursuing to establish its own sphere of influence, but to support common development of all 
countries. 
For the Chinese President, the world economy is in profound adjustments, moving 
along a twisted path to recovery, and stands at a crucial juncture where new growth drivers 
are taking the place of old fading ones. Protectionism is on the rise, global trade and 
investment – sluggish; multilateral trading regimes facing bottlenecks in development, and the 
emergence of various regional trade agreements leading to fragmentation of rules, as complex 
geopolitical factors, regional hot-spot crisis and global challenges have all affected the world 
economy with negative downturn consequences. 
Taking the banner of leader and spokesperson of the non-developed world, Xi pointed 
out that 2016 G-20 has, for the first time, put the issues of development front and center of the 
global macro policy framework, and the pioneering first action plan has been formulated for 
implementing the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development to support African countries 
and low-income developing countries (LDC) in their industrialization. 
Xi expressed his belief that the G-20 should join other members of the international 
community and act immediately and in good faith in the following aspects: ´´Work together 
and build a peaceful, stable international environme t … as the logic that a strong country is 
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bound to seek hegemony no longer applies and the willful use of force will lead to nowhere 
… All countries should uphold the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; work together 
to build a global partnership for win-win cooperation … and new type of international 
relations … and jointly build a community of shared future for mankind. Work together to 
improve global economic governance … as G-20 has come to a crucial juncture of 
development and one of the goals of China´s G-20 Presidency is to enable to transform it 
from a crisis response mechanism focusing on short-term policies to one of long-term 
governance that shapes medium-to long-term policies, and solidify its role as the premier 
forum for international economic governance.´´652 
President Xi´s official 13 minute opening speech of the G-20 Leaders´ Summit on the 
next day, September 4, 2016, in a nutshell repeated his previous keynote speech at the B-20. 
The speech was balanced, short of political and geopolitical references, but still quite firm and 
imperative, as most of the leading new paragraphs Xi began with the same phrase - ´In the 
face of these challenges, G-20 (we) should (must) …´, demonstrating Beijing´s resolve and 
determination to enhance the role and status of the forum as a centerpiece of multilateral 
economic global governance and cooperation, with China as a major player. 
After the G-20 closing ceremony President Xi held a 20 minute press-briefing of the 
outcomes of the Summit to the accredited journalists emphasizing that the forum was a signal 
to the world that G-20 belongs not to its members, but also to the whole world, and that for its 
vitality G-20 must embrace transformation, change and progress with the times. 
The G-20 Leaders´ Communique for the 2016 Hangzhou Summit was released late on 
September 5. While the 2014 Brisbane Communique had 21 articles, and the 2015 Antalya 
Communique displayed 27 article, 2016 Hangzhou one contained 48 articles. On September 
14, a total of fifty outcome documents, reports from international financial institutions and 
growth strategies for group members, including the Hangzhou Action Plan – a core outcome 
document, setting out a suggested strategy for the global economy to follow, were posted on 
the official website of the People´s Bank of China. 
What president Xi Jinping implicitly and symbolically tried to convey to the G-20 
Leaders and the international community, he openly xplained using plain realpolitik English, 
and gave further instructions at a study session on September 27, 2016, attended by members 
of the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee. 
For Xi, ´´the global governance structure depends on the international balance of 
power and governance reforms hinge on a change in the balance, … as the international 
balance of power has shifted and global challenges ar  increasing, global governance system 
reform has emerged as a ´trend of the times´ … China must take the chance and ride the wave 
to make the international order, with the principles of the UN Charter as the core, more 
reasonable and just to protect the common interest of China and other developing countries, 
by actively participating in global governance, setting rules and taking more international 
responsibilities, but definitely without overreach …´´653 
G-20´s role as a major platform in global economic governance should be promoted to 
a long-term mechanism. OBOR/BRI and AIIB projects, cooperation under the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, and regional cooperation mechanisms such as the Conference on 
Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), and the East Asia Summit 
should all be strengthened, according Xi´s guidelines and operational philosophy. 
´´China has been promoting the shaping of a new type of international relations … and 
will continue to pursue cooperation instead of confr tation …and needs to improve its ability 
                                                 
652 Ibid. pp. 8-9. 




of participating in the process of rule-making, agenda setting, publicity and coordination in 
global governance …´´654 
From ´big success´ to ´big on show but short on substance´ world coverage and 
divergent assessments, the China 2016 G-20 event can ot nd should not be underestimated 
both geo-economically and geopolitically: 
Whether the U.S. president got a red carpet - front d or - high level welcome might 
seem irrelevant, but the ´accidental precedent of Obama leaving Air Force One by the 
backdoor´ says much about China´s growing power, openly demonstrated self-confidence and 
initiatives for delivery of global public goods at the Hangzhou G-20 Leaders Summit.  
U.S.- Chinese exemplary joint ratification of the Paris agreement on climate change 
just hours ahead of the summit sort of calmed down the initial gaffe furor and offered China´s 
claim and promise of a new model for G-20 shared lea ership. China pragmatically used the 
host privilege of formulating and sending to the world a good number of direct and implied 
signals and imperative ideas and initiatives, in response to world opinion´s reservations about 
the role of the G-20 platform in the future. 
In its open efforts in confidence building and gaining broader trustworthiness Beijing 
used the parallel and offered its own national ´new historic starting point´, new national social 
contract within its China Dream Grand Strategy. It also offered the claimed successful ´new 
normal´ economic development model to be explored and shared with the goal of achieving 
´new G-20 starting point´ for global economic cooperation and governance, a new global 
social contract, i.e. – Globalization 2.0 planted with significant Chinese characteristics. 
Eight years after the creation of G-20, president Xi Jinping simply implied that the 
existing ´liberal economic and financial model´ is not working and that the international 
community must ´embrace change and progress with the times´. For him, G-20 ´´should 
provide solutions that address both the symptoms and the root causes of the global economic 
problems …must transform itself into a long-term mechanism … honor its commitments and 
become an active action team instead of a talk-shop´´655, thus enhancing its global legitimacy 
in contrast to G-7. 
Making the most of its status of member and guardian of the developing world, China 
brought at the summit the dual major themes of peaceful comprehensive global economic 
development and inclusiveness more firmly into focus. By extending official prior 
consultations well beyond the circle of G-20 members, and inviting a record number of guests 
from the major international institutions, from developing world, Africa in particular656, China 
secured its claim to being the most inclusive, globa ly responsible and unifying G-20 Leaders´ 
11th summit host. 
2016 G-20 Summit was abundant of psychological and Chinese classical style 
messages and symbols. Explicitly and implicitly it a med to demonstrate and show to the 
world China´s leadership abilities and claimed status of responsible major power. By its 
targeted efforts, ideas and initiatives Beijing tried to further open the door to comprehensive 
communication between China and the rest of the world, sending the implicit symbolic 
message - ´We are firmly determined to successfully implement our China Dream Grand 
Strategy of rejuvenation of the Chinese nation state and its people …at least we tried and 
offered to the world our ideas, visions, initiatives, and the ´´Hangzhou consensus´´ …, now, 
the choice is yours …´.657 
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Displaying non-systematic, non-streamlined references to the major emerging players 
to which the West prior made calls to share increased responsibilities in the global 
international relations and governance arena, the international IR community still falls short 
of correctly analyzing and assessing the mounting institutionalized cooperation of the BRICS 
countries - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa . It is the platform where Beijing 
tries to play the role of ´ first among equals ´ led by the goal of modifying and reshaping 
global governance – often to the detriment of the existing liberal order. BRICS not only insist 
for a broader say of the emerging and developing countries in the global international affairs,  
but also support the centrality of the WTO, IMF, WB, where, especially in the latter two, 
relevant governance structural reforms are needed. The BRICS also claim that their newly 
established New Development Bank (NDB) and China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) are not rivaling but complementing the role and functions of the IMF and WB, 
pledging to reinforce coordination to well build, maintain and further develop the 
compatibility of the BRICS and G-20 platforms, adhering to the principles of the UN Charter. 
 BRICS is not based on volatile economic conjuncture. There are four strategic goals 
that make BRICS a team and still functioning platform: each member tries to pursue an 
independent policy on the world stage, all members want reform of the global financial 
system, reforming the IMF in the first place, all want to strengthen the role of the UN, and all 
pragmatically want to use the factor of complementarity of their economies for the scope of 
speeding up their national development. Despite occasional doubts over the fading 
effectiveness of BRICS, and especially in the context of the recent serious economic problems 
in Russia, Brazil and South Africa, the developing world still looks at BRICS countries in a 
different way. In 2015, even IMF Christine Lagarde voiced her confidence in the development 
of the BRICS members against the background of the continuing fragile and unbalanced 
world economic recovery. 
 After prolonged discussions and negotiations since 2009, BRICS´ practical 
cooperation mechanism, especially at the last 2014, 2015 and 2016 summits, has formed a 
comprehensive, wide-ranging and multi-layered framework ( global governance, economy 
and finance, science, technology and innovation, civil society, anti-terrorism, etc,), setting an 
example for gradual successful multilateral cooperation and partnership among emerging 
markets and developing countries. 
 The sixth July 2014 Fortaleza, Brazil, BRICS summit, five years after the first 
presidential meeting in 2009, achieved its main goal and finally gained an institutional 
dimension. The creation of the BRICS´ New Development Bank (NDB - U.S. $ 100 billion) 
and the Contingency Reserve Agreement (U.S. $ 200 billion) had been discussed for several 
years, and yet came as a surprise to analysts who consistently argued that BRICS member 
states were too different from each other to ever agree on much. The sheer quantity of 
important global and regional issues laid down in the Fortaleza Declaration, along with the 
adopted Action Plan were impressive and underpinning the institutional character of the 
summitry. 
 2016 was crucial and testing for the future of the BRICS association project which 
comprises the five major emerging economies with 43% of the world population, having 
37% of the world GDP and a 17% share in the world tra e.  
 With most of BRICS nations mired in economic stagnation and with Brazil´s endless 
political/economic/institutional debacle many analysts assessed that BRICS is in a coma. 
After assuming the rotating Chair of BRICS in February 2016 in the tradition of ´´brief 
bumps´´ and lasting balancing acts towards Beijing, i  April, New Delhi hosted a three-day 
visit by U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter for finalizing the Logistics Exchange Memorandum 
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of Agreement (LEMOA) and decisions to boost bilaterl defense technology cooperation. 
New Delhi claimed that LEMOA is actually a version f the Logistics Support Agreement 
(LSA) which covers the provisions of logistical support, supplies and services between the 
U.S. military and armed forces of other countries, and Indian Defense Minister Parikkar 
categorically stated that LEMOA would apply only to supplies like fuel and food and not for 
stationing U.S. military in India. Also, although New Delhi has its own interests in the South 
China Sea, it has initially declined the idea to assist the United States in patrolling the region. 
 In 2016 Carter and Parikkar have met five times and the former´s last visit in New 
Delhi in December 2016 aimed reviewing the progress achieved in deepening defense ties 
over the last three years and the finalization of the provisions for the ´´Major Defense 
Partner´´ status which the U.S. had designated India during PM Modi´s visit to Washington 
in June 2016, before the change of administration in U.S. in 2017.658 
 Balanced and pragmatic India remained committed to the concept of multipolar 
world, which drives the BRICS platform, as its strong proponent right from the days when 
New Delhi co-founded the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961. In spite of the existing 
mutual India-China suspicions and periodic bilateral tensions,  Xi was the first leader of a 
major power to pay India a state visit in 2014 after the government of PM Modi was elected 
to power. Chinese cooperation and investments are still being courted and welcome. Parallel 
to existing differences and frictions with Beijing, India is interested and supports New 
Development Bank, CRA (Contingency Reserve Arrangement) and AIIB whose initial 
aggregate capital of $ 250 billion offers hedging ad diversity to the WB which has a capital 
base of $ 252.8 billion. India and China´s collective pressure did bring about a change in IMF 
quota regime in 2016 when both managed to get higher quotas, leading to a slightly less than 
the 15% blocking veto right of the BRICS countries as a whole. Understanding that together 
they have much more clout in all international negotiations, already evident at the WTO, in 
2017 Beijing and New Delhi took a joint stand against agricultural subsidies in the U.S. and 
EU. 
 October 15-16, 2016, India hosted the Goa Eighth BRICS Leaders´ Summit under the 
theme ´´Building Responsive, Inclusive and Collective Solutions´´. Goa Action Plan of 
events and meetings organized and held under India´s BRICS Chairpersonship before the 
Summit accounted for more than 100 - ( Parliamentarians´ Forum; meetings of National 
Security Advisers and ministers of: foreign affairs; finance and central bank governors; 
agriculture; disaster management; education; enviroment; health; labor and employment; 
trade; technology and innovation,  in addition  to tens of meetings and forums of working 
groups/senior officials, technical and expert groups in almost all kind of political, socio-
economic, financial, educational, health, business, youth and other aspects of the BRICS´ 
cooperation ). The Action Plan included also over 20 Indian key initiatives for further 
enlargement of BRICS´ cohesion: Rating Agency; Agriculture Research Platform; Institute 
for Economic Research and Analysis; Woman Parliamentarians´ Forum; MOUs for 
cooperation among BRICS Development Banks and NDB; in Customs, Ecology and between 
the Diplomatic Academies of BRICS countries, etc.659 
The 20 pages Goa Declaration of the Eighth BRICS Summit in India to a certain 
extent followed the letter and spirit of the final documents of the China hosted G-20 Summit 
in September 2016.660 
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The Declaration reiterates BRICS´ support for the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development (ASD) placing it as complementary to the African Union´s (AU) vision, 
aspirations, goals and priorities for Africa´s development enshrined in Agenda 2063. BRICS´ 
Leaders reaffirmed their commitment to strong, quota based and adequately resourced IMF, 
strongly determined to support the coordinated efforts by the emerging economies to ensure 
that the 15th General Review of Quotas, including the new quota f rmula, will be finalized 
within the agreed timelines. By protecting the voices of the least developed countries (LDCs), 
poor countries and regions, they welcomed the inclusion of China´s RMB into the Special 
Drawing Rights (SDR) currency basket on October 1, 2016. The Declaration also called for 
the advanced European economies to meet their commitment to cede two chairs on the 
Executive Board of the IMF. 
BRICS supports the multilateral trading system and the centrality of WTO as the 
cornerstone of a rule based, open, transparent, non-discriminatory and inclusive international 
trading organization with development at the core of its agenda. The declaration notes the 
increasing number of bilateral, regional and multilateral trade agreements, and reiterates that 
those should be complementary to the WTO in accordance with the principles of 
transparency, inclusiveness, and compatibility of the organization´s rules.661 
Appreciating the progress in the implementation of the Strategy for BRICS Economic 
Partnership and emphasizing the importance of the BRICS Roadmap for Trade, Economic and 
Investment Cooperation until 2020, the Leaders believ  that close cooperation between the 
sector cooperation mechanisms, BRICS Contact Group on Economic and Trade issues, the 
BRICS Business Council, New Development Bank and the BRICS inter-bank cooperation 
mechanism is crucial in strengthening the BRICS economic partnership. 
Commending China for the successful hosting of the 11th G-20 Leaders´ Summit in 
Hangzhou and its focus on innovation, structural reform and development as drivers of 
medium and long term economic growth, the Declaration recognizes the role of G-20 as the 
premier forum for international economic and financi l ooperation. The Leaders pledged to 
enhance BRICS consultations and coordination on the G-20 agenda on issues of mutual 
interest to their countries.662 
During its Chairmanship of the BRICS in 2016 New Delhi adopted and realized a five-
pronged approach: Institution building – to further d epen, sustain and institutionalize BRICS 
cooperation, Implementation of the decisions from previous Summits, Integration of the 
existing cooperation mechanisms, Innovation – proposals for new cooperation mechanisms, 
and Continuity of the mutually agreed existing BRICS cooperation platforms. 
BRICS´ New Development Bank (NDB) jointly founded in July 2014, headquartered 
in Shanghai and currently presided by the Indian K.V. Kamath, became fully operational in 
February 2016. NDB approved its first package of loans worth 811 million U.S. dollars in 
April 2016, with totally approved for 2016 - 1.5 billion U.S. dollars of loans for seven 
projects committed to infrastructure construction projects and sustainable development in its 
member states. The preliminary plans of NDB were to issue loans up to 2.5 billion U.S. 
dollars to over 15 projects in 2017. 
For Beijing, 2017´s China Chairpersonship of the BRICS presented a rare opportunity 
for the block to profoundly deepen cooperation in a wide range of fields, and thus help and 
guide the international organization in an active and better position to have a say and tackle 
global challenges and uncertainties. Since its birth in 2006, BRICS has gone beyond an 
economic acronym pleasant to the ear, and has become one of the most important locomotives 
for the world´s economic development contributing for more than half of the global growth in 
the light of the gloomy global economic picture. Despite the challenges, BRICS members 
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have abundant natural and human resources, vast markets, considerable growth potential and 
diversified prospects in trade and investments. Apart from carrying out structural reforms to 
make their growth more balanced and sustainable, the five economies also seek to coordinate 
their development strategies through such vehicles as the New Development Bank, the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank and BRI.  
In the international stage, BRICS countries, representing theirs, and the interests of the 
developing world, are called to drive the wheels of S uth-South cooperation, and claim to 
improve global governance and establish a fair, just and inclusive international system. 
Cooperation in economic and political fields has over the years, with ups and down, emerged 
as the two main ´´wheels´´ of BRICS. The rise of the five emerging economies has brought 
profound changes to the world political and economic landscape, and the group is bound to 
play a bigger role in international affairs as there is still much to be desired both in the 
international system and global governance.663 
The 2017 9th BRICS´ China Xiamen summit attended by all five head of states was 
particularly significant as it was held against thebackdrop of recent border discord in Doklam 
area in the Himalayas between India and China. 
The 73-day standoff between the two countries had casted shadow over the possibility 
of a successful forum. The standoff came to an end significantly days before the summit as 
result of mutual compromises, announcing ´´expeditious disengagement´´ of border personnel 
in conformity with the ´´Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence´´ and the Panchsheel 
agreement which the two countries had signed on April 29, 1954. Although there were 
differences in the manner in which disengagement was announced by the two sides, it 
nevertheless cleared the path for the summit and the signing of its Xiamen Declaration. The 
document emphasized that BRICS, as a forum, has ´´fo tered the spirit of mutual respect and 
understanding, equality, solidarity, openness, inclusiveness and mutually beneficial 
cooperation´´ among the members and reiterated their s ared desire for ´´peace, security, 
development and cooperation´´. 
China and India, being the two largest members of the BRICS, are the group´s most 
crucial economic members. For a long time trade and economics have been the key drivers of 
their bilateral relationship, while sensitive geopolitical issues have continued to overshadow 
more energizing aspects of their ties at times. Recurr nt tensions over issues like Doklam, set 
aside for now, China´s BRI, India´s reservations over the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(CPEC), as well as Beijing´s suspicions regarding potential role and inclusion of India into 
President Trump´s Pivot to Indo-Pacific area, replacing Obama´s Pivot to Asia-Pacific, 
continue to remain major irritants in the bilateral relationship.  
However, during the 2017 BRICS Xiamen summit the two sides displayed distinct 
diplomatic maturity, creating space despite differences, for mutual cooperation on broad range 
of issues, contributing to what was realized as a successful and added value summit, labeled 




Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is another basic multilateral 
international structure that President Xi utilizes for the consolidation of the building blocks of 
his China Dream Grand Strategy. 
IR professor Wang Jisi´s influential work on the need for China to ´´march 
Westward´´, was not only suggesting that China focus on the immediate periphery and 
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develop its West, but also appealed to Chinese leaders to refocus on the OBOR, and shift gear 
from their almost obsessive attention to China´s relations with the U.S. and maritime powers. 
Originally organized as the Shanghai Five (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan) in 1996, the organization added Uzbekistan in 2001 and renamed itself the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The six member states occupy territory that accounts for 
three-fifths of the Eurasian continent and have a population of 1.5 billion, almost a quarter of 
the world´s population. Unlike the BRICS, which according to Russian foreign minister 
Lavrov does not plan new member states in near terms, the SCO was officially expanded in 
2017 with two new member states – India and Pakistan. Thus the block´s population almost 
doubled to over 2.8 billion, adding huge territory in South Asia. SCO has four observer 
nations, including Iran, and six dialogue partners. Lobbied by Moscow and with the tacit 
support of Beijing, Teheran is expected to become the next member state of the SCO. 
As laid out in its charter, the organization functions as a forum to strengthen 
confidence and neighborly relations among member countries and promote cooperation in 
politics, trade, economy, and culture to education, energy, and transportation. The SCO has 
two permanent headquarters, the Secretariat in Beijing and the Regional Anti-Terrorist 
Structure (RATS) in Tashkent, the Uzbek capital. One of the organization´s primary 
objectives is promoting cooperation on security-related issues, namely to combat the ´´three 
evils´´ of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Decisions are adopted by consensus, and all 
member states must uphold the core principle of non-aggression and non-interference in 
internal affairs.664 
Recently, the SCO has also intensified its focus on regional economic initiatives like 
the integration of the China-led BRI and the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). At 
the 2015 Ufa Summit in Russia, member states adopte the 2025 SCO Development Strategy, 
which includes bolstering finance, investment, and trade cooperation as a priority over the 
next ten years. Beijing has pushed the organization to focus on economic and energy 
cooperation, including with initiatives for a SCO Development Bank and a free-trade zone. 
Met with skepticism in the past, consequently Central Asian member states and even Russia, 
in need of infrastructure and energy investment, have been responsive to these overtures, 
despite Moscow sensitivities to China´s expanding influence in former Soviet republics.665 
Predominantly China and Russia are the twin engines of the SCO, despite their 
balancing acts and self-nuanced visions for the organization. As India and Pakistan joined, the 
prospects for a SCO Development Bank may improve significantly. New Delhi, in spite of 
current economic and financial turbulences, strategically keen to invest in Central Asia, would 
be a source of additional financing and supporting l fe vitality into ambitious infrastructure 
and energy development plans. India could also grant greater legitimacy to the SCO 
traditionally seen as a club of authoritarian governments, and to give SCO the opportunity to 
revolutionize itself into a more comprehensive institution capable of connecting and 
integrating a broad swath of Asian complex and contradictory international politics. 
SCO represents the world´s largest regional cooperation organization and all members 
are major countries in China´s neighborhood and along the Belt and Road routes. 
At the same time, India, along with Japan, USA, and Australia, participated at a 
working-level meeting of the so called ´Quad´ of countries on the sidelines of the ASEAN 
summits in Manila in November 2017. The meeting was perceived as a coming-together of 
likeminded Indo-Pacific states to balance China, leding to Chinese foreign minister Wang´s 
warning to India of ´´cliques´´, a less-than-subtle reference to the reconvened ´Quad´. 
                                                 




Still, Beijing fosters the ´´Shanghai Spirit´´, the b drock of SCO, featuring mutual 
trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for cultural diversity and pursuit of 
common development, and searches to explore long-term compromise solutions with India. 
China believes that the ´´Indo-Pacific´´ strategy initiated repeatedly by President Trump and 
his top aides in recent months, is no excuse for India to lead to disunity and headwinds for 
BRICS and SCO. 
 
Can China achieve a ´´New Type of Major Countries Relations´´? 
Can it do it on its own? 
 
´´The international security environment is arguably more volatile today than at any 
point since World War II. Some of the most fundamental pillars of the West and of the liberal 
international order are weakening. Adversaries of open societies are on the offensive. Liberal 
democracies have proven to be vulnerable to disinformation campaigns in post-truth 
international politics. Citizens of democracies believe less and less that their systems are able 
to deliver positive outcomes for them and increasingly favor national solutions and closed 
borders over globalism and openness. Illiberal regim s, on the other hand, seem to be on solid 
footing and act with assertiveness, while the willingness and ability of western democracies to 
shape international affairs and to defend rules-based liberal order are declining. The United 
States might move from being a provider of public goods and international security to pushing 
a more unilateralist, maybe even nationalistic foreign policy. We may, then, be on the brink of 
a post-Western age, one in which non-Western actors are shaping international affairs, often 
in parallel or even to the detriment of precisely those multilateral frameworks that have 
formed the bedrock of the liberal international order since 1945. Are we entering a post-order 
world? How this question will be answered in the years to come will depend on all of us.´´666 
These were the concise and general assessments in the Foreword by the Chairman of 
the Munich Security Conference (MSC), ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, of the February 
2017 Munich Security Report (MSR), entitled ´´Post-Truth, Post-West, Post-Order?´´  
The main elaborated points, conclusions and even rhtoric questions in the report read: 
´´The world is facing illiberal forces and moments that are gaining ground. From within, 
Western societies are troubled by the emergence of populist movements that oppose critical 
elements of the liberal-democratic status quo. From outside, Western societies are challenged 
by illiberal regimes trying to cast doubt of liberal democracy and weaken the international 
order. And Western states themselves seem both unwilling and unable to effectively tackle the 
biggest security issues … 
The past twelve months have been a resounding rejection of the status quo. In several 
elections and referenda, political outsiders succeeded, while the establishment was dealt major 
blows. Populist parties are now part of government in about dozen Western democracies … 
The populists watch and learn from each other and increasingly cooperate across borders. 
Maybe unsurprisingly, in stark contrast to his predecessors, President Donald Trump´s 
inaugural address did not mention words such as democracy, liberty, or human rights …´´667 
´´First, liberal democracy has been increasingly contested… Second, the open 
international economic order may be unraveling …, and it seems protectionism may return. 
Long a champion of free trade, the United States is now on a more protectionist path…As 
Trump promised: ´´Protection will lead to great prosperity and strength.´´…Finally, the 
multilateral institutions at the heart of the international order are at risk as well…Perhaps 
most importantly some of its core institutions are increasingly questioned within the Western 
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countries itself …Donald Trump´s comments about NATO being ´´obsolete´´ have caused  
great uncertainty among America´s allies, especially in Central and Eastern Europe. The 
European Union is under pressure, too, as it has to deal with Brexit, a populist surge, the 
refugee crisis, a potential return of the euro crisis, jihadist attacks, and a revisionist Russia. 
Donald Trump, a few days before his inauguration, described the EU as a project intended to 
counter U.S. influence and suggested he did not really care about its future. 
Post-West or Even Post-Order? What does this – especially a much more unilateralist, 
nationalist U.S. foreign policy – mean for the future international order? Will it slowly 
become a more fragmented order in which regional hegemons define the rules of the game in 
their spheres? Or will the Western democracies be abl to preserve the core norms and 
institutions of the liberal international order? Dothey even want to? Who is going to provide 
common public goods that benefit their own country, but also others?´´668  
The third 2017 edition of the Munich Security Report displayed unprecedented 
political challenge, critique and rhetoric addressed to a newly sworn American president. In 
the 90 pages document there are less challenges and assessments regarding the policies of 
Putin and Xi Jinping. The ex – German deputy foreign minister´s sponsored report worries 
that Trump will embark on a foreign policy based on superficial quick wins, zero-sum games, 
and mostly bilateral transactions – and that he mayignore the value of international order 
building, steady alliances, and strategic thinking. Or, maybe worse, that unpredictable Trump 
sees foreign and security policy as a game to be used whenever he needs distractions for 
domestic political purposes, and if the U.S. does rtreat, vacuums will be filled by other 
actors.  
Prior to the Munich Security Conference, on January 31, 2017, European Council 
President Donald Tusk has named four components of the external threat facing the European 
Union: China, Russia, ´´terror and anarchy in the Middle East and in Africa´´ and … the 
United States, in a letter ´´United we stand, divided we fall´´ to the 27 EU heads of state and 
government on the future of the EU before the Malta summit.669 Tusk also sent his main 
message and warned: ´´It must be made crystal clearthat the disintegration of the European 
Union will not lead to the restoration of some mythical, full sovereignty of its member states, 
but to their real and factual dependence on the great superpowers: the United States, Russia 
and China. Only together can we be fully independent.´´670  
Also prior to the MSC, High Representative Mogherini made a goodwill research visit 
to the USA (February 9-11) trying to present the EU as a valuable friend to the United States. 
Still she warned U.S. President Donald Trump´s administration of meddling in European 
politics, saying the Brussels´ relationship with Washington will be ´´transactional and 
pragmatic´´. In 2016 Trump praised UK´s Brexit, PM May was the first EU leader and foreign 
head of government to be received in the Oval Office, and some of his transition team had 
contacted several EU officials before the inauguration asking which country is likely to exit 
the block after the UK, prompting concerns that he may seek to undermine the European 
project. ´´We do not interfere in U.S. politics … and Europeans expect that America does not 
interfere in European politics´´, Mogherini said after wrapping up meetings with U.S. 
officials, including Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, stating that her main task during the visit 
was to ensure that the Iran nuclear deal survived Trump´s administration.671 
Since his electoral victory in November 2016, several EU leaders have criticized 
Trump for his divisive remarks, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stating, ´´We Europeans 
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have our fate in our own hands´´. She had also led th  European push back against Trump´s 
demands of an immediate increase in NATO defense spending or risk the U.S. scaling back its 
commitment to the Transatlantic protection. Berlin claimed that Germany will not speed up 
on any existing plans to ramp up the country´s military budget by 2024, being ´´conscious of 
its responsibility´´ and already increasing its defense spending by 8% in 2017 budget. 
Commenting that ´´a stable European Union is just as much in the American interest as a 
united NATO´´, and pointing out that matters of development aid and crisis prevention are 
also important, Merkel was echoed by European Commission President Juncker´s statement 
that: ´´I don´t like our American friends narrowing down this concept of security to the 
military´´.672 
Against this backdrop of Trump – EU/NATO uncertainties and raising differences, 
Vice President Mike Pence led a chorus of U.S. February 2017 visits and reassurance talks 
with EU and NATO personally at MSC and Brussels, and by Defense and State Secretaries, 
James Mattis (MSC and NATO headquarters defense ministers meeting), and Rex Tillerson 
(G-20 foreign ministers meeting in Bonn, Germany). 
In Brussels, meeting Presidents Tusk, Juncker, VP/HR Mogherini and Belgian PM 
Michel, Pence pledged the United States´ ´´strong commitment´´ to cooperation with the EU 
and emphasized the U.S. does not support a breakdown of the EU or of NATO. His comments 
in Brussels came after he promised the U.S. will remain an ally of Europe during his speech at 
the Munich Security Conference. 
´´In the wake of Russian efforts to redraw international borders through force, we will 
continue to support efforts in Poland and Baltic states through NATO´´, Pence declared in an 
appearance with EC President Tusk adding that ´´While t e U.S. will continue to hold Russia 
accountable, at President Trump´s direction, we will also search in new ways for new 
common ground with Russia, which President Trump believ s can be found.´´673 
Speaking at NATO headquarters, Vice-President Pence reassured allies that America 
would uphold its commitments to the organization, but added that President Trump expected 
´´real progress´´ among NATO allies in stepping up their defense spending, echoing defense 
secretary Mattis´ previous week stand at NATO´s ministerial meeting that ´´all who benefit 
should share costs´´, and that NATO is in a process of adapting and transformation to new 
security challenges, charting the future course of the alliance.674 
In parallel with the affirmative EU/NATO U.S.´ commit ents and reassurances, and 
their lukewarm reception in Europe, In his February 24, 2017 Reuters interview, President 
Trump declared his opposition to nuclear weapons, but still confirmed the first priority on his 
agenda declaring that the U.S. should ´´lead the pack of world nuclear powers´´. 
Confirming and repeating his new 2016 strategic vision towards a Global Realignment 
based on the assessment that the U.S. era of global d minance ends, and that Washington 
needs to take the lead in realigning the global power structure through molding a geo-strategic 
triumvirate – USA/China/Russia, leaving a secondary role for the other global actors,675 
Brzezinski actively promoted his concept during theU.S. presidential transition period and 
the early days of the Trump´s administration. ´´The U.S. must be wary of the great danger that 
China and Russia could form a strategic alliance, generated in part by their own internal, 
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political, and ideological momentum, and in part by the poorly thought out policies of the 
United States. The U.S. should not act towards China as if it were already an enemy, 
significantly, it should not favor India as America´s principal ally in Asia. This would almost 
guarantee a closer connection between China and Russia. Nothing is more dangerous to the 
U.S. than such a close connection´´, Brzezinski posts.676 U.S. and China are the world´s 
dominant powers…In today´s world, China can´t lead alone. Neither can the U.S. To put it 
sharper, in seemingly paradoxical terms, if America tries to go it alone in the world without 
China, it will not be able to assert itself…America´s long-term interests lie fundamentally 
with deepening our ties to China, not uprooting them for perceived short-term gain.´´677 
For China, President Trump is both a chance, and still unknown and seriously 
unpredictable challenge for the future world order as the central question of international 
relations.  
Beijing quickly understood that President Trump would like to make it into history 
and would not run an administration like any of hispredecessors. Usually China is quick to 
react against hostile forces and traditionally when n eded accuses foreign governments of 
hurting the feelings of the Chinese people. Trump offered provocations which in similar cases 
would bring down retribution on other players. Throughout his presidential campaign, and 
after being elected, he accused and threatened China, calling it names on trade, currency,  
´revisionist adversary´, even challenging Beijing´s ´core national interests´ positions on 
Taiwan. As a whole Beijing has displayed iron self-discipline, restraint, even non-observance. 
China´s state-run news agency Xinhua commented: ´´He will soon realize that leaders of the 
two countries must use more mature and effective ways to communicate that trading barbs via 
Twitter´´.678 Since U.S. elections, China´s media has been on a tight control, instructed to use 
Xinhua´s balanced wording in its Trump and USA coverage. CCP run Global Times even 
published a semi- sympathetic to Trump article describing his first month in the Oval Office 
only as bumpy. The article points out that he won the elections despite tremendous opposition 
and criticism, with a unique tenacity and knack for turning adversity into positive results, and 
that if he fails, the U.S. remains unchanged while if he succeeds, the world will see a new 
America.679  
Unlike other competing world leaders, President Xi emerged as a firm and patient Sun 
Zi - ´turn your opponent´s weaknesses into your strength ´ actor, and when finally made the 
congratulatory phone call to Trump, Beijing achieved affirmative U.S. commitment to the 
´nonnegotiable´ One China policy and the only letter that Trump sent to foreign leader. 
On the global stage, President Xi has successful marketed himself as non Donald 
Trump. In contrast to President Trump´s rhetoric and first TPP withdrawal executive order, 
for Xi, at a time of global gloominess, China should stand out. His first state visit abroad in 
Switzerland in January 2017 and speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos was a 
clear signal to the world that despite the frustration of economic globalization elsewhere, 
China is firmly committed to international cooperation through multilateralism, global 
governance, common development, economic growth, free trade and no protectionism. In his 
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Davos speech Xi never used the term ´globalization´ without adding first the adjective 
´economic´ to it, implying very categorically what kind of globalization China really supports. 
During his Swiss trip Xi also visited the Geneva headquarters of the United Nations´ 
World Health Organization and International Olympic Organization displaying China´s 
support for the central UN and international organiz tions´ role in global governance, peace 
and stability.  
President Xi´s speeches in Davos and UN Geneva headquarters, and consistent 
proposals of building a ´community of common destiny´ and new model of international 
relations were echoed by foreign minister Wang Yi at the MSC. In his keynote speech and 
deliberations he emphasized the centrality of the UN, and that the main causes of world crisis 
and conflicts are the instances of breaching the UN Charter. For him, there was a need of 
strengthening cooperation between major powers, particularly between China and the U.S., as 
one of the most important bilateral relation in the world. Given that importance, the U.S. 
should do all it can to work with China as a partner on the world stage for building a new 
model of international relations, as common interest between China and the U.S. far exceed 
divergence.680 
After February 9, 2017, Trump-Xi constructive phone conversation and the former´s 
acknowledgment of U.S. One-China policy, Beijing began to propagate the ´´consensus 
reached between the two presidents´´ - a relationshp featuring ´no conflict, no confrontation, 
mutual respect and win-win cooperation´. According to 28.02.2017 Xinhua announcement, 
the previous day President Trump met with visiting Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi at 
the White House, pledging to enhance bilateral high-level exchanges and cooperation in all 
areas. Mutual presidential greetings were conveyed, an  Yang stated that following through 
on the spirit of the phone conversation, ´´China is willing to enhance exchanges with the U.S. 
at all levels from top down, and expand coordination and cooperation with U.S. on bilateral, 
regional and global issues, respect each others´ coe interests and major concerns.´´681  
Since 2013, on regional stage, China is continuously promoting itself as a leader on 
multilateral trade, finance, infrastructure and common development cooperation. Recently, 
Beijing is actively taking advantage of the U.S. withdrawal from the TPP deal, which was 
intended to underpin American economic leadership in Asia Pacific. 
After the result of the U.S. presidential elections, on November 19, 2016, at the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CEO Summit in Peru, President Xi reiterated the 
numerous Chinese ideas and initiatives for promoting the shared development in Asia-Pacific 
region. He also underlined that any regional trade rrangement should be open, inclusive and 
all-win, as closed, or exclusive initiatives are not the right choice. According to him, China 
has kept its contribution to world economic growth a  more than 25% in recent years and will 
implement its opening-up strategy more actively – expecting in 5 years imports of 8 trillion 
U.S dollars, 600 and 750 billion dollars of respectively inward and outward foreign 
investment, and 700 million outbound tourist trips.  
21 member states APEC summit offered Xi the perfect platform to advertise the 2013 
China-led OBOR initiative and to re-plug the merits of the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP), an initial idea from Japan, currently championed by Beijing, 
born at the 2012 ASEAN summit in Cambodia. RCEP is an ambitious project aiming to 
become the world´s biggest free trade agreement, 46% of global population, with a combined 
GDP of U.S. 17 trillion dollars, and 40% of world trade, including the 10 ASEAN countries 
plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. RCEP is also the fulcrum 
of the China initiated Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) at the 2014 APEC 
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meeting in Beijing, with the aim of motivating and luring nations whose top trade partner is 
China away from the then U.S.-led TPP. Both RCEP and FTAAP are not planned for setting 
ultra-comprehensive trade rules, but as the extension of existing agreements with ASEAN and 
key nations in Northeast Asia, South Asia and Oceania.682 
Full transparency, China analysts and experts traditionally do not associate with 
Chinese foreign policy, much less to its security-related policy, where specific drivers of a 
given Chinese behavior are often open to interpretations. Perhaps that is why, just prior to the 
inauguration of President Donald Trump, the State Council of the PRC, not surprisingly, on 
January 11, 2017, took the opportunity to release China´s first White Paper on ´´China´s 
Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation´´. In the 39 pages document, not aggressive, 
but blunt, confident and quite open - ´cards on the table´ Beijing tells the world and the Asia-
Pacific region its stand on main aspects of global governance and vision for regional security. 
The Paper analyzes China´s bilateral relations with the U.S., Russia, India and Japan, its 
active participation in multilateral organizations, and its major issues including the East and 
South China Sea, Afghanistan, counter-terrorism, etc. The official government publication 
may be assessed as an attempt by Beijing to minimize isunderstandings about its own firm 
intentions – and most importantly as an implicit call for like-minded and interested states to 
join China in its ´´struggle for the international system´´ on principles, terms and conditions 
laid down in the White Paper.683 
The policy document builds on two previous public efforts by China to shape and 
guide the debate regarding Asian security. The first is President Xi´s May 2014 speech at the 
CICA, when Xi first suggested a ´´New Asian security concept for new progress in security 
cooperation´´, emphasizing the need of ´Asian security for Asians´. The second document, 
released in October 2016 and presented at the Seventh Xiangshan Forum, elaborated on this 
new security concept. 
2017 White Paper gave the most detailed description o date of the security 
architecture that China first put forward in 2014. ´´Common, Comprehensive, Cooperative 
and Sustainable Security´´ was cemented as the overarching concept guiding China´s regional 
strategy as organic part of its China Dream Grand Strategy. The analysis of the document 
outlines the following main assessments, principles, t rms and stands that underpin China´s 
regional intentions and approaches: 
Preface: Asia-Pacific has an important strategic position in the world, and with the 
profound adjustment of the pattern of international relations the regional situation is also 
undergoing profound changes. 
China is committed to promote peace, stability and friendly cooperation with all 
countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. 
Policies and positions on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation: Asia-Pacific is stable on 
the whole, with a strong momentum for peace and development. Major policy of countries in 
the region is to address differences and disputes through negotiation and consultation. 
Regional hotspot issues and disputes are basically under control. Some countries are 
increasing their military deployment in the region, certain country seeks to shake off military 
constraints, and some countries are undergoing complex political and social transformations. 
Asia-Pacific should implement UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and narrow 
the development gap in the region. China´s BRI, AIIB and Silk Road Fund are all focused on 
common development. 
Countries can be partners, treating each other as equals, if they seek common ground 
while reserving differences. Major countries should treat the strategic intentions of others in 
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an objective, and rational manner, reject the Cold War mentality and respect others´ legitimate 
interests and concerns. Small and medium-sized countries need not and should not take sides 
among big countries. 
China calls for the building of a new model of inter ational relations centered on 
mutually beneficial cooperation. China is committed o: working with the United States to 
build a new model of major country relations from a new starting point, deepening its 
comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination with Russia, establishing a closer 
strategic and cooperative partnership with India, and pushing for the improvement of its 
relations with Japan. 
Asia-Pacific should promote the rule-setting and improve the institutional safeguard 
for peace and stability in the region by following the spirit of the rule of law, the international 
norms based on the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the 
widely recognized rules of fairness and justice. Inter ational and regional rules should be 
discussed, formulated and observed by all countries concerned, rather than been dictated by 
any particular country. Rules of individual countries should not automatically become 
´international rule´, still less should individual countries be allowed to violate the lawful 
rights and interests of others under the pretext of ´´rule of law´´. 
The future regional security framework should be based on consensus. Equal 
consideration should be given to both a security framework and an economic framework – the 
main components of the entire Asia-Pacific regional structure – to ensure their parallel 
development. 
Conclusion: The Chinese people are working hard to realize the China Dream of the 
great renewal of the Chinese nation. China´s development adds to the momentum for world 
peace. China stands ready to work with all countries to pursue mutually beneficial 
cooperation, to steadily advance security dialogues and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, and 
the building of a new model of international relations so as to create a brighter future for the 
region.684  
 Over the past three decades, China´s rising economic capabilities have began heavily 
to translate into more assertive role and a greater confidence in articulating its own ambitions 
as well as its strategy for Asia-Pacific and the world as a whole. China is now questioning 
some old realities – such as recognition for U.S. alliances or adherence to certain 
interpretations of international laws – and in some cases constructing its own bodies, like 
AIIB or the OBOR initiative. ´´China is more and more not just a taker, but [a] shaper and 
even [a] maker, … and the White Paper put more simply is an economics-first, cooperation-
first, and Asia-first vision. ´´685  
Such a vision makes strategic sense for a rising power like China: it buys it time to 
build up its capabilities (Deng Xiaoping´s KLP), stabilizes its periphery, and strengthens its 
hold on Asia (Xi´s mix of KLP-SFA), while balancing neighboring major countries and 
keeping other powers like the U.S. out (Monroe Doctrine). One statement in the new White 
Paper warns rather tellingly, ´´small and medium-sized countries need not and should not take 
sides among big countries´´. 
It is also interesting to compare the description of China´s major country relations in 
the policy statement. The U.S. relationship since 2015 is rather dispassionately described as 
stable and ´´maintaining a momentum of steady progress´´, while Sino-Russian ties are called 
strategic, coordinated in the UN, healthy and consistent of ´´lasting friendship in legal form´´. 
The term ´´strategic partnership´´ - missing from the U.S. section – is applied to India, where 
´´enhanced mutual political trust´´ and deepened overall relations are noted. Although 
´´complex and sensitive matters´´ remain between China and Japan, a ´´momentum of 
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improvement´´ is reported, and China´s ´´friendly and cooperative´´ relations with the rest of 
Asia-Pacific are assured. 
The Chinese report at the Seventh Xiangshan Forum, representing the second pillar of 
the January 2017 White Paper, also displayed China´s vision and commitment to constructive 
and active interactions with number of major actors, including Europe and EU. In the 
document analyzed above, there is no mentioning of the factor EU and Europe as a whole, 
even in the general context of ´new model of international relations´, ´economics-first´, and 
the multi-vector China Dream Grand Strategy. 
In 2016, China for the first time became Germany´s most important trading partner 
(170 billion euros), overtaking the U.S. (165 billion euros), which fell back from first to third 
place behind France (167 billion euros). German Vice-Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel has even 
suggested that the EU should refocus its economic poli y towards Asia, should the new 
Trump administration pursue its declared protectionist policy accusing Germany of exploiting 
a weak euro to boost exports. 
At the February 2017 G-20 foreign ministers´ meeting VP/HR Federica Mogherini 
told her Chinese counterpart Wang Yi that China is not a threat but an opportunity for the EU, 
in contrast to the EC President Tusk stand, who in Ja uary 2017 enlisted China, next to 
Russia, the U.S. and Islamic fundamentalism as the ext rnal threats to the EU. The lack of 
common vision and united China policy in the EU was reaffirmed by recent calls from 
Germany, France and Italy asking the EC to erect more barriers for foreign investors in the 
name of safeguarding the EU security, which Beijing assesses as targeted also at China. 
President Xi is the main strategic promoter in building up new types of partnerships 
between China and Europe. As discussed, in March 2014, Xi, for the first time, proposed joint 
China-EU partnerships for peace, growth, reform andcivilization in his talk with then-EC 
President Van Rompuy in Brussels, which he later elaborated in his speech at the College of 
Europe in Bruges, ´´We need to build four bridges for peace, growth, reform and the progress 
of civilization, so that China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership will take on even 
greater global significance.´´686 
For Xi, China and EU can deepen practical cooperation within the OBOR and AIIB 
projects, as they will link the Asia-Pacific and European economic circles and help tap into 
the enormous development potential of the Asian and European 1.9 billion people markets. 
Xi reaffirmed Beijing´s stance that China will continue to support an integrated 
Europe and wants to see post-Brexit EU and Britain prosperous and stable when talking to his 
Italian counterpart Sergio Mattarela and French Prime Minister Bernard Cazeneuve during 
their visits in Beijing on February 22, 2017. For China, ´´The prosperity and stability of EU 
and UK will boost Beijing´s ties with the two sides and bring mutual benefits as well as 
effective multilateralism and common development economic globalization.´´687 
In contrast to the more openly pro-post Brexit Britain position of the new Trump U.S. 
administration, Beijing is playing a balancing act between his ´golden age relationship´ with 
London and the ´new type of partnerships´ with Brussels. 
As for the EU, most of its major member states, including the 16+1 – China and CEEC 
countries, are long ago competing for the Chinese state and increasing middle class 
consumers´ markets within their bilateral strategic partnerships with China. 
 Where does June 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS), aka ´Realpolitik with European 
Characteristics´ and its ´principled pragmatism´s five priorities (EU security proper, 
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neighborhood security, dealing with war and crisis, global and regional stable orders, and 
effective global governance) stands? 688 
 If, ´´On Russia, the EUGS basically advocates strategic patience´´689, what can be 
expected regarding the fifth priority of the strategy - ´´effective global governance´´ where 
China and BRICS increasingly claim central role? Will the EUGS´ ambitions ´´to transform 
rather than simply to preserve the existing system´´ …to prevent ´´the emerging of alternative 
groupings to the detriment of all´´690 be enough and pro European productive? 
 In a way resembling the 2003 ESS, 2016 EUGS emphasizes the need for UN 
international rules and laws´ centered global governance order, still, departs and does not 
imply predominant centrality of the classical ´rule makers´ - WTO, IMF, WB, admitting the 
option that the framework of ´effective global governance´ may take a case to case format 
with the EU performing the role of project coordinator.691 
Aiming at an effective global governance system, the EUGS leaves much more 
maneuvering space in how it is to be achieved, placing traditional emphasis in collaboration 
on the international stage with priority allies, partners and ´like-minded states´ in Asia, Africa 
and the Americas. Displaying non-systematic, non-streamlined references to the major 
emerging players to which the EU prior made calls to hare increased responsibilities on the 
global arena, the strategy falls short of analyzing a d assessing the mounting ´institutionalized 
cooperation of the BRICS countries led by the goal of shaping global governance – often to 




Beijing has not yet articulated fully defined and authoritative blueprint of its vision for 
the holistic future of the global order – “the international system”. 
Closely analyzing and strategizing on the continuing global geopolitical, economic, 
financial and social volatilities, risks and uncertain ies, in its 2017 White Paper Beijing makes 
the general assessment for the existence of profound adjustments in the pattern of 
international relations and global/regional governance. 
After taking power in 2012, President Xi, besides the initial U.S. centered NTMCR 
strategic foreign policy initiative, undertook series of additional comprehensive steps for 
strengthening China`s posture and image in the region, and the world. He shaped and 
finalized the overall Grand Strategy in the context of reforming the regional and global 
governance system as much as possible on Beijing`s more favorable terms. Targeting reforms 
and challenging the established global governance system, and asserting its voice on the 
international arena, China seeks and works to be a l ad source of regional and global 
proposals and initiatives within that strategy in the foreseeable future. Not only is Beijing 
winning more favorable third path influence within the functioning institutions (UN, WTO, 
IMF), but it is also initiating its own led, outside the system, formal and informal multilateral 
organizations and regimes (BRICS, SCO, BRI, AIIB, NDB) while giving exemplary impulses 
and financial contributions to the stagnated Western-l d ones, demonstrating to the 
international community China`s different ideas and concepts of multilateralism and 
multipolarity. 
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Against the backdrop of U.S. $ 237 trillion global debt burden and depressed 
economic growth trends, divided America and unpredictable President Trump, EU´s socio-
politic, economic and financial woes, troubled waters with Russia, U.S., UK, and future soul 
searching, Russia´s Crimea annexation and Syrian expedition, Ukraine conundrum and 
economic stagnation, China´s economic slow-down and South China Sea disputes - the world 
of the global major powers does not project too much optimism for short-term return to 
normality, peace and stability. 
As President Trump is trying to effectively modify and reshape the philosophy and 
spirit of the American dream by selectively announcing a sort of ´declaration of war´ on 
domestic and external status quo, President Xi is cautiously and masterly following Sun Zi´s 
´The Art of War´ rules and guidance. He is adapting a d implementing China Dream step by 
step, by filling in the recent vacuum and cracks in the unity of the Western-led liberal 
democratic world order. Xi´s 2012 call for a new type of major power relations and 2014 
announcement that China was engaged in ´´a struggle for the international system´´ are more 
actively on Beijing´s strategic agenda. Continuing great emphasis on ´multipolarity´, 
understood as a transition away from the United States´ brief ´unipolar moment´, and a long-
term power shift from West to East, is challenging world´s traditional geopolitical perceptions 
and psychology Westerners have grown up with. 
Indeed, the post-WWII and post-USSR collapse system of international relations is 
undergoing profound adjustments, changes and regionalization. The world is steered to 
´´balancing and wait and see´´ postures in the foreseeable future, expecting the practical 
outcomes of the Trump presidency, the new vision and identity of EU, and the development 
of the bi- and multilateral relationships between the world´s major powers, where China seeks 



























CHAPTER 6: CURRENT STATE OF PLAY AND MAIN             
ACTORS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
REASSESSMENT OF PARALLELS (AND DIFFERENCES)     
BETWEEN THE LEARERSHIP RISE OF U.S. AND CHINA 
 
 As the title implies, this chapter explores concisely the current state of play in the 
international system, its main factors, and U.S.-China relations. It also researches and 
analyzes the third path – ´geo-economics first, geopolitics second´ mixed KLP-SFA nature of 
China Dream Grand Strategy as a role model for the 21st century, compared to the leadership 
rise of the USA in the mid-20th century. 
Final assessments and conclusions are given to the main research questions of the 
work.  
General state of play in the international system 
 State of the main factors/equations in the system 
The analysis of Branko Milanovic´s Elephant curves of Global Income Growth 
(1988-2008) clearly proves that China and India started to move up in the global supply 
chain with good income growth. Global elites also did well in that period, while middle 
income groups in U.S. and Europe did badly in terms of growth. (Fig. A & B) 
 
 































According to Professor Jack A. Goldstone, CFR´s life member, leading American 
sociologist and political scientist, specializing in studies of social movements, revolutions 
and international politics, President Trump´s election and populist movements all over the 
world can be considered akin to true ideologically driven revolutionary movements. For him, 
the latter were brought about by slowdown in social mobility, elite factionalism, decline in 
public goods, and by pursuing a revolutionary agenda i cluding propagandist reshaping of 
reality, leading to a radical reconfiguration of international relations. 
 In his Watson Institute, March 6, 2017, lecture - ´A World in Revolution: The 
Inevitable Backlash against Global Elites´, based on the newest February 2017 edition of his 
book, ́ ´Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World´ ,́ Goldstone claims that cycles 
and signs of global political instability are not driven by a kind of a long term movement 
towards progress or by some inevitable conflict of forces, but by the inability of systemic 
institutions to adapt to the demands that are put uon them. For the last 20-30 years the 
institutions of the post-WWII global order have been failing, and the present political 
changes that are seen across the world are not surprising, even when referring to individual 
political figures, and that he would still be making the similar assessments and lectures, 
having Trump not been elected. 
 What is seen everywhere is a collapse of what had been the mainstream political 
center, which has to either change its traditional political narrative or it may be taken away 
from it – in the UK, France, Holland, even in the USA. Due to the relative decline of the U.S. 
and the West as a whole, nations that were the richst countries in their day suffered fiscal 
crises because elites preferred to protect their private wealth, even at the expense of the 
deterioration of state finance, public services andlo g term international strength. Elites have 
turned into competing factions … starving the national state of resources needed for public 
improvements and international competitiveness. Factionalism within the elites … paralyzed 
decision making. Struggles for prestige and authoriy took precedence over a united approach 
to resolving fiscal and social problems.693 
 The key element in this decay is not … a decay of Western manufacturing ability or 
Western foreign power, or a threat of imminent economic collapse. Instead, it is a steady 
erosion of systemic public institutions and public services, which threatens to undermine the 
social and infrastructural foundations that supported American [Western] systemic 
leadership, and economic growth in the 20th century. If unchecked, it is certain that the long 
term results, which are now only apparent, but will accumulate rapidly in the coming 
decades, will be a relative decline in the living standards, freedom of decision, and 
international position of the United States as compared to other industrialized nations.694 
 For Goldstone, real problems lay in rising inequality, stagnant real incomes, declining 
social mobility and changing global labor market. He quotes recent Stanford´s study showing 
that proportion of people who could count of having hi her incomes than their parents has 
fallen from 80% to 45%, which psychologically represents a fall in ´faith in the future´, and 
in access to constricting public and mobility goods, healthcare, education, housing, nutrition, 
recreation, safe neighborhoods, etc., leading to loss f dignity and respect. Less-educated 
massively voted for Donald Trump not because they know less, but because they know very 
well what has happened to them, and that almost 50% of U.S. population is doing worse than 
the rising rest of the world. 
 Foundation is laid for a global revolt led by dissident elites, supported by middle 
classes against the prevailing international liberal o der aiming to recover national control of 
borders, economy, security, restore vigor to nationl culture, win self-respect, recover honor, 
based on a coherent ideology of – nationalism, nativism, anti-globalization, anti-corrupt 
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government, toughness and strong military, anti-regulation, anti-taxation, with mobilization 
by slogans, depicting elites and dysfunctional government as criminals and traitors. 
 Long term pressures have been building up for decades with strong opposition to the 
status-quo and politics as usual, not a passing event, where Trump, Le Pen, Wilders, 
Erdogan, are just the messengers.695 
 Adding to the above and the current economic slow-d n, Goldstone points out the 
immigration and cultural threats by comparing basic data: median U.S. male age of 27 in 
1970 to 36 in 2015, 5% U.S. foreign born, 16.5% all minorities in 1970 to 36% at present, 
less than 1% Muslims in Europe in 1970 to 5-8% today and perceptions at 20-30% in future. 
 The above socio-political theoretical analysis of the current global state of the play is 
echoed and given more practical depth and scholarly IR touch in January 2017 new book of 
the CFR´s president Richard Haass, A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the 
Crisis of the Old Order. 
 In his calm, though urgent examination of a world increasingly defined by disorder, 
Haass runs through the history of world order from the rise of the modern state system to the 
end of the Cold War, accounts for the momentous shifts since then, sheds light on the current 
state of affairs, and projects specific steps to tackle the many U.S.´ challenges ahead. ´´These 
are no ordinary times. It will not be business as usual in a world of disarray; as a result, it 
cannot be foreign policy as usual´´696, he argues, pointing out that the fundamental elemnts 
of world order that have served the world well since WWII have largely run their course. For 
him, the election of Donald Trump and the unexpected vote for Brexit signal that many in 
modern democracies reject globalization and internaio l involvement as well as a 
willingness to maintain alliances and overseas commit ents, thus being painfully evident 
that the 21st century will prove extremely difficult to manage. 
 Making the case that the world needs a new governance system – World Order 2.0., 
which reflects the reality of widely distributed power, Haass cautiously suggests how the 
U.S. should act towards China and Russia, as well as in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. 
He finally claims that the United States needs to define national security more broadly, 
addressing what in IR are normally thought of as domestic issues – from dysfunctional 
politics, economy to mounting debt – as well as coming to an agreement on the nature of 
U.S.´ relationship with the rest of the world.697 
  
 U.S.- leader in the international system 
 
In his Watson Institute lecture professor Goldstone posits that counterrevolutions in 
the current ́World in Revolution: The Inevitable Backlash against Global Elites´, are very 
difficult, if not impossible to achieve. For him, it is due to lack of energetic and innovative 
new political leaderships, divided countries, factionalized elites, paralyzed decision making, 
and unprecedented socio-psychological phenomenon of ´fall in the faith and confidence in 
the future´.698 
In the U.S. case, if it were not for the elite super d legates of the Democratic Party, 
most probably Bernie Sanders would have won the 2016 presidential Democratic 
nomination, and would have run against Donald Trump. Two candidates, who have taken 
away the political narrative and explanations from what had been the mainstream political 
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center, now turned to simple non-creative blocking coalitions,699 with evident parallels in 
Austria, Holland, France, UK, even in Germany. 
In his vision and attempts for elaboration of a radic l new U.S. Grand Strategy for the 
21st century, based on ´America first´, ´Make America great again´ geopolitical and geo-
economics pillars, President Trump also actively exploits the rich resources of social 
psychology theory and practices, by directly addressing the American people and urging for 
the ´renewal of the American spirit´. Asking and appealing for direct popular support he 
promises practical everyday rewarding results and people´s renaissance in the ´faith and 
confidence in the future´, eliminating and bypassing the political narrative and shaping 
explanations of the mainstream media. 
Trump´s campaign and inaugural address ´declarations f war´ on status-quo, 
establishment elites, government corruption, and on the other hand, populist demanded care 
for the American people, are still high on his agenda. He frequently uses exemplary 
gratifying parallels with past great American presid nts, like Andrew Jackson, Theodor 
Roosevelt, and Reagan. Fighting domestic hostile poitical/economic/financial/media status 
quo, Trump actually fights also for his own political survival. His strong moves and declared 
´American first´ policies regarding North Korea, Iran nuclear deal, further Russian economic, 
Chinese trade, sanctions, and Syrian strikes, imply ´ ast greatness parallels´, and his 
preparatory reach for the 2020 U.S. presidency. 
2017 Goldstone and Haass´ paradigmatic and geopolitical landscape anxieties and 
warnings were not new, and may be considered as sociologi al and IR added value 
guidelines for the new Trump Administration. Long before Brzezinski´s 2016 chess-board 
geo-strategic reshuffle and new U.S. Grand Strategy proposal, calling actually for a U.S.-
China-Russia global power triumvirate, in which theUnited States acts as the power broker, 
Kissinger addressed the same U.S. vital issues in his 2014 book World Order. For Kissinger, 
the contemporary global context is highly flammable, in a parlous condition verging on 
international anarchy, because the legitimacy of the postwar world order is being challenged. 
There is a profound tension between economic globalization and the political persistence of 
the nation state, which the 2008 financial crisis la d bare. For him, the four competing visions 
of world order: European-Westphalian, Islamic, Chinese, and the American – are each in 
varying stage of metamorphosis, with no real legitimacy, if not decay. The characteristic 
trends of the new world disorder can lead to ´´regional blocs´´ with contradictory world 
visions.700 Kissinger warns, ´´A struggle between regions could be even more destructive 
than the struggle between nations has been.´´701 
 Kissinger used to shuttle and see Xi and Putin quite regularly. Based on World Order, 
Diplomacy702, Jeffrey Goldberg´s interview703, as well as on private conversations with his 
biographer, Niall Ferguson claims that Kissinger´s four most likely scenarios-catalysts for a 
large-scale conflicts, and strategy recommendations t  President Trump may be summarized 
as follows:  
´´A deterioration in Sino-American relations that history sets for every incumbent 
power and the rising power that challenges it, a breakdown of relations between Russia and 
the West on mutual incomprehension, a collapse of what remains of European hard power 
and/or the will to use it, an escalation of conflict in the Middle East if handing hegemony in 
the region to a still revolutionary Iran… One or a combination of these threats, in the absence 
of a coherent American strategy, threatens to turn mere disorder into a conflagration.´´ 
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- ´´Do not go all-out into a confrontation with China, whether on trade or the China 
Seas, but rather seek ´comprehensive discussion´ and aim to pursue that policy of dialogue 
and ´co-evolution´… 
- The recognition that Putin craves is that of ´a great power, as an equal, and not as a 
supplicant in an American-designed system´, and it is not possible to bring Russia into the 
international system by conversion, but by deal-making and understanding that would turn 
Ukraine into a ´bridge between NATO and Russia rather an an outpost of either side´. 
- Treat Brexit as an opportunity to steer the continental Europeans away from 
bureaucratic introspection and back to strategic responsibility. 
- Make a former Yugoslavia type ´cantonized peace´ in Syria. Contain Iran, but keep 
the ´nuclear deal´. Take advantage of the new-found, albeit tacit, anti-Iranian and anti-ISIS 
alignment of the Arab states with Israel to achieve a new kind of Arab-sponsored Palestinian 
peace deal, perhaps including quasi-sovereignty … that is, de facto autonomy without a 
legalistic superstructure.´´704 
Recently, Harvard professor Joseph Nye Jr., along with the ´´Thucydides Trap´´, 
employs the ´´Kindleberger Trap´´, in describing the severe dilemma facing global 
international relations and economic governance regim , making the ´two traps´ defining 
features of the crisis upsetting the present-day world rder.705 Famous Harvard economic 
historian Charles Kindleberger elaborated that period in history in great detail in the 1970s. 
He put forward the ´´theory of hegemonic stability´´, which has had profound impacts on 
international relations and political economy ever since, claiming that the international 
system without a strong leader will face difficulties in governance. For him, a stable 
international economic system is highly dependent on the public goods provided by a country 
in the leadership role, including an open market, credible international currency, and its 
identity as creditor of last resort. Kindleberger, an intellectual architect of the 1948 initial $ 
14 billion Marshall Plan, argued that the disastrous decades of the 1930s and 1940s were 
caused when the U.S. replaced Britain as the largest global power but failed to take on UK´s 
role in providing global public goods. The result was the collapse of the global system into 
currency and trade wars, depression, genocide and shooting world war. For Nye, today´s 
power gap between the U.S. and China is much greater than that between Germany and 
Britain in 1914, and that metaphors may be useful as general precautions, but they become 
dangerous when they convey a sense of historical inexorableness.  
Warning that that is the danger the USA confront at present with China, Nye advises 
the newly elected U.S. President to ´worry about a China that is simultaneously too weak and 
too strong´, and that in achieving his objectives President Trump must avoid the ´two traps´, 





´´The inauguration of Donald Trump heralds the arriv l of a new world order. The 
West is weaker than ever before and rising American n tionalism poses a threat both to 
Germany´s economy and the European Union.´´707 During the presidential campaign and 
even after Trump´s inauguration, titles, head lines, assessments, projections like this and 
many similar ones were abundant in liberal European and especially German mainstream 
media: ´´For more than 60 years, the U.S has promoted European unity…But now, a man is 
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entering the White House who is counting on the disintegration of the EU. He would rather 
negotiate with each country individually, believing that will be more beneficial for 
America.´´; ´´Concepts like human rights and the protection of minorities are not part of his 
vocabulary. His only goal is America´s profitability, particularly in global trade, which he 
sees as a brutal fight for survival.´´; ´´An epochal shift, for Trump there is no such thing as 
friendships and alliances. He is not focused on morals; he is not concerned with dividing the 
world into good and evil … simply not interested in the world order that has developed since 
1945 … Europe´s loss, Russia´s and China´s gain.´´; ´´Trump will not determine the 
direction of U.S. foreign policy on his own, as he requires Congressional approval.´´708 
Government officials in Berlin confessed of an astounding mixture of arrogance and 
ignorance in their conversations with counterparts in the incoming administration. Implicitly, 
for Merkel´s foreign policy adviser Christoph Heusgen, after his U.S. talks in late December 
2016, besides the ´foreign world´ he observed, ´the new president´s team doesn´t have a clue 
about Europe.´709 
Next to Trump´s no taboos issues, provocative and ambiguous style, such as: NATO 
– obsolete, WTO – a disaster, he was not shy of sometimes open interview rhetoric, exposing 
his attitude towards EU, Germany and Merkel in particular: ´EU as basically a vehicle for 
Germany´, adding ´I believe others will leave´, ´the German chancellor had ´´made a 
catastrophic mistake´´[regarding immigration and refug es], his January 16, 2017 Bild and 
Times interview where he said of Merkel and Putin: ´´I start off trusting both, but let´s see 
how long that lasts. It may not last long at all.´´710 
In spite of the significant ups and downs in the initial Trump presidency period, 
domestic and external attempts to correct and guide the course of his policies, he seemed 
quite resolve, determined, sometimes even openly stubborn and emancipated, to firmly 
pursue the implementation of his Grand Strategy platform he ran upon during the 2016 
presidential campaign. 
The culmination of his non-diplomatic, blunt and even unpardonable attitude and 
approaches was demonstrated during Merkel´s March 17-18, 2017 visit to the U.S. Besides 
his ´no hand shake with the chancellor photo-op´, his s ort and clear-cut program stands 
expressed during their joint press-conference speak up for themselves. Ranking and using 
key-words, expressions, assessments such as: desire for security, prosperity and peace, 
rebuilding the American industrial base –  strong America is in the interests of the world as a 
whole, strong support for NATO where all allies have to pay their fair share for the cost of 
defense and owe vast sums of money from past years – ´´very unfair to the U.S.´´ Trump sent 
very blunt signals that these nations must pay what t ey owe [implicitly Germany], that 
Germany should increase its defense spending at least to 2% of GDP [as compared to the 
current 1.19%].Trump expressed his appreciation of Merkel´s leadership, along with the 
French President, to resolve, ideally peacefully, the conflict in Ukraine, and urged both to 
take part in the fight against radical Islamic terrorism and defeat of ISIS. Assessing 
immigration security as national security, he pledged they both work together towards fair 
and reciprocal trade policies that benefit both peopl s, to respect historic institutions, and 
support shared values, etc.711 
Not surprisingly, there were no presidential references to the EU, Putin, Crimea, even 
globalization and TTIP. There was no Trump reaction when Merkel hopefully tried to resume 
both the latter back on the U.S.-EU agenda, except his remark that NAFTA has been a 
disaster for the United States. When pressed by German journalists, Trump reiterated his 
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position that he is not an isolationist, but a free and fair trader, and that the U.S. has been 
treated very unfairly by many countries over the years. Bashing once again towards ´fake´ 
news media, very seldom regretting his ´tweets´, Trump even went much far by commenting 
that, ´by past Obama administration, at least he and Merkel have something in common, 
perhaps´[alluding to both being wiretapped].712 
Two days after the press-conference, and a day after me ting Merkel, on March 18, 
Trump said on Twitter – that Germany ´´owes vast sums of money to NATO, and the United 
States must be paid more for the powerful, and very expensive defense it provides to 
Germany!´´, On March 19, 2017, German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen rejected 
Trump´s claim. In a statement she said, ´there is no debt account at NATO´, adding that it 
was wrong to link the alliance´s target for members to pend 2% of their GDP on defense by 
2024 solely to NATO, as defense spending also goes into UN and EU missions, and into 
German contributions to the fight against IS terrorism. The German defense minister further 
claimed that it was necessary to have a ´modern security concept´ that included modern 
NATO but also a European defense union and investment in the United Nations.713 
In compliance with Trump´s strategic global order and bilateral policy priorities and 
guidelines for his administration, Trump´s designated rade representative Robert Lightizer, 
has long been known in Washington circles as a passionate protectionist who misses no 
opportunity to insist that WTO rules are ´not religious obligations´. At January 2017 Davos 
meeting, Trump adviser Anthony Scaramucci upheld the stance that the postwar world order 
was no longer suitable for the challenges of the 21st century, while White House economic 
adviser Peter Navarro accused Germany and China of taking advantage of weak currencies to 
build a trade surplus with the United States. 
On March 18, 2017, in parallel with the mixed Merkel U.S. visit results, financial 
leaders (finance ministers and central bankers) from the world´s biggest economies found 
common ground on foreign exchanges at their Germany´s Baden-Baden G-20 meeting but 
failed to agree on trade, highlighting a potential U.S.-led global shift towards protectionism. 
One sentence from last year´s China Hangzhou G-20 communique – the shortest and one of 
the most important – was omitted: ´´We will resist all forms of protectionism.´´ Fundamental 
disagreement between the U.S. administration and the o er 19 participants, particularly 
China, Japan and the Europeans, who flatly rejected any form of protectionism, began to take 
shape. U.S. representative, treasury secretary Steven Mnuchin commented from his point of 
view, that the previous communiqué was not necessarily relevant to the current global 
economic climate, adding that some agreements might need to be renegotiated.714 
At the Hanover hi-tech fair on March 19, 2017, German Chancellor Merkel and 
Japan´ PM Abe spoke up for free trade. Without namig the U.S. government, both used the 
opportunity to distance themselves from protectionist surges coming from the Trump 
administration. Both, echoed by European Commission President Juncker, called for a free 
trade deal to be reached between EU and Japan by the end of the year.  
In support of this German-Japan joint staunch position on trade and liberal 
globalization as a whole, the Conclusions of the March 9, 2017, European Council summit, 
supported by 27 member states, UK – against, served well. Article 4 of the Conclusions 
read:´´…The EU remains strongly committed to a robust trade policy and an open and rules-
based multilateral trading system, with a central role for the WTO… to tackle unfair trade 
practices and market distortions…resolutely advancing on all ongoing negotiations for 
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ambitious and balanced free trade agreements, includi g with Mercosur and Mexico, 
negotiations with Japan are closest to an early conclusion. Trade relations with China should 
be strengthened on the basis of a shared understanding of reciprocal and mutual benefits.´´715 
On March 16, 2017, one day ahead of the Merkel´s U.S. encounter with President 
Trump, and the Baden-Baden G-20 financial meeting, set to be dominated by debates on 
protectionism, the German Chancellor and President Xi had a telephone conversation, . In a 
statement issued in Berlin, Merkel and Xi both committed to: ´´together fight for free trade 
and open markets.´´716 
Early and mid-2017 Trump presidency´s tensions and contradictions in U.S.´ relations 
with EU and NATO were relatively healed and ironed by consequitive visits and 
commitment reassurances by Vice President Pence, U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense in 
Europe and NATO headquarters in Brussels. The alliance solidarity principle was restored in 
March-April 2018, when U.S., NATO, and EU took a united stand and actions against Russia 
in connection with the attempted assassination Skripal case in the UK, and the alleged Assad 
chemical attack against civilians in Syria. Initially declared, affecting EU, introduction of 
25% and 10% U.S. imports trade tariffs, respectively for steel and alluminium products, were 
temporarily frozen for EU member states 
 
China-Russia 
China´s strategic partnerships, role of BRI and AIIB 
 
In 2008 Fareed Zakaria wrote,´´China has been remarkably adept at using its political 
and economic muscle in a patient, low-key, and highly effective manner.´´717 
 The fall of the Soviet Union changed the structure of global power, and Deng´s 
reform and opening-up grand strategy, required of China the establishment of supportive 
stable relations with more and diversified countries worldwide. The focus was not only on 
great powers, but on cultivating and improving beneficial relations with a broader range of 
states around the globe, under the early 1990s´ initiated new foreign policy approach, termed 
- ´multidimensional diplomacy´.718 
 To understand China´s strategic partnership initiatives and policies, it is necessary to 
analyze the changes in the world, in China´s comprehensive national power, Beijing´s 
interactions with the world, and the partnerships´ priorities, character and timing. 
 New international relations and foreign policy paradigm required new diplomatic 
instruments. China had five policy options: unilater lism; balance of power; partnership 
diplomacy, multilateralism and bandwagoning, with some IR scholars arguing for partnership 
diplomacy, complemented with elements of balance of p wer and multilateralism.719 In 
comparison to the realistic idealistic partnership policy all the other instruments were 
considered bearing elements of limitations and riskuncertainties. China was not powerful 
enough to effectively assert unilateralism. Then, there were no imminent threats to force 
China to build alliances against the U.S.´ unilaterl superpower, no alliance balance of power 
was a viable option, and multilateralism – although on the rise – was not perceived as the 
sole or main guiding principle for international strategy, as Beijing had not yet joined or 
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initiated major international organizations (WTO) and structures (SCO, BRICS). 
Bandwagoning was not even seriously considered as an option for big country such as China, 
having longstanding policies for independence, non-alignment and equal rights in the 
international system. 
 While it was impossible during much of the Cold War period to think about genuine 
international cooperation absent the term ´alliances´, over the past two decades of still fluid 
´polycentric´ international order, strategic partneships have occupied a central position in 
many states´ international relations and foreign policy toolkit.  
Besides the traditional and existing formal military-security alliances, U.S.´ Bush 
administration, started using strategic partnerships and dialogues to secure support for the 
global ´war on terror´ and the management of relations with emerging powers.  Obama 
administration made even stronger use of the partnership approach, and by increasing its web 
of partners sought to advance U.S. values and interests, and promote what the U.S. believed 
would constitute a stable and legitimate international order, including strategic or 
comprehensive partnerships with: Afghanistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and 
Vietnam; the elevation of Israel´s status to that of a ´major strategic partner´; and strategic 
dialogues with Tunisia and Liberia.720  
 Since the end of the Cold War until July 2016 China has established specifically 
cultivated bilateral partnerships with 81 countries, out of which with 71 defined as strategic, 
and five regional international organizations including EU, AU, and ASEAN.721 Beijing, not 
only kept pace balancing the U.S. alliance model and partnership activism, but became the 
country with the most tactical and informal strategic alignments. In the 1990s China had 
worked on only three strategic partnerships, with: Brazil, Russia and the U.S.   The first 
strategic partnership concluded with Brazil in 1993, laid down the framework and specific 
model of the gradually evolving foreign policy with ´Chinese characteristics´.The last, being 
one of the few that was later downgraded, from Constructive Strategic Partnership in 1997 to 
Cooperative Partnership of Mutual Respect and Benefit in 2011.722The Brazilian case was 
launched in a rush, remained dormant for over decade, nd though seen as an attempt to 
restore and improve China´s image after 1989 Tiananmen, it served its pioneer role for the 
future streamlining of Beijing´s partnerships diplomatic strategy. 
In early 1990s, as the unilateral new world order was taking shape, Beijing´s real 
attention was focused on supporting broken and financially bankrupt Russia, as a hedge and 
balance manuevering against Washington´s influence in Eltsin´s Moscow.  
In 1996 China and Russia established a partnership of strategic cooperation. Until 
Putin´s arrival in the Kremlin, the bilateral cooperation and consultation mechanisms were 
superficial, as Russian foreign policy had been focused mainly on the West. With Putin, the 
institutionalized strategic partnership mechanisms became much more comprehensive and 
effective. Quite a few Chinese strategic partnerships publicly touch upon issues of 
sovereignty and security. The China-Russia Treaty of G od-Neighbourliness and Friendly 
Cooperation in 2001 specified that neither China nor Russia would resort to the use of force, 
or use nuclear weapons against each other.723 By end of 2016, China and Russia have 
developed unparalleled mechanisms and measures to strengthen their comprehensive and 
coordination strategic partnership. Xi and Putin see each other numerously every year and 
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there is a hotline for their direct personal communication. In May 2017, Putin was one of the 
main speakers at the international conference in Chi a dedicated to the development of the 
OBOR/BRI strategy, followed by return official Xi vsit to Russia in July 2017. The premiers 
as well as the heads of parliament also meet annually. China-Russia Strategic Security 
Consultation and the China-Russia Friendship, Peace and Development Commission also 
play important roles in strengthening the bilateral relations. 
Besides their top level consultations, cooperation and coordination in the UNSC, G-
20, SCO, BRICS, AIIB, OBOR-EEU compatibility, military and security, and on sensitive 
conflicting issues, such as: South China Sea, U.S. THAAD system in South Korea, North 
Korea nuclear problem, the Middle East, Syria, Ukraine, Moscow and Beijing explore and 
develop strategic Arctic cooperation, based on the Arctic Territory of Dialogue vice-premier 
forum created by Russia in 2010. Among the agenda topics are not only Arctic local 
cooperation projects, but also BRI – EEU linked options and infrastructure, oil and gas 
initiatives that may ease the Western sanctions on Russia. 
 Shortly after the late May 2014 Ukraine crisis, presidents Xi and Putin signed in 
Shanghai during their seventh meeting in 14 months, a joint statement, pledging to expand 
cooperation in all fields and coordinate diplomatic efforts to cement the China-Russia all-
round strategic partnership of coordination. In 2016 they met five times, and at the 2017 
Munich Security Conference Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi commented that Sino-
Russian relations represent cornerstone for global stability. 
 At the backdrop of current Russia-U.S./West tension and confrontations, in June 2018 
there will be a planned Putin official visit in China, followed by his attendance of the SCO 
summit in Qingdao. 
In 1997, then U.S. and China presidents Clinton and Jiang issued a joint statement in 
which both leaders expressed determination to raise cooperation and build a constructive 
strategic partnership.724 With President George W. Bush in office, in 2001, at their meeting in 
Shanghai, he and Jiang only expressed the intention of building a ´constructive relationship 
of cooperation´, a step back, and ever since the notion f ´strategic partnership´ has never 
been included in bilateral official documents or statements/declarations. Even Obama´s 
upgraded 2009 U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, failed to deliver due to 
increasing strategic distrust, not to mention the failed President Xi´s 2012 attempt for the 
establishment of a ´New Type of Major Country Relationship´ with Washington. Judging 
President Trump´s globalization, free trade, climate change stands and anti-Chinese 
accusations, signs of trade war, so far, high expectations for any radical positive change in 
the bilateral relationship might prove to be obviously too optimistic. 
 The mechanisms, characteristics and timing of the C ina-EU and China-Asia-ASEAN 
partnerships are also indicative. Beijing had established annual summits with both the EU 
and ASEAN in the late 1990s before the respective srategic partnerships were launched. 
 Due to Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the U.S. unilateralism and EU´s ´effective 
multilateralism´ divergence, in 2003, China and the EU upgraded their relationship and 
gradually established a cooperation mechanisms that now cover over 50 areas and include  
High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue (2008), High-Level Strategic Dialogue (2010),  
High-level People-to-People Dialogue (2011), etc. The 2000s also marked the bulk of 
Beijing´s new strategic bilateral partnerships with European countries, currently representing 
around 25% of the overall such, established and cultivated by China: France (2004); 
Germany (2004); Italy (2004); UK (2004, and Golden Age relationship since 2015); Spain 
(2005); Portugal (2005); Greece (2006), etc.725 
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 Asia and ASEAN represent the major current focus of China´s strategic partnerships 
agreements, with 24 bilateral and one with ASEAN, almost 30% of those China has 
concluded so far. Roughly 60% were initiated and agreed after Obama/H.Clinton 2011 U.S.´ 
´Pivot/Rebalance´ to Asia. 
 In 1997, China and ASEAN concluded the Partnership facing the 21st century based 
on good neighbourliness and mutual trust, and in 2003 – The Strategic Partnership for Peace 
and Prosperity. China and ASEAN hold 12 ministerial meetings annually and over 40 inter-
governmental committees´ sessions. China and ASEAN are top reciprocal trade partners and 
investors, and all ASEAN member states have joined the China-led AIIB and expressed 
practical interest in the OBOR/BRI strategy projects. 
 China has been successful in achieving masterly combinations and compatibility of its 
strategic partnerships´ goals with diverse forms of multilateralism, continental, regional and 
national identity. Beijing has established strategic partnerships with major EU and NATO 
member states and has attracted their participation in its defining economic-infrastructure and 
financial projects – OBOR and AIIB. All of the leading Latin American countries, all of 
BRICS, SCO, the majority of G-20 states, ASEAN and African Union are members of 
China´s ´strategic partnership´ global network. 2006 China-African joint declaration was 
followed by the establishment of China-AU strategic partnership.  
Another telling case was the establishment of an Inovative Comprehensive 
Partnership between China and Israel during PM Netanyahu´s largest Israeli-business 
delegation to ever visit Beijing on March 21-22, 2017. The joint statement announced that 
the two countries agree to closer exchange among young technological personnel, and 
cooperation in joint labs, a global technology transfer centre, innovation parks and an 
innovation cooperation centre, and promote bilateral trade. Netanyahu also voiced Israel´s 
adherence to the one-China policy, and admiration for China´s history, achievements and role 
in the current international community.726 
In April 2018 China and Austria agreed on the promotion of bilateral ´friendly 
strategic partnership´, concluded during the high level visit in Beijing of the Austrian 
president. 
 Due to ´China rise´, ´China threat theory´, and the narrative of the relative decline of 
the U.S., all of which reactivated with the arrival of the Trump´s unpredictable ´twitter 
diplomacy´, and allegedly nationalistic and isolationist 2017 presidency, China´s role and 
future posture in the world are currently again central topics of major scholarly theoretical 
and practical strategists´ research and debates. 
 Theorizing on China´s strategic partnerships 
 In the past, in general, ´the status quo, KLP option´ held that China is adapting to the 
existing liberal world order, while the ´revisionist SFA school´ believed that China wants to 
challenge the status quo. At the beginning of this decade, a third school  emerged, arguing 
that although China has been socialized by the interna ional community, at the same time it is 
trying to change (in Beijing parlance – to democratize, make more fair and just) the 
international system from within.  
For Zhu Liqun, China´s international engagement as a seamless set of practices, have 
engendered new Chinese identities and at the same time Beijing has influenced the evolution 
of the international order. In 2014, for Feng, vice-pr sident of the China Institute of 
Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), China´s strategic partnership policy was an 
embodiment of the third school, and although [Grand Strategy] goals and calculations behind 
each strategic partnership vary and can change over tim , in general there were two main 
logics underlining these calculations: one defensive and one assertive.727 
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In line with the defensive logic, China will continue to merge into the world 
peacefully as long as its 2011 officially defined core interests are protected – state 
sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and reunification, China´s political system 
established by the constitution, overall social stabili y, and the basic safeguards for ensuring 
sustainable economic and social development. According to Feng, countries that are 
considered to be crucial for the protection of these core interests are likely to be or become 
China´s strategic partners. 
Next to safeguarding core Chinese interests, China´s strategic partnership policies 
seek to deter external purposeful threats and impediments, to create a better international 
environment for China´s continuous rise, world integration, and economic development. 
They also represent China´s assertive logic and a must for Beijing in shaping a more benign 
world order in line with its long-term interests. In recent years, the assertive logic has grown 
stronger as China´s rise and comprehensive national power has gathered pace. In practice all 
strategic partnerships contain and display mixed elm nts of both the defensive and assertive 
logics, and that their diversified enlargement demonstrates Beijing´s growing ability and 
leverage to both protect its core national interests and correspondingly shape the international 
system.728 As a recent example, supporting Feng´s claim, on October 1, 2016, China´s yuan 
(RMB) has been officially accepted in the list of the IMF´s reserve currency basket with a 
share of 10.93%, taking third place after U.S. dollar (41.73%) and the Euro (30.93%). All 
world central banks are now required to keep a portion of their reserves in RMB, thus 
strengthening China´s position and influence. 
Building on, in addition to Qin Yaqing´s constructivist-realist Zhongyong, ´continuity 
through change´ explanation of the current China Dream Grand Strategy, and Feng´s 
analogous mixed KLP/SFA (defensive/assertive) China´s strategic partnerships policy 
analysis, the dissertation implicitly and explicitly assesses that besides the numerous parallels 
in the rise of the USA and China, including the U.S.´ alliance centered and China´s strategic 
partnership based patterns, China´s overall operation l behaviour objectively is unique, 
neither only ´status quo´, or ´revisionist´, and represents a third strategic path in search of the 
establishment of a new type of international system that suits Beijing´s long-term interests. 
Feng´s assessment and affiliation with the ´third school´ explanation of China´s 
strategic partnerships policies and international egagements that finally aim the reshaping of 
the world order only from ´within´, does not objectively disclose the full complexity of the 
current international situation. That is why as Zakaria puts it ´China is highly effective´, and 
why is China´ s rise also unique compared to the U.S. final rise after 1945. 
First, U.S. rise to Western leadership after World War, and globally after the collapse 
of the USSR in 1991, took place into an entirely tense and resource consuming, Moscow v/s 
Washington, China detached, Cold War structural andideological international system 
period. The latter period was in contrast to the relatively non-confrontational and China 
conciliatory one, until 2008-2010, that allowed forBeijing´s increasing international posture 
and pre-eminence assertiveness, regionally and initially world-wide.  
Cold War´s hostile systemic and structural West-East divide in military, political, 
economic, ideological, cultural, even sports´ competition, containment and Moscow-
Washington proxy wars was a blessing for Deng Xiaoping´s Sun Zi type strategy of ´winning 
the war without fighting´, and led to China´s KLP reform and opening up in 1978. 
Washington´s Western dominated liberal economic andfi ancial 1944 Bretton 
Woods system was a closed door for the East until the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia 
became member of the IMF on June 1, 1992, of the WB on June 16, 1992, and it took 18 
years of hard negotiations for its WTO membership in August 2012. 
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After President Nixon´s 1972 normalization and ´quasi anti-USSR alliance´ visit to 
Beijing, the establishment of official bilateral U.S.-PR of China diplomatic relations on 
January 1, 1979, in April 1980, China was accepted to the IMF, WB, and Western markets 
were relatively open to Chinese goods even before its December 11, 2001 ascendance to the 
WTO. Given the cooperation with the West, even though not altruistic, with economic, 
financial strings attached, and hopes for domestic liberalization and systemic changes, 
Beijing´s comprehensive national power was the greatest beneficiary from the Western 
liberal model and economic globalization. It worked and still works for China, thus no 
surprise that President Trump is changing liberal Grand Strategy gears regarding 
globalization, free trade, and climate change, understanding the threat and risks of losing the 
economic competition with China. On the other hand, it was also no surprise when President 
Xi, at the 2016 China G-20 summit, called for ´a new historic starting point´ in global 
economic governance, ´Hangzhou consensus´, aka globlization with Chinese characteristics, 
and implied the option of future Chinese leadership in economic globalization, free trade, and 
climate change in his January 2017 Davos speech.729 
Second, as unprecedented great power rise case, China, in contrast to the ´geopolitics 
first, geo-economics second´ final U.S. rise, does not prioritize, yet, the issues of military 
supremacy and global security alliance networks. Intead, China in spite of its trillions of 
U.S. dollars currency reserves option for military spending, stands firmly on its non-alliance 
Grand Strategy principle and ´geo-economics first, geopolitics second´ current policies. 
Beijing also prioritizes efforts and emphasis on peaceful regional and global environment, 
which it so existentially needs for its domestic China Dream socio-economic stability and 
Party legitimacy, as well as for its future final rise to world pre-eminence. For Chinese 
leadership: USSR type collapse, economic ´black swam´, U.S. posture, current relative 
decline and potential Grand Strategy shifts, are all top priority strategic research and analysis 
issues, taking lessons and measures for fending off any possible damaging future scenarios 
for China. 
President Xi´s 2014 open bluntness that China is ´fighting for the international 
system´, his G-20, and Davos reiterated initiatives and stands on new type of global 
governance, economic globalization, free trade and climate change, and his February 2017 
´two security guidelines´, indicate for China´s anxiety and uneasiness regarding the current 
political and economic global state of play. 
Xi´s announcements, vision and considerations were echoed by Premier Li Keqiang 
in his opening remarks at the annual March 2017 session of China´s NPC, warning of 
´profound changes´ in world order730, adding that China should prepare for ´´more 
complicated and graver situations´´ as a result of developments ´´both in and outside China´´. 
Following U.S. 2011 ´Pivot/Rebalancing´ to Asia, the non-China TPP project, and 
declared plans to dislocate over 60% of U.S. modern Navy and Air Force in the Asia-Pacific, 
Beijing causiously changed strategic gears. China´s strategic partnerships policies and 
international engagements that finally were aiming at the reshaping of the liberal world order  
from ´within´, took a radical additional pace and as dynamic asymmetrical strategic response, 
Beijing began on working from ´outside´ the established system and its institutions. 
 
Role of AIIB 
As APEC top leaders met at Bali resort in October 2013, President Xi shared his 
vision for a new multinational, multibillion-dollar bank to finance roads, rails and power 
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grids across Asia, under Chinese stewardship. After th  initial John Kerry reaction, ´´That´s 
great idea´´, the enthusiasm didn´t last long, as the Obama administration invested serious 
efforts to minimize the future bank´s potential influence, considering that China will use the 
bank to set new strategic partnerships, and global economic agenda on its own terms.731 Non-
the-less, most of Washington´s closest allies, in a defining moment led by Britain, Australia, 
South Korea joined the AIIB in 2014, and from 57 memb r states by then, their number 
increased to 70 in March 2017, as 13 new nations applied for membership, including 3 
NATO member states.732 Another 15 countries are waiting in line, thus potentially making 
AIIB larger than EBRD and ADB. 
On October 24, 2014, representatives from 21 Asian n tions signed the AIIB 
establishment agreement, with Australia, Indonesia and South Korea´s absent at the 
inauguration ceremony, with ADB and WB cautious welcome and hope for collaboration. 
The total capital commitment, $ 100 billion, was double the amount originally envisioned. 
 All continents´ countries presence and calculations for joining the bank are simple. 
China with its wealth, resources, and government guarantees, now rivals the United States at 
the global economic and financial table. Many countries are considering they must 
increasingly participate in China´s initiatives and projects, and backing the new bank would 
bring them financial/economic advantages, as well as selected favours from Beijing. 
The new bank ´´is an instrument for China to lend legitimacy to its international 
forays and to extend its spheres of economic and political influence while changing the rules 
of the game … and it gives the existing institutions a kick in the pants´´.733 
China´s official stand was that Asia has a massive infrastructure funding gap, with 
ADB pegged hole at some $ 8 trillion between 2010 and 2020, and that existing institutions 
cannot hope to fill it: ADB capital base (money both paid-in and pledged by member nations) 
of just over $ 160 billion and the WB - $ 233 billion. Besides, the China Development Bank 
and the Export-Import bank of China already claimed financing major projects in Asia and 
Africa, with their combined overseas assets to the tune of $ 500 billion, more than the 
combined capital of the WB and the ADB. 
China´s decision to fund a new multilateral Asia oriented bank rather than give more 
to existing ones reflected its exasperation with the slow pace of Asian and global economic 
governance reform, and U.S.-Japan Asian financial dominance. Although China is the 
biggest Asian economy, the ADB is dominated by both Japan and the U.S., where Japan´s 
voting share is almost twice China´s, and the bank´s president has always been Japanese. 
´´The U.S. risks forfeiting its relevance while stuck in its domestic political quagmire´´, AIIB 
president Jin Liqun, wrote in a chapter for a recently released book, ´Bretton Woods: The 
Next 70 Years´, adding, in reference to the United States, ´´History has never set any 
precedent that an empire is capable of governing the world forever´´.734 
The China-led AIIB, is now in the process of implementing its first projects, and the 
future financial choices will provide insight into how China plans to wield its 21st century 
Grand Strategy. Either China is serious about taking a leadership role in the global economy 
and governance, and in prioritizing projects that broadly benefit Asia, or it plans to use the 
bank as a vehicle to further its own strategic ambitions. So far China appears to be navigating 
the two extremes, as Beijing made a number of comprises: unlike the ADB, not 
accommodated and not day-to-day management and working in Beijing 12-member board of 
AIIB, accepting the Australian idea that procurement should not be limited only to member 
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countries – distinguishing the bank from existing similar international bodies, meaning that 
companies from the U.S. and Japan can compete for cont acts, staff  appointments from non-
AIIB member countries, Chinese slightly more than 26% of the total votes, not exercising 
veto power on day-to-day operations, and retaining o ly enough votes to block decisions it 
really cares about, like membership and the president of AIIB.735 
The same geo-economics motivations were behind the proj ct of the mostly China 
funded July 2015 New Development Bank established by the BRICS, and as the name ´New 
…´ demonstrates, Beijing´s new, outside the liberal conomic world order, gradual approach 
for change, and as the Economist put it, ´´to take matters into its own hands.´´736 
 
Role of OBOR/BRI 
Besides the two non-systemic banks, the AIIB and BRICS´ NDB, in 2013-2014, 
Beijing also initiated its predominantly Asia-Africa-Europe centric OBOR strategic project 
for inclusive economic development, trade and infrastructural networks of roads, rails, 
energy hubs and pipelines along the old Silk Road. BRI passes through Central Asia to 
Europe, with a maritime equivalent call ports from Southeast and South Asia to East Africa 
to the Mediterranean and potentially the Black sea.
In the beginning, connecting some 60 countries, the OBOR initiative has been aligned 
with many foreign national and regional development strategies, bringing forth more and 
more cooperative projects. For Beijing, the project represented the optimal avoiding direct 
confrontation and defusing U.S.´ Pivot to Asia-Pacific´ pressure, Chinese strategic counter 
measure. 
In this context, OBOR´s Beijing Forum for International Cooperation in May 2017, 
was a high-profile international meeting on the Belt and Road Initiative, and demonstrated 
China´s firm intentions of proceeding with the implementation of this balancing strategy. 
According to Beijing, at a time when certain Western powers are retreating into 
protectionism, isolation, and anti-globalization, China is ready to continue and promote 
economic globalization in a spirit of openness and inclusiveness.737 Beijing used the Forum 
to build more open and efficient international cooperation platforms and closer, stronger 
partnership network. 
Beijing believes that the BRI project will succeed based on the following arguments: 
International recognition – more than 100 countries and international organizations have 
already joined, of which more than 40 have signed cooperation agreements with China. 
UNGA, UNSC and APEC have incorporated or reflected OBOR/BRI cooperation in their 
resolutions and documents. Facilitates connectivity – a series of major transport, energy and 
communication projects, including the multi-purpose rail-road Padma Bridge in Bangladesh, 
the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, and China Railway Express trains to Europe, all have 
witnessed breakthroughs over the past three years. Unimpeded trade – trade between China 
and countries along the OBOR totalled 6.3 trillion RMB (U.S. $ 913 billion) in 2016, more 
than 25% of China´s total trade value (up 26.2% in the first three months of 2017 compared 
with the same period of 2016). Financial integration – 2015 AIIB and the U.S. $ 40 billion 
Silk Road Fund are providing financing for infrastructure development in Asia, while AIIB 
membership swiftly increased to 70 countries, with its multilateral development lending 
amounting to over $ 2 billion in a short period of time, and $ 2.95 billion non-financial 
outbound Chinese direct investment in 43 economies along OBOR, accounting for 14.4% of 
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the country´s total. Economic corridors – implementation of OBOR´s six economic corridors: 
the New Eurasian Continental Bridge, the China-Mongolia-Russia corridor, the China-
Central Asia-West Asia corridor, the China-Indochina Peninsula corridor, the China-Pakistan 
corridor, and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar corrid r, together form an economic, 
trade and transport network across Eurasia, laying a solid foundation for regional and trans-
regional economic development plans, and strengthen people-to-people bonds.738 
More than 1200 representatives attended the May OBOR/ RI Forum, including 
government, business, financial institutions, media from 110 nations, as well as from more 
than 60 international organizations. They included h ads of state and government from 28 
countries, UN secretary-general, WB president, and the managing director of the IMF. 
Results of the Forum ranged from consensus building to specific measures of 
projects´ implementation. Beijing signed cooperative documents with nearly 20 countries, 
with more than 20 international organisations, and intends to also work with countries along 
the OBOR routes on nearly 20 action plans concerning infrastructure, energy and resources, 
production capacity, trade and investment. 
According the March 2017 Boao Forum for Asia (BFA) in Hainan Province, China, 
economic globalization, not isolationism, will ensure a better future for Asia and the world. 
The theme of the conference - ´´Globalization and Free Trade: The Asian Perspectives´´ - 
reflects the attention to economic globalization paid by the international community, 
especially Asian countries, emphasized President Xi´s congratulatory address to the 
conference.739 In his letter, Xi lauded the forum in building an ´Asian Consensus´, promoting 
Asian cooperation and upgrading Asian influence since its establishment 16 years ago. Key 
speaker, executive vice-premier Zhang Gaoli asked Asian countries to promote economic 
globalization and free trade, and forge a community of common destiny for Asia and 
mankind. For Zhang, the 2013 inclusive OBOR initiative, having currently attracted more 
than 100 countries and international organizations, was part of the Chinese answer to 
globalization, and he reaffirmed China´s commitment to further opening up its market – 
expecting $ 8 trillion of imports, $ 600 billions of foreign investment and $ 750 billion of 
Chinese outbound investment in the next five years.740 
Belt and Road Initiative is an enormous and many deca s long endeavour. China is 
expected to pour almost $ 1 trillion in largely public financing into a variety of projects 
spanning 65 countries. Once complete, it will include a massive network of highways and 
railways linking China to Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle East/Africa. Series of 
maritime routes will connect Southeast Asia and Europe. Sixty-eight nations and 
international organizations have already signed cooperation agreements with China, and 18 
countries, including the UK, have agreed on principles for financing BRI projects. 
At his press conference on the sidelines of the March 2017 NPC annual session, 
Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi summed up China´s current international relations and 
foreign policy with three key words: vision; initiaive and consistency. For Wang, China has 
accomplished a great deal and opened a new chapter in major country diplomacy with 
Chinese characteristics. ´´China´s vision is evident by a series of new ideas and thoughts put 
forward by President Xi, including foreign partnerships that replace confrontation with 
dialogue, and alliance with partnership … to jointly building a community of shared future 
for all mankind. These new ideas and thoughts reject the old concepts of alliance and 
confrontation … and have distinct Chinese characteristics and major implications for the 
world.´´741 
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China´s continuous activism leads to a series of vital questions about the implications 
for Asia, and Asia-Pacific. What China wants in Asia and especially in East Asia, would it 
seek to become the dominant power by reducing the role of the U.S., would China seek a 
Sino-centric regional order in which many of its neighbours, including Japan, must acquiesce 
to Beijing´s strategic prerogatives? 
 China´s practical strategic moves and accomplishments within the framework of its 
China Dream Grand Strategy in the last 4-5 years , show that in spite of Beijing´s public 
discourse, and claims for active engagement and leadership position to jointly ´build a more 
just and reasonably new world order´, and ´guide the international community to jointly 
maintain international security´, still, its overall current strategic priorities are concentrated 
on strengthening Beijing´s positions and influence in Asia and the Asia-Pacific, seeking a 
new version of – Sino-centric regional order 2.0. 
Besides the OBOR, AIIB, India´s inclusion in the China dominated BRICS, the 
launch of the latter´s NDB, SCO, and Xi´s CICA call for new Asian security concept that 
relies on the Asians, Beijing continues its efforts in developping the priority ´geo-economics´ 
pillar of its Grand Strategy. 
In principle, and until recently, China was very reluctant and cautious in embracing 
and participating in Asian regional liberal economic initiatives and project, especially in such 
put forward by the West. Even after the United States, which initiated the TPP, withdrew 
from it, China´s stance on the trans-Pacific economic arrangement has not changed despite 
Australia and some other TPP signatory countries´ wi h to see China fill the vacuum created 
by the U.S.´ withdrawal. In Beijing, the TPP, besids being major part of U.S.´ 
´´Pivot/Rebalancing´´ to the Asia-Pacific, was seen as a typical example of the many 
international trade arrangements and rules that Western countries dominate, with norms and 
rules that reflect Western values at the cost of ecnomic fairness and even the spirit of 
WTO.742 
In his first foreign leader October 2013 speech to the Indonesian parliament, entitled 
´Jointly Building a Closer China-ASEAN Community ofCommon Destiny´, President Xi 
publicly and convincingly emphasized: ´This year makes the tenth anniversary of the China-
ASEAN strategic partnership. Our relationship now stands at a new historical starting 
point,´743 implying not only the material but also Asia´s spiritual, cultural and communal 
bonds and traditions. 
President Xi Jinping´s presence at the 24th APEC November 2016 Peru Summit 
marked a watershed, a historic milestone not just in terms of China´s rise as a great power, 
but, of equal importance, as a palpable manifestation of its new status as Asia-Pacific´s pre-
eminent leader in promoting economic globalization, trade liberalization, and its model for 
regional economic integration. 
In advance of the APEC Summit, China spearheaded a holistic Free Trade Area of the 
Asia Pacific (FTAAP) feasibility study, the Collective Strategic Study on Issues Related to 
the Realization of the FTAAP. The study was first au horized during the APEC Beijing 
Summit in 2014 at China´s insistence – also known as the Beijing Roadmap. The study 
formed the basis for APEC´s consensus endorsement of FTAAP implementation at the Peru 
Summit, in particular the 2016 Leaders´ Declaration, a d even more definitely, the Lima 
declaration on FTAAP.744 
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In the Declaration, the APEC leadership formally recognized FTAAP as a major 
instrument to realize APEC´s goals of Asia-Pacific regional economic integration, 
encompassing all 21 APEC economies, including China, U.S., and Russia. APEC leadership 
further announced that all their economies should immediately begin a stock-take on how 
regional trade and investment issues, including regional trade agreements and free trade 
agreements as well as different levels of economic development amongst APEC members, 
should be fairly resolved within the FTAAP framework. Most likely APEC is also to embark 
on concrete programs to update FTAAP, such as: improved market access and reciprocal 
tariff reductions; elimination of non-tariff measures; liberalization of trade in services; 
investment convergence and liberalization, and harmonized preferential rules of origin, the 
majority of which fall under Beijing´s call for a ´new historic starting point´ in economic 
globalization raised by Xi at the 2016 G-20 Summit. 
With the U.S. withdrawal from the TPP, at present, the most viable pathway to 
achieve FTAAP is through the strongly China backed RCEP (ASEAN + 6), as 7 of the 12 
countries of the envisioned TPP are also RCEP participants, and 12 of the 16 RCEP countries 
are APEC members. The uncertainties around the future of TPP may force some of its 
signatories to focus more vigorously on RCEP, which in turn, would make it more attractive 
as the APEC- preferred vehicle to achieve a comprehensive FTAAP, even for a larger 
membership in the future, including APEC countries from Latin America. This may also be 
encouraged by the fact that unlike TPP rules, the RCEP does not include provisions on 
environmental, labour, and food safety standards, ha  less coverage of cyber/internet issues, 
and does not address the treatment of state-owned eterprises. Alternately, some more 
advanced TPP provisions could percolate into the APEC-driven FTAAP´s expected, and 
eventual final negotiations.745 
China supporting, U.S. opposing – Regional Comprehensiv  Economic Partnership 
(RCEP) and Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) are gradually taking traction, and 
Beijing is seemingly patient and following the step by step gradual cautious approach – it 
still has to deal with unpredictable President Trump, and its second strategic China Dream 
goal lies in the far ahead 2049. 
China´s obvious Lima success in pushing forward with the long-sought FTAAP, and 
gaining adherents to its RCEP as the primary model and pathway to achieve FTAAP, 
represents significant Asia and Asia-Pacific strategy step forward and achievement. Coupled 
with the apparent vacuum in the original TPP project, China´s initiatives and exemplary 
´win-win´ activism constitute a damaging setback to U.S. regional standing and credibility, 
with still unclear but likely far-reaching strategic consequences and economic model 
transformations.  
 
 The Chinese path to world pre-eminence - a sui generis 
            economic development model? 
 
Conventional wisdom goes that Chinese usually do not i vent anything new 
economically, but rather take foreign best know-how and good practices, which they most 
profitably then realize in their own interest. According to President Xi: ´China learns, but 
never copies, from others´, and ´´it is important for us to use both the invisible hand and the 
visible hand to form synergy between market forces and government function and strive to 
achieve both efficiency and fairness.´´746 
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For decades after China opened itself in the late 1970s, Beijing more or less accepted 
the Nixon-Deng´s ´quasi alliance´ and the U.S.-led liberal international order´s 
´congagement´ strategy towards China. Being a sort of member of the order was essential for 
paramount leader Deng Xiaoping´s peace and developmnt concept based on the notion that 
China needs a peaceful external environment to develop and rise economically. The bargain 
with the U.S. tacitly accepted American primacy in East Asia in exchange for selective 
access to the U.S.-led world order´s markets, investm nt and technology. 
As China has become much stronger, the ´grand bargain´ nd its 
engagement/deterrence major component came under serious stress, especially over the last 
decade and since the global financial crisis´ negative impact on China´s economic growth 
and development. The tensions were reflected in the ongoing debate and strategic analysis 
within China: how far and for how long should a great power like China continue to be 
dependent on the goodwill of another great power, the United States, for its socio-economic 
well-being and national security. After 2012, the course, that a self-respecting great power 
should not depend on outside forces and should rely on its comprehensive national power and 
foreign strategic partnerships to determine its economic development, future destiny, was set 
in stone. 
 President Xi reached out for a mobilizing and unifyi g philosophy of national idea/l 
Grand Strategy, which he labelled, ´China Dream for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation´, 
a ´new historic starting point´. Unlike empire-type and other major countries747, in China - a 
unitary sovereign state with no need for a national identification, and firm civilization code 
of 91.5% Han/Chinese out of almost 1.4 billion peopl , the China Dream received massive 
popular approval and support. 
 Some of the liberal - ´democratic peace´, ´economic interdependence´, ´China 
collapse´, schools, have plausible points, based on real existing socio-economic problems 
that currently China faces within its ´new normal´ growth pattern and huge debt burden. Yet, 
as a whole they can be relegated to the realm of wishful thinking, especially taking into 
account President Xi´s proactive domestic and external policies. The latter totally dismisses 
the Japan-South Korea-Taiwan – authoritarian turned – multiparty democracy scenario, and 
seeks that in 2049 China celebrates its 100th anniversary as a People´s Republic under the 
leadership of the CCP. Gerald Segal´s ´the Middle Kingdon is merely a middle power´, David 
Shambaugh´s Ćhina as a partial power´, even Liselotte Odgaard´s assessment that ´China´s 
Great Power-hood is psychological and symbolical rather than based on reality´748, do not 
correspond with the purposeful and gradually implemented China Dream Grand Strategy. 
China´s current engine role for world growth amid sluggish global economic recovery749,  
Xi´s G-20, 2017 Davos visions, and February 2017 ´two guidance´s stands and leadership 
initiatives are much telling and underpin the China Dream strategic course in the 21st century. 
 China, fully aware of the crucial domestic socio-ec nomic and external geopolitical 
risks and threats that lie ahead in its development trajectory, continuously researches, studies 
and analyses the causes and consequences of key 20th century geo-strategic events, such as 
the final rise and superpower status of the U.S., and the demise of the USSR. Based on its 
domestic theoretical and practical achievements since reform and opening up, on Zhongyong 
dialectical socio-economic and political experience, B ijing also turns to and learns from 
                                                 
747 In the Russian Empire, until 20th century, the unifying factor was Orthodox Christianity, based on the Monarchy/court cast system, where according to 
the Tzarist legislation, any foreigner could occupy top government post as long as he converts to orthdox Christianity. In today´s Russian Federation, 
building unity on the base of national idea/l is almost impossible, as the Russians are allegedly 60% f the population, and the current RF constitution 
officially announces that there is no national/state ideology. 
748 All quoted in, Stefaan Van Kerchove, ´The Rise of China in Historical Perspective´ Gent University, Ph.D. dissertation, October 2009, 
pp. 256-257, fn. 616, 620. 
749 According to IMF estimate, China contributed 39% to world economic growth in 2016, a rise of 14.2% compared to 2015. 
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foreign thought and know-how in matters important for its 21st century domestic 
development, international relations and foreign policy. 
In 2017 Davos speech President Xi declared: ´This is the best of times and worst of 
the times´, and called for a ´global community of common destiny´, a concept that, 
´´transcends all sort of differences in human society and targets greatest possible benefits for 
all´´.750 
At a time when U.S. and European leaders are searching for confidence in the future, 
when Chancellor Merkel comments that ´Europe can no lo ger rely entirely on the U.S. and 
UK´, China´s Xi has boldly embraced it, emphasizing that ´the future belongs to the brave´. 
This paradox, however, is the natural outgrowth of decades of successful Chinese economic 
policies in contrast to continuing narrative of relative Western decline and transfer of 
economic power to the East. 
President Xi´s repeated calls and search for ´global community of common destiny´ 
and ´Asian, China-ASEAN community of common destiny´ represent the external 
derivatives goals of China Dream. For Beijing these goals can be achieved as foreign 
minister Wang has operationally put it in March 2017, through: ´vision, initiative, and 
consistency´. 
Beijing well understands, that for its visions of ´global and Asian communities of 
common destiny, with Chinese characteristics´ to go forward and to be realized in long term, 
China first needs to succeed and deliver its own ´sui generiś functional model of economic 
development for the 21st century, which should be attractive, and eventually accepted initially 
regionally and gradually, step by step, globally.  
Faithful to its ´geo-economics first´ strategy, China has generally shaped the initial 
external legs of its 21st century economic development model (OBOR, AIIB, NDB, Silk 
Road Fund, OBOR-EEU cohesion, etc), or as Fukuyama has exclaimed in 2016, ´´in striking 
departure in Chinese policy, it is for the first time that China seeks to export its development 
model.´´751 
So far, China´s ´ external support economic model works fairly successful judging by 
the increasing number of strategic partnerships, AIIB members and applicants, as well as the 
willing participants in the OBOR, RCEP and FTAAP projects, added to EEU Russia-led 
cooperation and coordination with Beijing, even on major projects and matters concerning 
Arctic economic and infrastructure development. 
Long before Premier Li Keqiang´s March 2017 NPC statement that ´China should 
prepare for more complicated and graver situations, as result of the global 2008 financial 
crisis, and due to developments both in and outside China´, the previous Hu-Wen leadership 
began preparing China´s economy for its historic ´new normal´ transition. They had a clear 
and realistic understanding about the opportunities and challenges facing China´s objective 
problems: slower growth, social imbalances, industrial overcapacity, excessive debt, massive 
pollution – the list goes on. 
For President Xi, China´s guiding, integrated development model strategy, going 
forward, will be driven by ´´innovation, coordination, green, openness and sharing´´, or as 
it´s called, the ´´Five Major Development Concepts´´.752 Although each of the five concepts 
was already well known and separately commonly prescribed, their China´s practical, 
adequate integration, and complex interaction is given as autonomous original theory and 
practice with ´Chinese characteristics´. 
                                                 
750 ´Xi´s world vision: a community of common destiny, a shared home for humanity´, Xinhua, January 15, 2017. 
751 See Francis Fukuyama, ´Exporting the Chinese Model´, Project Syndicate, January 12, 2016, at https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/china-one-belt-one-road-strategy-by-francis-fukuyama-2016-01#cYsLzruVgUwkPjiV.99 
 
752 Robert Lawrence Kuhn, ´The five major development concepts´, China Daily, 23.09.2016. 
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´´Innovative Development´´ is in the top spot, as the first of the five concepts. It 
wants to demonstrate that China´s leadership seriously considers the primary role of reform 
in the country´s economic and social transformation, as reform requires continuous change 
through innovation, primarily in technology, scienc, as well as in management and 
processes. 
The balanced, optimized, and efficient allocation of future economic development 
resources is provided through the second ´´Coordinated Development´´ concept. In spite of 
Xi´s recognition that the market ´invisible hand´ must play a ´´decisive´´ role, the state´s 
´´visible hand´´ is attributed priority coordination role on issues of industrial and trade 
competition between different provinces and cities, including on how to integrate diverse 
regions and rebalance urban and rural areas. 
As the Chinese people are critically displeased to see their air, water and soil so 
polluted, the government´s social stability and security concern has responded by elevating 
´´Green Development´´, the third development concept, to highest national priority. 
´´Open Development´´, the fourth, external leg concept, is exemplified by China´s 
numerous free trade zones, the OBOR + AIIB strategy. Beijing actively lobbies for the RCEP 
and for the FTAAP, which would allow Chinese companies and corporations to go settle and 
operate abroad in new markets - building infrastructure and industrial base, selling high-
speed rail and self-developed technologies, even buying foreign companies and production 
assets. 
China cannot reach the 2021 first China Dream strategic goal of ´moderately 
prosperous society´ until its economic and social imbalances – particularly between rural and 
urban areas – are reduced and poverty is considerably minimized, which leads to the fifth 
development concept of ´´Shared Development´´. It comes last, not because it is least 
important, but because it requires the success of the first four development concepts.  
President Xi´s philosophy and policies call for market and government working 
pragmatically together, to optimize and balance effici ncy and social fairness, which now 
inform the thinking, and guides the practice of all levels of government and party officials.753 
At the April 2017 34th meeting of the Central Leading Group for Deepening Overall Reform 
Xi urged all departments and localities to attach greater importance to implementing reform 
measures, and called for enhanced supervision to effectively detect and solve existing and 
forthcoming economic and social problems.754 As China´s economy settles into its ´new 
normal´, with slower growth and multiple external and internal structural challenges, by 2021 
it must transition and the Chinese society must rebalance within the framework of the Grand 
Strategy. 
It is not only Fukuyama and Western experts that anxiously research and analyze 
China´s evolving economic development model. In a lecture entitled ´Synergy of Corporate 
and State Strategies for China´s Development´, Russian economic analyst professor Vladimir 
Rumyantzev claims that Chinese economic strategists, backed by and in coordination with 
Chinese elite, have chosen their development path. Grand Strategy plan is in a process of 
formulation and realization, perhaps not ideal, but still working in China´s longterm interests. 
For him, the world today is divided into two: a world of consumption and a world of 
production, where the U.S. depends on the former, China on both, while Russia is in the 
middle, still undecided, and her only positive operational strategy as a transit between Asia 
and Europe will not be enough to save her recession pr e economy. 
According to Rumyantzev, Beijing´s economic development strategies are all based 
on Chinese culture and Confucian ethics, on higher cooperation, social responsibility; better 
coordination and synchronization, expedient contractual agreements, like ´´back to 5000 
                                                 
753 Ibid., 
754 ´Xi demands enhanced supervision over reform efforts´, Xinhua, 18.04.2017, at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-04/18/content_28981669.   
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years ago, when the rice plantations to be effectiv and productive needed the agreement and 
support of the whole village.´´755 
At the March 2017 NPC session Premier Li Keqiang has declared that China has all 
the chances to create a fully beneficial digital technology production ecosystem, and take a 
leading position in a new economy and international trade. He also forcefully urged top state 
managers to learn modern technologies. For him, synchro ization of efforts in adopting 
modern technologies allows with minimum financial and organizational resources to create 
huge monsters who can engulf quite swiftly domestic and overseas businesses. Relying on 
the latter, foreign business on its own initiative and strategy will try to enter in cooperation 
processes in search of access to Chinese markets. 
Development of e-commerce is one of the main tasks of the Chinese 13th FYP (2016-
2020), and the State approved ´Internet +´ program seeks the creation of a new technology 
development ´trans-border e-commerce´ zones, as well as a strategy conditions for massive 
appearances of sector Ubers. 
For Rumyantzev, the case of the private Alibab Group is a telling example of how 
China sees key elements of its 21st century economic model. In the mid 1990s there were 
many Chinese entrepreneurs like Alibaba´s owner Jack Ma, but he succeeded primarily due 
to synchronization with the state´s economic and technological policies. In 2014 only, his 
´Taobao Villages Project´ led to the creation in 191 villages of more than 220000 new jobs 
by opening of over 55000 Internet Taobao shops and s les in every village worth of more 
than $ 1.6 million each. Taobao.com and tmall.com, both under the Alibaba Group´s 
electronic payment system Alipay, with almost 400 million users, registered nationwide 50.7 
billion RMB (U.S. $ 8.2 billion) in sales on November 11, 2014. A few weeks later, the total 
Internet sales plus the in-store sales in the U.S. market during the three-day Thanksgiving 
weekend was only 40.7 billion RMB (U.S. $ 6.6 billion). The 50.7 billion RMB were only 
the sales of Alibaba, not including 163.com, qq.com, jd.com, and other online stores in 
China, or any physical store sales, making China the world´s largest digital payment market, 
facilitated by the 80% mobile, out of its almost 700 million Internet users. 
In the last 10-15 years China has made incredible progress in technology 
development. While in the early 2000s there were no highly rated Chinese computers, now 
Lenovo is competing with Apple for # 1 lap top position. A new world super computer is 
under construction with the ambition to be 3x faster than the existing one, also of Chinese 
origin. 50% of world´s financial technology investment in 2016 was done in China, and 
Beijing is throwing a wall around the fintech market with the goal of creating its own 
indigenous champion technologies (from adapting to innovating) that will go global, under 
the ´Made in China´ policy (2020-2025). 
China pushes to be the world´s leader in robotics, with U.S.$ 25 billion allocated for 
2017, with plans to be doubled in the next 3-4 years. Quantum computers, satellites, 3D 
printing, and nanotechnologies are also on the highpriority agenda of the ´geo-economics 
first´ component of the 21st century strategic enterprise. 
Chinese government´s digital space ´Production 4.0´and the U.S. $ 175 billion 
´Industry Robotization -2025´ programs plan to lead to integration of state and corporate 
information systems, as the 3rd phase of China´s e-government where state information 
systems collect and process data not only in the regulator´s but also in the interest of 
businesses and seeks the creation of ´global champions´ n relatively short 2-3 years time 
span. If the strategy does not meet serious problems in 2025-2030, by 2035 China expects 
digitalization and update in real time database of: current loading of the majority of the 
country´s productive capacity, actual leftovers andprices of 99% of all components, natural 
                                                 
755 Владимир Румянцев, ‘Синергия корпоративних и государствених стратегий развития Китая’, 11.11.2016, at  https://www.youtube.com/watch/? 
v=f1ujfoRMMA0 
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resources and equipment in all storages, current volume of production of 99% of all goods; 
current consumption of 99 % of all goods and their consumers, social digital portfolios of 
employment of the majority of the workforce, and financial portfolios of most consumers 
(assets + income – expenses). 
The expected consequences of the latter strategy are: optimization of most sales, 
production processes, logistic chains, and financial balance of basic goods´ purchases and 
deals; balance and equilibrium of pricing, including on regional consumption; timely 
economic production based on demand; robotization of most functions; appearance of exact 
projections of basic consumer´s needs, and innovation based profits, all that assessed as the 
prerequisites for a winning economic future based on – ´´new management systems; 
Uberization, and innovation technologies for the real economy´´,756 that will make China the 






























                                                 













General Assessments and Conclusions: 
 
No rising new great power in history has become part of the established hierarchical 
world order without major military conflict, defeat nd/or continued occupation. The USSR 
has lost the Cold War systemic and hostile competition relatively peacefully and major war 
absent. Still, this has not paved the way of Russia into the U.S. led liberal international order, 
especially after Putin´s 2007 Munich Security Conference´s radical anti-USA and the West 
speech.757 
 The research questions and challenges that faced the current dissertation were aimed 
at addressing the most pressing, long-term geo-economics and geopolitical questions 
confronting the world today: What is the next interational system going to look like, how 
long and in what direction this unknown potential construct is going to take mankind, would 
it be peaceful or would it vindicate the realist discourse of warlike hegemonic transition? Is 
Beijing a sui generis geo--strategist, and how will China and the USA behave strategically in 
the rest of the 21st century? 
 Though still on the IR agenda, extreme ´China Threat´, ´China Collapse´, ´China´s 
symbolic and psychological Great Power-hood´, ´China turned Liberal´ schools continue to 
loose traction, being quite far from the deep and complex processes, model and current 
Beijing´s leadership worldview for the first half othe 21st century that drives China Dream 
Grand Strategy. 
  
On Economic Globalization with ´Chinese Characteristics´ 
 
A brief compressed analysis of the five Chinese leadership generations since the 
creation of the People´s Republic in 1949 can be generalized as follows: Mao´s period was 
characterized with ideology and internationalism rather than with economy and development. 
Deng´s revolutionary reforms and opening up of China laid the foundations of the current 
Grand Strategy. Jiang´s presidency brought China more broadly and selectively into the 
liberal system of international relations and political economy. President Hu, who was more 
absorbed with domestic social and ideological stabili y, relatively assertive, took a pause and 
KLP posture towards major international activities. Current President Xi is trying to combine 
basic domestic ideological stability from the early Mao period with economically, 
technologically, and social psychologically motivated, and driven global competition with 
the U.S. under the slogan of the ´rejuvenation of the Chinese nation´ within the framework of 
the China Dream. Since 2012, Xi is leading major reform of the Chinese system of 
international relations and political economy, and it has evolved with efforts of bearing initial 
features in the context of Kindleberger theory´s definition for a stable international system as 
- ´highly dependent on the public goods provided by a country in the leadership role´. From 
the latter theory point of view China has almost passed the test for leadership role: nearly $ 1 
trillion planned  OBOR/BRI investments, 39% contribution to world economic growth in 
2016, (a rise of 14.2 percentage points from 2015, according to IMF estimates), including an 
open market (support for economic globalization), credible international currency (inclusion 
of the RMB into the IMF´s SDR basket in 2016), and identity as creditor of last resort (AIIB, 
NDB and the Silk Road Fund). 
 As a response to the ´´Kindleberger Trap´´ dilemma Beijing claims that China is 
approaching the central stage of global governance, as demonstrated at 2016 G-20  and 2017 
Davos Forums. With the questionable and still uncertain Trump-era U.S. pulling back from 
                                                 
757 See ´Putin Says U.S. Is Undermining Global Stability´, The New York Times, February 11, 2007, at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/11/world/europe/ 11munich.html 
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the global governance regimes, China, as the second largest world economy and important 
player in global governance, faces and analyzes difficult strategic choices: to follow on the 
U.S.´ fluid example and Trump´s protectionist and nationalist declarations, or to contribute 
more public goods to global governance in areas where the U.S. may potentially withdraw. In 
a tactical, opposing the TPP model, manoeuvre, and as a reconciling attempt to counter the 
former choice, Beijing has encouraged Washington to participate in the OBOR Initiative thus 
´opening the gate of opportunities´ for U.S. enterprises.758 
 In the past 20-25 years, with different altitude and motivations, China has tried to 
demonstrate its participation in the existing globa governance regimes, accomplishing the 
initial and basic twin strategic goals of peaceful economic development and safeguarding its 
political system and domestic security and stability. Acknowledging the various inequalities 
and imperfections of the existing regimes, China has always insisted reform of the system 
should be pursued and accomplished in a well thought step-by-step manner, rather than 
destroying and replacing it with something entirely new.  
Especially since 2008, China has strategically participated in the established global 
governance system in a more active manner, both from within and from outside, seeking to 
reform it by playing a distinct leadership role and putting forward initiatives spanning on 
three stages – from capital supply to mechanism building to concept innovation. Starting in 
2008, China has been contributing more funds for global governance, from financing 
multilateralization of the Chiang Mai Initiative to injecting funds into the IMF and World 
Bank to proposing the OBOR Initiative. For Beijing, the hallmark of Chinese contributions to 
global governance in mechanism building was the founding of the AIIB, BRICS´ NDB, BRI, 
and the Silk Road Fund.  In addition, since 2016 G-20 and 2017 Davos Forums, China claims 
it has been generating ideas and rational initiatives for successful, inclusive globalization 
2.0., as a mature and responsible great power. 
 China considers that its emphasis on open, inclusive, hared and green development 
in global governance in a way inherits and complements the global governance regime the 
U.S. has advocated on the basis of freedom, democracy, human rights and rule of law. For 
Beijing, its Chinese characteristics´ contribution embodies plenty of innovative ideas and 
positive initiatives for more democratic, fair and just global governance. Beijing admits on 
the one hand that opening up is not a Chinese idea, but British diplomacy and force promoted 
19th century Manchester School´s idea of open economy world ide, inherited and imposed 
again by the U.S. in the 20th century. On the other hand China assesses that in contradiction 
to that Western concept, at present the U.S. and Europe may drift back to protectionism and 
self-isolation in attempts to reverse economic globa ization. 
 For China, inclusive global governance regime needs to incorporate as many 
countries as possible, and avoid exclusive, small-clique governance models. In the wake of 
the 2008 global crisis, objectively the core platform of global governance has shifted from G-
7 to G-20. TPP and TTIP models as well as U.S.-led a liance system were viewed  in Beijing 
as old Cold War patterns of deep-rooted exclusiveness and antagonism in economic and 
security global issues, in contrast to the partnership networks that China advocates, 
representing inclusive international political, economic and security relations. 
 In Beijing´s terms and promotion, sharing means to le  all stratums, countries, and 
regions benefit in the process of economic globalization, where the stronger and richer help 
the weak conform the ideological traditions of Chinese collectivism and societal 
development. U.S.´1990s promotion of liberal development based on the ´Washington 
Consensus´ has brought simultaneously unprecedented high growth worldwide as well as 
acerbated development gaps and inequality on national, regional and global level, a negative 
                                                 
758 An Baijie, ´China invites US to join Belt and Road, ChinaDailyAsia, April 26, 2017,  
 226 
consequence, seen in Beijing to a certain extent, as the root cause of the ´´Trump 
phenomenon´´. 
 China´s development faces the most severe environmental domestic and worldwide 
pressures, and development at the price of environmental degradation is seen by Beijing as 
unsustainable and prone to domestic political instabili y. The option of potential U.S. 
withdrawal of support for clean energy and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and 
return to fossil fuel, is strategically assessed. For Beijing, blazing a trail of green 
development will be the greatest contribution China can make to the world. On May 9, 2017, 
being one of the first foreign leaders to have a phone conversation with newly elected French 
President Macron, President Xi emphasized China´s support for the European integration 
process, and that China and France should further promote the reform of the global 
governance and champion its fruits, such as the UN Paris Climate Change agreement. 
Macron echoed, by saying that his new administration will deepen cooperation with China on 
foreign policy, the economy, trade and industry, and in collaboration within the framework of 
building the OBOR.759 
 As opposed and conflicting with its vision for economic globalization, Beijing argues 
that many historic changes have taken place in globalization and global governance in the 
last 1-2 years. Geo-political contradictions between major countries worsening, competition 
for dominance in the processes of globalization that is fiercer, and the world economy 
continuing to slide, the world is witnessing a new period of uncertainty and turbulence, a sign 
of new phase, overly simplistic to be defined just as ´´anti-globalization´´. 
  ´´Winners´´ and ´´losers´´ in the globalization processes, liberalism´s inherent, and 
increasingly intensified fundamental contradictions, wealth gaps widening, contradictions 
between elites and the rest proving insurmountable, is what Beijing sees as a whole in the 
outcome of the interaction of intensification of domestic contradictions in the United States 
and the trend of changes in globalization and global governance.760 China researches 
potential risks as a major variable in global changes to inevitably influence the direction of 
globalization and the prospects and evolution of Xi´s ´major-country relations´, ´global 
community of common destiny´ and ´Asian, China-ASEAN community of common destiny´ 
concepts. 
 China realizes that the U.S. will remain a dominant force, and considers that 
Washington will attempt to change the pattern of glba ization, make new international rules, 
and control again the distribution of the benefits of globalization. Currently both U.S. 
government and American public believe globalization has deviated from the track of 
´Americanization´, with the U.S. getting fewer benefits, and emerging countries like China 
getting more.761 
 For Beijing, globalization itself won´t disappear, nd the discourse, therefore, should 
focus and be directed towards ´re-globalization´, ´optimizing economic globalization´, or 
´redefining´ globalization, and how to better plan international cooperation in a new evolving 
paradigm of global governance. China claims that openness can be beneficial to all only if 
economic globalization is tolerant of differences, allowing countries to pursue their own 
development paths without undue external influence and coaching. For Xi, China stands on 
its own conditions and experience, as well as on inherited wisdom from the Chinese 
civilization, learning widely from the strengths of both East and West. ´´We defend our way 
but are not rigid. We learn but do not copy from others. We formulate our own development 
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path through continuous experimentations … No country should view its own development 
path as the only viable one, still less should it impose it … on others.´´762 
 
 On the current state of U.S.- China relationship 
 
As the father of the modern U.S.-China relationship, that opened after his secret 
Pakistani enabled 1971 China trip, culminating the almost three decades long previous 162 
Sino-American ambassadorial level closed-door meetings, no American strategist has had 
more experience with China, and to certain extent with USSR/Russia, than Dr. Henry 
Kisssinger. For almost five decades he has helped gui e U.S. leaders and educated 
Americans about the dynamics and crucial importance of the Washington-Beijing 
relationship, on Russia and other major global issue .  
For Kissinger, U.S. relations with China will shape international order in the long 
term and both countries will be the world´s most consequential, as economically already they 
actually are. Both nations will have to undergo unprecedented domestic transformations, and 
as a first step they ought to try to develop an understanding of how joint Sino-American 
action could stabilize the world. At minimum, both s ould agree to limit their disagreements; 
more sophisticatedly – to identify projects they can undertake together, as a balanced, 
peaceful world order depends on a stable U.S.-China rel tionship. A military conflict 
between the two countries, given the technologies th y possess, would be calamitous and 
forcefully dividing the region and the world. 
Echoing Qin Yaqing´s ontological level concept of relationality processes based 
global governance, rather than only in purely rule terms, and the Zhongyong dialectics, 
Kissinger makes the basic assessments for the need of U.S.-China transparency towards each 
other about their motives. Both must strive to come to an understanding about the nature of 
their co-evolution towards an evolutionary global st bility, coordinating their strategic reach 
not in dominating the world, but in constraining their adversarial impacts on each other and 
agreeing to cooperate. 
Due to President Xi´s China Dream Grand Strategy and its two ´hundreds´ strategic 
goals, and by the time the second is reached in 2049, the Chinese will be, by their 
projections, the equal of any other country in the contemporary world. They will, by their 
reckoning, be able to insist on absolute material and strategic equality, including with 
America, and the latter is seen as serious latent source of tension. 
In American perceptions, President Xi, for his part, has put currently two additional 
objectives for China: ´Asia for Asians´, and to ´turn adversaries into partners´. Some 
American experts claim the latter being the one that W shington should make the dominant 
theme of U.S.-China interactions.  
Chinese internal discussions lead to two clashing options: the hard-liners would posit, 
´´The Americans are visibly declining. We will win. We can afford to be tough and look at 
the world with sort of Cold War-ish attitudes.´´The other, still dominant position – apparently 
that of President Xi – is that confrontation is toodangerous: Cold War with the U.S. would 
keep China from reaching its strategic economic goals. Hence, in the contemporary period, 
adversarial countries must become partners and cooperate on a win-win basis, and however 
one interprets the arc of history, a conflict between countries possessing modern 
technologies, and their dangerous uncertain application, the U.S. and China have a duty to try 
to cooperate, avoiding the ´Thucydides Trap´. 
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A viable interpretation of the latter ´moderate´ approach is that the Chinese think that 
the world is moving in their direction, that they will eventually inherit it in some fashion, and 
that their strategic task is to keep the U.S. quiet in the period in between.763 
Chinese view the world very differently, and until the 1911 revolution foreign 
relations with other countries were managed by the Ministry of Rites, classifying each one as 
a relative tributary to Beijing, with no Westphalian type diplomatic relations and sense that 
overseas countries are equal entities. 
In the context of cultural gaps and obstacles, the basic American attitude is that 
normal condition of the world is peaceful, so if there are problems caused by country or a 
person, they should be defeated, and everything will become harmonious again. By contrast, 
conceptually, the Chinese do not believe in permanent solutions, and think in terms of trends 
and processes - that one solution leads to the emerg nce of another problem. They ask, 
´´Where are you going to? What do you think the world will look like in 15 years?´´764 
For Kissinger, another obstacle and difference is that hough both countries consider 
themselves exceptional, they follow separate indigenous philosophies. Every post WWII 
U.S.´ president has bought the ideas of American exceptionalism and American 
indispensability, including President Trump, on his own specific business-like, unpredictable 
and add-hoc terms.  The U.S. believes that its exceptionalism entitles it to educate others 
because if they adopt the American principles, the world will be more peaceful, while the 
Chinese do not strive for conversion. They think America has no moral right to intervene in 
their domestic affairs, and their analogy to conversion is that the majesty of their 
performances and developmental success will so awe oth r societies that they will follow 
enough of the Chinese pattern to become cultural and political tributaries, believing 
historically that any rational party would accept it. ´´They would use military force less to 
occupy than to impress, and in Deng Xiaoping´s words and theory - ´to teach respect´, and 
that ´Chinese pre-eminence, not governance´, would f llow.´´765 
Since the new millennium, and especially after 2008, the U.S. is in a sort of 
imbalance in the making and adaptation of its Grand Strategy. With some basic policy 
discontinuity from administration to administration, there is a kind of pendulum dilemma that 
goes from excessive engagement to regret to conditial tactical withdrawal. The world is 
now living into a crisis period where the nature and force of exceptionalism are being re-
examined and readjusted, seen also in U.S.´ desire to r treat from the worldview, from the 
kind of bipartisan engagement that characterized Washington´s Grand Strategy for the past 
half-century.  
In the face of President Trump´s domestic political/de-legitimization, U.S.´ economic 
and fiscal conundrums, in contrast to his anti-Chinese presidential campaign rhetoric, in 2017 
he was initially forced to try to buy sometime to sabilize internally his presidency, including 
on the complicated and complex major powers relations´ foreign policy front. 
President Xi was the first non-U.S. ally foreign lead r to be invited for USA visit in 
early April 2017. Both presidents had discussions o urgent global issues with priority on 
North Korea´s nuclear ambitions, Trump´s 2017 China visit and the restructuring of the U.S.-
China senior-level dialogues. Real and concrete result was the agreed ´100 days´ negotiation 
plan´ on economic, financial, and trade bilateral relations. The first swift tangible outcome 
that followed was the May 12, 2017, U.S.-China 10-point trade deal that opened Chinese 
markets to U.S. credit rating agencies, credit card companies, lifted the ban on U.S. beef 
imports, and accepted U.S. shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG). In return, Chinese 
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poultry products and Chinese banks will be able to access U.S. markets. The political win-
win aspect of the agreement was announced by U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross – 
reduction of China´s trade surplus by the end of 2017 and playing by the rules, major 
Trump´s campaign promise. For Beijing – important global image reshaping from the U.S. 
and the latter´s statement recognizing the importance of China´s OBOR, including plans of 
sending a representative delegation to attend the OBOR/BRI Forum (May 14-15, 2017) in 
Beijing.766 Unlike France, Germany and Britain, represented at the Forum by 
economic/financial officials, U.S. was represented by Matt Pottinger, special assistant to 
President Trump and Senior Director for East Asia on the National Security Council767, 
implying the geopolitical impact that Washington attaches to the Chinese impressive project. 
China strongly refuted April 2018 U.S. report on the Belt and Road Initiative. After 
analyzing 15 Chinese-funded port projects, a research institute called C4ADS concluded that 
the projects were not driven by win-win economic development, but intended to expand 
China's "political influence and military presence." 
As world´s ´frenzy study´ of what President Trump will do next continues, and after 
Xi´s Florida visit and talks with Trump in early April, U.S. Vice-President Pence paid a 10-
day visit to Asia that included South Korea, Japan, Indonesia and Australia. Analyzing the 
visit through the lens of the successive Asia-Pacific/Indo-Pacific policies and moves made by 
the Trump administration, Beijing is still hesitant but most obviously apt to assess that there 
is more continuity than change in the new U.S. administration´s Asia-Pacific strategy.768 
In line with Obama´s bipartisan endorsed Pivot/Rebalance strategy, Trump has made 
it a top priority to strengthen the U.S. presence and lliance system in the region. Since 
January 20, 2017, Defence Secretary Mattis, Secretary of State Tillerson and Vice-President 
Pence have visited both Japan and South Korea. PM Abe was twice received by President 
Trump and reassured of U.S.´ security obligations.  
In a March 2017 statement, distancing the current administration from the Obama´s 
´Pivot/Rebalancing´ formulation, and even doubting f ever there will be a new clear-cut 
Trump´s one, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs Susan 
Thornton outlined the following U.S. Asia strategic policy framework: ´´We are going to 
remain active and engaged in Asia. Asian economy is very important for U.S. prosperity and 
growth, we´ll be there working on fair and free trade issues, working on regional security 
challenges, such as North Korea, and continue to press for a rules-based, constructive, 
peaceful, stable order in Asia.´´769 
For Chinese strategists: No matter who occupies the W ite House, guaranteeing U.S. 
security and huge economic interests will be top priority in Washington´s policy to the 
region. Trump´s strategy has inherited the emphasis on the alliance system, especially with 
Japan, South Korea, Australia, even with India, in order to further deepen U.S.´ presence and 
influence in Asia. The assessment is seen in the context of the recently Pentagon endorsed 
plan, known as the Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative (APSI), to invest nearly $ 8 billion to bulk 
up the U.S. presence in Asia-Pacific region over th next five years by upgrading military 
infrastructure, conducting additional exercises, and deploying more forces and ships. On the 
economic front: U.S.´ interests will be placed higher than others´ in the name of ´America 
First´ and ´fair and balanced trade´. Japan will be persuaded to open FTA negotiations, Seul 
to renegotiate KORUS (U.S.-ROK FTA), and U.S. will engage substantially with Indonesia 
and Australia in economic affairs with the bid to further open those markets and reduce 
tariffs. Beijing is analyzing U.S. potential return to the TPP after removing bilateral obstacles 
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and earning of needed preferential terms, on requests from allies such as Japan and Australia, 
and continuous U.S. emphasis on ´regional norms´ - freedom of navigation and 
denuclearization, as instruments for containing China and playing a regional leadership 
role.770 
Discarding Obama´s ´strategic patience´ North Korean approach is seen in Beijing as 
Trump´s three-fold intentional strategic shift to: emphasize U.S.´ regional indispensability 
leadership for security and stability, bring Pyongyang back to the negotiation table, and to 
pressure Beijing for cooperation on the North Korean nuclear problem. For Beijing, all three 
goals correlate and complement the U.S. alliance bas d Asian strategy for Trump´s ´´result 
oriented constructive relationship´´ with China.771 
In spite of President Xi´s liberal-constructivist parlance that ´the Pacific Ocean is vast 
enough to accommodate both China and the U.S.´, ´the common interests shared by China 
and the United States are far greater than their differences´, and the May 2017 trade deal´s 
initial sign of maturity and accommodation, the bilateral relations are still showing a serious 
degree of adversarial fragility, and realism´s risks of strategic misjudgement and 
contradictions, that were existing in a latent form, especially since the 2008 crisis. 
The nuanced improvement effects of bilateral cooperation in areas of economics, 
finance, trade, culture, people-to-people, global governance, and climate change, are 
seemingly down-graded by the intensification of the two countries´ strategic competition on 
Asia-Pacific leadership and security. For Beijing, U.S. actions, such as: recent strategic 
adjustments of the Asia-Pacific Pivot/Rebalancing and reconsolidation of U.S.´ regional 
alliance system, THAAD deployment in ROK, and increas d U.S. military presence, drills, 
and surveillance in China´s periphery, are more than telling. U.S.´ taking sides, favouring 
countries that have territorial disputes or historical grudges with China, and continued 
development of military relations with Taiwan, have exacerbated, and confirmed China´s 
suspicions whether the U.S. seeks to implement a comprehensive ´containment´ strategy 
towards China.  
Recent U.S.´ North Korean threats and demonstration of naval nuclear force, March 
2018  ´Taiwan Travel Act´, and especially early April 2018 initial steps of trade war with 
China, were all assessed as clear signs of the Washington containment strategy. 
For Beijing, in case of ´strategic emergency crisis´, the two countries´ militaries or 
law enforcement forces may collide with one another into an uncontrolled strategic conflict, 
directly impacting the options of both countries´ domestic and economic worldview, 
seriously shaking the international system and order. 
From a long-term strategic perspective, ´initiatives´, partially and conditionally 
accommodating and preventing the United States fromwrong assessments and miscalculated 
actions towards Beijing, as being Washington´s crucial strategic threat, are becoming China´s 
most important policy objectives, and containment tools in regards to the U.S. In line with 
this strategic thinking, Beijing seeks to divert and diffuse the ´China threat´ in U.S.´ global 
strategy priority status, and to place China´s assertiveness as one of several other big 
challenges for the United States in the world. China presents itself as being an opportunity as 
well as a challenge, far less threatening than Middle East crisis, Syria, Iran and North Korea, 
violent terrorism and extremism, even than recent Russia´s challenges. Not surprisingly, 
early April 14th 2018, U.S., UK, and Franch´s joint missile attacks on Syria, the option of 
which was strongly opposed by Russia in advance, were not officially met by China ´with 
indignation´, but with ´opposition´, and Beijing´s calls for politico-diplomatic negotiations 
and peaceful solution of the Syrian issue. 
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The continuing trend of China-U.S. strategic competition is receiving far greater 
media coverage and nationalist popular attention tha  encouraging and positive news about 
the Beijing-Washington relationship. Given the obvious differences in social systems and 
ideologies between the two countries, promotions of ´g od news and assessments´ about the 
other country or their bilateral contacts and exchanges are feared to incur accusations of lack 
of ´political correctness´ or bear real political/professional risks. Although the Chinese and 
American governments have been maintaining frequent a d pragmatic working 
communications at high levels, displaying adequate atmosphere in those interactions, both 
countries´ exceptionalist public opinion often ´does not buy into it´, continuously demanding 
that their respective government be ´tougher´ towards the other party, as seen endorsed by all 
candidates during the 2016 U.S.´ presidential election campaign and in Chinese social media. 
This domestic political context and nationalist opinion environment has, to a considerable 
extent, offsets the actual state and benefits of U.S.-China interactions and cooperation efforts, 
thus reducing the options of reaching mutually and i ternationally beneficial strategic 
agreements and balancing acts. 
For Washington, the most pivotal question in the geopolitical equation is whether and 
how the U.S. will exercise its military power to impose serious costs on China for seeking to 
assert military dominance in East and Southeast Asia. This central question is one among 
many regarding how the United States and China will navigate each other´s changing roles in 
international relations, particularly as Chinese President Xi gave greater expression to 
China´s ambitions to be a premier global power by 2050 at the October 2017 19th CCP 
Congress. 
On November 1st, 2017, Brookings Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy 
Bruce Jones convened a brain-storm session/interview with seven Brookings´ China 
strategists – to discuss the future of U.S.- China rel tions, the latter´s current and future 
posture, and the American debate about how to respond, under the title - ´´Avoiding war: 
Containment, Competition, and Cooperation in US-China relations´´772 
The basic assessments and conclusions of the panel rioritized on the following: 
There is a broad consensus that the strategy the U.S. has pursued for the past 30 or so 
years has not met expectations. China has risen without reforming itself in the way the U.S. 
strategy intended them to. There is no current consensus on how the U.S´ China strategy 
should adapt among the Washington´s three leading schools of thought. The first group – 
economic nationalists, see China through an economic prism, claim that China is acting 
unfairly and taking advantage of the international tr ding system for its advantage and U.S.´ 
disadvantage. The second group - national security hawks, fear China is amassing both 
economic and hard power with the intent to eventually push the U.S. out of Asia and develop 
something approximating a sphere of influence that would disadvantage the United States 
strategically. The third school – mainstream foreign policy and business community, 
recognizes that China´s rise places significant stres  upon U.S. strategic and economic 
interests, but still believes that with steady, wise, thoughtful leadership, it remains possible to 
manage China´s posture in a way that allows both the United States and China to coexist.773 
For most of the panel participants, there is often a false dichotomy between 
competition versus cooperation in U.S.-China relations, while there are – and should be – 
elements of both competition and cooperation in both the economic and security spheres. For 
them, China has reached a point of economic and political confidence where it no longer 
needs and looks to the West for advice, and is gaining confidence in charting its own path in 
both domestic and international affairs, increasingly assertive in its relationships with its 
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regional neighbours. All strategists in the Brookings´ debate sought to avoid direct conflict 
between the U.S. and China, but disagreed as to how to achieve this goal, and what the 
threshold for military confrontation should be. Across the various schools of thought there is 
growing support for a more assertive U.S. response to Chinese actions that disadvantage the 
United States economically or challenge the credibility of U.S. security commitments to 
allies and partners. For them, as a conclusion, Washington also needs to invest more efforts 
in building broad public support for a coherent China strategy. Absent such an U.S. domestic 
consensus, Beijing will question the credibility and sustainability of American policy toward 
China and its broader commitments across Asia.774 
 
On the global geo-strategic outlook in the context of the U.S.-China relationship 
 
When addressing these issues and judging the trends in U.S.-China relations, 
strategists and scholars observe the overall current world situation, foreign and domestic 
developments in each major country. 
Since 2008, world economic development has slowed down, with China and the U.S. 
remaining the two largest economic factors, balancing and supporting the still anaemic 
growth of the world economy. Globalization´s momentum has suffered a setback, and China 
is attempting to take over the leadership role, but not in the context of holistic, but rather 
specific economic globalization, presuming that the arc of history is on its side. Trends of 
nationalism, protectionism, and populism are generally on the rise, with patterns of united 
blocking political coalitions denying their grasp of national power. The gap between rich and 
poor growing, austerity on display, ethnic and sectarian conflicts, immigration and refugee 
unresolved problems, and violent terrorist atrocities, indeed, all the above gives a rather out 
of control chaos/disorder picture, which dangerously impacts global economic development, 
peace, security and stability. 
Geo-strategic rivalry and contradictions add to this current gloomy global outlook. 
The world is in a situation in which American, Chinese, and Russian leaders are trying to 
find a way out for a new model of their strategic balancing interactions, with the latter two 
working very hard for the replacement of the previous ld unilateral U.S. model that worked 
since the end of the Cold War. To this geo-strategic Rubicon, and to the question whether the 
world can forge a new type of international relations, that reflect the trend of West to East 
material power transition, there are no definite answers and viable solutions in sight, as yet. 
Can theoretical U.S-China-Russia geo-strategic balancing power ´co-evolution´ 
paradigm serve as a global option in the context of the December 2017 NSS of the new 
American administration? 
During his presidential campaign Trump famously declared that ´he does not want to 
lead the world´, obviously an entirely new personal ideological philosophy, with no chances 
of real implementation in the foreseeable future. The current U.S. domestic distribution of 
power, the old system model, the Establishment and me ia will not let him take any serious 
consequential steps and policies in that direction. For major policies´ initiatives and changes 
American presidents need at least 70-80% credit rating pproval, which at present President 
Trump does not have in the face of divided nation, hostile and resistant Democratic and even 
divided Republican parties. The prevailing status-qo can be summed in the political analyst-
guru Fareed Zakaria´s CNN April 6, 2017, commentary, following the U.S.´ cruise missiles 
attack on Syria - ´´Trump just became president´´.775 
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Domestic failures and setbacks – the Wall, immigraton bill, controversial health bill, 
short-lived key Administration appointments, debt ceiling, 2018 fiscal uncertainties, anaemic 
economy, and Russia-connection accusations, make President Trump vulnerable and force 
him to draw-back and radically deviate from some of his presidential campaign´s major 
foreign policy promises. Besides consolidating and taking control over the Republican party 
at the 2018 mid-term elections, Trump needs foreign policy victories on major geo-strategic 
issues, initially on North Korea, Syria, Iran and Middle East as a whole, in the Ukraine and 
the way forward of globalization. On this front, inspite of some positive signs regarding 
North Korea, things do not seem very promising for President Trump, too, and there is 
nothing much that he can do in terms of hard and soft power. 
Besides China´s and Russia´s red-line opposition to any potential war escalation on 
the North Korean provocative and threatening nuclear program developments, South Korea, 
Japan, and Asia in general, do not see military solution of the critical problem as the best 
option. There are unknown and unpredictable very high human, social and economic costs, 
Pyongyang retaliation reaction might incur to Tokyo and Seoul, including possible regional 
economic depression, with risks of bringing down world economy. ROK´s May 2017 newly 
elected president Moon Jae-in signaled conciliatory approach to North Korea and China, 
advocating open dialogue and negotiations with Pyong a g. He may as well initiate review 
of the recently operational and China/Russia opposed U.S. THAAD missile defence system 
deployed in South Korea,776 dispatching former ROK PM Leet Hae-chan as special nvoy to 
China on both hot-spots issues.777 
While the end of the Syrian conflict is in no near sight, President Trump is trying to 
figure out a winning common ground way out of the Moscow-led Astana peace process and 
the concept of ´safe/stabilization zones´ in Syria In the meantime U.S. is creating tensions 
with Turkey by delivering weapons to the Syrian Kurds. April 2017 cruise missiles attack in 
Syria was more so for the domestic audience consumption. The strikes were approved even 
by Trump´s bitterest opponents. Externally it was a demonstration of determination and hard 
power to Putin, and a not so polite statesmanship diplomatic gesture to Xi, with whom 
Trump was having a dinner ´chocolate cake´ at the tim of the strikes – or as put by U.S. 
Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross, ´´an after-dinner entertainment´´,778 most probably not 
to be forgotten by the Chinese president. 
New, April 14, 2018, joint U.S., UK, and French missile strikes made Syrian crisis 
even more complicated, risking escalation and direct confrontation between the nuclear 
powers. 
The February 2015 UNSC approved Minsk agreement on he Ukraine does not 
explicitly include the U.S. as an active participatng party in the process. During his May 
2017 visit to Washington, discussions with Vice-Presid nt Pence, and meeting with President 
Trump, the Ukraine foreign minister Pavlo Klimkin raised the possibility of involving the 
U.S. in the ´Normandy format´ of negotiations on settling the geopolitical conflict.779 For 
Washington, similar formal direct and open involvement would have meant, a new 
multilateral agreement´s responsibility in contrast to Trump´s preferences for bilateral 
approaches, reformulation of the legal UNSC resolution on the Minsk agreement, an 
additional geo-strategic confrontation with Moscow, enabling the latter to most probably use 
its veto power in the UNSC. The brief White House statement on these meetings 
read:´´…The Vice President emphasized unwavering U.S. support for Ukraine´s sovereignty 
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and territorial integrity. He underscored that the Minsk agreements remain the most viable 
path towards peace. Following that meeting, the President spoke with the Foreign Minister 
and reaffirmed U.S. support for Ukraine and his desire to work with our Ukraine partners to 
peacefully resolve the conflict.´´780 
While Vice President Pence was discussing with Klimkin, President Trump hosted 
Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and Russian U.S. ambassador Kislyak in the Oval Office. 
The White House statement on that meeting read:´´… President Trump emphasized the need 
to work together to end the conflict in Syria, underscoring the need for Russia to rein in the 
Assad regime, Iran, and Iranian proxies. The President raised Ukraine, and expressed his 
Administration´s commitment to remain engaged in resolving the conflict and stressed 
Russia´s responsibility to fully implement the Minsk agreements. He also raised the 
possibility of broader cooperation on resolving conflicts in the Middle East and elsewhere. 
The President further emphasized his desire to build a better relationship between the United 
States and Russia.´´781 
Following the meeting, Lavrov commented, that ideologically free, constructive, and 
result oriented, both countries are looking to ´remove all the barriers´ to having a better 
relationship. 
Since the elevation of President Xi at the 2012 CCP Congress, Beijing insistently 
claims that peace and development is the mainstream of ti es, and cautiously, pragmatically 
persisted in reform and opening up within the framework of its evolving Grand Strategy. 
Admitting its beneficiary status in the current system, it also claims to be defender, 
contributor and builder of reformed international order. China constantly emphasize that it is 
still world economy # 2, and does not want to ´set up its own international system´, attaching 
great importance to the stability and development of the cooperative relationship with the 
United States. 
Established principles and rules serve as the foundation of bi- and multilateral 
international cooperation. In many international areas, U.S. and China adhere to the same or 
similar rules and principals, yet the struggle over some of them has increasingly become the 
focus of their geo-strategic contention. Beijing would rather oppose and disagree with the 
March 2017statements of the U.S. permanent representative to the U.N. Nikki Haley in her 
speech at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York that ´´Human rights are at the heart 
of the mission of the United Nations´´ and that ´´The United States is the moral conscience of 
the world.´´782 
In the political domain, China advocates and pushes for the ´democratization of 
international relations´, and for a ´New Type of Major Countries´ Relations´ which means: 
democratization internally on a country level in the international system where developing 
states represent the majority, and mutual respect, no confrontation, no conflict and win-win 
major power relations of equality and parity.  For Beijing, inspite of Trump, American elite 
continues to work for the reinforcement of the ´liberal international order´ and promotes the 
social engineering ´democratization of the world´ based on individual freedom and rights of 
the people, which characterizes the insurmountable o stacles between U.S.-China,´s different 
basic approaches and worldviews. 
In economics, the U.S. is assessed as attempting to formulate or strengthen a series of 
international rules that limit the development of state-owned enterprises (SOE), to raise 
labour standards, allow the flow of information, protect the ecological environment, and 
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protect intellectual property right as initially envisioned in TPP, TTIP, and TISA, some of 
which China refuses to accept. The United States has not recognized China´s market 
economy status. It has imposed additional barriers to high-tech product exports to China, the 
main reason for Beijing, why the EU has taken the same stand, in spite of the fact that, if not 
obstructed China-U.S. trade is on its way to surpass China´s trade with the EU. Not joining, 
and discouraging others to join China-led AIIB, the wait-and-see U.S. position on 
OBOR/BRI, and the proposed harsh conditions in negotiating the Bilateral Investment Treaty 
(BIT) are also on China´s geo-strategic radar. For Beijing, to maintain the dominance of U.S. 
dollar, Americans have displayed a negative attitude towards expanding China´s voting rights 
in international financial organizations, and work against the internationalization of the 
Chinese RMB. By applying national security review – U.S. tries to limit the growth of 
Chinese business activities, including of private owned enterprises, in the United States. All 
these American positions and obstacles are considered as U.S´ attempts to ´regulate and 
guide´ China´s domestic and foreign economic policies, and containment strategy to establish 
and impose rules that are solely beneficial to the U.S., making the incompatibility of their 
´economic models´ even bigger than in the past.783 
Geopolitical contention is also surfacing in the ara of international security. Both 
countries have, nevertheless, avoided direct conflict and serious crisis. Besides Xi´s CICA 
vision as ´Asian security for Asians´, the divergenc s on the South China Sea´s ´freedom of 
navigation´, THAAD´s deployment in South Korea, recently the North Korean nuclear 
program developments and provocative actions, stirred controversial approaches by both 
sides. In contrast to Washington´s ´hard power´ respon e by threatening with military 
actions, Beijing, besides increasing its embargo sanctions over North Korea, prefers the ´non-
isolationist, dialogue, and negotiations´ approach, as demonstrated by inviting North Korea 
delegation at the May 14-15, 2017 OBOR/BRI International Forum, arranging a bilateral 
brief meeting between the North Korean delegation´s leaders and South Korean officials 
attending the Forum. 
Xi-Kim March 2018 summit in Beijing was a demonstration that China holds the key 
to the peaceful solution of North Korean nuclear ambitions and assertivness. 
Both China and the U.S. attach very high degree of importance to cyber-security 
challenges, regard each other as one of the main driver of these threats they face, displaying 
different focal points. If not for the recent Russia accusations for interfering and influencing 
U.S.´ political process and 2016 election outcome, th  United States was more concerned 
about ´online hackers´ stealing American commercial/technological secrets or attacking 
military and security agencies´ installations. China, on its part is prioritizing political 
infiltrations in its domestic networks that may compromise the political system and domestic 
stability by undermining personal leaders´ and CCP authority. 
In contrast to the new American administration´s initially announced propensity for a 
piecemeal approach to global issues and challenges, including in Asia, treating bilateral 
relations as its primary unit of analysis, Beijing is on a global inclusive march with its Grand 
Strategy´s ´Geo-economics/Soft Power-first´ comprehensive, pragmatic policy priorities and 
´step-by-step´ practices. 
The May 14-15, 2017 two-day OBOR/BRI Forum for Inter ational Cooperation 
represented another, institutionalizing China´s Grand Strategy priority building blocks. 
Launching his OBOR Initiative in Kazakhstan and Indo esia in 2013, and during his 
promotional overseas visits in the past 3-4 years, President Xi insistently proposed, lured and 
called on countries – including in Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America – to cooperate and 
join with China on the initiative. 
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In his keynote speech at the opening of the Forum, calling the Initiative - the project 
of the 21st century, Xi reiterated China´s foundational global geopolitical perspective: 
peaceful, open, inclusive, balanced, and beneficial to l economic development. 
While accounting for the economic, infrastructure and investment results and 
achievements of the OBOR/BRI projects until the Forum in U.S. dollars, for future Chinese 
plans to scale up financial support and contributions, President Xi outlined the figures in 
Chinese currency – the RMB: 100 billion for the Silk Road Fund, 300 billion for foreign 
financial institutions; 250 billion for China Development Bank´s lending schemes and 130 
billion for EXIM Bank of China for support of cooperation on infrastructure, industrial 
capacity and financing.784 
Following Xi, as the next speaker at the Forum´s opening ceremony, Russian 
President Putin called BRI – a civilization project, and that given his country´s geopolitical 
status, Russia is willing to cooperate with China i all possible and potentially mutually 
beneficial sectors, supporting its institutionalization after Xi´s announcement that the second 
Forum will take place in 2019. 
Militarily and politically assertive Russia, economically, globally, and regionally 
institutionalized Chinese influential posture, may be defined, and characterized as the two 
major coordinated principle forces challenging U.S. in global geo-strategy. Elevating two 
partnership agreements in 1994 and 1996, and a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 
2001, the 2012 comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation, underlined the principles 
of mutual benefit, mutual trust, and equality, in addition to setting specific economic targets 
in the Sino-Russian bilateral relations. Though with a ten-year term, after Putin labelled their 
interactions as a ´special relationship´ in 2013, the 2012 strategic partnership of cooperation 
turned in 2014 into a strategic partnership of coordination with President Xi as a co-
signatory. 
Since the 2014 Strategic Coordination Partnership (SCP), amid strengthening of 
personal ties in Putin-Xi relationship, there has been an extensive broadening of interactions 
beyond merely focusing on domestic economic and energy interests. SCP is centred on 
mutual support of ´core interests´ and close coordination in foreign policy strategy, including 
on joint advocacy and demands for reform of the international financial and economic 
architecture in accord with the rapidly-changing global real economy. 
Both being the engine of BRICS, and coordinating on G-20 global governance 
agenda, at the level of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Putin and Xi´s proposals for 
integrating China´s OBOR with Russian-led EEU played a key role and significantly 
elevated the status of SCO. After India and Pakistan´  memberships in June 2017, Iran and 
other countries are actively lobbying to join, too. At the November 2016 summit in 
Kyrgyzstan, China´s PM Li Keqiang proposed a free trade area among SCO members, 
endorsed by Russia. Following the membership of India and Pakistan, the SCO now accounts 
for 43% of world´s population and 24% of global GDP, with Chinese floating idea for the 
creation of SCO´s own Development bank. 
At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum held in November 2016, in 
Peru, Xi and Putin further pushed forward their close cooperation and ongoing coordination 
on international policy matters. They agreed to promote the APEC bloc by fostering regional 
and economic growth strategies, including their support for an Asia-Pacific Free Trade Area 
for all 21 member states.785 
On global geo-strategy, in June 2016, during Putin´s visit to China, both leaders 
signed joint ´´Statement on strengthening global strategic stability´786, voicing concern over 
                                                 
784 See ´Chinese President Xi Jinping gives speech at B&R Forum´, People´s Daily, May 14, 2017. 
785 See Bob Savic, ´Behind China and Russia´s Special Rel tionship´, The Diplomat, December 7, 2016. 
786 ´China, Russia sign joint statement on strengthening global strategic stability´, Xinhua, June 25, 2016. 
 237 
increasing ´negative factors´ affecting the global strategic stability, followed by a joint 
´Declaration on promotion of international law´787 signed by foreign ministers Wang Yi and 
Lavrov. 
Without naming names, both documents, claiming to be based on the principles of the 
UN Charter and international law, have an explicit and implicit anti-USA and NATO 
approach and content in the context of the latters n gative effects on global and regional 
strategic balance, stability and security, such as: seeking decisive advantage in military and 
relevant technology to serve their own interests, use or threat to use force in international 
affairs, unilateral deployment of anti-missile systems all over the world, development of long 
distance precision attack weapons – the global system for instant attack, interference in third 
countries´ domestic political affairs and others. 
At his opening speech at December 2016 Symposium on International Developments 
and China´s Diplomacy in 2016, foreign minister Wang Yi underscored that in 2016, 
´´China-Russia comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination was elevated to a higher 
level … and has become a cornerstone for global peace and stability.´´788  
The question - ´Can China be a peer competitor to the U.S. without any allies?´ for 
long has been research topic for many foreign and Chinese IR scholars. As China´s activism 
continues to shape its role and influence in regional and global geopolitics, Chinese IR 
strategists and researchers are engaging in a tense d bate about the country´s Grand Strategy, 
particularly whether or not China should abandon the non-alliance principle it has adopted 
since the 1982 CCP congress. Realists and some orthod x Marxists contend that a non-
alliance strategy cannot safeguard China´s national ´core interests´ in the face of the U.S.´ 
geo-strategic security alliance network throughout East Asia. They argue that without allies 
China´s posture will be contained by the United States, and cautiously endorse a formal 
alliance with Russia. Orthodox liberal and constructivist scholars in favour and supporting 
the continuation of the officially President Xi endorsed position of non-alliance, claim that a 
formal alliance would be risky, counterproductive, and will deviate from the fundamental 
principles of independence and Zhongyong dialectics´ indigenous self-reliance that have 
historically guided China´s international relations and foreign policy. A number of currently 
more appropriate alternative strategies have been proposed to replace or complement the 
non-alliance strategy, such as: quasi-alliances, ad-hoc strategic coalitions and partnerships. 
Thus, whether or not China forms alliances with other powers and neighbouring state will 
depend on its flexible self-defined role within the changing international system, as well as 
its strategic perceptions of external security threats. Considering and analyzing both the 
external and internal constraints it faces, for the time being, the trends show that China is 
highly likely to maintain the non-alliance strategic stance, and in the meantime work hard in 
pursuing alternative approaches to attract partners and like-mined friends and supporters,789 
all based upon, and implementing President Xi´s FAWC 2014 guidelines for a foreign policy 
with a salient Chinese feature and a Chinese vision. 
Besides Xi´s idealist-constructivist, backed by classical Chinese legacy metaphors, 
foreign visits´ parlance, at home, the Chinese President´s strategic visions and assessments 
evolve rather into a neo-Realpolitik world of contemporary geopolitical dimensions and 
challenges. For Xi, ´´China is in a period of important strategic opportunity for development, 
and the overall direction of multi-polarization of the world, globalization of the economy and 
democratization of international relations has not changed. No matter how the international 
                                                 
787 ´The Declaration of the People´s Republic of China ad the Russian Federation on the Promotion of International Law´, MFA of the P.Republic of 
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789 See, Liu Ruonan, Liu Feng, ´Contending Ideas on China´s Non-Alliance Strategy´, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, May 2017. 
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situation changes, China must maintain its strategic steadiness, strategic confidence and 
strategic patience.  With global vision in China´s national security work, coordinating 
development and security, combining principles with tactics, China has to take strategic 
initiative in its own hands. Beijing should proactively shape China´s external security 
environment, by strengthening cooperation and guide the international community to jointly 




For the time being, the obvious current looser in the international system, in the 
context of the U.S.-China geo-strategic competition, s – Russia, and especially the Russian 
President. Putin and his mostly liberal, and pro-Western economic block of the government, 
headed by Medvedev, have quite different and contradictory positions in regards to the 
strategic coordination partnership between Moscow and Beijing. Putin seeks, builds, and 
develops multisector comprehensive, and containing U.S., interactions with China in the 
form of informal ´quasi alliance´ with Xi. His opponents in the government, majority of them 
eminent figures from the Eltsin era, whom Putin simply cannot dispose of, practically seek 
and work for more balanced and Western leaning Russian foreign policy, cautioning of future 
risks and security threats that may come from the Eastern neighbour.  
The West is well aware of this existing major contradiction and domestic opposition 
to Putin. Russia, on its own, is not a real existential or global hegemonic threat, even from 
point of view of its military superiority in Europe. Georgia, Ukraine, and mostly Crimea, 
were Putin´s domestic nationalistic showcases, modest ´strategic compensations´ for the loss 
of USSR, and Syria is the limit. Economically, socially, and demographically, the country is 
in a mess, and stagnating. The ruling oligarchy has no apetite for external expansion, but to 
keep its capital and assets safe and sound in the West. Still, hypothetical formal strategic 
alliance between Beijing and Moscow, combining China´s geo-economic, financial might 
and modernizing army, with Russia´s huge nuclear-military capabilities and vast natural 
resources, potentially might become a formidable and non-stopable global dominant force, 
one has to reckon with. This is what Kissinger and Brzezinski had always warned of. 
Not surprisingly, the main facade political and moral target and culprit in the recent 
Skripal UK case and for the joint April 14, 2018, U.S., UK, and Franch missile attacks on 
Syria, was Putin. The West openly and explicitely accused him of personal involvement in 
the Skripal assassination attempt, and for not preventing Assad from using chemical weapons 
against Syrian civilians. 
 The real implicit longterm target behind Putin, is China, the only real and potential 
geo-strategic peer competitor, who can claim and compete for 21st century pre-eminence, not 
Russia. On the chess-board of this U.S.-China geo-strategic game, Putin, being the weaker 
component in his ´quasi alliance´ with Xi, has to be ´sanctioned, punished and humiliated´, 
so as to reconsider the potential future negative consequences for Moscow and for him 
personally. He is indirectly pushed and forced to change gears, and strategically distance 
Russia from China. 
China, though backing Putin, is rather selectively ´keeping a low profile´ than 
´assertive´, in defending and supporting him. U.S. and the West are mainly concentrated and 
preocupied with Putin´s Russia, thus distracted and not strategically focused on China. The 
current geo-strategic state of play is also quite favorable for Beijing in terms of achieving 
more advantages, and Russian consessions in the Xi-Putin ´quasi-alliance´. 
                                                 
790 ´Xi calls for overall national security outlook´, Xinhua, February 18, 2017. 
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Beginning of May 2018, Putin will be officially inaugurated as the new/old Russian 6 
years term president. By constitution, Medvedev has to hand in his government´s resignation. 
The analysis of the next government´s construct and personal composition, the choice of the 
new PM, will be quite indicative regarding Putin´s future strategic agenda towards China and 
the West, and for the potential geo-strategic global utlook in the next decade, and possibly 
beyond. 
 
Finally, we can now turn to the results in the dissertation and formulate basic answers 
to the four-folded research questions put forward in the Introduction, by reprise and summary 
of the arguments defined and developed throughout this work: 
1. Similarities and differences in the leadership postures of the U.S (mid-20thc.) and 
China (21stc.). Is China selectively and pragmatically emulating some of the successful 
approaches and Grand Strategy of post-WWII U.S., and does Beijing have a Grand 
Strategy for a power transition in the 21st century? 
Civilizationally, and historically, with the exception of the predominantly Western 
brought ´century of humiliation´ in 1840, China has always enjoyed and strived for ´wealth 
and power´. The American Dream and U.S.´ power rise to global dominance was both, 
feared, as well as covertly, jealously admired and targeted as an example to follow. Some 
American successful experience was thoroughly examined, selectively modified, and to a 
point pragmatically emulated with specific ´Chinese characteristics´, underpinning China´s 
national interests and agreed upon Grand Strategy, initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1978, and 
finally shaped by President Xi Jinping in 2012-2013. 
Goldstone and Haass´ ´not so ordinary and as usual, passing events´ present times,  in 
which we observe and analyze China´s 21st century transition posture, are not so different 
from the times of the U.S.´ ascendence period in the 20th century. Some IR scholars even 
claim that they parallel the pre-1914 period. Back then there were – WWI, the Great 
Depression, post-WWII ruined global economy, world stage front-runner emerging united 
bipartisan United States helping the rise of the West, and divided China survival from civil 
war and foreign occupation. At present, the world struggles with the consequences of the 
Great Recession, unsustainable global debt problems and austerity, global economic growth 
slowdown and potential trade wars crisis. The international system is witnessing liberal 
globalization v/s nationalistic de-globalization processes, risks and threats for major military 
conflicts around North Korea, Iran, Syria and Ukraine, as well as, united and ascendant 
China Dream in contrast to elite/societal divided an in relative decline U.S.  
After WWII, U.S., holding 50-55% of world´s GDP, initiated and shaped a new 
Western, turned in 1991  into global liberal international system, based on the U.S. dollar, 
and the governance principles and rules of the IMF, WB, and GATT/WTO. Its post-WWII 
leading role of generator of public goods, and promoter of global free trade, aka – 
globalization, is currently emulated and taken over by China. 1947 Marshall Plan is paralled 
with China´s 2013 BRI, and U.S.´ post-1945 role of gl bal creditor is discretionary echoed 
by China initiated, established and supported new non-Bretton Woods financial institutions, 
such as AIIB, BRICS´ NDB, and planed SCO Development Bank.  
Chinese bank assets reached $ 33 trillion at the end of 2016, versus $ 31 trillion for 
the Eurozone, $ 16 trillion for the U.S. and $ 7 trillion for Japan. Four of the five largest 
global banks are now Chinese, and the value of China´s banking system is currently more 
than 310% the size of its GDP, compared to 280% for the Eurozone and its banks, forcing 
Beijing to strengthen financial security measures to keep its banks viable and solvent at all 
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costs.791 Until recently, the U.S. had five standing liquidity swap agreements worth $ 333 
billion, China had 28 worth $ 499 billion. 
After 1945, U.S. adopted ´geopolitics first´ Grand Strategy of the Cold War. NATO, 
and a global politico-military alliance system – SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS, as well as 
architecture of bilateral security treaties with Japan, South Korea and Australia, including the 
China firmly opposed unilateral Taiwan Act since 1979, were created. Still, in close parity 
and in parallel to geopolitics, U.S. actively worked on the issues of geo-economics for the 
reconstruction and development of real productive economies and for the re-industrialization 
of Western Europe and Japan. Nixon´s 1971´temporary´ elimination of the dollar´s gold 
standard, Reagan/Thatcher´s geopolitically based neo-lib ral revolutions and financialization 
of the economies since the 1980s led to the 1987 stock-exchange crash, 2000 dot.com bubble 
and the 2007-2009 Great Recession. 
In 2001, the United States abandoned its successful double-focused strategy. For the 
first time in modern history, all major foreign policy positions were held by defense 
specialists: General Colin Powell as secretary of state, Richard Armitage as his deputy, 
Donald Rumsfeld at defense and Condoleezza Rice as national security advisor, all led by a 
former defense secretary, Vice President Cheney. With its overwhelming military priority, 
the United States now has the most powerful military in world history. But this great military 
has lost every war it has fought since the change of strategy, and continues to lose. 
Besides lingering global financial/economic/debt travails, Washington´s current 
attempts for reversal of some of the major rules and principles of globalization, such as, free 
trade, anti-protectionism, climate change, caused ngative reactions and tension in the 
bilateral U.S.-China trade and overall relationship, even with some allies and partners. 
Beginning with Deng Xiaoping´s 1978 Grand Strategy of reform and opening up, for 
Chinese policy makers, scholars of international relations and foreign policy, the subjects of 
the rise and fall of Japan, Germany, British Empire, and especially that of ´super-power 
USSR´, have been thoroughly researched, and analyzed. All have been assessed as 
´´unsuccessful geopolitics trumping geo-economics´´, with exuberance of lessons drawn of 
how China´s rise to world pre-eminence should not pr ceed. Dismissing these militaristic 
and ideological failed attempts, Deng´s China strategically embarked on emulating the 
´rapprochement-appeasement, special relationship´ model of British Empire-USA´s power 
transition model, whose final phase took almost half a century, beginning with November 
1914 Great War imposed outflow of capital and gold from the City of London to the U.S., 
and ended with 1967 British government´s decision to cease warfare and turn to well-fare 
state. 
1941 Roosevelt-Churchill´s Atlantic Charter marked the beginning of the final 
Western power transition from the British Empire to the U.S. President Xi´s 2012 implied 
equality and parity in the bilateral U.S.-China interactions under the proposal of New Type of 
Major Countries Relationship rings a bell, and the analogy can be also magnified with the 
2011 officially declared Chinese ´core national interests´ that parallel the long existing U.S.´s 
stratagem of ´national security´, and ´vital national´ interests´ red lines. 
China´s Grand Strategy has always been promoted as based on ´geo-economics first´, 
not dismissing but placing geopolitics in secondary supplementary role. Deng Xiaoping cut 
the military budget from 16% of GDP to 3% in order to focus on economic development, and 
China became great power in only 30 years.  Instead of financialization of its economy, 
China´s ´new normal´ economic developmental model is based on supply-side, innovation, 
technologically, green and inclusive economic globaization driven approach, as a long term 
exemplary strategy. 
                                                 
791 See, ´China´s banking system overtakes the Eurozone as world´s largest´, Financial Times, at https://www.ft.com/content/14f929de-ffc5-
11e6-96f8-3700c5664d30 
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1982 officially adopted Party and State´s principle of ´non-alliance´ facilitated 
China´s operational approach towards conclusion of strategic partnerships instead of formal 
alliances in its international relations and foreign policy interactions, allowing for more 
flexible and result oriented approaches. 
In spite of the tense domestic debate on the issue of China having formal security 
allies and forging institutionalized security alliances, there is no empirical evidence that in 
the foreseeable future China will try to emulate thU.S. and open, disproportionate to its 
comprehensive national power, military bases and installations around the globe, deeming 
this strategy as remnant of Cold War´s old geopolitica  thinking, ineffective, over-stretched,  
too expensive, and with hegemonic connotations. 
Nixon-Deng´s ´quasi-alliance´ is now echoed by Xi-Putin´s evolving ´quasi-alliance´ 
within the frame-work of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership of coordination, reinforced 
by their joint effort and plans for Eurasian integration and the future developments in the 
SCO and the BRICS. 
In March 2018 Beijing launched its first futures oil contract in RMB – the petro-yuan, 
emulating and competing with the established system of the $ 14 trillion petro-dollar market, 
making the U.S. nervous, as in many ways the hegemony of the U.S. dollar came from oil 
trading in dollars. That set the stage for what seemed impossible five years ago: the Chinese 
renminbi has surpassed the euro as the second most i portant settlement currency. As the 
renminbi becomes more prominent, the United States is opting out of leadership in the next 
evolution of the global monetary system. Hong Kong, Singapore, Seoul, Sydney, London, 
Frankfurt and Paris have all rushed to become RMB settlement centers. With the United 
States uninterested, the North American settlement c ter is now Toronto. 
Best way to correctly assess China´s longterm intentions is to analyze what Chinese 
top leaders are saying and practically implementing at present. Since 2012 President Xi has 
articulated a Grand Strategy for China until 2049 under the idealistic-constructivist term 
´China Dream´ or the ´new identity of great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation´. The two 
centenarian strategic and holistic development targe s for China Dream are capturing 
concrete goals, milestones, with initial 2021 and 2049 timelines. 
October 2017 CCP 19th Congress adopted 3 milestones Party Constitution´s 
amendment resolutions incorporating: Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics for a New Era, CCP´s ´´absolute´´ ladership over the armed forces, and 
pursuing the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), thus elevating President 
Xi to the CCP pantheon in the rarified company of Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping 
Theory. Besides firmly confirming the two strategic centenarian goals of achieving a 
moderately prosperous society by 2021, and rich and powerful socialist nation by 2049, the 
19th CCP Congress adopted an intermediate strategic target of reaching a basically 
modernized nation and reformed armed forces by 2035. The Congress did not elect/select a 
heir-apparent to Xi for the next 20th Party Forum in 2022, and the March 2018 annual session 
of the NPC revoked the two five years terms limit in office of the Chinese president clause in 
the Constitution. 
The option that ´core leader´ Xi will be still in charge, if no ´black swan´ events, at 
least into the late 2020s, leading directly or from behind, guaranteeing the right next 6th
leadership succession, and full implementation of his Grand Strategy, is very high and viable. 
Xi´s reasoning and arguments are clear - the period is crucial for the 21st century strategic 
transition development of China and needs strong Chinese leadership response to potential 
domestic and foreign risks and threats, including to Trump´s December 2017 NSS 




2. Can China be fully brought in line with the Western liberal international order, 
or shall we have confrontation; defeat and possible integration? 
 
For China, since 2008, deep debt growth economic model crisis has surfaced across 
the ´liberal democratic world´, appearing in the U.S. and in many developed countries. The 
crisis is still wreaking havoc within the political eco-system in the Western world, weakening 
the centrist and progressive forces that used to underpin the U.S.-led postwar liberal order. 
When in 1978 the Chinese leadership under Deng Xiaoping decided to join the 
existing international order, or, in Chinese conceptual terms, to gear itself (jiegui) to the 
system, assessments were made, that only by joining ca  China learn from the other powers 
within the order how to deal with it and fend off in safeguarding its national interests. 
History, strategic thinking, and more than 3000 years civilization´s lessons, has taught 
the Chinese to view any system-order as non-permanent. Based on the co-evolutionary 
process paradigm of Zhongyong dialectics China believ s that the existing international order 
is open to change, and in a process of changes, as a sy tem devised to serve the interests of a 
single superpower cannot be stable for long. China as made great pragmatic efforts to join 
the existing system and play the ´responsible stakehold r´ role by joining the IMF and its 
SDR currency basket, the WB, WTO, partially and selectively - the debt growth economic 
model. Beijing even helped save both the Asian, in 1997, and the global financial system in 
2009. Recent Chinese Xi leadership has intensified its strategy goals for the establishment of 
a new reformed international order, a process in which China can play a leading 
transformational and guiding role. 
China´s experience before and after the 19th and 20th centuries have forced it to focus 
on three major strands, which already, though challenged, form part of existing world 
structures, including a balanced and restrained multi-power system, a rule-based global 
interdependent market economy, and a world of modern, rational, and secular civilizations. 
For China, the current processes challenging the lib ral order as well as liberal 
democracy, come much more from within, rather than from outside the system. Natural and 
legitimate questions arise, whether after the loss of credibility of economic neo-liberalism 
since 2008, Brexit, ´Trump Phenomenon´´ can the ordr´s unity and solidarity, as is known, 
continue and survive, taken the controversy on natio l interests based bilateral relationship´s 
unit of analysis, and contradictions on free trade, protectionism/isolationism, climate? 
Bush Junior promoted TPP over China favored Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific 
because TPP excluded China. President Obama presented TPP as an antidote to Chinese 
influence in every speech promoting it. 
The effort to exclude China jeopardized one of the gr atest achievements of U.S. 
postwar strategy. China and the United States have become the greatest economic partners in 
world history. Their trade in goods and services now exceeds $650 billion, and over $750 
billion including Hong Kong. Its integration into the Western investment, production and 
distribution system, its openness to vast amounts of foreign investment, its embrace of U.S. 
products to a degree that exceeds America’s main Asan allies, its grudging adjustments to 
join the WTO, accepting an agreement far tougher than t ose imposed on any other country, 
and its acceptance of WTO adjudication mechanisms, constituted one of history’s great 
reversals of alliance. 
Western producers are about to benefit from a wave of over 3 billion new emerging 
market consumers, centered in China, that will be the fastest growing export market in world 
history. The risk of the United States partially isolating itself from Asian market 
liberalization, centered on China, is the greatest risk to U.S. foreign policy preeminence since 
the isolationist movement preceding WWII. Not surprisingly, making a radical U turn, on 
April 11, 2018, President Trump authorized his Trade Representative, to seek ´on US terms´ 
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the option of rejoining the TPP agreement, signed in March 2018 by the other 11 member 
states. 
For a positive economic strategy one must look across the Pacific to China. The 
Chinese BRI strategy comprises one silk road on land d one on the sea, stimulating 
integrated economic development of 60 plus countries. The land silk belt will connect 
Southeast Asia, Eurasia and Western Europe with infrastructure built to common standards, 
gradually negotiating common standards of many other kinds. Already rail traffic from China 
to Germany is three times faster than by ship and it will soon become far faster. Chongqing is 
becoming a gigantic Chicago, a hub for Eurasia. Thesea Silk Road intends to integrate 
Africa and South Asia into this network of development. New international financial 
institutions will fund this. China will continue to pen its markets to neighbors faster than 
formal agreements require. In his keynote speech at t e opening ceremony of the Annual 
Boao Forum for Asia Conference, April 10, 2018, Presid nt Xi promised to further open up 
China to the world, by widening market access, expanding imports, improving the 
investment environment for foreign investors, and strengthening protection of intellectual 
property rights. The move was obvious attempt for calming down and neutralizing the option 
of looming trade war with the U.S., as well as giving additional incentives for more active 
global trade and investments in China. 
Admitting China´s huge benefits from Globalization, Beijing today appears to be one 
of the strongest supporters of the economic world order established by the victors of WWII, 
pushing for its transformation and transfiguration, but not for its demise. Simply put, U.S. 
and EU consumer markets and investment absent, export oriented Chinese economy and 
Grand Strategy will fail, with unknown extreme political and socio-economic consequences 
the country may face. 
China claims it´s not a shaker, and taker, but a maker of new just, fair and inclusive 
rules based international system centered on the purpose and role of the UN. President Xi 
pledges that China does not seek confrontation, and is willing to share its development 
opportunities and experience with the world, without imposing its own path, models, and 
theories on others. 
China views Globalization 2.0 and the new inclusive int rnational cooperation to be 
deeply rooted in the success of China´s ´new normal´ economic growth and its domestic 
governance, rest by copying liberal governance models. Beijing claims that developing and 
emerging markets, as well as advanced industrial nations may be assured that China is able to 
offer its own alternative third path developmental model that will lead to ´shared and 
common destiny, peace and prosperity for all mankind´. 
 
3. Will for the first time in history of Modernity the West loose the Grand contest 
and let live peacefully a Chinese model in the international system? 
 
Analyzing historical evidence, no contender rising power has ever become part of the 
established international order in times of geopolitical peace and in normal, sustainable, 
productive global/regional economic environment, indeed. Even the processes of the 
relatively peaceful, internal collapse of the USSR were marred by the prospects of pending 
ethno-religious separatist wars in the Northern Caucas s  republics, and the total bankruptcy 
of the ´super-power´, had it not been for loans and cre its from the West. 
Analogy and claims of some realist scholars and strategists, especially in Russia and 
China, that the current international situation resembles quite a lot the 20th century pre-Great 
War period with elements of Cold War 2.0, and Offensive Realism´s posture, that ´China 
cannot rise peacefully´, are overstated and lack a real basis for such a comparison and 
assessments. Back in 1914, none of the belligerent parties expected, (though almost each one 
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of them, domestically supported, and hoped for a short term decisive conflict), that 
unprecedented bloody and long-term atrocious World War would be unleashed.  
Today, no world power really wants war and would victoriously claim success in a 
hypothetical major prolonged conflict, without suffering retaliatory devastating blow-back, 
with real risks for the extinction of human race. 21st century major warfare, in contrast to the 
20th century Great Wars, with the advent of highly sophisticated and deadly nuclear and other 
related military technologies, plus the brutal inhumane lessons of the past century, is assessed 
as rather zero-sum non-victor game. Any current hypothetical major conflict will be falling 
short of reaching victorious consequential strategic geopolitical advantages, and economic 
gains from a ruined global economy, finances, lack of public goods, and social development 
perspectives. 
Global political, economic, and social awareness and demand is on the rise. If peace 
is to be cherished and safeguarded, 21st century is to be fundamentally shaped and guided by 
healthy multilateral and bilateral mixed balancing and hedging cooperation/competition in 
search of new functioning ideas and win-win models of digital economic and social 
development, trade, finance, etc. Tightly, mutually constrained as they are at present, global 
political, economic and military powers will be press d and objectively forced to initiate a 
new holistic and inclusive Bretton Woods moment. New adequate, viable and functioning 
global political, economic, financial and trade systems are much needed, to change and fix 
the current failing ones. For Beijing, the latter, a e the real cause of world´s almost a decade 
period of economic slowdown, anemic growth, austerity, volatility, uncertainty, assertiveness 
and cases of aggression, currency and trade wars, and th t if driven to the extremes may turn 
into major shooting wars. 
21st century global development logic seems to be favoring ´geo-economics first´, 
rather than the nefarious 20th century´s ´geopolitics first´. 
President Trump´s declared policies for re-industrialization and economic renaissance 
of the U.S. mark a sign in this direction. His contr versial stands on free trade, protectionism, 
climate change, and ´America first´ priority as a whole, still, display elements of a status-quo 
isolationist energized approach. Still, according to China, Trump is driven by bilateral based 
relationships´ guarantees for American national interests, rather than a cooperative 
multilateral win-win long term strategy, as demonstrated during his May 2017 visits to Saudi 
Arabia and Europe (EU, NATO, G-7), and his 2017 NSS. 
On May 27, leaders of G-7, issued their Sicily 2017 meeting final communique, with 
U.S. President Trump refusing to join his counterparts in pledging commitments to the 195-
nation 2015 Paris accord on climate change, leaving the option for his final decision in due 
time. Some of the supporters of the agreement have suggested that a withdrawal by the U.S. 
would help position China as a leader of global enviro mental policy, and new green 
technologies. For German Chancellor Merkel, climate change discussions have been ´very 
unsatisfactory´ into ´a situation of six against one´.   
The declaration also includes position on trade, which appeared to be a compromise, 
stating that G-7 members reiterate commitments to keep their markets open and to fight 
protectionism, while standing firm against all unfair trade practices. On Russia, Trump went 
along with the geopolitical club, maintaining a hard line on the conflict in Ukraine, and in 
Syria. For him, as he tweeted after the summit, first on the list as a major topic was terrorism, 
based on the two-and-a-half pages joint statement G-7 leaders approved and published at the 
beginning of their formal meeting. 
President Trump´s ´America first´ overseas trip, scolding Europeans over NATO 
military spending, slamming ´bad´ behavior in trade by Germany, still ambiguous stands on 
trade and climate change, shadowed the most difficult G-7 in years, threatened to undermine 
a show of unity, and the international order in place since WWII. 
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Potentially hard, quarrelsome Brexit, and London´s ´Global Britain´ vision, too, are 
similar signs for British isolation and detachment from Europe, in a search for a ´UK first´ 
scenario, and workable Commonwealth 2.0. grand strategy. 
In case the current status-quo and isolationism driven, modifying the international 
system paradigm, continues to prevail, the trends of regional and quasi-blocks divide may 
persist and lead to tense geopolitical rivalry, continuous contradictions and overt/covert 
proxy hostilities, especially in the Middle East after Trump´s recent recognition of Jerusalem 
as the capital of Israel, and the Russian military expedition in Syria. 
In the case of China, the processes of economic globalization have immensely lifted 
the country to becoming the world´s factory, and from hub of low-cost outsourcing to 
emerging as global leader in trade, investment and lo g-term projects, a very attractive 
strategic partner for many other nations. U.S. absent, at 2017 Davos and BRI Forums, China 
did not shun from the option of taking the leadership baton of economic globalization, 
declaring its transition from junior partner of the West to great power status. Almost all 
reliable projections show that until 2030 China may become the largest global economy and 
Asian leading country, something U.S. policymakers have always hoped will not happen in 
the 21st century´s most important region of the planet. 
While Beijing, strongly denouncing G-7 communique, d claring it interfered in the 
East and South China Seas issues in the guise of international law, and urging the West to 
stop making irresponsible statements, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi was in Moscow for 
talks with Lavrov. He was received also by Putin, for political preparations of the July 2017 
forthcoming visit to Russia of President Xi Jinping. Pledging mutual trust and support, no 
matter how the international situation changes, Wang emphasized China´s strong 
determination to strengthen their strategic coordinatio  on the international arena, to firmly 
safeguard their strategic interests in global and regional hot spot issues. According to Putin, 
the bilateral comprehensive strategic partnership of co rdination was ´worthy of its name´. 
The strategic political/economic/military division of labor and coordination between 
China and Russia comes into play to ensure, predominantly on their terms, the evolvement of 
new model of international relations, economic globa ization and Eurasian inclusive 
interconnectivity as a whole in Asia, in the Middle East and in Europe. Warning signals and 
troublesome recollections of the USSR-China period´s confrontation and Nixon-Deng ´quasi-
alliance´ exist, as well as different tactical and geopolitical considerations on issues such as 
India, Far East, Central Asia, Europe, and the Pacific. Still,  displaying non-ideological, but 
long-term strategic common ground, both countries dclare there are no forces that can 
deviate or delimit their complex and diversified are s of coordinated cooperation in the UN, 
G-20, SCO, BRICS, OBOR-EEU, APEC. Beijing and Moscow continuously claim and 
actively propagate their role and efforts for departure from the labeled current belligerent, 
exclusive, unsustainable and chaotic unipolar world der, in search of support by engaging 
as many as possible third countries in bilateral and multilateral relationships, in return for 
economic and security guarantees and assistance. 
December 2017 U.S.´ NSS grouping together and labeling both China and Russia - 
´revisionist´ ignored to its own detriment one of the most basic principle of international 
relations – the balance of power/threat theory, thus p shing Beijing and Moscow closer 
together and increasing the options for risks of backfire and unintended crisis and conflicts. 
March and April, 2018, consequitive Skripal assassination attempt in the UK, and 
alleged Assad chemical attack upon civilians in Syria, increased the tension and 
confrontation between UK, U.S., NATO, EU and Russia, almost to the threat level of the 
1962 Caribbean crisis, when the world was on the brink of a nuclear war. Besides mutual 
diplomatic expulsions, increased economic sanctions on Russia, Trump´s promised missile 
strikes in Syria took place, in spite of Moscow´s in advance declared warning that it will 
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neutralize the missiles and destroy their launcher´s sites. Backing Russia, Beijing called for 
consultations and dialogue, though UNSC was paralyzed by reciprocal vetos on each of the 
opponents´ resolution proposals. 
At the peak of the war-like confrontation, Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi, as 
special envoy of President Xi, was on official visit in Moscow in early April, 2018. At the 
same time, on first official visit overseas, newly appointed Chinese defense minister General 
Wei Fenghe took part in Moscow organized International Security Conference. During his 
separate talks with Russian defense minister Shoigu, General Wei firmly reiterated the 
viability of their bilateral strategic partnership of coordination and extended China´s support 
for Russia at this critical conjuncture. 
Safeguarding its strategic ´core national interests´ in realist terms, and sending direct 
signals in the wake of the critical U.S.-Russia confr tation, early April, 2018, President Xi 
has attended unprecedented massive naval display in the disputed South China Sea, in which 
more than 10000 naval officers and marines, 76 fighter jets and a flotilla of 48 ships and 
submarines took part. Speaking from an undisclosed location, Xi commented that the need 
for a strong Chinese Navy had ´never been more pressing´´. The naval drill came ahead of 
planned live-fire military drill by China in the narrow strait separating the mainland from 
Taiwan on April 18, 2018, as a kind of warning and reaction to the March 2018 U.S.´ 
Congress approved Taiwan Travel Act, opening the option for increased exchange of 
contacts and visits of different character and levels b tween Washington and Taipe. 
The U.S.-China balance of power is changing. Strategic political, economic, and 
security competition is on the rise, national social media is increasingly agitated and 
´exceptionalist´, all of which will lead to the intensification of the existing bilateral strategic 
suspicions and distrust. With the Trump era and factoring his first December 2017 NSS, 
U.S.-China relations may gradually and cautiously enter into a period of ´flexible normal´ in 
which competition/rivalry and conditional cooperation will grow simultaneously, and where 
the global distribution of power and domestic political and economic factor variables will 
exert greater impact on the relationship. 
For Beijing leadership, China should prepare for ´´more complicated and graver 
situations´´ as a result of developments ´´both in and outside China´´. 
In the end, it will all come to the fundamental issue  of peace, confidence, credibility 
and kind of delivery of domestic and global public goods that will determine slowly and 
gradually the shape, direction, and basic content of the co-existing opposing worldviews that 
legitimately may claim parenthood if not globally, at least regionally, for the international 
system in the rest of the 21st century.  
 
4. Is China a status-quo, revisionist or third pathway strategist, targeting a new 
multipolar and no one´s international system? 
 
In line with the Zhongyong´s middle co-evolutionary course of due measures and 
degree, lacking the either-or dichotomous approach, classical dialectics of ´continuity 
through change´, of selectivity and flexibility, all of which fully underpin the construction 
and functioning of the basic pillars and operational behavior of the China Dream Grand 
Strategy, Beijing obviously represents a novice and distinct third pathway strategist in 
achieving his reemergence and claim for pre-eminent great power status in the 21st century. 
Analyzing the three main pillars and ´core´ national i terests underlining the Grand 
Strategy: safety and stability of the political system under the CCP, sovereignty and security, 
and sustainable economic and social development, their priority rating deserves a special 
attention and assessment. 
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Never in the history of world great power´s ascendence and transitions, has the crucial 
issue of safeguarding their political system been top priority, ranking # 1. British Empire, 
even when fading, never feared any risks regarding the Royal institution. Japan and Germany 
were led by military ambitions for regional and global dominance, not by any threats to their 
political systems, as after being defeated Germany easily entered the liberal world, and the 
Japanese Emperor is still here to stay. American IR scholars and historians assess that the 
U.S.´ MaCarthyism period was highly overblown, with no real risks and threats to the 
political system, as bipartisan Washington had already taken the baton of world preeminence. 
Cold War Soviet leadership would have not even for a moment thought of the possible 
scenario of regime change in the superpower, as it was all about ideology and global 
dominance.  
The second centenarian strategic 2049 goal envisions that by that time China would 
have reached the current per capita living standards of the developed industrial countries, still 
as a People´s Republic, and that is where the Grand Strategy top priority concludes.  
For China, the second and the third national ´core´ int rests and pillars of its Grand 
Strategy, are functionally dependent and derivatives of the main # 1 ´core´ top priority. 
Learning from British Empire, U.S.´ current travails, and especially from the USSR collapse, 
China realizes that it is strategically inadmisible, totally detrimental, to even try to construct a 
China-centered world order. The latter is deemed impossible to construct, afford and sustain, 
with potential fatal ending for China proper, as Beijing openly and firmly declares that it will 
never allow for China to be humiliated again. 
Leading from the U.S.´ final rise experience and practice, China has geared itself to 
the existing liberal world order, using mixed status-quo, revisionist and purely Chinese 
classical tactics and strategies. Beijing is trying to play balancing guiding role from within 
and from outside the international system, in peaceful environment, declaring that it is not a 
disruptor who wants to shatter, but to fix the failing current international order, with 
idealistic-constructivist calls for global identity changes towards harmonious common 
destiny and peaceful common prosperity of the world. 
Believing that the arc of history is on its side, China works for and promotes the 
development of a balanced, multipolar, no one´s world der, such, that poses no existential 
threat to the current Chinese political system and the leadership role of the CCP. The latter 
two will serve as the main leading and defining criteria, based upon which China will 
determine the character and direction of its international relations and foreign policy with the 
rest of the world. 
U.S.´ foreign and domestic politics´ debates and rhetoric reflect division and 
dysfunction. Economic issues lead the debates, nextto culture wars, but real wars and 
conflicts – and where America stands – are part of he controversies too. While debates 
preoccupy USA, the world is changing on the double, entering a new stage of geopolitics and 
international relations, sometimes beyond America´s guidance and control. As Senator 
Daniel Moynihan has put it, ´´America is entitled to decide what role we want to play in the 
world, but we are not entitled to pretend the world is not changing around us.´´ 
Some have described the current West to East power transition phase as a new Cold 
War between major powers, or a ´´G-Zero´´, i.e. a world of every country for themselves, and 
a wider emergence of a new geopolitics, a new ´´great game´´ of competition between great 
powers that is rife with risks of confrontation and deadly miscalculations. 
There is no clear structural IR scholarly empirical evidence at hand that can lead to 
the assessment that the U.S.-China relationship has gone into a ´turning point from 
quantitative to qualitative change and improvement´, nor for the alternative one, that it will 
ultimately continue ´on a downhill critical conflict/war spiral´. Whether U.S.-China ´co-
evolution relationship´ paradigm, in which ´both countries pursue their own domestic 
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imperatives, cooperate when and where possible, and adjust their actions to minimize 
potential conflict is accepted and implemented by the Trump administration,  is quite obscure 
and controversial when analyzing the content of  December 2017 National Security Strategy 
of the United States . The program document seems more tactical and like a competition 
script entailing ´´all measures short of war´´. Will the ´Trump phenomenon´ and his NSS be 
only a blip in U.S.´ political and security history or long lasting American IR paradigm, also 
remains to be seen. 
China-Russia strategic coordination partnership, and Xi-Putin ´quasi-alliance´´s future 
shape and dynamics wil have significant impact regionally,globally, and on the overall U.S.-
China complex, and still undefined relationship in mid-, and long-term perspective. 
Beijing, most probably accepting the concept of ´co-ev lution´ in its relations with 
U.S., will add to it its own interpretation and the concept of ´peaceful competition´, - ´finding 
out which of the two countries is able to handle its domestic affairs and development better 
and bring stability and prosperity to its people and the world´, in this most unprecedented 
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Securitỳ, 2005, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
GATZKE Hans W., Germany and the United States: A “Special Relationship”? , 1980, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
 
GOLDSTONE Jack A., Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World, 1991, 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
GOLDBERG Jeffrey, ´World Chaos and World Order: Conversations with Henry Kissinger´, 
The Atlantic, November 10, 2016. 
 
HOBBES Thomas , `Leviathan`, John Plamenatz, (ed.), 1962, London: William Collins. 
 
HIGHES Christopher R., Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era, 2004, Abingdon: 
Taylor&Francis. 
 
HANSEN Lene, WAVER Ole, European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of 
the Nordic States, 2002, London: Routledge. 
 
HOLLANDER Paul, Understanding Anti-Americanism. Its Origins and Impact at Home and 
Abroad, 2004. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. 
 
HIGLEY John, `Democracy and Elites`, in ENGELSTAD Fredrik, GULBRANDSEN Trygve  
(eds.), Comparative Studies of Social and Political Elites (Comparative Social Research, 
Volume 23), 2006, Emerald Group Publishing Limited 
 
HONGNI Miao, `Yingguo xuepai yu guoji shehui lilun` ( The English School  and Theory of 
International Society` ), in Qin Yaqing, (ed.), Lixing yu gouji hezuo ( Rationality and 
International Cooperation ), 2008, Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe. 
 




HARRIS Peter, `The Imminent US Strategic Adjustment to China`, 2015, The Chinese 
Journal of International Politics, Vol. 8. Issue 3. 
 255 
 
HAASS Richard N., Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case for Putting America`s House 
in Order, 2013, New York: Basic Books. 
 
HAASS Richard N., A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order, 
2017, New York: Penguin Press. 
 
HOLSLAG Jonathan, Trapped Giant: China`s Troubled Military Rise, 2011, Adelphi Series, 
IISS, London: Routledge. 
 
IGNATIEFF Michael, Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, 
2003, London: Vintage. 
 
IKENBERRY G. John, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of 
Order After Major Wars, 2001, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
IKENBERRY G. John, The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System 
Survive?,Foreign Affairs 87 (1), January/February 2008. 
 
IKENBERRY G.John, “Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal 
World Order”. Perspectives on Politics, March 2009, Vol. 7, No.1. 
 
IKENBERRY G. John, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the 
American System, 2011, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
IKENBERRY G. John, Power,Order and Change in World Politics, (ed.), 2014, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
IKENBERRY G.John, Chatham House lecture, ´The Rise of China and the Future of Liberal World Order´, 
May 7, 2014, Transcript. 
 
INDYK Martin S., LIEBERTHAL Kenneth G., O´HANLON Michael, Bending History: 
Barack Obama`s Foreign Policy, 2012, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
 
JOHNSTON Alastair Iain, “Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in 
Chinese History”, 1998, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
JACQUES Martin, When China Rules the World, 2009, London: Penguin Books. 
 
JIANGLI Wang, BUZAN Barry, ´The English and Chinese Schools of International 
Relations: Comparison and Lessons´, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 2014, 
Vol. 7, No. 1. 
 
JOHNSON Alastair Iain, `How New and Assertive is China`s New Assertiveness?, 
International Security, Vol, 37, No. 4 (2013). 
 
JERDEN Bjorn, `The Assertive China Narrative: Why it is Wrong and How So Many Still 
Bought into it`, The Chinese Joirnal of International Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1, (2014). 
 
 256 
JINTAO Hu, `Firmly March on the Path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive 
to Complete the Building of a Modern Prosperous Society in All Respects` Report to the 18th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China, November 8, 2012, http://www. 
xj.xinhuanet.com 
 
JIECHI Yang, `Xin xingshi xia Zhongguo waijiao lilun he shijian chuangxin`( New Theories 
and Practices of China`Diplomacy in New Situations`), Qiushi ( Seeking Truth ), No. 16, 
(2013). 
 
JIECHI Yang, `China`New Foreign Policy for a Complex World`, China International 
Studies, No. 1 (2014). 
 
JINPING Xi, `Keynote Speech at the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building 
Measures in Asia ( CICA )`, May 21, 2014, http://ww.chinanews.com 
 
JISI Wang, `China`s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way`, 
Foreign Affairs, March/April 2011 Issue. 
 
JISI Wang, `March West: The Rebalancing of China`s Geostrategy`, Global Times, October 
17, 2012. 
 
JOHNSTON Alastair Iain, “Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in 
Chinese History”, 1998, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
KRISTOF Nicholas D., The Rise of China, 1993, Foreign Affairs, 72 (5). 
 
KATZENSTEIN Peter, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium, 
2005, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
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